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Environmental Law  
Of Armed Conflict 
 
Introduction 
 
“Modern armaments can dissipate their destructive energy or 
introduce their destructive agents on the land or in the sea, in the 
air or in the space above it. The ecosystems at risk may be either 
terrestrial or oceanic and either arctic, temperate or tropical. The 
terrestrial ones may be continental or insular, either forest, 
grassland or desert, the oceanic ones may be estuarine, littoral 
(near shore), over the continental shelves or within ocean basins. 
Damage may be inflicted either directly or indirectly and range 
from subtle to dramatic.”1 
 
There is renewed evidence that warfare involves conflicts not only between the 
combatants, but also between man and nature. The ability of modern warfare to devastate 
the natural environment has become ever more obvious: animal species become extinct, 
forests become deserts, fertile farmland becomes a minefield, water becomes 
contaminated and native vegetation disappears.  
Attacks on the environment become more savage as technology develops. 
Environmental destruction has become an inevitable result of modern warfare and 
military tactics. The nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that emerged during the 
late twentieth century present threats to life itself; but short of that apocalypse, modern 
weapons can cause or hasten a host of environmental disasters, such as deforestation and 
erosion, global warming, desertification, or holes in the ozone layer. The devastating 
effects of military weapons on the environment is reflected throughout the history of the 
                                                          
1 Westing and Lumsden (1979:8), quoted in Cassady B. Craft & Suzette R. Grillot, Conventional Arms 
Control and the Environment: Mitigating the Effects of War, paper prepared for the Symposium: Arms 
and the Environment: Preventing the Perils of Disarmament 4 (Dec. 9-10, 1999) 
Tulsa, Oklahoma [hereinafter Craft & Grillot]. 
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twentieth century, in World War I, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, the 
Cambodian civil war, Gulf wars I and II, the Afghan civil war, and the Kosovo conflict. 
The Science for Peace Institute at the University of Toronto estimates that 10 to 
30 percent of all environmental degradation in the world is a direct result of the various 
militaries.2 Military operations can affect land, air, wildlife, and water resources. A 
German report concluded that six to ten percent of the world’s air pollution is a result of 
military activity, and that the world’s military is also responsible for the emission of 
approximately two-thirds of all chlorofluorocarbon-113 released into the atmosphere.3 In 
modern warfare, environmental destruction can be a primary means of threatening or 
defeating one’s enemies. War itself can, and often does, mean war against the natural 
environment. 
During Gulf War II, which was the most toxic war in history, Saddam Hussein 
threatened to pollute the Gulf with oil, and burn oil wells if other nations attempted to 
liberate Kuwait.4 He carried out his threats after the beginning of the United Nations 
coalition5 air raids. Iraq pumped crude oil into the Gulf, and set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields. 
Iraqi troops destroyed eighty to eighty five percent of Kuwait’s 950 oil wells.6 The daily 
release of heat from these wells was estimated to be about eighty six billion watts, 
equivalent to that of a five hundred-acre forest fire.7 The fires burned about 4,600,000 
barrels of oil daily. Smoke spread as far as 800 miles south of Kuwait.8 The Iraqi military 
                                                          
2 Suzan D. Lanier-Graham, The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of 
Weaponry and Warfare xxix (Walker & Company, 1993) [hereinafter Lanier-Graham]. 
3 Id., at xxx. 
4 Stephen Dycus, National Defense and the Environment 138 (University Press of New 
England, 1996) [hereinafter Dycus]. 
5 The International Coalition Member States in the United Nations Authorized Action Against Iraq in the 
Gulf War II are: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. In addition, Japan participated by sending medical 
assistance to Saudi Arabia. And Turkey allowed coalition air forces to take off from air bases on its land. 
See John North Moore, Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rules of Law 399 (Oceana 
Publication, Inc., 1992).  
6 Donatella Lorch, Burning Wells Turns Kuwait into Land of Oily Blackness, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1991, at 
A1, A15. 
7 Mark J.T. Caggiano, Comment, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: 
Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 479, 480-481 (1993) 
[hereinafter Caggiano]. 
8 Bob Davis, U.S. Scientists Play Down Effect of Fires in Kuwait, Angering Environmentalists, Wall St. 
J., June 25, 1991, at A3. 
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created what has been called “the worst man-made environmental disaster in history.”9 
The Kuwaiti government estimated the value of the lost oil at $12 billion.10 Some reports 
stated that at least 30,000 marine birds perished as a result of exposure to oil, and about 
50% of the coral reefs on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia was damaged or destroyed. 
Some of the annual flora in the region failed to set seeds because of the exposure to soot 
and oil mist.11  
Moreover, massive environmental destruction was caused not only by deliberate 
military tactics, but by other activities related to war efforts. The United States military 
produced approximately 6 million used plastic bags weekly, from their “Meals Ready to 
Eat.” Soft drink cans and junk food cardboards were also disposed of in the desert.12 
About 40,000 km² areas of Kuwait, northeastern Saudi Arabia, and Southern Iraq were 
littered with solid waste from Gulf War II.13 Solid wastes were generated mainly from 
destroyed military hardware (over 5000 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles, over one 
million mines in Kuwait), residue of explosives and ammunitions (over 80,000 tons of 
bombs were dropped and about 120,000 tons of ammunition used), and sanitary residues 
(over 4 million tons of wastes from humans).14 Solid wastes generated during Gulf War 
II still pose a serious threat to land resources in the war zone. 
d 
 
                                                          
Depleted Uranium (DU) was used in weapon ammunition for the first time by the 
coalition during Gulf War II in 1991. It is estimated that the United States Army fired 
about 14,000 high-caliber shells containing DU during the war.15 According to the 
British Atomic Energy Authority, about “forty tons of this type of projectile are scattere
near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders, and no more than ten percent of these ammunitions have
9 Michael Ross, Experts Blame Saudis, Kuwaitis as Spell, Oil Fires Go Unchecked, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 
1991, at A10 [hereinafter Ross, Experts Blame]. 
10 Caggiano, supra note (7) at 480-481. 
11 Makram A. Gerges, On the Impacts of the 1991 Gulf War on the Environment of the Region: General 
Observations, 27 Marine Pollution Bull. 305, 306 (1993).  
12 Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 66. 
13 Mohammad Sadiq, John C. Mc Cain Eds., The Gulf War Aftermath: An 
Environmental Tragedy 183 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) [hereinafter Sadiq & 
McCain]. 
14 Id., at 183. 
15 Dr. Siegwart-Horst Guenther, How D.U. Shell Residues Poison Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, in 
Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium, How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers & 
Civilians with depleted uranium Weapons 168 (Rosalie Bertell et al. eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter Guenther]. 
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yet been detected.”16 An American lieutenant colonel was quoted in an official report
saying: “[t]he explosions spread DU penetrators […] throughout the north compound. 
The fires produced billowing black and white clouds of smoke that … drifted … towards 
Kuwait City … I personally handled over two dozen rods or pieces of rods [of DU]. Most 
of them had a black sooty or powdery coating over them…there would be as many as 50 
soldiers ‘on line’ sweeping down a cleared area of very small debris, sand and dust 
[…]”
 as 
                                                          
17 DU is used to strengthen weapons because it is sixty five percent denser than 
lead.18 It is flammable and can penetrate even “steel-armored tanks.”19 However, DU is a 
real threat to human health and the environment. For example, since uranium is a heavy 
metal it can be toxic if it enters the body and lodges in the kidney.20 Studies have shown 
that contact with DU projectiles leads to leukemia, anemia, birth defects, and other 
serious maladies.21 One British company refused a contractual project to remove 
poisonous uranium from the Kuwaiti region because of the fear that its staff would be 
exposed to great risk.22 Land resources of the war region were adversely affected. 
However, because Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq lack the technology and expertise to 
fully determine the environmental impact of the war, and because it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately assess the harm to the natural environment, damage to the land 
resources may not be repaired for several decades, if indeed at all. 
Similarly, in the Kosovo conflict, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)23 also used depleted uranium as a component in ammunition. NATO said that 
the United States A-10 aircraft fired 31,000 rounds of ammunition containing DU during 
the 1999 air strikes against Serbia,24 creating a danger not only to the people, but also to 
16 Eric Hoskins, Depleted Uranium Shells Make the Desert Glow, in Metal of Dishonor: 
Depleted Uranium, How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers & Civilians with 
depleted uranium Weapons 164 (Rosalie Bertell et al. eds., 1997). 
17 Alexander Nicoll, Pressure Mounts for Broader Studies into Effects on Health, Fin. Times, Jan. 18, 
2001, at 2 [hereinafter Nicoll]. 
18 Gina Kolata, Fray in Europe Over Uranium Draws Doubters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2001, A6 
[hereinafter Kolata, Fray in Europe].  
19 Id., at A6. 
20 Id., at A1, A6. 
21 Guenther, supra note (15) at 167. 
22 Id., at 168. 
23 NATO is a regional military alliance created in 1949 for the collective defense of North America and 
Western Europe.  
24 James Blitz & Alexander Nicoll, Italy Calls For NATO Probe into Uranium Rounds, Fin. Times, Jan. 
4, 2001, 2 [hereinafter Blitz & Nicoll]. 
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the environment of the entire Balkans. “A-10s were the anti-tank weapon of choice in the 
1991 Gulf War, because they carry a GAU-8/A Avenger 30 millimeter seven-barrel 
cannon capable of firing 4,200 rounds of ammunition per minute.”25 John Catalinotto, a 
spokesperson from the Depleted Uranium Education Project of the International Action 
Center, said “DU is used in alloy form in shells to [enable them to] penetrate targets. As 
the shell hits its target, it burns and releases uranium oxide into the air. The poisonous 
and radioactive uranium is most dangerous when inhaled, [because it will continue to] 
release radiation [throughout] the life of the [exposed] person.”26 Moreover, inhaling 
uranium 23827 can cause lung cancer, or lymphoma.28 In 1999, six Italian soldiers died 
after serving in Kosovo and Bosnia.29 As a consequence, Italian Prime Minister Giuliano 
Amato declared that his government will call for NATO to investigate “the Balkans 
syndrome” and assume responsibility for its actions.30 Moreover, in France, four soldiers 
who served in the Balkans are being treated for leukemia.31 Paul Lannoye, the leader of 
the parliament’s Green Group, said: “EU governments and NATO must be 
accountable…It is not acceptable to say that we should wait and establish a link between 
the weapons and illnesses before action is taken.”32 Consequently, the European 
parliamentarians called for “a moratorium on the use of DU weapons until the health 
risks are clearer.”33 
Even more significant is the fact that NATO forces bombed petrochemical and 
other chemical plants and factories, thus releasing tons of toxic substances such as 
                                                          
25 A statement by the International Action Center, a group that opposes the use of (DU) weapons. 
Radioactive Weapons Used by U.S./NATO in Kosovo, available at <http://www.iacenter.org/duyug.htm>, 
(last visit Apr. 1, 1999). 
26 Id. 
27 Dr. Frank von Hippel, a physicist who is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton 
University said that depleted uranium is left “when the more highly radioactive uranium 235 has been 
removed from its more abundant atomic cousin, uranium 238 [which] is very weakly radioactive.” See 
Kolata, Fray in Europe, supra note (18) at A1. 
28 Id., at A6. 
29 Italy was the largest participant in the peace-keeping operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Albania in the 
1990s after the U.S. See Blitz & Nicoll, supra note (24) at 2. 
30 Id., at 2. 
31 Ralph Atkins & Dan Bilefsky, U.S. Envoy Called in Over Uranium Weapons, Fin. Times, Jan. 18, 
2001, at 2. 
32 Id., at 2. 
33 Id., at 2. 
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chlorine, ethylene dichloride, and vinyl chloride into the air, water, and ground.34 
According to information received by the Balkans Task Force in August of 1991, some 
93 bombs had been located and exploded by NATO. Some number of unexploded bombs 
remain in the deep waters of the Adriatic Sea,35 and perhaps elsewhere as well. 
Similarly, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in April 1992 and 
ended in November 1995, caused environmental damage estimated at twenty to seventy 
billion US dollars.36 An estimated 300,000 hectares of land sustained environmental 
degradation, raw sewage flowed into surface waters because of the destruction of waste 
collection equipment during the war,37 and water sanitation services deteriorated to the 
point where chemical, bacteriological, and biological surface water contamination can be 
observed in both urban and rural areas.38 
Even without armed conflict, military bases often generate considerable amounts 
of hazardous wastes, such as explosives, solvents, acids, and spent fuel that can 
contaminate the surrounding soil, water, and air. For example, at several bases in 
Germany, underground sources of drinking water have been contaminated with “spilled 
jet fuel and trichloroethylene from U.S. military operations.”39  
In the Philippines, the departure of the American military exposed the extent of 
hazardous waste contamination at the U.S. bases there. The U.S. General Accounting 
Office reported in January 199240 that untreated chemical and heavy metal wastes had 
been discharged into the air, the ground, and into Subic Bay from Subic Bay Naval and 
Clark Air Force Bases.41 A report by the World Health Organization in May 1993 found 
                                                          
34 Kenneth Friedman, War Effects on the Environment, 1999, available at 
<http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/environment/19141>, (last visit Oct. 10, 1999). 
35 The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements 8 (United Nations 
Environment Programme and United Nations Center for Human Settlements, 1999) [hereinafter The 
Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment].  
36 Stuart Thompson, Status of the Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Current Assessment, 12 
Geo. Int’l. Envt’l. L. Rev. 247, 256 (1999) [hereinafter Thompson]. 
37 Federal Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State of the 
Environment Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Soil: Causes of Soil Destruction, (1998), available at 
<http://www.grida.no/prog/cee/enrin/htmls/bosnia/soe/soil/presure.htm>, (last visit Nov. 10, 2000). 
38 Thompson, supra note (36) at 257. 
39 John M. Broder, Pollution “Hot Spots” Taint Water Sources, L.A. Times, June 18, 1990, at 16. 
40 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-51 Military Base Closures: U.S. Financial Obligation in 
the Philippines (1992)[hereinafter Gen. Accounting Office]. 
41 Id. 
 6
a potential risk of pollution at Subic Bay.42 Similarly, local citizens complain that U.S
military operations “monopolize fertile farmlands in Guam, threaten bird sanctuaries in 
Japan, and fill the air with jet noise in Germany.”
. 
environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human 
                                                          
43  
Serious environmental and health effects can result from non-hostile military 
operations, even by accident. Three American soldiers died and fifty were wounded in an 
accidental explosion near the U.S. military camp at Doha, Kuwait on July 11, 1991, when 
some of the ammunition detonated.44 A statement from the Joint Information Bureau in 
Dahran, Saudi Arabia reported that “we know it was not due to hostile action or 
sabotage.”45 The explosion resulted in the release of radioactive and toxic dust which 
might cause cancer, or respiratory, kidney and skin disorders.46 Further, Dr. Charles 
Phelps, the provost at the University of Rochester and a member of an Institute of 
Medicine Committee, reported that uranium-238 was leaching into the soldiers’ kidneys, 
and “they had very high levels of uranium salts in their urine.”47 
Some political and military leaders have already recognized the threat to the 
environment from war and other military operations. For example, Colonel Ken 
Cornelius, an Air Force officer on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the 
Environment, asserted: “If we’re going to break things and kill people, and that’s what 
war’s about, if push comes to shove, that’s what we’re there to do. I can’t think of too 
much that’s more damaging to the environment than the war.”48 Kofi Annan, Secretary 
General of the United Nations, stated that “Peace is understood not just as the absence of 
conflict, but as a phenomenon encompassing economic development, social justice, 
42 See, M. Victoria Bayoneto, Note, The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for the 
Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases, 6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 111, 
112 (1994) [hereinafter Bayoneto]. 
43 Dycus, supra note (4) at 73. 
44 Three G.I.’s Killed in Explosion Near A U.S. Camp in Kuwait, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1991, § A, at 7, ¶ 1, 
Foreign Desk, Available in LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Two Years, [hereinafter Three G.I.’s Killed]. 
45 Id. 
46 Edward Ericson, Recycling the Army Way: The Pentagon Uses Radioactive Waste as Armor and Bullets, 
E/The Environmental Magazine, (Mar., Apr. 1997) available at <http://www.emagazine.com/march-
april_1997/0397curr_army.html>, (last visit Dec. 12, 1999), see also, Kathleen Sulivan, Troops Exposed to 
Toxic Depleted Uranium in Gulf War Weapons, The Austin-American Statesman, Jan. 10, 1998, 
News, at A3, Available at LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Tow Years. 
47 Kolata, Fray in Europe, supra note (18) at A6. 
48 Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 12. 
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rights.”49 The countries of the world must recognize that peace has many pillars in 
addition to the mere prevention of conflicts. One of these pillars is environmental 
protection, so that people can live without the threat of contaminated water, polluted a
or toxin-laden soil.   
ir, 
                                                          
There is often no way to measure environmental loss in dollar amounts, and the 
loss is often irreversible. Even though experts have found methods to calculate the 
monetary costs of environmental destruction, money alone cannot return the original 
animal or plant life, clean water, or remove all the traces of pollutants. In ecological 
terms, reparations are inadequate after armed conflict has already caused that kind of 
damage. Thus, the focus of world leaders must be on preventing environmental 
destruction before, or even during, armed conflict.   
This study is not the first and, it is hoped, not the last on this controversial issue. 
The purpose of this study is to provide an overarching analysis of the legal aspects of 
warfare in which the environment is a direct or indirect victim of the armed conflict. This 
thesis evaluates the impact of armed conflict on civilians as well as the environment, and 
classifies environmental harm into three distinct phases: harm caused during preparation 
for armed conflict, harm caused during armed conflict, and harm caused following armed 
conflict. The study will examine applicable international humanitarian rules which 
encompass elements of environmental protection, classify those rules, identify aspects of 
the law of war relevant to environmental concerns, and examine national and 
international environmental rules that deal with this subject. 
This thesis explains the law of the environment during armed conflicts in five 
parts: 
* Part One, “General Background of Armed Conflict,” focuses on the nature of 
armed conflict, including international and national disputes, civil war, and the problem 
of applying international legal duties to internal belligerents, the impact of armed conflict 
on civilians, and the environmental impact of preparing for, engaging in, and recovering 
from armed conflict. 
49 Kristi L. Bergemann, Nuclear Weapons and International Environmental Law: Peace Through 
Responsibility, The International Environmental Law of War and Peace, “Kofi Annan, Secretary General 
of the United Nations, in the opening of The International Day of Peace, 1997” available at 
<http://www.eckerd.edu/academics/intlaw/warandpeace99.html>, (last visit Feb. 10, 2000). 
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* Part Two, “Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian Law,” 
examines the definition of international humanitarian law (IHL), focusing particularly on 
the environmental protection provisions in the IHL and its current inadequacy as a tool to 
protect the natural environment. 
* Part Three, “The Environmental Law Rules,” will examine relevant provisions 
of environmental law, and investigate environmental law rules relevant to armed conflicts 
in the national, comparative, and international levels.  
* Part Four deals with “Enviro-Humanitarian Rules,” and explores the Articles of 
Armament Conventions, a main source of enviro-humanitarian rules. This section 
examines the deficiencies of those rules in the environmental protection framework. 
*Part Five, “The Responsibility of Warfare Environmental Damage,” will 
examine the system of responsibility for environmental damage resulted from military 
activities in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. This part explores two levels of 
responsibility in the international and internal systems.  
*Part Six, “The Recommendations” in which some recommendations and 
proposals will be presented to better advance the environmental protection and to reduce 
warfare environmental damage. The recommendations are grouped according to the 
concerned party. Some recommendations are directed to the international community, 
others are directed to national societies and the last group of recommendation is directed 
to non-governmental organizations. 
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Part I:  
General Background of Armed Conflict 
 
A-The Nature of Armed Conflict 
 
Conflict is a congenital characteristic of mankind and a notable aspect of 
international relations. There is no specific definition of armed conflict acceptable to all 
international experts. As a result, most of the argument about armed conflict focuses on 
moralistic or pragmatic explanations of human nature.50 For example, Forest L. Grieves, 
an international theorist, identifies four characteristics of the nature of conflict: “First, 
human conflict is a fact of modern social life and is likely to remain so for the indefinite 
future. Second, the abolition of war is a dream. Third, theories of Armageddon are likely 
to be not only empty but even dangerous, and fourth, wars may be inevitable but nuclear 
war is unthinkable.”51 On the other hand, John Spanier, a political scientist, observes that 
“human beings may well be alike, in spite of their different languages, clothing, and 
manner. But politics starts where the commonalities of humanity stop, and it starts here 
because of the different interests, values, ideologies, and histories of the many nation-
states. All want peace-but only on their terms.”52 
An armed conflict can be defined, very simply, as any disagreement involving the 
use of weapons between two or more, national such as civil wars, or international parties 
such as international armed conflicts. A weapon, in turn, can be defined as an “instrument 
used or designed to be used to injure or kill someone.”53 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia defined armed conflict as follows: 
 
                                                          
50 Jeffrey M. Elliot & Robert Reginald, The Arms Control, Disarmament, and 
Military Security Dictionary 14 (Clio Press Ltd., 1989). 
51 Forest L. Grieves, Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International 
Relation 92-95 (Houghton Mifflin, 1977)[hereinafter Grieves]. 
52 John Spanier, Games Nations Play 568 (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987) [hereinafter 
Spanier]. 
53 Bryan A. Garner ed. Black’s Law Dictionary 1587 (7th ed, 1999). 
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[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.54 
  
The Permanent Court of International Justice was the first to use the expression in 
the SS. Wimbledon Case, when it referred to “the rights consequent upon neutrality in an 
armed conflict.”55 
Later, in 1949, the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 
declared that the scope of the Conventions extended to “all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict […]”56 Those definitions suggest that parties can engage in 
armed conflicts even without declaring war on each other. 
One expert on the laws of war has observed that “human beings fight to the death. 
They kill members of their own species, where wolves do not. It is not our lack of 
humanity, but our lack of animality that causes our troubles.”57 There are various causes 
of war. The 1925 Conference on the Cause and Cure of War identified over 250 sources 
of war, classified as political, economic, social, and psychological.58  
Those causes certainly include: 
1- a nation’s belief that war will achieve some kind of national victory, 
2- intolerance of differences in religious or other belief systems,  
3- military capability, particularly the possession of weapons of mass destruction,59 
                                                          
54 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32, para. 70 
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic]. 
55 S.S. Wimbledon (Brit., Fr., It., Jap., v. Ger.,) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.1, at 24. 
56 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Member of Armed Forces at 
Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of the Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention (III)]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
art. 2, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.[hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]. 
57 David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics 114 (Little, Brown, 1987). 
58 In 1925, Carrie Chapman Catt organized the National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War. See, 
Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, 94-95, 258 (1987); see also, 
Grieves, supra note (51) at 101. 
59 Despite the disastrous effects of the mass destruction weapons, such as the nuclear weapons, they may 
deter war. French President Jacques Chirac stated that nuclear weapons are not combat weapons and that 
France will coordinate in a nuclear deterrence policy with its European neighbors. Further, during the Gulf 
War II, the U.S. government deterred Iraq from using its mass destruction weapons by threatening to use its 
nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. continues to hold nuclear weapons for deterrence and self-defense. 
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4- the absence of peaceful mechanisms to settle conflicts, and  
5- chaos, disorder, or other emergencies within a given nation. 
Although the history of war is as old as the history of humanity, since the middle 
of the 20th century, war has carried with it the possibility of apocalypse. Winston S. 
Churchill, the former British Prime Minister, at the end of World War I, even before the 
development of nuclear arms, said that: “mankind has got into its hands for the first time 
the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination.”60 
Modern warfare also presents unprecedented threats to the environment. A 
significant example of using the environment as a weapon in armed conflict occurred in 
the Gulf War II, 1990-1991, when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to 
invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Hussein claimed that Kuwait overproduction of oil in 
violation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, and the 
removal of $ 2.4 billion worth of Iraqi crude oil by “slant drilling” into the Rumaila oil 
field, in addition to the long-running historical dispute over the dependency of Kuwait to 
Iraq were the reasons for the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait.61 The Iraqi armed forces 
deliberately released crude oil into the Gulf, and set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields.62 As a 
consequence, the Gulf War II was termed an “eco-war”63 and Iraq’s actions described as 
“environmental terrorism.”64  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
See, Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary International Law Prohibit 
the Use of Nuclear Weapons in all Circumstances? 20 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 181, 193, 195-96 (1996) 
[hereinafter Sheldon].; see also, William M. Arkin, Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf 
War, Wash. Q. 3, 5 (Autumn 1996). 
60 Spanier, supra note (52) at 34. 
61 The United Nations and The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996 at 14, U.N. Doc. DPI/1770, 
U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.3 (1996). 
62 Shilpi Gupta, Note, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 
251, 252 (1993)[hereinafter Gupta]. 
63 Richard Lacayo, A War Against the Earth, Time, Feb. 4, 1991, at 28 [hereinafter lacayo]. 
64 Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Gulf Oil Spill A “Sick” Act by Hussein, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, L5. 
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B- Civil War and the Problem of Applying International Legal Duties to Internal 
Belligerents 
 
Traditional International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) classifies civil wars into 
three categories: “rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.”65 Rebellions are “small-scale, 
localized conflicts which are usually solved with police measures.”66 An insurgency “is a 
conflict that lies somewhere between a rebellion and a state of belligerency.”67 On the 
other hand, a state of belligerency may be declared when four conditions are met: “first, 
there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished from a 
purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial 
portion of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with 
the rules of war and through organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority; 
fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to 
define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency.”68  
Most of the armed conflicts in the world are internal. Since 1945 internal armed 
conflicts (civil wars) have been more numerous than international wars, and even many 
international wars had their roots in civil wars. For example, the wars involving Israel 
and Arabic nations developed out of hostilities between the Jewish and Arab people 
living in Palestine during the last years of the British mandate.69 International law has 
historically treated internal armed conflict as a matter of national jurisdiction, to be 
determined by the people of the concerned State.70 Generally, international law simply 
does not address civil wars and revolutions, and thus has no rules to prohibit or restrain 
such internal conflicts. Significantly, the United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) prohibits 
the use of force in international relations, but says nothing about the use of force in civil 
                                                          
65 L. Oppenheim, International Law 249-50 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed., 1952). See also, Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid to Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the 
Standards of Belligerency, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 43, 46 (1988). 
66 Boals, The Relevance of International Law to Internal War in Yemen, in The International Law 
of Civil War 303, 313 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971). 
67 Id., at 313-14. 
68 H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 176 (University Press, 1947) 
[hereinafter Lauterpacht]. 
69 Michael B. Akehurst, Civil War, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Use of 
Force. War And Neutrality Peace Treaties 88 (Rudolf Dolzer et al. eds., 1982) 
[hereinafter Akehurst].  
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wars. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”71 Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War it 
appears that customary international law has softened its prohibition against intervention 
in internal armed conflict, and has started to acknowledge the necessity of humanitarian 
intervention in such conflicts.72 That recognition is reflected in the Statutes of the ICRC, 
which require the ICRC73 to help the victims of armed conflicts, regardless of whether 
they are victims of international or internal armed conflicts.74 Further, Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, Secretary General of the U.N., suggested that civil wars “are no longer inherently 
domestic in scope. They disrupt stable international order and peaceful global existence 
because nations are generally too interdependent and prefer egocentric isolationism.”75 
International humanitarian law defines civil war as a non-international armed 
conflict occurring in the territory of a nation, involving the armed forces of that nation 
and dissident or other organized armed groups which exercise control over part of the 
territory.76 However, in recent years, internal armed conflicts have broken out with 
increasing frequency. Internal conflicts, often threaten the environment even more than 
international armed conflict, because they often last for long periods and the armed forces 
of the involved parties often deplete natural resources in order to continue their fight. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
70 David Wippman, Change Continuity in Legal Justification for Military Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 
27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 425, 435 (1995-96)[hereinafter Wippman]. 
71 Charter of the United Nations, art 2 (4), June 26, 1945 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [U.N. Charter]. 
72 Humanitarian intervention will be discussed later in the next few pages.  
73 The ICRC is an “impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian 
mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with 
assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in 
situations of conflict. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian 
law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.” The International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Forum: War and Water, The Cover Page (ICRC Publications, 1998) [hereinafter 
Forum: War and Water]. 
74 The Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross, art. 4 (1) (d) Jul. 
20, 1998, 324 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 537-543 (1998) [hereinafter ICRC Statutes]; see also, Denise 
Plattner, The Protection of Displaced Persons in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 291 Int’l Rev. Red 
Cross 567, 577 (1992). 
75 The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN 
SCOR, 47th, Sess., 3046th mtg. at 9-10, UN Doc. S/PV.3046(1992).  
76 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, art. 1 (1), U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (15 Aug. 1977) [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol (II)]. 
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Despite the obvious threat posed by situations of civil war, none of the IHL rules 
explicitly provide for prevention of their environmental effects. Nevertheless, since the 
adoption of the Additional Protocol II,77 civil wars have been subject to IHL rules. The 
1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions specifically provides some 
environmental protection during internal armed conflicts,78 although less than during 
international conflicts. As Additional Protocol II lacks provisions comparable to Article 
35 (3),79and Article 5580of Additional Protocol I, which deal with the environmental 
protection in international armed conflicts, a proposal was made at the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH) to introduce into Protocol II a provision 
analogous to Articles 35, and 55 of Protocol I, but the idea was rejected.81 
In international armed conflicts, the rules of neutrality82 provide a clear criterion 
for distinguishing between lawful and unlawful help given to a belligerent State by a 
neutral State; yet such rules are not as clear with regard to internal conflicts.83 However, 
it is sometimes hard to distinguish between international and internal armed conflict. For 
example, when foreign armed forces intervene in a conflict at the request of a 
government or rebel forces, and become involved in internal armed conflict, both internal 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 The concept of environmental protection is defined in Articles 14 and 15 of Protocol II. Article 14, 
entitled the “Protection of Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,” prohibits attacks 
against “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, life stock, drinking water 
installations and supplies and irrigation works.” Article 15 prohibits any attack against “installations 
containing dangerous forces…if such attack may cause the release of such forces.” 
79 Article 35 (3) states that “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” 
Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Related to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35 (3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.S.T.S. [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol (I)]. 
80 Article 55 states that “1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or 
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment 
and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 2. Attacks against the natural environment 
by way of reprisals are prohibited.” Id. art. 55. 
81 Antoine Bouvier, Protection of the Natural Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, 285 Int’l. Rev. 
of the Red Cross 567, 576 (1991) [hereinafter Bouvier, Protection of the Natural Environment]. 
82 The Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of 
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, arts 19 & 31, in ICRC, International Humanitarian Databases, available at 
<http://www.inrc.org>, (last visit Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter The Hague Convention (V)]. 
83 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 
para. 89, General List No. 95, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 8 July 1996, 1996 WL 939337 (I.C.J.)  [hereinafter Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]. 
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and international factors are involved. This intervention is known as “internationalized 
internal conflict,” and has occurred in places such as the Bosnian and Angolan armed 
conflicts.84 As a rule, in a civil war, foreign States possess not only the right, but also the 
duty, to recognize the ‘belligerency’ of forces occupying a substantial part of a nation’s 
territory.85  
However, according to the U.N. General Assembly’s Friendly Relations 
Resolution adopted on October 24, 1970,86 “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from 
organizing, instigating or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another 
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when [such] acts involve a threat or use of force,” and that “no 
State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or 
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or 
interfere in civil strife in another State.”87 Nonetheless, according to the right of counter-
intervention,88 rebels may receive foreign help from sympathetic States when the 
government is itself receiving international assistance.89 For example, in 1979, following 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia gave money to the rebels, and Egypt 
declared that she would provide military training for the Muslim rebels.90 Moreover, 
according to the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
                                                          
84 Ewen Allison, Robert K. Goldman, Gray Areas in International Humanitarian Law, in Crimes of 
War: “What the Public Should Know,” 158 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter Allison & Goldman]. 
85 Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study 
of the Principles of International Order 124-25 (State University of New York Press, 
1988) [hereinafter Luard]. 
86 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 Oct, 1970, G.A.Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N.Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter U.N. General Assembly’s Friendly 
Relations Resolution]. 
87 Id. 
88 This right is based on the right of self and collective defense adopted by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
which reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 51. See also, Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on 
the Use of Force, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (1986). 
89 Akehurst, supra note (69) at 89. 
90 Id., at 89. 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Dusko Tadic Case,91 international humanitarian law rules and 
principles apply to both international and internal armed conflicts.92 The tribunal held 
that: “it had jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the conflict, and that it need not 
determine whether the conflict is internal or international.”93 Based on that conclusion, 
the tribunal has competence to apply IHL rules whenever there are severe violations of 
human rights in armed conflicts. Further, the status of the 1990 San Remo Declaration on 
the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts94 attempts to impose humanitarian restrictions even 
on internal conflicts, in order to protect non-combatant civilian populations,95 to avoid 
unnecessary suffering or injury,96 to protect medical and religious personnel and medical 
units and transports,97 to prohibit attacks on dwellings,98 and to protect resources 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.99 This Declaration, if applied 
rigorously, would extend to internal conflicts the humanitarian safeguards already 
imposed on international warfare. Moreover, even though the Declaration does not 
specifically address environmental damage, some of its language could apply to that 
issue. This is the case even though IHL principles are not applied word-for-word to 
internal armed hostilities.100 
The United Nations, however, has been very hesitant to intervene in internal 
conflicts. The U.N. Charter asserts the principle of the sovereign equality of all the U.N. 
                                                          
91 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, was charged with 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, and crimes against 
humanity relevant to the torture and murder of Muslims at Karaterm and Trnopolje prison camps in 
northwestern Bosnia, during the summer of 1992. Tadic was found guilty by the trial chamber and received 
a twenty-year sentence. See in general, Michael P. Scarf, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, (http://www.un.org/icty/index.html), International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, May 7, 1997, 91 Amer. J. Int’l. 718 (1997); Sean D. Murphy, Developments in 
International Criminal Law: Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 93 Amer. J. Int’l. L. 57 (1999). 
92 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note (54) at para. 65. 
93 Id., at para. 65. 
94 The Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, San Remo, Apr. 7, 1990, available at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1990a.htm>, (last visit Dec. 10, 2000) [hereinafter San Remo 
Declaration]. 
95 Id., at A (1). 
96 Id., at A (3). 
97 Id., at A (5). 
98 Id., at A (6). 
99 Id., at A (7). 
100 Allison & Goldman, supra note (84) at 158. 
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members,101 and therefore, that principle protects State sovereignty from external 
intervention. Nevertheless, the international community has accepted humanitarian 
intervention in cases of flagrant violation of human rights. According to customary 
international law, there are four exceptions to the principle of State sovereignty and non-
intervention in a State’s national affairs: “1) when a de jure government requests or 
consents to intervention, 2) when a group of States or a regional actor invokes a right to 
humanitarian intervention, 3) when a State acts in self-defense, and 4) when counter-
intervention by a State offsets an illegal prior intervention by another state.”102 In these 
circumstances, the international community supports humanitarian intervention.103 
According to the U.N. Charter, Chapter VII, the Security Council, which is charged with 
the maintenance of the international peace and security, may ask all member states to 
apply sanctions against an aggressor.104 Although the General Assembly can authorize 
such collective action,105 any of the five Security Council members106 can veto107 such a 
resolution. Therefore, collective security cannot succeed unless the five major powers 
cooperate in action against aggressor States. With that cooperation, the U.N. Security 
Council has intervened in internal conflicts. It “has authorized military intervention to 
end repression of the Kurds in Iraq, famine in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and 
genocide in Rwanda…”108 On the other hand, the Security Council did not authorize 
military intervention to end ethnic cleansing in Chechnya, or to cease human rights 
violation in Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem.109 The Security Council did not 
                                                          
101 U.N Charter, supra note (71) art. 2 (1). 
102 Wippman, supra note (70) at 446. 
103 Humanitarian intervention is: “the intervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N. action in Iraq 
and Somalia or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) action in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone) or threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and, at the least, 
makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted-as it attempts to alleviate conditions in 
which a substantial part of the population of a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale.” 
See, Christopher Greenwood, Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention? 49 The World Today 34 
(1993); see also, Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: and 
the Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 333, 335 (1998). 
104 U.N. Charter, supra note (71). art. 39. 
105 Id. art. 10. 
106 The U.N. five major powers are: The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and France.  
107 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 27 (3). 
108 Wippman, supra note (70) at 462-63. 
109 A significant resolution, CGR2.CNV030, was adopted by the IUCN World Conservation Congress in 
Amman, Jordan 4-11 Oct. 2000 concerning the securing of the environment in Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 
and Jerusalem. Thus, that resolution recognized the danger to the environment as a result of Israeli-
Palestinian hostilities. 
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deem these situations a threat to international peace and security, even though they 
caused thousands of casualties, and devastated the natural environment.  
Thus, the U.N.’s participation in internal peacekeeping operations has been 
uneven. However, the U.N. Charter does provide a legal basis for humanitarian 
intervention in internal conflicts. The Charter gives regional organizations the first 
responsibility for resolving disputes,110 as with the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone,111 and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the 
Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic.”112 Similarly, the 
European Community has played a significant role in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
mediation,113 and the U.N. Secretary General has requested the assistance of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in resolving the conflict in Somalia.114 Based on 
these precedents, the U.N. could take a more active role with regard to internal conflicts. 
There is ample reason for the U.N. to do so. Recent history abounds with bloody 
and destructive conflicts within States. For example, in the Rwandan civil war of 1990-
1994, between Rwanda’s two main ethnic groups, the Tutsi and Hutu,115 more than 
850,000 Rwandans were killed from April to July 1994 in Rwanda (formerly Ruanda) in 
east central Africa.116 Similarly, in the Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995, the 
predominantly Serbian federal army, shelled Croats and Muslims and carried out ethnic 
cleansing117 and genocide in Sarajevo, the Capital of Bosnia. However, on December 14, 
1995, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the “Dayton Peace Accords,” 
                                                          
110 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 52 (3). 
111 See, S.C.Res. 866, UN Doc. S/RES/866 (Sept. 22, 1993). 
112 On January 31st 1997, the Heads of States of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali established MISAB 
to “maintain peace and security in the Central African Republic by monitoring the implementation of the 
Bangui Agreements and conducting operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other 
unlawfully armed persons.” See the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) 
Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), 53rd.  Sess., UNSCOR, UN Doc. 
S/1998/61(1998). 
113 See, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. S/24333, at 4 
(1992).  
114 See, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, UN Doc. S/24343, at 10 (1992). 
115 Tara Sapru, Comment, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council 
Tribunal Into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 Tex. Int’l L.J. 329, 332-333 (1997). 
116 George Childs Kohn, Dictionary of Wars 423 (Checkmark Books, 1999) [hereinafter 
Kohn]. 
117 Ethnic cleansing will be discussed later in the Section of “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Civilian 
Populations.”  
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which ended the civil war in Bosnia and Croatia only after about 250,000 people died and 
more than 3 million others became refugees.118 
An internal armed conflict lasted for nine years following the Sierra Leone civil 
war of 1991. A rebel movement known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sought 
to overthrow the republican government of Sierra Leone, and this civil war left 75,000 
people killed and over a million others homeless.119 The U.N. Security Council took 
action by adopting Resolution 1132 to ban the sale or supply of all petroleum, arms, and 
other ammunition to Sierra Leone in order to prevent the importing of arms into the 
war.120 However, the RUF financed its military operations through the illegal trade of 
diamonds, so the U.N.’s intervention failed to stop the internal conflict. Internal conflict 
in Colombia resulted in particularly dramatic environmental damage. During the civil war 
there, dating back to the mid-1960s,121 anti-government rebels exploded petroleum 
pipelines, spilled millions of barrels of crude oil into rivers, and contaminated drinking 
water supplies. Consequently, hundreds of aquatic fish were poisoned, forest fires caused 
severe air pollution, soil was sterilized, and riverside inhabitants were severely harmed. 
Moreover, even though the conflict itself took place within Colombia’s borders, the 
environmental impact extended far beyond the Colombian borders to Venezuela.122  
These examples demonstrate that the legal guidelines that apply to international 
wars should also apply to internal conflicts, since “internal” conflicts can cause as much 
destruction within a nation, or even across national borders, as warfare between States. 
Guerrillas,123 irregular forces “who use unconventional methods of warfare, such as 
sabotage, ambushes, and sniping,”124 and headed by dissidents who use arms to seek to 
                                                          
118 Kohn, supra note (116) at 65-66. 
119 Sheryl Dickey, Sierra Leone: Diamonds for Arms, 7 Hum. Rts. Br. 9, 9 (2000) [hereinafter Dickey]. 
120 Id., at 9. 
121 Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian Law as 
Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1, 10 (1999) [hereinafter Carrillo-Suarez]. 
122 Environmental Law Institute, Background Paper, Addressing Environmental Consequences of War, the 
First International Conference on Addressing Environmental Consequences 
of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives 2(Washington, D.C., June 10-12, 
1998). 
123 The term “guerrilla” is of Spanish origin and means “little war.” See, Otto Kimminich, Guerrilla Forces, 
in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Use of Force. War And 
Neutrality Peace Treaties 201 (Rudolf Dolzer et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter 
Kimminich].   
124 Jon Lee Anderson, Guerrillas, in Crimes of War: “What the Public Should Know,” 159 
(Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999). 
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win power in order to change the political, social, and economic structure of a nation, 
must be bound by regular armed forces rules. Some legal guidelines already recognize the 
significance of such internal conflicts, and recognize the status of combatants in such 
conflicts.  
The ICRC, for example, recognizes that “[t]he word guerrilla is not intended to 
signify a category of conflict, but a particular method of waging war which may be used 
in international or internal conflict by persons who in general do not fulfill the conditions 
required of combatants under the Geneva Conventions to qualify for prisoner of war 
status but who have at their command a logistic and political infrastructure supported by 
some or all of the population.”125 Similarly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, extends 
certain protections to any guerrilla fighter who  
 
1-is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,126  
2-wears a distinctive sign or article of clothing visible at a 
distance,127  
3-carries his weapon openly,128and 
4-observes the laws and customs of war.129 
 
Guerrillas involved in internal armed conflicts are specifically covered by Article 
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.130 Article 3 is the only part of the 
Conventions that applies explicitly to internal armed conflicts, and sets forth limits on the 
behavior of both regular armed forces and dissident ranks: 
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions:  
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
                                                          
125 ICRC Doc. 1153 of Aug. 1970, at 4; see, Kimminich, supra note (123) at 202. 
126 This requirement is intended to ensure that irregular forces have a structure of command 
and discipline capable of following the laws and customs of war. 
127 This provision is for the protection of civilians, who may be attacked by opposing forces. 
128 Such requirement is to indicate his combatant status and to distinguish fighters from the civilian 
population. 
129 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art. 13 (2), Geneva Convention (II), supra note (56) art. 13 (2), 
Geneva Convention (III), supra note (56) art. 4 (2). 
130 Id., common art. 3. 
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those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or 
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this 
end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) 
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the 
conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the 
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.131 
 
In sum, and as examined thoroughly in Part II “Environmental Protection in the 
International Humanitarian Law,” until 1977, dating back to the adoption of the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the law of war excluded civil 
war from the rules that govern international armed conflicts, including environmental 
protection rules. Nevertheless, the protection offered by the Additional Protocol II of 
1977 was not adequate to achieve the necessary environmental protection. In contrast, the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions offers a great deal of environmental 
protection during international armed conflicts. 
 
C- The Impact of Armed Conflict on Civilian Populations 
 
Modern nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare seriously harm both humans 
and the natural environment. For example, the intentional destruction of developed areas 
deprives local citizens of shelter. The destruction of sewage treatment facilities, the ruin 
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of dams that flow to agricultural areas, and the detonation of power plants to release 
poisonous emissions in times of armed conflicts, result in damage not only to the 
environment, but to the civilian population as well. Therefore, any study of an 
environmental law of armed conflict must address the impact of armed conflict on 
civilian populations who interact with and are dependent on, environmental systems.  
As a fact, civilian deaths and injuries have been high in recent armed conflicts. 
“In World War I, thirty percent of wartime casualties were civilians. During World War 
II, civilian casualties increased to sixty percent. Significantly, wartime civilian casualties 
increased to ninety percent in the Rwanda civil war.”132 Most international law experts 
believe that there is a substantial relationship between armed conflict and civilian 
causalities during or after the conflict, and the infringement of international humanitarian 
law. Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) surgical 
database reported that in 1991, 17, 086 people treated by ICRC personnel for weapon 
injuries, “thirty five percent were females, males under sixteen, or males aged fifty and 
over.”133 Thus, examining the impact of armed conflict on civilian populations is the 
legal bench mark against which law must be evaluated. International humanitarian law 
has defined the problem and provided some controls, however, environmental law will 
need to learn from this if it is to do better. In addition, as it will be discussed in the eco-
refugees section, the war refugees can harm the environment by depleting nature and 
natural resources. 
This section will highlight civilian deterioration from death, chronic diseases and 
paralysis, persecution of ethnic minorities, rape and torture, violence and drug abuse 
induced by armed conflict experiences, and refugees as the result of armed conflicts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
131 Id., common art. 3. 
132 Eisa Al-Anzi, A Study on Human Rights in Peacetime and During Armed 
Conflicts: A case Study of the Situation in Kuwait and the Arab World (in Arabic) 
224 (Kuwait University, Faculty of Law Publications, 1998-99). 
133 International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, Commissioned by the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 16 (1999) 
[hereinafter Arms Availability]. See, D.R. Meddings, Are Most Causalities Non-Combatants? 317 Brit. 
Med. J. 1249, 1249-1250 (1998). 
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1. Death 
Regrettably, thousands of civilians are killed every year as a direct result of 
fighting, and many more die from malnutrition and disease caused by armed conflicts. 
About 8.5 million soldiers and 1.5 million civilians were killed during the four years of 
World War I.134 For example, the French lost “955,000 men in five months of 1914; in 
1915, 1,430,000 men; and in 1916, 900,000 men [including civilians].”135 Some 50 
million people were killed during the six years of World War II.136 In El Salvador, 
between 1980 and 1992, 1.5 percent of the Salvadoran population, about 70,000 persons, 
including many civilian non-combatants, were killed by the government’s armed 
forces.137 Further, during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in1990, mortalities reported 
from Kuwaiti sources were 1,061.138 Comparing this figure with the total Kuwaiti 
population of 700,000 shows the dimension of this occupation. As a result of the same 
war, between 5,000 and 15,000 Iraqi civilians died in coalition attacks.139 
Additionally, the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University 
in Chicago estimated that of 140,000 to 150,000 casualties in the former Yugoslavia, fifty 
percent were civilians. One-third of those were women and children.140 In Croatia, one 
study found that of the 4,339 casualties studied, sixty four percent were civilians.141 And 
during the siege of the eastern Croatia city of Vukover in November 1991, Serbian troops 
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removed hundreds of patients and staff from the municipal hospital, executed them and 
buried them in a mass grave on the Ovcara collective farm.142 
NATO air strikes also caused civilian casualties in the former Yugoslavia. Human 
Rights Watch reported “[ninety] confirmed incidents in which civilians died from NATO 
bombing,”143 and estimated that “as few as 489 and as many as 529 Yugoslav civilians 
were killed in these incidents.”144 That group also reported that “between 279 and 318 of 
the dead, --between [fifty six] and [sixty] percent of the total number of deaths—were in 
Kosovo. In Serbia 201 civilians were killed and eight died in Montenegro.”145 
On January 6, 1999, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, 
occupied the capital Freetown. According to the July 1999 Human Rights Watch Report, 
“Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape,” “the rebel RUF 
occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and wide spread perpetration 
of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were 
gunned down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from 
the upper flours of buildings, used as human shields and burned alive in cars and 
houses.”146 
Even after war ceases, its effects often continue to cause civilian deaths. In the 
Kandahar region of Afghanistan, where there was an extended conflict between rival 
combatant groups, mortality rates increased from 2.5% to 6.1% during the post conflict 
period.147 Since the 1991 cease fire in the Gulf War II, a study carried out in 1993 by 
three American scientists showed that about 50,000 Iraqi children died during the first 
eight months after the war from the effects of depleted uranium.148 Similarly, Beth O. 
Daponte, an analyst from the U.S. Census Bureau, estimated that Iraqi deaths in the war 
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totaled 86,194 men, 39,612 women, and 32,195 children,149 many of them civilians. In 
another estimation, the DoD reported that up to six million Iraqi could have been killed 
from the dispersion of anthrax and botulism viruses caused by a single attack on 
biological weapons facility.150 Furthermore, in May 1992, Harvard Study Group 
published a study estimating that 170,000 Iraqi children under the age of five would die 
from “delayed effects of the Gulf Crisis.” The major cause of such death would be water 
borne diseases, hunger, and malnutrition.151 
Today, children in at least sixty-eight countries live amid the threat of more than 
110 million hidden mines.152 Many of the explosives look like toys, and children may 
pick up or step on the devices which will result in death or paralysis. The United Nations 
head of Humanitarian Assistance in Kosovo, Dennis McNamara, confirmed that “kids are 
picking up the cluster bombs and getting blown up because the cluster bombs have bright 
canisters which are very attractive.”153 A blatant example could be found in Afghanistan 
during the war against terrorism, when the U.S. military used cluster bombs. The cluster 
bombs have the same color, yellow, as the humanitarian supplies that U.S. planes were 
dropping to the Afghan people.154 Number of casualties among civilians resulted from 
people mistakenly picking up an unexploded cluster bomb.155 Accordingly, General 
Richard Myers, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that “the color of 
future food packets will be changed to blue.”156 
Armed conflicts can have devastating effects on civilian populations. In general, 
the high percentage of civilian casualties results from the fact that they are not physically 
prepared to engage in warfare. In addition, although some modern arms are “smart,” and 
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can destroy a specific target, distinguish between combatants and civilians.157 More 
significant, however, is the fact that the armed forces of the involved parties, focused on 
achieving their military goals, often intentionally or unintentionally cause civilian deaths. 
In internal armed conflicts, civilian deaths are often dramatically increased, because the 
armed forces seek to dominate their own populations, including both combatants and 
civilians. 
 
2. Chronic Diseases 
Even aside from civilian deaths that result from armed combat, warfare’s 
lingering effects on civilians include a legacy of chronic diseases. For example, nuclear 
weapons may cause eye damage. Anyone looking at a nuclear fireball could be blinded 
for a period of a few minutes to some hours (called flash blindness) or could sustain 
permanent eye damage (retinal burns.)158 Radiation emitted by nuclear weapons, even 
when it does not kill, can cause leukemia, birth defects, and other diseases.159 Neutron 
bomb technology is designed to kill people by radiation that “causes ionization, or static 
electricity, among the atoms of any material it passes through. This happens when 
electrons are torn away from their positions surrounding atoms. Atoms consist of a 
nucleus charged with positive electricity surrounded by electrons charged with negative 
electricity. When the ionizing radiation separates these charges by removing electrons, 
atoms and free electrons react swiftly with other atoms or collections of atoms 
(molecules.)”160 This reaction can seriously damage living tissue. 
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Studies of the effects of the atomic bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima have shown 
that “leukemia is the most radiogenic of the cancers following exposure to ionizing 
radiation. The leukemia excess is the first to appear [among civilians] (with a latency 
period of three to seven years), and it appears in the greatest excess among the cancer 
excesses 40 years after exposure. In other words, the Japanese studies show other cancer 
excesses occurring in smaller, yet observable, amounts.”161  
Other kinds of cancers reported among the victims of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, 
included “thyroid cancer, breast cancer, lung cancer, and cancer of the salivary gland.”162 
Other evidence from Japan showed that infections of nausea, vomit, diarrhea, fever, and 
delirium, were rife among bomb victims.163 Affected people died instantly. However, 
those who survived would recover very slowly, and even after recovery, they might die 
suddenly from an infection that would cause only a minor disease in a healthy person.164  
During the Gulf War II, 1990-1991, a considerable number of Allied soldiers 
were diagnosed with symptoms including “damage to organs, genetic manifestation, 
chronic fatigue, loss of endurance, frequent infections, sore throat, coughing, skin rashes, 
night sweats, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, dizziness, headaches, memory loss, 
confusion, vision problems, muscle spasms and cramps, joint pain and loss of mobility, 
aching muscles, swollen glands, dental problems and malformation of newborns.”165 
According to the National Gulf War Resources Center, such symptoms were known as 
“Gulf War Syndrome.” Of the 695,000 U.S. troops who served during Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, more than 45,000 said that they have health concerns.166 Some 
American combatants died as a result of infections.167 
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In Great Britain 3,500 soldiers are reported to be suffering from Gulf War 
Syndrome.168 Australian, Canadian, and French soldiers are said to be suffering too.169 In 
1994, reports on 251 families of veterans of the Gulf War living in Mississippi, showed 
that sixty seven percent of the children of these families were born with “congenital 
deformities: their eyes, ears or fingers are missing, or they are suffering from severe 
blood diseases and respiratory problems.”170 In 1996, the United States Presidential 
Advisory Committee on War Veterans’ Illnesses admitted that neurotoxic chemical 
warfare agents, especially sarin, had been released in certain areas of the Gulf during the 
destruction of the Iraqi ammunition depot, and caused critical health problems in the 
region,171 to both soldiers and civilians. 
Additionally, in Kuwait, thousands of people still suffer deep psychological 
disorders including “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.”172 Indeed, the environmental 
impact of air pollution fallout, and fumes may have long-term health consequences on the 
whole Kuwaiti people through accumulation in the food chain. Similarly, in November 
1996, following the warfare in the former Yugoslavia, reports showed that about 1000 
children were suffering from headaches, aching muscles, abdominal pain, dizziness, 
respiratory problems,173 and other symptoms similar to those described in the Gulf War 
Syndrome. 
 
 
 
3. Persecution of Ethnic Minorities   
Civilian populations can also be affected by persecution, or “ethnic cleansing,” 
that often accompanies armed conflicts. Ethnic cleansing is “the use of force or 
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intimidation to remove people of a certain ethnic or religious group from an area.”174 The 
United Nations Commission of Experts, in a January 1993 report to the Security Council, 
defined ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”175  
As one example, between 1959 and 1961, the Hutu majority in Rwanda revolted 
against the Tutsi rulers, and began a widespread ethnic cleansing.176  In 1963, Hutus 
killed an estimated 10,000 Tutsis, largely with Rwandan government complicity and even 
encouragement.177 In 1994, another massive killing of Tutsis178 and there Hutu 
sympathizers was inspired by members of the predominantly Hutu government.179 
Another particularly blatant example of ethnic cleansing occurred during the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in April 1992 and ended in November 
1995. More than 700,000 Muslims were eliminated by Serbs from an area covering 70% 
of Bosnia, between April and August 1992.180  In Vlasenica, a city in Bosnia, there were 
18,699 Muslims before the war, but now there are none, as a result of ethnic cleansing.181 
One of the Serbian guards at the Susica camp in Vlasenica, Pero Popovic, admitted that 
“our aim was simply to get rid of the Muslims.”182 The United Nations Commission of 
Experts, in its January 1993 report to the Security Council, clarified that the ethnic 
cleansing in former Yugoslavia included all sorts of murder, rape, sexual assault, 
executions, and destruction of public and private property.183 The Commission’s final 
report in May 1994 identified these crimes of war: “mass murder, mistreatment of 
civilian prisoners of war, use of civilians as human shields, destruction of cultural 
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property, robbery of personal property, and attacks on hospitals, medical personnel, and 
locations with the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblem.”184  
This ethnic or religious persecution can have devastating consequences to civilian 
populations even if those populations are not the stated “enemy,” and even when there 
has been no formal declaration of war. 
Because of the death and destruction that can be caused by such ethnic 
persecution, international law should be available to stop or to punish such activity. Some 
provisions of international law do apply to such situations, even when they occur within a 
nation’s border. 
Under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, persecution of ethnic 
minorities is considered a war crime. According to Article 49, only the security of 
civilians or “imperative military reasons” justify the temporary evacuation of civilian 
population in occupied territory.185 Even then, Article 49 requires that they must be 
returned to their homes when the crisis is settled.186 The 1977 Additional Protocol II to 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 extends that principle to civilians in internal armed 
conflicts.187  
 
4. Rape and Torture 
Rape, and particularly the rape of civilians, has become all too familiar as a 
consequence, and even as a tactic, of armed conflict. Wartime rape often has a tragic 
effect that extends far beyond the physical and psychological pain. Victims of rape are 
themselves often stigmatized by their own cultures. Rape victims who become pregnant 
are often ostracized by their families and abandon their babies. Some may even commit 
suicide.  
Rape can be seen as a crime against humanity, and various provisions of 
international law are available to prosecute those responsible for wartime rapes. The four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide that “women shall be treated with all the regard due 
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to their sex.”188 The fourth Geneva Convention, in Article 27, also provides that women 
be protected against “rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”189 
Under a statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “persons 
responsible for […] rape committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character, and directed against any civilian population”190 shall be prosecuted before the 
tribunal. Furthermore, a commander can be prosecuted for rapes committed by his 
subordinates if he ordered or aided and abetted the rapes, or if he “knew or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the 
perpetrators thereof.”191 On the other hand, that statute does not expressly mention rape 
as a war crime. 
The 1998 Rome Statute for the establishment of a permanent International 
Criminal Court identifies rape, sexual slavery, and enforced prostitution as crimes against 
humanity,192 and as grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.193 
During the Gulf War II, Iraqi soldiers raped an estimated 500 Kuwaiti women, 
according to the 1992 report of members of an American health assistance team.194 Rape 
in Kuwait is not reported, because Kuwait is an Islamic country, where a woman’s sexual 
purity is a crucial prerequisite for marriage, and severe punishment can be aimed at 
woman who is proven not to be maiden. After the war, numerous people were treated in 
the Al-Riggae Specialized Center for War Victims, among them women and men who 
had been sexually abused during the Iraqi invasion.195  
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In Bosnia-Herzegovina, women were raped systematically as part of the ethnic 
cleansing against Muslims.196 In 1993, a European Community Commission estimated 
the number of rape victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina at 20,000, while the Muslim 
authorities placed the number at 50,000.197 Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of 
the U.N. writes: “the practice of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and rape and sexual assault 
in particular, have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they 
strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may also be inferred from the 
consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish 
their perpetrators.”198 In response, in June 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia issued indictments against eight Bosnian Serb soldiers for the rape 
of Muslim women in the Eastern Bosnian town of Foca during 1992 and 1993.199 
Members of the Serb military police were charged with repeatedly torturing and raping a 
fifteen-year old girl over the course of eight months, while she served in a Serb military 
brothel as a servant and a sex slave.200 Similarly, in Rwanda, the Ministry of Family and 
Women Affairs statistics showed that from July 1994 to April 1995, about 15,700 women 
of the age of thirteen to thirty five were raped.201 
Although torture is universally prohibited in armed conflict,202 whether 
international or internal, it is commonly used against combatants who have laid down 
their arms, and against civilians. Many provisions of international law are available to 
prosecute those responsible for torture, but enforcing a prohibition of torture is at best a 
daunting task. 
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The 1984 Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.”203 The Convention 
focuses on the principle that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may 
be invoked as a justification of torture.”204 Torture has been prohibited by international 
law as early as in The Hague Convention of 1907 on Customs of War. Article 44 of that 
Convention states that “a belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory 
occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its 
means of defense.”205 Similarly, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions 
makes it clear that “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture,”206 as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment,”207 are strictly forbidden under any 
circumstances. Moreover, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also 
forbids torture by declaring that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”208 According to the Statute of the former 
Yugoslavia Tribunal, torture is prohibited and personnel responsible for that crime shall 
be tried before the tribunal.209 
Despite those legal provisions, however, torture of civilians continues to 
accompany almost all warfare, whether internal or international. One notorious example 
of torture that accompanied armed conflict was during the Algerian War of 1954-1962, 
when Algerian Muslims of the National Liberation Front (NLF) began open warfare 
against French rule in Algeria.210 The French government refused to grant Algeria 
independence, and sent thousands of French troops to crush Algerian rebels. Among the 
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despicable practices of the French soldiers, torture was often used during investigations 
of Algerian suspects.211 In 1960, the French newspaper Le Monde published the text of 
the report of ICRC mission to Algeria, which contained evidence of the use of the torture 
against Algerian prisoners of war, and civilians in internment camps.212 
Another example of torture in armed conflict occurred during the Gulf War II, 
where the investigation of 108 persons executed in Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation 
showed that they had been severely tortured before they were killed.213 And in the Al-
Riggae Specialized Center for War Victims, two thirds of the 250 victims were survivors 
of physical torture, most of them men between twenty-one and forty years.214 
 
5. Violence and Drug Abuse, Induces by Armed Conflict Experiences 
 
Every gun that is fired…is in the final sense, a theft from those 
who hunger and are not fed, those who are called and not clothed. 
This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending 
the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of 
its children.215 
 
  
War consists of violence and destruction not only during armed conflict itself; it 
leaves its imprint even after the battles cease. Violence and drug abuse rates increase 
remarkably in its aftermath, particularly among children and adolescents. Arms are often 
readily available for anyone to acquire without restrictions. Therefore, crimes such as 
murder, burglary, and rape, as well as a profusion of such ills as drug abuse, revenge, and 
prostitution, are prevalent.  
An example of such violence was found in Kuwait, where it was reported that 
violence and drug abuse increased dramatically after the war of 1990-1991.216  In Africa, 
similarly, violence flared during the influx of Rwandan refugees into Congo-Zaïre, where 
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guns were distributed by the former Rwandan soldiers and militias.217 Some of the 
inhabitants were given guns and ordered to hunt elephants for the ivory trade.218 The 
most dramatic effects of war can often be found in children who witnessed filthy events 
in times of war, and who then become depressed, hopeless, or develop aggressive 
behavior. Those children are more likely themselves to become soldiers and engage in 
future combat. In recent years, it is estimated, around 300,000 children were serving 
either in government armies or in irregular armed forces.219 And to date no peace treaty 
has formally recognized the existence of child combatants.220 Nevertheless, the 
Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 impose an obligation on the parties to a conflict “to 
take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years do not take a direct part in hostilities,”221 and to “refrain from recruiting them into 
their armed forces.”222 Further, the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC) declares fifteen as a minimum age for going to war.223 Significantly, a 
number of governments and NGO’s propose to attach an Optional Protocol to the 
UNCRC in order to raise the minimum age for recruitment into armed forces to fifteen.224 
However, despite such provisions, the legal and psychological protection offered to 
children in times of armed conflicts is inadequate. Consider these disturbing findings: 
 
• A 1991 study of Iraqi children revealed that 62 percent 
worried that they may not live to become adults. 
• A study of 50 displaced children in Mozambique found that 
42 had lost a father or mother by violence, 29 had witnessed a 
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murder, 16 had been kidnapped, and all had been threatened, 
beaten, or starved. 
• A study conducted in September 1994 by [the United Nations 
Children’s Fund] (UNICEF) found that 50 percent of the 
Rwandan children interviewed had witnessed the killing of 
family members, and more than 75 percent had seen people 
murdered. More than 50 percent had witnessed mass killings 
in churches and schools; 75 percent had had their own lives 
threatened. UNICEF is helping to bury those killed in 
massacres in Rwanda because of the effect of the profusion of 
human remains on young children. The decision was reached 
after a Rwandan child pointed to a skull and said, “This is my 
mother.”225   
 
Scenes of violence during armed conflicts affect the morality of the population, 
especially the children. For example, children who lose their parents during armed 
conflict will often become involved in illegal activities such as prostitution and drug 
abuse. Children used as combatants may be particularly at risk for such behavior. 
Moreover, that behavior is likely to continue long after the end of the war. Indeed, the 
population as a whole is more likely to engage in violet and lawless behavior after a war, 
perhaps because of the availability of weapons, and almost certainly because of chaos, 
dislocation, the breakdown of governmental and social institutions, and the desire for 
revenge.  
 
6. Refugees 
Armed conflict often results in thousands of refugees who have been forced to 
abandon their lands and homes, and who then cause intense pressure on natural resources, 
especially water supplies, electric services, and forests in the over occupied refugee 
camps which are unprepared for receiving them. One commentator has identifies a class 
of “environmental or eco-refugees,” an expression used to describe “people displaced as 
a result of the effects of armed conflicts on their natural environment.”226 For instance, 
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towns in Somalia and refugee camps in Thailand, Pakistan, and other countries are 
surrounded by ever-growing areas of deforestation and desertification.227 
During the Former Soviet Union invasion followed by the civil war in 
Afghanistan, refugees began to flow over the border into Iran and Pakistan in 1978.228 It 
was estimated that more than 300 camps in Pakistan held 3.3 million Afghan refugees.229 
The costs of caring for the refugees were evaluated at $ 500 million per year. The Afghan 
refugees have deforested timber lands for firewood, and destroyed some grazing lands.230 
The 1982 report of the United States Committee for Refugees suggested that depletion of 
these green areas will be one of the most long-term environmental impacts of the war, 
lasting long after the war itself has ceased.231 On October 7, 2001, Another wave of 
approximately 1.3 million refugees left Afghanistan after the U.S. war against terrorist 
group of AlQaeda.232 Again, the wave of refugees entered into Pakistan and Iran caused a 
substantial humanitarian crisis, where providing all the needs to the refugees was not an 
easy task, especially during wintertime, where these areas are usually covered with snow. 
However, although the United States declared the war on terrorism and led the coalition 
attacks against terrorists’ groups in Afghanistan, they provided around $300 million as a 
financial aid to better life conditions for the Afghan refugees.233 
Another example was after the Gulf War II, when a United Nations inspection 
team found that 9,000 Iraqi homes were destroyed, leaving 72,000 civilian homeless,234 
which means broken families, lost livelihoods, and shattered hope. 
During the Rwandan Civil War of 1994, over one million Rwandese fled into 
Zaire, fearing the conflict between the government forces and the Tutsi forces, as well as 
the unknown consequences of the genocide that had spurred the revolt, most of them 
traveled with cattle, which had a severe impact on the forest as well as public health, as 
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many infectious materials were disposed of inside national parks in Zaïre.235 Moreover, 
large parts of the forests were systematically destroyed for firewood, cooking, and for 
commercial purposes. Destruction was particularly severe in the Nyamulagira sector of 
the Virunga National Park (PNVI) which was created in 1925, and is considered the first 
national park in Africa.236 According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the PNVI was declared a “World Heritage Site” in 
1979, and a “World Heritage Site in danger” in 1994.237 ICRC has urged development 
agencies in Rwanda to create programs for reforestation and to make repairs to water 
reservoirs damaged during the conflict.238 
In Kosovo, similarly, Serbian forces destroyed many towns and villages, not only 
displacing the resident population, but also destroying much of the documentation that 
established ownership rights in land and property.239 Thus, in Albania and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where huge numbers of refugees fled from Kosovo, 
their return to their homes was complicated as a result of the loss of their ownership 
documentation.240 
In sum, in an attempt to protect their lives, civilians abandon their homes to seek 
the protection of a neighboring State or international organization. Despite the miserable 
situations in refugees’ camps, civilians prefer to stay there rather than return home and 
risk being killed, raped, or tortured. Environmental damage can result from the conditions 
in refugees’ camps. Unfortunately, as of the date of this study, most of the refugees’ 
camps do not meet the minimum standards necessary to protect human health and the 
environment. When the war ends, and the refugees return home, the environment can be 
left destroyed with no party taking the responsibility to rehabilitate it.  
D- Environmental Impact of Preparing for Armed Conflict 
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There is no doubt that the activities of armed forces during and following 
hostilities can have devastating environmental impacts. However, military buildup for 
future warfare can also cause environmental harm.  
 
1. Storage and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes 
The most critical menace to the environment is the military’s storage and disposal 
of hazardous wastes, such as obsolete mustard gas, nerve gas, lead, arsenic, solvents, 
acids, and pesticides, among other toxic contaminants.241 These substances persist in the 
environment and because they do not decompose are destructive to human health, plants, 
soil, wildlife, air, and drinking water. In the United States, for instance, more than 20,000 
government land sites are contaminated with toxic substances, even though no war has 
been fought on U.S. soil for over a century.242 The Denver Rocky Mountain Arsenal, a 
disposal site for military wastes, for example, has been described by the media as “the 
most toxic square mile on earth.”243 Another example is Aberdeen Proving Grounds, in 
Maryland, one of the largest federal firing ranges in the United States, where military 
personnel have disposed of toxic substances such as cyanide, napalm, and lead in the 
soil.244 Aberdeen is of particular importance because it is near a national wildlife refuge 
and the Chesapeake Bay.245  
In the U.S., the danger presented by military disposal sites and the transportation 
of hazardous military wastes has given rise to citizen awareness and concern. Thus, the 
Military Toxic Project, a coalition of citizen groups formed to address military pollution, 
and to safeguard the transportation of hazardous materials, brought a suit in federal court 
challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s promulgation of the Military 
Munitions Rule. That Rule exempts from RCRA munitions and solid wastes that are 
transported or stored in accordance with the Department of Defense (DoD) standards.246 
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The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule violated the Federal Facility Compliance Act 
(FFCA).247 FFCA was passed by the Congress in 1992. It amended RCRA to explain that 
“DoD and all other federal agencies are subject to penalties, fines, permit fees, reviews of 
plans or studies, and inspection” under RCRA.248 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Rule, thus allowing the military to ignore 
the safety restrictions applicable to hazardous material generated by other sources.  
                                                          
According to Lanier-Graham, in a Congressional Review in February 1991 on the 
Defense Department’s Installation Restoration Program,249 many military sites are 
contaminated with toxic residues.250 Among the contaminated sites are:  
 
Anniston Army Depot, Alabama:  
Volatile organic compounds, heavy metals, paints, acids, 
solvents, degreasers, oil, and grease contaminate surface and 
groundwater. 
Hill Air Force Base, Utah:  
More than fourteen volatile organic chemicals such as benzene, 
methyl ethyl ketone, and ethanes, along with other hazardous and 
municipal wastes, have contaminated groundwater. 
Treasure Island Naval Station, Hunters’ Point Annex, San Francisco, 
California: 
Tests in 1987 detected benzene, PCBs, toluene, and phenols in 
the water, which is used for recreational activities, commercial 
navigation, and fishing. 
Twin Cities Air Force Reserve Base (Small Arms Range Landfill), 
Minneapolis, Minnesota:  
Ten sites have been contaminated. The largest area is the actual 
landfill, which is adjacent to the Minnesota River, and is located 
within the 100-year flood plain. Only 500 feet from the 
Minnesota Valley National Wildlife Refuge, it contains paint 
thinners and removers, paint, primers, and leaded fuel sludge.251 
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Cleaning up these hazardous toxic sites will take time and money. Estimates are 
that it will take at least thirty years and $ 400 billion to clean up the pollution caused by 
U.S. military activities in these areas.252 Nevertheless, U.S. environmental laws require 
the cleanup of these sites, as will be discussed later in Part Three. 
The problem of military wastes is not limited to the U.S. The former Soviet 
Union’s military-industrial complex, much of which is still in the Russian Federation, 
also generated hazardous toxic sites. One of these complexes is the Lenin Steelworks, 
which has enough pollutants to cover 4,000 square miles.253 Furthermore, in 1992, when 
the Soviet military withdrew from the former East Germany, about 1.5 million tons of 
ammunitions were destroyed, by burning in the open air, and highly toxic contaminants 
were released into the atmosphere.254 
 
2. Military Training Areas 
Another environmental threat arises from military training areas, used by armed 
forces as bombing targets, weapons testing grounds, and training facilities. The United 
States Colorado Air National Guard, for instance, has moved to install a military 
operations area (MOA) in the Great Sand Dunes National Monument. The National 
Guard estimates that, “fifty fighters, two to six bombers, and ten support aircraft would 
use the MOA twenty-four times a year.”255 However, the forest service rejected the 
project, as it would impact water quality, wildlife, and the migratory herds of bighorn 
sheep and elk in the area.256 Therefore, the project was suspended to avoid environmental 
damage. 
However, the prospect of environmental damage did not prevent military training 
operations in Reid State Park in Maine. There a citizen group sued the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, for 
violating the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, in connection with Operation 
Snowy Beach. That exercise consisted of the landing of about 900 marines, who would 
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bivouac in the park over 3 or 4 days, and cause potential environmental damage by 
moving over rocky outcroppings in the wooded upland area of the park.257 However, the 
court found that “a limited maneuver or training exercise by small elements of a military 
department would not be a major action nor would it normally affect the environment 
significantly.”258  
Potential environmental damage has long been an issue with regard to the U.S. 
military’s use of the island of Vieques, an offshore island of Puerto Rico, as an operations 
site. The United States Navy has used Vieques since 1941 as a maneuver area for its 
Atlantic Fleet. Inspections made by the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (EQB) 
found evidence of environmental destruction to land, coastal waters, flora and fauna from 
the detonation of bombs and other armaments.259 Deforestation was so severe that 
tropical lagoons and wetlands dried up and their beds were filled with bomb craters. 
Furthermore, the land was covered with “fragments of bombs, and projectiles, 
unexploded bombs, charred junk, military debris, discarded parachutes, and other 
wastes.”260 The island residents were left with a wasteland.261  
As a result, in 1979, an action was brought by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
to enjoin the U.S. Navy from using Vieques and the water surrounding it as a maneuver 
area. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico262 rejected the 
Commonwealth’s request for a comprehensive injunction, holding that the Navy’s 
violations were not causing any “appreciable harm” to the environment,263 and that 
because of the importance of the island as a maneuver area “the granting of the injunctive 
relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to defendant 
Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation.”264 However, on appeal, the First 
Circuit265 vacated the District Court’s order and ordered the Navy to cease any activities 
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in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), until it obtained a 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.266 While that 
decision required the Navy to adhere to one specific water-pollution statute, other k
of environmentally damaging activity continued. In 1999, a 500-pound bomb dropped 
from a United States Navy F-18 airplane and struck an observation platform on 
Vieques.
inds 
ironmental 
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Rican island of Vieques.274 He said “[t]here’s been some harm done to people in the past. 
These are our friends and neighbors, and they don’t want us there.”275 
Thus, the environmental damage to Vieques may be halted. If so, it will be as the 
result of many complicated political factors, not solely because of concerns about the 
environment. It should also be noted that the referendum resulted from the political 
agreement between two leaders, not from any requirement of international law.  
In sum, military training areas present a great threat to human lives. For example, 
on October 4, 2001, seventy-eight passengers and crew-members of the Sibir Tu-154 
airplane killed when a Ukrainian missile launched during military exercises. The Tu-154 
crashed into the Black Sea while en route from Tel-Aviv, Israel, to Siberia.276 
Another example is the death of five U.S. citizens and one New Zealander 
observers, when an U.S. warplane accidentally bombed them during their observance to 
the U.S. Kuwaiti military exercises, in Kuwait.277 
 
3. Nuclear Weapons 
A nuclear weapon is: “any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in 
an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for 
use for warlike purposes.”278  
The effect of nuclear weapons on the natural environment is still beyond our 
calculation. A nuclear explosion includes “blast effects, thermal radiation, initial nuclear 
radiation, electromagnetic pulse, and radioactive fallout.”279 The nuclear bomb that 
destroyed Hiroshima in 1945 was a modest nuclear weapon in comparison to today’s 
standards. “It was rated as a 12.5 kilotons weapon, equivalent to 12,500 tons of high 
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explosive.280 The nuclear fireball was as hot as the sun, when detonated; in less than a 
thousandth of a second the fireball grew to more than 300 feet (100 meters) wide, and 
6,000 feet (2 kilometers) wide after ten seconds. At the same time, it rose like a hot air 
balloon, at about 300 feet every second.”281 The International Atomic Energy Agency 
declared, “The nuclear weapons legacy comprises two components: their actual use, 
twice fifty years ago in August 1945, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their potential use, 
in the form of nuclear weapons testing and environmental releases of radioactive 
materials from the nuclear weapons fuel cycle.”282 The International Atomic Energy 
Agency estimates that 520 atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons were conducted between 
1945 and 1980, which caused “substantial emission of radionucleides” and “worldwide 
environmental contamination.”283 
The United States arsenal contains some of the most complicated nuclear 
weapons in the world. Each one has thousands of parts. Some of their materials, “like 
plutonium, uranium, and tritium, are radioactive materials that decay.”284 America’s 
nuclear weapons program, which consists of designing, producing and testing nuclear 
weapons, involves waste storage at 280 facilities at twenty sites across the United 
States.285 These facilities have released huge amounts of hazardous waste into the 
environment. For example, at Hanford Nuclear Reservation in southeastern Washington, 
44,000 workers were exposed to radiation that might have caused an increase in multiple 
myeloma, a bone marrow cancer, among them, according to Dr. Ethel S. Gilbert, a 
biostatistician at Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.286 Radioactive particles have 
been also found in frogs, ducks, rabbits and turtles.287 Other contaminated sites include 
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the Pantex plant in Texas, Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, and Portsmouth Uranium 
Enrichment Complex at Piketon, Ohio.288  
In a 1955 naval manual, the U.S. Government declared that “the use of nuclear 
weapons against enemy combatants and military objects is legally permissible until an 
express rule of international law prohibits their use.”289 Significantly, after about four 
decades, the U.S. Senate, on October 13, 1999, rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), which was signed by President Clinton in 1996, on the ground that would 
jeopardize the safety and security of the United States nuclear arsenal. James Woolsey, 
one of the CTBT opponents, said: “We have slain a large dragon [the Soviet Union], but 
we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.”290 That 
statement, while understandable in the context of military defense, is unacceptable from 
the view of the environmental security. If the U.S., as the unchallenged superpower, fails 
to lead the international community towards disarmament, then the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction will continue to threaten human lives and the environment, 
even if no nuclear war taken place. With regard to the testing of nuclear weapons, the 
U.S. already has in place the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), a series of 
experiments and computer simulations that allow testing of weapons systems without 
actually detonating them. The Department of Energy hopes that by 2010, the SSP will 
have the “capabilities that are necessary to provide continuing high confidence in the 
annual certification of the stockpile without the necessity for nuclear testing.”291 Perhaps 
other countries with nuclear weapons will follow the American program, and thereby 
reduce the environmental threat posed by nuclear weapons programs.  
However, Russia retains a significant military capacity, including over 6000 
nuclear warheads.292 In 1953, the former Soviet Union established reprocessing plants 
and began storing highly radioactive wastes in steel tanks.293 In 1957, the cooling system 
failed at the Chelyabinsk site, and the subsequent heating of radioactive materials led to 
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an explosion that emitted huge amounts of radiation into the air. An estimated 500,000 
people were exposed to radiation, and surrounding land and water were contaminated.294  
And by analogy, even the use of nuclear power in peacetime could harm the 
environment. For example, in 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power station,295 tons of 
radioactive uranium and graphite were released into the atmosphere.296 Seventy percent 
of these emissions descended on the people, animals and crops of Belarus.297  Thirty-one 
people working at or in the immediate vicinity of the plant died, twenty-nine of them 
from radiation sickness.298 According to researchers reports “levels of thyroid cancer 
among children in the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor had risen to eighty times 
higher than the normal rate.”299 More than 30,000 acres of farmland in Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus have been abandoned and 70,000 square kilometers are radioactive.300 The 
Belarussian National Science and Research Institute of Agricultural Radiobiology 
estimated that it would take six hundred years before the cropland can be rehabilitated.301 
Even today, in Russia, about 600 million curies of high level nuclear wastes are 
stored in liquid form along with about 500,000 tons solid waste. Studies have shown 
radioactive leakage into the groundwater.302 The northern coastal zone of Russia contains 
radioactive contamination, from nuclear weapons testing at Novaya Zemlya, dumping of 
nuclear materials from submarines and surface ships in the Kara Sea, and dumping of 
high-level radioactive wastes into the Kara, Barents, and White Seas.303  
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A great deal of high-level nuclear waste comes from nuclear reactors operated for 
military purposes.304 Reactor accidents have occurred on military naval vessels, wastes 
produced by the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium into rivers have been dumped, 
and discarded nuclear reactors have been stored improperly.  
An example of dramatic accident occurred on April 7, 1989, when the Russian 
nuclear sub Komsomolets sank 1700 meters below the surface of the Barents Sea off the 
Norwegian coast. Evidence has shown radioactive plutonium leakage into the sea, one of 
the richest fishing areas in the world.305 Potentially disastrous accidents have occurred 
since the end of the Soviet era. For instance, on October 17, 1993, a Russian Navy tanker 
opened an undersea valve and released over 200,000 gallons of radioactive waste into the 
waters of the Sea of Japan, ninety miles from the Japanese city of Nakhodka. That release 
impacted the oceanic food chain negatively.306 Most recently, on August 12, 2000, the 
Russian nuclear submarine Kursk, sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea with nuclear 
reactor, bombs, and missiles. All 118 men on board died.307 A Norwegian environmental 
group said the Kursk’s reactor could explode on the seabed, spreading radiation 
throughout the region.308 Yet another environmental hazard exists in the storage facility 
of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP), where in 1996 cracks in the walls and 
carrying structures of the storage building allowed radioactive water to leak from the 
cooling pool into the soil.309 The storage facility is just 90 meters from the shore of the 
Baltic Sea. According to Sergey Kharitonov, an LNPP employee and member of the 
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Green World Association (GWA), about 360 liters of radioactive water leaked from the 
storage pool into the soil daily.310  
Interestingly, despite this history of Russian and Soviet nuclear hazards, in 2000, 
the Russian Goskomekologia (State Committee on Environment) stopped the 
construction of a U.S. funded plutonium storage site in Mayak due to violation of Russian 
environmental laws.311 The storage site was intended to be an interim storage facility for 
plutonium from nuclear warheads. The U.S. Department of Defense provided $55 million 
of the total construction cost of $250 million. The first stage was expected to be complete 
by the end of 2000.312 However, the Goskomekologia stopped construction after it found 
an ecological risk in the leakage of radioactive elements into the groundwater.313 
The United States and the former Soviet Union do not stand alone. The 
environment of other nations has also felt the devastation of nuclear weapons. France, for 
instance, conducted 193 nuclear test explosions at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls, part of 
French Polynesia, 46 above the ground and 147 below. These tests in the South Pacific 
polluted lagoons and atolls with plutonium, tritium, cesium, and strontium. During the 
nuclear testing, the rate of fish poisoning rose from 200 cases per 100,000 in 1960 to 
20,700 cases per 100,000 in 1970s.314 In 1973, New Zealand filed an application in the 
Registry of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to sue France for damage caused by 
radioactive fall-out from the South Pacific tests alleging that it had caused severe 
environmental harm to the New Zealand ecosystem. The ICJ declared that the French 
Atmospheric nuclear tests carried “a particularly serious risk of environmental pollution, 
and are considered a source of acute anxiety for present day mankind.”315 The ICJ also 
invited the international community to undertake serious efforts in order to prevent future 
atmospheric tests.316 However, the court took no action against France, holding that New 
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Zealand’s claim had become moot317 when France announced (while the case was 
pending) that it would cease atmospheric nuclear testing. However, on August 21, 1995, 
New Zealand instituted proceedings against France in the ICJ after France announced on 
June 13, 1995, that it would conduct a final series of eight underground nuclear weapons 
tests at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufu in September 1995.318 New Zealand asked 
the Court to declare that French underground nuclear tests in French Polynesia 
constituted a violation of New Zealand’s rights under international law, and that such 
testing was unlawful because France did not prepare an environmental impact 
assessment.319 However, the Court dismissed New Zealand’s claim, on September 22, 
1995, holding that it was not authorized by the earlier case because that case dealt only 
with atmospheric testing.320  
 
4. Storage, Testing, and Disposal of Chemical and Biological Weapons 
The storage, testing, and disposal of chemical and biological weapons also raise 
the issue of environmental devastation when preparing for armed conflict. The longer the 
chemical and biological agents are stored, the greater the chance of leakage.  
First, it is necessary to distinguish between chemical and biological weapons. 
Chemical weapons are synthesized in laboratories, and are designed to affect human 
health and the environment.321 Biological agents, on the other hand, are living creatures, 
or are derived from living creatures, that cause diseases in man, plants, or animals.322 
There are six categories of biological weapons: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, chlamydia, 
fungi, and toxins.323 These kinds of biological agents can spread across hundreds of 
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thousands of square miles, and can be obtained inexpensively.324 Their effectiveness as 
weapons has been increased as a result of scientific progress in the field of microbial 
genetics and virology.325 For instance, scientists at the Australian National University in 
Canberra found a way to make viruses more lethal by developing “a biological 
contraceptive to fight plagues of mice and rats, [through] immunizing the animals against 
their own sperm and eggs.”326 Accordingly, they injected a specific gene into mousepox 
in order to weaken the immunity system, and turned the harmless virus into a rodent 
killer.327 Similar techniques may be used by researchers to strengthen biological agents 
based on “human viruses such as smallpox.”328 Given the availability of this 
biotechnology, efforts should be taken to prevent such inventions from falling into the 
hands of madmen or terrorists, and to strengthen the Convention of Biological Weapons. 
The United Nations classifies chemical weapons into seven categories: nerve 
agents,329 blister agents, choking agents, blood agents, tear and harassing agents, 
psychochemicals, and herbicides. These agents can cover tens of square miles,330 and 
once released into the environment, some can persist for years. Although recent 
developments in technology have produced even more sophisticated chemical weapons, 
chemical warfare is not new. In ancient times, chemicals were added to fire to cause more 
destruction. And drinking water supplies were contaminated by chemicals. Mustard gas 
was used extensively in World War II in order to exterminate civilians. In addition, in 
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1935, during the Italian-Ethiopian War, Italy used mustard gas on unarmed civilians 
causing thousands of deaths.331 
Chemical and biological weapons can have devastating effects even when not 
actually used as weapons. For example, in the United States, where 40,000 tons of nerve 
gas and mustard gas are stored,332 one of the oldest stockpiling facilities of chemical 
weapons is the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where nerve gas has been stored since 1950. 
Inspections have detected that underground water was contaminated with chemical agents 
from Arsenal, causing the deaths of animals and about 2000 ducks and wildfowl every 
year.333 
In Utah, on March 13, 1968, as part of an over flight spray test, an Air Force F-4E 
aircraft released 2500 pounds of VX nerve gas over the Dugway Proving Grounds, near 
Salt Lake City, and Skull Valley. Reports showed that about 6400 sheep that had been 
grazing in the area were killed, and news articles voiced suspicion that the chemical agent 
was the cause of the death.334 In 1969 and 1970, the Journal of American Veterinary 
Medical Association published articles on the sheep deaths, and reported that sheep were 
poisoned from eating VX- contaminated forage…”335  
In 1996, the environmental groups Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc., 
Sierra Club, and Vietnam Veterans of America filed suit, challenging the operation of the 
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF)336by the U.S. Department of the 
Army to incinerate chemical agents. The plaintiffs claimed that the Army had violated the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to prepare a supplemental 
environmental impact statement on the basis of significant new information relevant to 
environmental issues, and various environmental statutes such as Clean Water Act 
(CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 1986 Department of 
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Defense Authorization Act (DAA), and sought injunctive relief,337 on the grounds that 
the Army’s continued operations presented an imminent and substantial endangerment
human health and the environment.
 to 
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The American stockpile of chemical weapons is housed at the following eight 
locations around the United States:  
1- Tooele Depot, Utah (42.3 percent) 
2- Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (12 percent) 
3- Umatella Depot, Oregon (11.6 percent) 
4- Pueblo Depot, Colorado (9.9 percent) 
5- Anniston Depot, Alabama (7.1 percent) 
6- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (5 percent) 
7- Newport Ammunition Plant, Indiana (3.9 percent), and  
8- Lexington Depot, Kentucky (1.6 percent).341 
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Unfortunately, dumping these agents at sea is the easiest method to dispose of 
them. However, doing so results in the contamination of water, fish, and plants. The 
United States dumped 1,706 concrete containers, each filled with thirty rockets 
containing nerve agents, into the Atlantic Ocean during 1967 and 1968.343 Unsafe 
haphazard disposal of chemical agents has not been limited to the U.S., or to that time 
period. At the end of World War I, the Germans army dumped 20,000 tons of stockpiled 
chemical weapons into the Baltic Sea, which has since then continued to poison Danish 
fish and fishermen.344 Sunken ships and aircraft shot down during armed conflict rest at 
the bottom of many rivers, seas, and oceans, and cause a serious threat to marine life 
from the toxic and hazard substances found on them. An important example is found in 
the Skagerrak seabed between Norway, Sweden, and Denmark where it is estimated that 
21 ships loaded with German chemical weapons were sunk during World War II.345 The 
Danish Ministry of the Environment claimed in 1984 that between 36,000 and 50,000 
tons of chemical ammunition had been dumped in the Baltic Sea by Soviet forces 
following World War II. The Danish report documented that 5,000 tons of nerve gas had 
been sunk off the Denmark coast, and 34 ships and 151,425 tons of ammunition had been 
sunk in the Skagerrak Sea immediately following the war.346 Another location that has 
been affected by the World War II sunken ships is the Solomon Islands, in the South 
Pacific.347  
The Solomon Islands became the eventual burial site of countless 
sailors and marines from the United States, Australia, and Japan 
who were lost with the sinking of fifty warships. This obscure 
graveyard, quiet and unobtrusive for over fifty years except for 
the occasional relic or munitions that washed ashore, has begun 
to seep oil. Oil from theses ships, possibly bunkers (heavy fuel 
oil) or highly toxic lubricating oil, is believed to be destroying the 
Solomon Islands’ fragile coral reef ecosystem.348 
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These chemical agents are insidious and extremely toxic. Nerve agents (VX, 
designated GA or Tabun, and GB or Sarin) are odorless, colorless, and tasteless 
organophosphorus esters which attack the human nervous system directly, in both liquid 
and vapor forms.349 They can cause an enormous range of symptoms, including runny 
nose, tightness in the chest, dimming of vision, pinpointing of the pupils, drooling, 
excessive sweating, involuntary urination or defecation, twitching, jerking, and 
staggering, headache, drowsiness, coma and convulsion, finally, cessation of breathing 
and death.350 Nerve agents also present a tremendous risk to the environment. For 
example, at Fort Greely, Alaska, in 1966, 200 canisters of nerve gas which had been 
accumulated on the surface of a frozen lake sank through the ice.351 Six years later fifty-
three nearby caribou died, and the Army refused to investigate the site.352 Herbicides and 
agricultural chemicals can poison or desiccate the leaves of plants, causing them to lose 
their leaves or die.353 Some herbicides, particularly those containing organic arsenic, are 
also toxic for man and animals.354 Chemical and nerve agents manufactured and 
stockpiled by the U.S. Army at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and used by the Army during 
and after World War II, polluted the groundwater and the soil, killing birds exposed to 
toxic wastes, and damaging crops and livestock from contaminated well water at adjacent 
farms.355  
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries 
Act,356 in an attempt to regulate the dumping of all toxic material into the ocean waters, 
and to limit dumping of substances hazardous to human health and the environment. The
need for ocean dumping legislation is reflected in the findings and recommendations of
the Council on Environmental Quality: “Ocean dumped wastes are heavily concentrated 
and contain materials that have a number of adverse effects. Many are toxic to human a
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marine life, deplete oxygen necessary to maintain the marine ecosystem, reduce fish 
population and other economic resources, and damage aesthetic values…”357 Section 101 
(a) of the Act prohibits the transportation from the United States for the purpose of 
dumping of any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agents and high-level 
radioactive wastes beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That statute 
thus prohibits the dumping of herbicide compounds intended for use in warfare activities, 
and bars the dumping of nerve gases as well.358 Section 101 (c) prohibits the 
transportation of any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agent or high-level 
radioactive waste by any Federal employee or agency from a source outside the United 
States for dumping into the ocean, coastal, and other waters.359  
Appropriate technology exists to make the disposal of these agents less hazardous. 
In the early 1980s, about thirty-eight tons of GB (Sarin) and eight tons of VX were 
destroyed by incineration at the Army’s Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System 
(CAMDS), the Army’s pilot demilitarization plant, located at Tooele Army Depot, 
Utah.360 In 1988, the U.S. Army completed construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical 
Agent Disposal System, a large incinerator in the South Pacific Islands used to destroy 
chemical agents.361 The U.S. Army spent more than $340 million studying the safety of 
incineration, considering alternatives, conducting environmental studies, and holding 
public hearings.362 The Army funded a $400,000 study conducted by the National 
Research Council, a part of the National Academy of Sciences, which concluded that 
incineration was the best way to eliminate the chemical weapons.363 Moreover, the 
independent group Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) asserted that “leakage 
would endanger the environment much more seriously than any pollution produced by 
burning the weapons in the incinerator on the island.”364  
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Disposal of these substances can create hazards not only to water, but to land and 
soil resources as well. When the United Kingdom tested the military potential of Bacillus 
anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, in Gruinard, a Scottish island, between 1941 
and 1942, the testing contaminated the island seriously.365 Millions of anthrax spores 
became buried in the soil of the island, which remains uninhabitable to this day.366  
Unfortunately, the storage, testing, and disposal of chemical and biological 
weapons hold terrifying prospects for humanity and natural environment by upsetting the 
balance of nature. Nevertheless, these weapons are increasingly used among nations 
despite the existence of the international conventions that regulate and prohibit, to some 
extents, their use, possession, and sale. 
 
E- Environmental Damage during Armed Conflict 
The possible destruction of the environment during wartime has become a threat 
to every human, not just those in the armed forces of belligerent nations. Technology 
makes that threat even more serious than ever before. By examining the impacts of war 
historically, perhaps it is possible to gain a better understanding of today’s environmental 
concerns. Although the causes of environmental damage during warfare have remained 
largely the same throughout history, the consequences are changing. Large populations 
and advanced technology have made the effects of environmental damage even more 
catastrophic. “Greater destruction is now possible in a single day than in months of 
warfare two thousand years ago, even if nuclear weapons are not used.”367 
During Gulf War II, in 1991, the world witnessed millions of gallons of oil 
pouring into the gulf waters. Television viewers around the world saw horror stories 
about Iraqi destruction of the Kuwaiti environment. Middle Eastern residents looked on 
helplessly as the midday skies turned black with smoke, and an oily rain covered the 
countryside. The beaches in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were coated with crude oil and 
littered with dead marine life and birds.368 Tens of thousands of birds and untold numbers 
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of fish died.369 Crude oil damaged sea grass beds, algae, coral reefs, and nesting areas.370 
These effects on the Gulf ecosystem will continue to damage the food chain and marine 
life for many years.371 The United States Environmental Protection Agency conducted a 
study that showed, for short periods of time, the pollution levels of small particles in the 
air in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were up to 400 times higher than permissible United 
States air quality standards,372 as a direct result of the burning oil and oil fields.  
Yet the experience in 1991 was not the first, nor will it be the last, that the 
environment has suffered at the hands of warring forces.373 Warfare has had a dramatic 
impact on biodiversity, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere. This section 
will examine the impact on each of these portions of the earth’s natural systems. 
 
1. Biodiversity 
Biological diversity, as defined by Article 2 of the Rio de Janeiro Convention on 
Biological Diversity, is: 
 
the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part. 
This includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems.374  
 
The earlier discussion in section (C) examined the impact of armed conflict 
impacts on civilian populations. This section will examine some of its effects on domestic 
and wild animals, agricultural crops, forests, and other ecological areas. Although 
civilians rely on these natural resources, it is important to consider their intrinsic 
ecological value, quite apart from their immediate utilitarian value.  
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a. Animals and Wildlife 
Warfare has always taken its toll on animals375 and wildlife.376 During World 
War I, animal populations were severely impacted by the widespread fighting.377 For 
example, the European buffalo, or wisent, was endangered prior to the start of the war
and had been reduced to a small population in Eastern Europe. The wisent’s habitat was 
virtually destroyed by the German occupation forces, which cut down the Polish forest t
obtain lumber needed for military operations. The wisents had no place left to hide and
were easy prey for the German force
 
o 
 
s.378 
                                                          
During World War II, wildlife in the South Pacific was severely impacted.379 Of 
particular significance was the damage to the bird population when nesting places were 
destroyed by bombing and other military operations, and patterns of migration were 
interrupted because of the war.380 Birds in the South Pacific were killed and their eggs 
smashed by the thousands. There were other reported accidental killings of animals 
throughout World War II.381 A large number of whales were killed during the war by oil 
spills due to the sinking of oil tankers.382 Furthermore, when Germans occupied Norway 
from 1940 to 1945, they were fearful of their position in Norway, expecting a Soviet 
attack, so they destroyed everything in an area of 15 million acres, including property, 
crops, and wildlife. The reindeer population of 95,000 was reduced by half during that 
period.383 
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During the Vietnam War, wildlife in South East Asia was severely impacted, 
particularly by the widespread use of airborne chemical defoliants.384 Loss of animal 
habitats was caused by bombs, defoliants, land clearing, and fires. Four of the eleven rare 
species of mammals became extinct because of the war, and several others were 
threatened. For example, the red-shanked douc langur, a small monkey not found 
anywhere else in the world, is facing extinction.385 In addition, thousands of dead cattle 
and river fish where killed by herbicides dumped by U.S. military in South Vietnam.386 
Since most spraying was aerial, not only agricultural lands but also humans, animals and 
marine life were all affected. Cattle were killed as a result of eating contaminated grass. 
The dead animals, in turn, concentrated pollution in the waterways, threatening those 
vital ecosystems and the life that depended on them.  
Prior to Gulf War II, in 1991, Kuwait had a camel population of 10,000. That 
population is now estimated at 2,000 camels.387 Desert warfare at night was often most 
dangerous for the camels. By night, the troops saw only blips on a radar screen. 
Assuming an approaching Iraqi enemy, the tank troops fired at and destroyed whatever 
caused the blips on screen. Too often the following morning they found the desert 
covered with dead camels.388 Saving the endangered Arabian oryx populations in Kuwait 
was an ongoing project prior to the war; it has come to an end as a result of the war.389 
Moreover, Iraqi soldiers destroyed the Kuwait City Zoo, killing and maiming the zoo 
animals. Fewer than twenty-four animals could be found after the Iraqi departure, from 
over four hundred prior to the invasion.390 A United States Army veterinarian, Colonel 
Philip Alm, began caring for the wounded animals, finding food and water for them, and 
removing bullets from some victims at the zoo.391 Examinations made by an American 
veterinarian showed that many animals had died neither from bullets nor from diseases, 
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but apparently from ingesting the toxic chemicals produced by Gulf War II and the 
Kuwaiti oil fires.392 Wildlife in the Gulf region was affected due to damage to food 
sources, military vehicles running over animals and their burrows, noise and air pollution, 
oil lakes and trenches, and heat generated by the Kuwaiti oil fires.393 Many of the animals 
(gazelle, camel, Arabian hare, wild ass, porcupines, Syrian hyena, Asiatic jackal, Persian 
and Arabian wolves, and wildcats) that resided there before the troop deployment 
probably migrated to less disturbed areas.394 Rodents such as jerboa, mice, snakes, and 
lizards were not able to leave the area of deployment, and many of them were crushed by 
military vehicles.395 A Kuwaiti scientist reported that many sheep in Kuwait City died 
due to inhalation of smoke and other pollutants.396 Other reports from Kuwait stated that 
many rodents, snakes, and birds fell into the oil lakes and died. Animals were also killed 
by the intense heat when they tried to leave their burrows, or were forced to remain 
underground and starve to death.397 
Warfare in Rwanda had a similarly devastating effect on animal life and the 
environment. The Government of Rwanda has reported, to the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the degradation of two protected areas, Akagera 
National Park and the hunting reserve, Mutara.398 It accused a rebel group, the Front 
Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), of participating in the systematic massacre of animals, 
“lions, leopards, buffalo, antelope, zebras, giraffes, rhinos, and elephants,” and in the 
destruction of their habitats.399 Moreover, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire), civil war stopped efforts to protect the last habitat of the pygmy 
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chimpanzee, a species endemic to the country.400 Local people are forced to depend on 
the forest for survival, and about 15,000 of the apes are threatened by those people.401 
 
b. Agricultural Crops, Forests, and Other Ecological Areas 
The destruction of agricultural crops for military purposes is probably as old as 
war itself. As recorded in the Old Testament, Philistine crops -corn, grapes, and olives- 
were destroyed by Israelite resistants as long ago as the twelfth century BC.402 One 
forester who witnessed the impact of World War I on agriculture crops and forests 
commented: 
 
[o]f all the injuries that are inflicted upon nature by war, forest 
destruction is one of the heaviest and most worthy of 
complaints…In any case, destroyed forests…must be tended with 
total effort for many years, often decades, until you can halfway 
celebrate their recovery and until you have completely healed the 
damage and devastation.403 
 
In the 1950s, the British carried out chemical attacks by air and from the ground 
on crops in Malaya, in an attempt to suppress an insurgency.404  
The use of herbicides by the U.S. in South Vietnam caused enormous damage to 
crop lands during the 1960s and 1970s.405 Operation Ranch Hand was the most infamous 
of the United States government’s spraying operations. According to an Agent Orange 
Brief published in 1991 by the Department of Veterans Affairs, over twenty million 
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gallons of herbicides were employed on more than six million acres of land in Southeast 
Asia.406  
The routine military policy of systematic, large-scale, and indiscriminate crop 
destruction407 destroyed an estimated 108.9 million kilograms of food during 1967 
alone.408 Of this total, seventy five million kilograms was classified as rice, and the 
remaining 33.9 million kilograms was classified as dicotyledonous food crops.409 The 
same scientific advisory group concluded that crop destruction operations were “an 
integral, essential, and effective part of the total U.S. war effort in Indochina.”410 
It has been estimated that more than 300,000 acres of mangrove forests were lost 
through the use of defoliants and napalm during the Vietnam War, severely stressing the 
area’s mangrove ecosystem.411 Even today, nearly twenty percent of the tidal mangroves 
and 30 percent of the rare mangroves have not recovered. Areas of wasteland have been 
named “Agent Orange Museums.”412 
The U.S. military also used fire as a weapon of war in Vietnam. One particularly 
destructive fire was set in the U Minh area in Southwest Vietnam. The Advanced 
Research Projects Agency reported, as the result of that fire, 
 
* 75 to 85 percent of the true forest destroyed 
* 50 percent of various outlying swamps destroyed 
* Hundreds of tons of ammunition, rice, and petroleum products 
destroyed 
* The probable dislocation of large quantities of supplies and 
ammunition and the relocation of several major Viet Cong 
headquarters and service areas 
* The increased opportunity for aerial reconnaissance of the area 
* The lack of lumber and possible food shortage for the local 
populace 
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* The increased danger of floods in areas adjacent to the forest 
since there were no longer trees or underbrush to provide water-
shed.413 
 
The United States developed chemical weapons including agents “white, purple, 
blue, green, pink, and orange” to destroy the vegetation in South Vietnam.414 Over a 
period of ten years, 19.4 million gallons of herbicide were spread over the land, sixty 
percent of which was Agent Orange.415 The use of Agent Orange416 had been shown to 
cause birth defects in laboratory animals.417 The Herbicide Assessment Commission of 
the American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reported in 1970 that 
twenty to fifty percent of the South Vietnam’s mangrove forests had been destroyed, and 
half of the hard wood and rubber trees had been killed,418 as a result of the use of Agent 
Orange and other herbicides. 
The vegetation in a war zone can suffer direct damage in hostile action, or various 
forms of indirect damage.419 For instance, Germany ruthlessly exploited the timber 
resources during World War II in those portions of Europe that it occupied, including 
France, Poland, and Netherlands,420 by chopping down the trees to build military 
structures. During World War I, the occupied zones of France were estimated to have 
included about 600 thousand hectares of forest, about five percent of the total French 
forest lands. Of this area, some 200 thousand hectares were damaged sufficiently to 
require artificial reforestation.421 Moreover, agricultural lands were destroyed in the U.S. 
to support military operations during World War I, even though the war was half a world 
away. The Americans believed that “while Europe fought the battles on their lands, the 
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United States grew the food needed to feed the Allied world,”422 so the battlefields 
“spread to the cotton fields of the South, the cornfields of the Middle West, and the wheat 
fields of the Great Plains.”423 During World War I, 40 million new acres of land were 
cultivated. Land that was not fit for growing crops was forced into production.424 Natural 
wetlands were destroyed in the Northwest to make room for wheat crops. Native grasses 
were plowed under in the Southwest to make new wheat farms. Cotton was overplanted 
in the South, depleting the soil of nutrients. Timber forests in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan were destroyed to meet wartime needs.425 
More recently, NATO carried out intensive war operations, including bombing, in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing damage to the national parks Kopaonik, 
Fruska Gora, and Lake Skadar.426 According to the Balkans Task Force mission, three 
sites in Serbia were adversely impacted: 
 
* Hotel Baciste: coniferous forest with crater damage and many 
uncleared, unexploded cluster bombs. The craters will be filled 
and the area rehabilitated, using local trees. 
* Velika Gobelja: sub-alpine meadow; damaged by 11 craters. 
Some of the craters on a steep hillside should be filled to prevent 
erosion. 
* Djuricka Ravan: 150 trees, covering an area of about 0.5 ha, 
were damaged. Rehabilitation and monitoring programs are 
planned.427 
 
National parks in other countries have also been damaged by warfare:  
 
* In Burundi, Kibira and Ruvubu National Parks were used as 
sanctuaries and entry points for guerrillas fighting the 
government. They became operational areas for government 
troops. 
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* In Sri Lanka, Wilpattu National Park was attacked by Tamil 
rebels in 1989, who killed over a dozen guards and destroyed 
facilities, causing a withdrawal of conservation staff.428 
 
In Kuwait, the Gulf War II caused extensive damage to the fragile plant and 
animal life of the desert. Desert plants are an integral part of the desert ecosystem. These 
plants provide shelter for small desert creatures, secure the desert soil, prevent erosion, 
and provide food for grazing domestic and wild animals.429 Some 400 species of desert 
plants and flowers growing in Kuwait, such as arfaj, with its salty taste, and al-awsaj, a 
strong thorny plant with small leaves and raspberry shaped red flowers. Both plants are 
eaten by camels. In addition, several common plants grow in the desert. Of these plants, 
the Anogllis femina with the blue-crimson flower and the Senecio desfontainei with its 
golden yellow flowers are most frequently found.430 However, most of these plants were 
destroyed during the Iraqi invasion in 1991.431 Moreover, agricultural facilities, including 
greenhouses, livestock farms, and most major poultry farms were destroyed. A United 
Nations mission in 1991 found abandoned farms and damage to greenhouses and 
irrigation systems. Perennial plants and date palms were destroyed in the Al-Wafra and 
Al-Abdaly areas.432 Although desert plants tend to be quite resilient, the massive troop 
movements and the extensive use of landmines dramatically affected soil composition. 
This change in soil composition may affect the ability of desert plants to recover quickly, 
if at all.  
While examining environmental damage during armed conflict and under the 
category of agricultural crops and forests, it is necessary to mention the war on narco-
traffic as a separate category. The narco-traffic war is widespread during insurgencies as 
a result of the absence of government. 
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Thus, the “war” on drug producers constitutes another threat to the 
environment.433 In Peru, the world’s largest coca leaf producer, with about 121,000 
hectares under cultivation,434 the government of Peru engaged in an eradication effort 
that included the extensive use of herbicides.435 According to Article 14(2) of the 1988 
United Nations Convention on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Psychotropic Substances 
(CIDT), eradication measures must take the protection of the environment into 
consideration.436 Peru has made efforts to utilize safe and effective herbicides in its 
eradication initiatives, and has analyzed soil, air, and water for herbicidal effects.
coca 
n 
ystem.439  
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the other hand, in Columbia, glyphosate,438 the main chemical weapon used to fight the 
war against coca and other illicit crops, threatens the destruction of agricultural crops and 
forests in a fragile ecos
 
2. Lithosphere 
Land covers almost “fifteen billion hectares (twenty nine percent) of the earth’s 
surface.”440 Almost “1.6 billion hectares of the land (eleven percent of the total land area) 
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accounted for by rugged mountain terrain.”442 Most of the world’s population lives on the 
remaining 10,500 million hectares and most of that land is in the Northern 
hemisphere.”443 
Soil, the top layer of the earth beneath us, supports almost all of the plant life on 
our planet. It is composed of gravel, sand, silt, clay, and organic matter, and is very 
heterogeneous.444 It is also subject to damage and destruction by warfare. Soil destruction 
by weapons employment may stress an ecosystem in two ways: “physical displacement 
of soil and alterations in soil structure and composition.”445 For centuries, the ground has 
been used for the storage and disposal of chemical wastes. Pesticides and fertilizers are 
applied to soil, and chemicals reach the soil from the atmosphere and from human 
activities in peacetime as well as in times of armed conflicts.446 
Like the rest of the ecosystem, the Persian Gulf lithosphere was a victim of the 
“oil war.” An estimated sixty million barrels of crude oil released from gushing oil wells 
created some 246 oil lakes in Kuwait. The oil lakes were formed in adjoining depressions 
or low-lying land and covered forty-nine square kilometers of desert.447 The depth of oil 
lakes ranged from 10 to 150 cm.448 Several holes were dug in the desert land of Kuwait, 
crude oil poured in and torched by Iraqi troops. Oil seeped deep into the beaches, sand, 
and gravel as a result of tides lifting oil onto the Gulf beach.449 
Furthermore, the surface of the desert was severely affected by construction of 
bunkers, installation and removal of land mines, and the oil, oil mist, and soot from the 
fires.450 Troop movement added to the compacting of the desert soil.451 Some areas of the 
desert were salinated from the firefighting efforts. The oil mist and other fallout from the 
fires, along with the mechanical disruption of the desert, caused tremendous damage to 
vegetation. The oil-contaminated sites contain high levels of hydrocarbons, vanadium, 
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chloride, sodium, sulfate and calcium.452 The oil-logged soil layer is considered to be 
dead as a natural habitat of plant growth and production.453 
The Gulf War II was not the only instance in which oil was used as a weapon. 
During the first Russian revolution in 1905, when the Tatars revolted in Baku, they 
destroyed Armenian property including oil derricks. One witness described this disaster 
by declaring that: “I realized for the first time in my life all that can possibly be meant by 
words. Hell let loose.”454 Other examples occurred in World Wars I and II, when the 
Allies bombed and burned Romanian oilfields and facilities, seriously harming the 
surrounding environment.455 
Damage to the lithosphere is not limited to the effects of oil. In 1937-1945, during 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese dynamited the Huayuankow dike on the 
Yellow River near Chengchow to halt the Japanese advance.456 The floodwaters 
destroyed major parts of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces, ravaging millions of 
hectares of farmlands, and about 4,000 villages.457 
During the Vietnam War, the United States sprayed huge forest areas with 
herbicides, particularly Agent Orange, that leading to soil erosion and degradation of 
trees.458 Additionally, the use of high-explosive ammunitions rendered large areas of land 
unusable. Consequently, in a country comprised largely of an agrarian people, the effects 
were, and continue to be, devastating.459 Undetected landmines and unexploded 
munitions are still a major threat to both human and natural ecologies. 
Another example of land depletion is in Central America, where contra guerrillas 
in Nicaragua seriously damaged forests in Southern Honduras near the Nicaraguan 
border. Contras forced hundreds of peasant coffee growers from their native landholdings 
in the 1980s. And about 20,000 Nicaraguan refugees in Honduran camps caused 
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extensive environmental degradation, such as deforestation, land clearing, illegal trade of 
valuable species including “cedar, mahogany, and pine,” and forest fires which destroyed 
an estimated 110 square miles.460 
 
3. Hydrosphere 
The oceans of the world cover 71 percent of the earth’s surface,461 and are 
threatened by the release of chemical agents and other forms of pollution. During World 
War II, in late 1943, the Germans bombed Allied ships anchored at Bari Harbor, Italy,462 
causing 220,500 pounds of mustard gas to leak into the Adriatic Sea. Mustard gas is toxic 
to ocean mammals and humans. According to Swedish experts, the released mustard gas 
forms a protective layer underwater, which helps the chemical agent retain its 
effectiveness for many years.463 Byproducts created from the breakdown of the mustard 
gas are toxic to humans, land animals, and aquatic species. Scientists estimate that the 
byproducts will remain dangerous for the next 400 years.464  
The Persian Gulf is one of the most polluted bodies of water in the world, and was 
so even before Gulf War II. In 1983, during the Iran-Iraq War, three oil wells were 
attacked in the Nowruz oil field off the coast of Iran, spilling 1.9 million barrels of oil 
into the Gulf’s waters. One report documented that “the oil slick released from the 
Nowruz platform ended up in deep water in the central Gulf. But its ecological impact is 
still largely unknown.”465 In 1991, Iraqi troops caused the spill of millions of gallons of 
oil into shallow Gulf waters. They also destroyed four sewage-treatment facilities, at Al-
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Riggae, Al-Jahra, Al-Rigga, and Failaka,466 causing 330,000 cubic meters of raw sewage 
per day to spill into the Gulf, polluting it with microbes, viruses, and harmful bacteria.467  
The Gulf ecosystem is particularly fragile because of its unusually shallow water 
and the unusual conditions of the area. The Gulf is a basin with only one outlet to the sea, 
at the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf is thirty-five miles long and hundred and ten feet deep. 
It takes an average of two hundred years to flush out.468 The Gulf ecosystem includes sea 
grasses, coral reefs, mud flats, and salt marshes.469 A National Geographic study by Dr. 
Sylvia Earle470 shows that the sea grasses deep in the Gulf are coated with oil. Mollusks 
and crabs were found dead and oil coated.471 In 1992, a Greenpeace study showed that 
the full negative impact of oil contamination on coral reefs in the Gulf is still unknown to 
today.472 In addition, severe oil impacts were found in salt marshes,473 and in populations 
of shore birds.474 Significantly, drinking water supplies in Kuwait are still contaminated. 
However, experts from Green Cross International found that one fresh groundwater 
aquifer, producing forty percent of the freshwater reserves of Kuwait, is heavily polluted. 
The remaining freshwater reserves provide Kuwait with “less than a two-months supply 
for the entire population.”475 
The impact of oil on marine life during times of war can also be seen in 
Yugoslavia, where considerable environmental destruction resulted from the NATO 
bombing of the chemical factory complex at Pancevo, about 12 miles from Belgrade.476 
According to Pancevo’s Mayor, Srdjan Mikovic, NATO aircraft struck the complex with 
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at least 56 missiles between March 24 and June 8, 1999.477 Chemicals released into the 
water on April 18 alone included “15,000 tons of ammonia, 1,800 tons of ethylene 
dichloride, 1,500 tons of vinyl-chloride monomer, and 250 tons of chlorine.”478 On April 
21, 1,400 tons of ethylene dichloride poured into the Danube.479 Workers at the complex 
dumped 9,500 tons of ammonia into the river, in order to prevent harm from attack on the 
ammonia storage tanks.480 Oil could be seen flowing down the Danube like a massive 
spill 15 kilometers long and about 400 meters wide.481  
The history of armed conflict includes other kinds of environmental manipulation, 
such as the destruction of a water system to cause flooding. In June 1672, during the 
Franco-Dutch War of 1672-78, the Dutch were able to stop the French army by damaging 
dikes and causing the release of water. This interception, dubbed the Holland Water Line, 
to some extent prevented the French army from gaining control of the Netherlands.482 
In the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45, the Chinese dynamited the 
Huayuankow dike of the Yellow River (Huang He) near Chengchow to halt the 
advancing Japanese troops. This massive flooding ravaged eleven Chinese cities and 
more than 4,000 Chinese villages, destroying millions of hectares of farmland, crops, and 
top soil.483 
In May 1943, during World War II, the British destroyed two major dams in the 
Ruhr Valley in Germany, in an attempt to ravage Germany’s industrial economic base. 
The British action released 34.3 billion gallons of water from the Möhne Dam and 
another 52.8 billion gallons from the Eder Dam,484 and caused serious damage to 125 
factories, forty-six bridges, power stations, numerous coal mines, and railway lines. Some 
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6,500 cattle and pigs were lost and 3,000 hectares of arable land were ruined.485 In 1944, 
during World War II, German forces intentionally flooded some 30,000 hectares of 
agricultural lands in the Netherlands with saltwater,486 making them unusable for 
crops.487 The land was reclaimed only after a massive rehabilitation program.488 
Water resources are also affected by unexploded ordnance and munitions lying at 
the bottom of seas, ports, rivers, and oceans throughout the world. Sea mines from World 
War II have been found at the entrance to the port of Le Havre, France, in the waterways 
of Berlin, in the Thames estuary in the United Kingdom, and even sixty miles off the 
coast of North Carolina, U.S.A.489 Since the end of World War II, 16 million artillery 
shells, 490,000 bombs, and 600,000 underwater mines have been found in France.490 
Sunken ships lying at the bottom of the world’s oceans slowly leak oil and other 
contaminants into the ocean,491 damaging or destroying animal life, coral reefs, and 
seagrass beds.492 Such contaminants can also affect the marine ecosystem severely by 
damaging marine historical sites,493 and threatening endangered marine species.  
World War II saw 674 large U.S. merchant ships sunk by hostile actions, 152 of 
them oil tankers.494 An estimated 300 tankers released approximately 5.5 million cubic 
meters of oil into the ocean during World War II alone.495 
 
4. Atmosphere 
The earth’s atmosphere acts as both the receiver and transporter of pollutants. 
Many pollutants do not stay in the atmosphere, but settle on living systems on land and 
water. The atmosphere extends hundreds of kilometers upward, but becomes 
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extraordinarily thin above 150 kilometers.496 The lower atmosphere extends upward fifty-
five kilometers, and consists of the troposphere and the stratosphere.497 The troposphere 
contains dust, wind and clouds, whereas the higher stratosphere is cloudless.498  
Air pollution is not a new topic. In 1600, an English treatise complained of “th[e] 
horrid Smoke which obscures our Church and makes our Palaces look old, which fouls 
our Cloth and corrupts our Waters, so as the very Rain […]”499 In modern times, the 
problem of air pollution has only become more complicated. Military operations have 
played a major role here too. Modern military tactics include direct attempts to interfere 
with the atmosphere in various ways. Military forces have attempted to gain control over 
winds, clouds and precipitation. Climate modification, release of substances to affect the 
electrical properties of the atmosphere, rainfall enhancement, and injection of 
electromagnetic fields in the atmosphere500 have all resulted directly from military 
manipulation of the atmosphere for hostile purposes. During World War I, the German 
Army lined up canisters along a four-mile front, and released a cloud of chlorine gas 
toward the French troops.501  
During World War II, the Germans bombed a ship laden with 100 tons of mustard 
gas, at Bari Harbor, Italy, which resulted in the release of a poisonous clouds that drifted 
over the port town of Bari, killing more than 1,000 civilians.502 
A much more ambitious example is the release of materials by the U.S. into the 
troposphere over enemy territory to incapacitate radar during the Vietnam War.503 
In 1990, during Gulf War II, atmospheric pollution resulted from burning oil 
wells, which fouled the air and sent vast clouds of dense smoke that darkened the skies as 
far east as Afghanistan and Northern India.504  The sulfur dioxide emitted from the 
burning oil wells can return to the ground, combining with water vapor to form sulfuric 
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acid (acid rain)505 which damages crops, forests, vegetation, buildings, and water 
resources.506  
According to one source, smoke can also affect climate:  
 
[t]he greatest threat is that airborne soot from petro blazes might 
cancel springtime in the northern Hemisphere and stifle the Asian 
monsoons on which millions of people depend for their lives. 
This would happen if the soot rose high enough to alter the way 
the sun’s energy is absorbed. Usually the ground soaks up heat, 
creating warm air whose rise creates the turbulence that drives 
weather. The height of the soot cloud depends on the fire’s 
temperature and size, as well as on how much fuel combusts.507 
 
It was estimated that the oil well fires in Kuwait emitted, over the course of nine 
months, 
 
•1-2 milion tons/day of carbon dioxide (CO²); 
•5,500-65,000 tons/day of sulfur dioxide (SO²); 
•500-3,000 ton/day of nitrogen oxides (NOx); 
•250 tons/day of carbon monoxide (CO); 
•5,000 tons/day of soot or particulate matter.508  
 
These pollutants raise concerns in three respects: the presence of carcinogens in 
the atmosphere; the reduction in sunshine and possible deficiencies in vitamins D and E; 
and the introduction of air pollutants into the milk of sheep and cattle.509 George D. 
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Thurston of the Institute of Environmental Medicine at New York University estimated 
that the air pollution levels in Kuwait could cause 1,000 excess deaths annually.510  
The oil well fires were one of world’s gravest air pollution disasters.511 Two days 
after the Gulf War fires, Iran reported that “black rain” had fallen on its lands.512 
Rainstorms and hurricanes as far away as Bangladesh have been attributed to these 
fires.513 Moreover, during the seven months’ occupation of Kuwait, all trash disposal 
services were rendered inoperable, forcing the population of Kuwait to burn its trash. 
That circumstance only added to the oil-related pollution; moreover, the trash released 
dioxins from the incomplete burning of plastics.514 
In the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that 
the most serious environmental consequences of the attack of April 17 and 18, 1999,515 
were the release of toxic substances from the burning oil products at a refinery and the 
burning of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) at a petrochemical plant.516 An estimated 
80,000 tons of oil products were burned, leading to the release of noxious substances into 
the air, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs) and lead.517 
The foregoing discussion shows that a number of techniques are available to 
modify the atmosphere for hostile purposes, and that many have been used. However, the 
future may bring even more sophisticated techniques for the hostile manipulation of the 
atmosphere, such as the modification of clouds to bring about hail storms or lightning 
discharges in enemy territory, or the reduction of the stratospheric ozone layer over 
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enemy territory. Even more drastically, nuclear war would have an unthinkable impact on 
the atmosphere, weather, and climate.518  
Damage to the ozone has become a widely recognized problem. In recent years, 
increasing quantities of Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) have been released into the 
atmosphere and slowly drifted into the stratosphere,519 seriously threatening to deplete 
the stratospheric ozone layer and foster global climate changes. In particular, damage to 
the ozone may result in a warming of the Earth’s surface, and thus “cause migration of 
food-growing belts, change monsoon patterns, turn farmlands into deserts, cause sharp 
rises in sea and ocean levels due to melting of polar ice caps, which would result in 
flooding many coastal areas, increasing hurricane activity and storms, salt water intrus
into supplies of fresh water, destruction of wildlife habitats, and the impairment of p
facilities.”
ion 
ort 
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parts.526 The dangers posed by the continued use of CFCs should prompt world leaders to 
take further action both within their own countries and internationally to reduce CFC use 
and production. Some action has already been taken to protect the ozone. In 1987, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal 
Protocol)527was introduced to address the international control of CFC emissions. On 
January 1st, 1988, the Montreal Protocol entered into force. 
This brief survey makes clear the extent and the variety of dangers to the air, soil, 
water, and biota caused by armed conflict, both directly and indirectly. Pollution of these 
crucial resources appears certain to have long-term effects on the ecosystem, not just 
within the borders of specific counties, but internationally as well.528 
 
F: Environmental Harm Following Armed Conflict 
Avoiding environmental harm before it occurs is easier, cheaper, and safer than 
attempting to remedy the harm after it has taken place. Throughout history, wars have 
caused environmental damage; recovering from that damage has often proven to be very 
slow, very costly, and in some cases impossible. Modern weapons, particularly chemical 
and nuclear weapons, present a whole new order of threat, and are even more likely to 
result in long-term irreversible environmental effects.529  
Typically, combatants are more concerned with immediate military advantage 
than with the long-term environmental effects of their warfare. However, the more 
extended and intensive the war, the more destruction will be left behind. A major concern 
following war is unexploded ammunition and ordnance, which act as “hidden killers.” 
Discarded materials including debris, trash, and explosives can present environmental 
hazards long after the battles have ceased. Further devastation to the environment can 
result from the destruction of endangered species, poisoned water supplies, soil pollution, 
deforestation, and desertification. 
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Examples of long-term environmental damage are, unfortunately, not difficult to 
find. Many of the battlefields of World War I and II, for instance, are still unfit for 
cultivation today, and are still dangerous to people and animals due to unexploded 
devices and projectiles embedded in the soil.530 French and Belgian farmers still find 
unexploded ordnance from World War I.531 Modern weapons also can leave poisonous 
residue. 
 
1. Unexploded Ammunition and Abandoned Materials 
Unexploded ammunition can include anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, bombs, 
artillery and mortar shells, and cluster bombs.532 Their failure to explode can be the result 
of a variety of circumstances, including defective fuses, improper congregation, or 
smashing into a flexible surface.533 Unexploded ordnance can last for many years 
undetected.  
Mines have been used routinely in wars for nearly two centuries, as explosive 
devices for the purpose of killing, destroying, or otherwise incapacitating enemy 
personnel and/or equipment. They can be employed in any quantity within a specific 
area to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to reinforce non-explosive 
obstacles.534 
Landmines not only cause death and destruction of soldiers and military objects. 
Once in the ground, they can kill civilians, farm animals, or any other moving being.535 
Yet landmines can, and do, also cause dramatic harm to the environment, in terms of the 
pollution of air and water, loss of agricultural lands and fields, and impairment of 
economic growth and land use development. For example, sand and soil are damaged 
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when landmines are laid, exploded, and cleared.  The nature of the soil can be changed 
after the explosion of landmines. 
 
Explosives commonly used in landmines, such as trinitrotoluene 
(TNT), seep into the soil. The decomposition of these substances 
can cause many environmental problems because they are often 
water soluble, carcinogenic, toxic, and long lasting. Landmines 
also harm the environment when they explode, scattering debris, 
destroying surrounding vegetation, and disrupting soil 
composition. This substantially decreases the productivity of 
agricultural land and increases an area’s vulnerability to water 
and wind erosion, which in turn can add sediment into drainage 
systems, adversely affecting water habitats. Unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) detonations have similar results. One study has 
shown that the detonation of UXO in the Vietnamese province of 
Quang Tri has drastically reduced soil productivity. According to 
estimates, rice production per hectare has decreased 50 percent in 
this area. The slow degradation of landmines and their 
devastating impact on surrounding land can render resources 
unusable for many generations. The environmental impact of 
landmines is particularly pronounced when viewed in 
conjunction with socioeconomic factors and other consequences 
of landmine contamination.536 
 
Moreover, farmers will of course avoid using lands due to the presence, or 
suspected presence, of landmines, thus leading to underproduction of food, scarcity, and 
hence, malnutrition.537 Many areas where minefields exist should be kept out of 
cultivation for people’s safety. However, under economic pressure, some farmers may 
venture into such areas to earn their livelihood, despite the presence of mines, thus 
risking horrific injuries or deaths. For example, in Angola, in 1998, a pregnant mother 
who had gone into the brushwood to collect some firewood, lost her pregnancy and one 
of her legs. Later, a landmine killed her husband when he ventured into the same 
brush.538 The presence of minefields can prevent access to safe drinking water, causing 
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in turn intestinal diseases, especially diarrhea.539 Laying and removing landmines can 
degrade the soil and can cause evaporation of water from sand and soil.540 Furthermore, 
the animals and plants killed by landmines can pollute waters where they were killed.541  
The devastating effect of unexploded ammunition was reported in 1985 to the 
United Nations Environmental Program by Dr. Arthur Westing, who documented that 
unexploded ammunition during World War II led to soil disturbance and destruction of 
vegetation and animal life.542 And in the wake of the Gulf War II, thousands of tons of 
unexploded ordnance and landmines lie under the soft surface of desert soil. An estimated 
33,000 unexploded mines remain in the desert.543 A study by the U.S. Government 
estimated that seventy percent of the conventional bombs dropped over Iraq missed their 
target, and that of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped on Iraq, 17,700 tons never 
exploded.544 In addition, some of the ordnance used by the U.S. contained depleted 
uranium in order to enhance penetration capability. After the war, many rounds of this 
ammunition remained in the ground causing radiological contamination.545 Moreover, 
uranium can become airborne and may be inhaled or ingested.546 Casualties resulted from 
these ammunition and landmines are still reported. Thus, the public should be informed 
about such dangerous areas, and how to deal with suspicious objects.   
Coastal life can also be affected by mines. Explosions can kill coral reefs, sea 
turtles, seaweeds, and algae, threatening the extinction of these species. For example, 
during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, mines were used extensively on the high sea, 
involving even non-belligerent ships such as the U.S. flag supertanker Bridgeton.547 
Iran dispersed mines in the path of neutral shipping in the Gulf water. Another example 
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was during the Gulf War II, when Iraq planted more than half a million mines in Kuwait 
in order to seal off Kuwait’s coastline.548 The Iraqis also mined the Gulf with thousands 
of explosive devices that had to be detonated by allied naval forces in order to permit 
them to maneuver.549 The presence of those explosives posed, and continue to pose, a 
threat to the marine ecosystem of all Gulf waters. When mines explode, the damage 
they cause to the fragile Gulf marine resources is often irreversible.  
                                                          
Moreover, battlefields left dead bodies of men and animals. Bodies were dumped 
in creeks, polluting the downstream water supply.550 Debris and equipment were left 
abandoned on battlefields.551 For example, in 1991, during the Gulf War II, the Allied 
Forces bombarded Iraqi military strategic locations. It was reported that the Allied Forces 
destroyed about seventy percent of the Iraqi tank force (more than 3000) and artillery 
power (more than 2100 pieces).552 In Kuwait, the “death road”553 was covered with 
thousands of cans, tanks, damaged military hardware as well as dead bodies.554 In 
addition, sanitary waste, including leftover food for more than half a million troops, 
littered the Northern Saudi desert.555 It was estimated that 10 million gallons of human 
fecal waste were produced per day,556 and about 4 million tons of human fecal waste 
produced during December 1990 through February 1991 alone.557 In addition to these 
organic wastes, large quantities of barbed wire and material used to maintain military 
vehicles were dumped in battlefield areas. Spent lubricating oil was collected and burned 
and its residue was buried,558 resulting in soil contamination. 
This environmental threat led the United Nations, for the first time, to recognize 
environmental harm as a compensable injury. In 1991, the U.N. Security Council issued 
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Resolution 687, stating in Paragraph 16 that it “Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to 
the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed 
through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, 
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or 
injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait...”559 Resolution 687 provided for the creation of a 
fund “to pay compensation for claims” arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 
establishment of a Commission to administer the fund. The Resolution addressed 
liability for environmental damage as one category of compensable direct loss,560 the 
first time “environmental claims had been recognized explicitly in an institutional claim 
context.”561 Resolution 692 established the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC),562 to administer a system to provide compensation for damage arising from 
the Gulf War II. The UNCC, located in Geneva, Switzerland, is divided into three parts: 
the Governing Council which is comprised of the fifteen members of the U.N. Security 
Council,563 Commissioners who are experts in law, finance, insurance, and 
environmental damage assessment,564 and a Secretariat which handles the 
administrative work of the UNCC.565 
 
2. Destruction of Endangered Species and their Habitats 
Yet another environmental consequence of war is the danger to, or destruction of, 
endangered animal species. Species extinction is a side effect of deforestation as it 
destroys their habitats.566 For example, during the civil war in Rwanda, bamboo forests 
were damaged, leading to a decrease in the populations of elephants, buffalo, and 
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hippopotamus.567 In the Gulf region, specifically Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, there 
are more than 3,650 animal species. About fifty species are recognized internationally as 
being threatened with extinction.568 The Gulf has four vulnerable marine habitats: 
“coastal marches and mudflats, coral reefs, seagrass beds, and mangroves.”569 In 1991, 
during Gulf War II, these ecological sites faced the worst marine disasters from the 
spilling of oil by Iraqi Forces. Seven years later, traces of spilled oil were still present on 
the southern beaches of Al-Khiran.570 The intertidal areas of the marine environment 
have been most severely affected. Notwithstanding all of these environmental effects 
from the Gulf wars, there are few monitoring programs in Kuwait specifically 
documenting the long term environmental impacts. Without that information it is difficult 
to establish precisely what damage resulted from precisely which source. This is 
particular so because the many possible sources of environmental damage include the 
Gulf War oil spill, oil releases from tanker traffic, discharges from industrial areas, 
human activities in the coastal areas,571 dredging and landfilling for the building of a 
bridge across Kuwait Bay, and the development on Bubiyan Island.572 
 
3. Deforestation and Erosion 
Deforestation occurs not only during armed conflict, but following warfare as 
well. The complete recovery of forest ecosystems may take several centuries. After 
World War II, “about 500 million board feet of lumber and 100 million square feet of 
plywood were needed for occupation troops and family housing. Another five billion 
board feet of lumber would be required each year for five years to rebuild homes and 
businesses destroyed during the war.”573 In Vietnam, approximately “5.5 million acres of 
forest and one-fifth of the agricultural land were destroyed by bombings, land clearing, 
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defoliating, and napalming during the war.”574 Vietnam has over half a million acres of 
coastal swampland, much of it concentrated in the south in the Mekong delta and Cape of 
Camau regions. Much of this swampland was covered with mangroves, which formed a 
natural hide-out for the guerrillas, and was thus subjected to intense chemical attack by 
the Americans.575 The consequences of this environmental disaster have lasted far longer 
than the war itself. 
Similarly, both eastern and western Rwanda were affected by the 1990 civil war. 
In the west, in 1991 the Rwandan army cut a swathe of vegetation about 10 meters wide 
north-south across the forest to allow the staff of the Virunga Volcanoes park to patrol 
this line and prevent any Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers from moving across the 
park.576 Further, the use of the park as a refugee camp, after the mass killing in 1994, 
resulted in the clearing of a large area of forest for firewood.577 Moreover, the eastern 
side, where Akagera National Park is located, was also deforested during the war. The 
Park contained 2,800 km² of savanna and wetlands.578 The park was attacked by the 
RPF,579 and many animals were killed between 1990 and 1993. After the change of the 
government in 1994, the RPF settled many of the returning Tutsis,580 along with their 
cattle, in large portions of the park.581 
During Cambodia’s long-running civil war, its forest cover dwindled from 
seventy percent of land area in the 1970s, to about thirty percent today582 as the sale of 
the timber funded the war. In 1991, Pol Pot, the former head of the Khmer Rouge, said 
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“[o]ur state does not have sufficient capital either to expand its strength or enlarge the 
army. The resources in our liberated and semi-liberated zones absolutely must be utilized 
as assets.”583 Similarly, during the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
sizable tracts of timber from the Azikh cave in the Fizuli region, one of the first places in 
the world where evidence of Neanderthal man was discovered, has been cut in the 
occupied forests of Azerbaijan and exported to Armenia.584  
Other military governments, such as that of the former Burma, have engaged in 
armed confrontations with the tribal groups who live in the forested mountain areas along 
the borders with India, Bangladesh, China, Laos, and Thailand.585 These tribal groups 
have over-exploited the forest to fund their war effort. In 1996, the Kibira and Ruvubu 
National Parks in Burundi were used as sanctuaries and entry points for guerrillas 
fighting the government. As a result, the Parks also became operational areas for 
government troops, with both sides heavily involved in poaching.586  
In sum, after assessing the massive impacts of armed conflicts, it is clear that the 
cost of armed conflict is paid by both the civilian population and the environment. 
However, protection of people takes precedence over protection of the environment. 
Because international law and the law of war must be concerned first with direct harm to 
humans, environmental concerns have always received less attention. However, as 
environmental awareness is increased among nations, it is becoming clear that wanton 
environmental destruction has had a severe impact on humankind. Not only are people 
immediately affected by pollution, the release of toxic chemicals, and other 
environmental insults, many of the “substances mobilized during environmental warfare 
are mutagenic or teratogenic,”587impacting both present and future generations. 
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Part II:  
Environmental Protection in  
International Humanitarian Law 
 
It is necessary to survey the history of International Humanitarian Law in order to 
understand its connection with environmental protection. A number of initiatives to 
prevent the use of force588 as a method of settling international conflicts have been 
identified throughout history. Notable among these initiatives are The Hague 
Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, the Pact of the 
League of Nations of 1919,589 the Pact of Paris of 1928 and the United Nations Charter of 
1945. All these initiatives failed to prevent the use of force completely, since wars are 
seen everywhere, in the Middle East, South and North America, Asia, Africa, and 
Europe. As a result, pressure on the international community has grown to “humanize” 
wars, and reduce their effects on mankind, especially non-combatants.   
Consequently, a new field of international law appeared, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), applicable in times of armed conflict.  
The codification of this law proceeded cautiously because it dealt with human 
beings, who are not considered subjects of international law. States, the subject of 
international law, resisted the internationalization of rules for human protection. 
Nevertheless, this resistance did not prevent the emergence of IHL, and it came to 
provide a degree of human protection. While IHL provisions cannot protect human life, 
health, and the environment completely, traditional IHL is also limited because it deals 
only with protection of persons, even though natural systems also need to be protected. 
For example, if wartime harm or injury can be repaired or restored, the IHL rules usually 
focus on the compensation. However, most environmental harm is a kind of irreparable 
harm, not measured easily by monetary compensation. For example, the destruction of 
cultural or historical sites, the pollution of water bodies, the degradation of national 
                                                                                                                                                                             
587 Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds.,The Environmental Consequences of War: 
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588 Hilaire Mccoubrey & Nigel D, White, International Law and Armed Conflict 
17-35 (Dartmouth, 1992) [hereinafter McCoubrey]. 
 88
forests, or threats to endangered species cannot easily be measured in solely economic 
terms. Thus, IHL has to be supplemented by reference to environmental or enviro-
humanitarian law rules. The environmental law deals with the protection of nature, 
recognizes that ecological harm is immitigable and cannot be evaluated by money,590 and 
therefore focuses to prevent rather than repair environmental damage.  
Nonetheless, IHL plays a considerable role in imposing restrictions on combatants 
in times of armed conflicts, and has achieved some success in the protection of human 
rights. Moreover, environment concerns have been recognized in IHL provisions, a 
number of instruments which seek to prevent, directly or indirectly, environmental 
destruction.591 Recently, for instance, a provision adding more protection of the 
environment was adopted at the Second World Conservation Congress, held in Amman, 
Jordan, 4-11 October, 2000, as is discussed below in the context of examining the 
specific provisions of the IHL.  
However, despite the development of IHL, its success is far from complete. A 
number of legal lacunas preclude human protection, and combatants do not always 
comply with their obligations. Moreover, a number of States have not yet signed, or 
ratified some of the IHL instruments.  
Since our subject focuses on times of armed conflict, it is necessary to examine 
the humanitarian laws of war, as classified under The Hague Law, and the Geneva Law:  
[O]ne is the law of warfare proper, otherwise known as the 
Hague law, which defines the rights and duties of belligerents in 
the course of military operations and restricts the parties in their 
choice of the means of injuring the adversary. The body of this 
law is made up of the conventions adopted at The Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899 and 1907, excluding the rules which in 1929 
and 1949 were taken over into the Geneva conventions, such as 
the provisions on prisoners of war and the civilian population of 
the occupied territories, but including the St. Petersburg 
Declaration of 1868 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The other 
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part of the laws of war is international humanitarian law taken in 
the narrow sense, known otherwise the Geneva law, which is 
concerned with the protection of soldiers rendered hors de 
combat and [keeping civilians] out of hostilities.592 
 
However, while the Geneva laws are characterized by strict, nonderogable 
prohibitions,593 The Hague laws are vaguely worded and permissive, enabling powerful 
States to use advanced military technology with no regard to humanitarian 
consequences.594 
Some international law experts use the narrow term Geneva Law as a synonym 
for IHL rules.595 Armed conflict may have been, to some degree, humanized, by the 
adoption of these rules. IHL offers an advanced humanitarian protection, and a basic 
environmental protection. Human protection is the main focus of the IHL provisions. 
They also seek to protect hospitals, schools, and places of worship as necessary to human 
welfare. But the environment as an indivisible element of human life needs to be 
protected also, because people have the right to live in a clean and safe environment. For 
example, during the Gulf War II, IHL provisions were applied vigorously in order to 
protect the lives of the civilian population. But the environment was completely ignored 
from such protection. As a result, the Kuwaiti environment was and is still highly 
polluted with variety of known and unknown hazardous materials such as DU.596 
According to Britain’s Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) secret report, the allies had 
left at least forty tons of DU, enough to cause “500,000 potential deaths.”597 DU was 
created severe health problems as a result of its presence in the food chain and water 
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supplies.598 Despite this serious threat to the environment and to human health, IHL 
offered no platform to deal with, or even recognize, this hazard. 
Humanitarian protection should not be limited to the direct effects of armed 
conflict on civilian population, it should be extended to the indirect impacts of armed 
conflict on them too, to offer a real and a powerful protection to both civilians and 
combatants in times of armed conflicts. Both humanitarian organizations and 
environmental organizations seek to prevent armed conflict from affecting humans as a 
primary objective, and the environment only as a secondary objective. Closer harmony 
and more collaboration between these organizations is necessary to ameliorate the 
situation, as we will examine in the final part of this thesis.     
 
 
 
A- Definition of International Humanitarian Law, and its Relationship to 
Environmental Protection 
 
It is difficult to distinguish between IHL and other fields of law that have similar 
characters, such as the international law of human rights that protects human rights in 
peacetime. IHL is defined “as being that considerable section of international law which 
is pervaded by the feeling of humanity and is aimed at the protection of the person.”599 
According to this definition, IHL has a broad sweep.600 Humanitarian law in the broad 
sense “divides into two branches. It comprises, on one hand, the laws of war (Jus in 
bello) and, on the other, human rights (Jus contra bellum.)”601 Further, IHL applies “from 
the initiation of […] armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until 
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved. Until that moment [of peace] international humanitarian law 
continues to apply [to all the] warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, in the 
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[entire] territory under the control of a party, whether an actual [war] take place there or 
not.”602 
International humanitarian law focuses primarily on the protection of people in 
times of armed conflicts. But, protecting people’s lives only and leaving them in a 
polluted environment, as a result of armed conflict, is not adequate. While armed conflict 
may directly kill civilians, a polluted environment will directly harm civilians and 
indirectly kill them.  
In times of armed conflict, humanitarian organizations work hard to prevent 
human casualties. Recently, these organizations have discovered also that environmental 
protection is necessary to achieve real humanitarian protection. Therefore, part of their 
efforts has been directed at the environmental protection. This protection “could 
substantially limit environmental damage.”603 For example, in the aftermath of the 1991 
war in Somalia, large areas of Mogadishu were deprived of “a single drop of water.”604 
Therefore, ICRC adopted a program to drill and rehabilitate boreholes to increase the 
water supply to most of the city. Between 1995 and 1997, “six new boreholes were 
drilled, tested, and equipped with a submersible pump, four boreholes were cleaned and 
equipped, and twelve hand-dug wells were equipped with submersible pumps powered by 
diesel generators.”605 Thus, the ICRC recognized that environmental concerns were 
crucial to meeting their humanitarian objectives. Other humanitarian organizations have 
adopted similar programs.606  
However, most of these organizations do not have the technical or scientific 
expertise to address environmental concerns, they are poorly equipped to make “a 
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scientific assessment of the environmental damage caused by modern warfare and a 
thorough analysis of the content and limitations of the rules in force.”607 Environmental 
organizations, however, do have that expertise, and therefore should be considered to be 
the most capable body to protect the environment, even in times of armed conflict.  
Entry into the battlefield is not easy even for the purpose of providing 
humanitarian or environmental relief to civilians. For military and security reasons, 
belligerents do not allow any third party to access to the battlefield. Communications 
between civilians and aid organizations are often difficult. However, a neutral person, 
state, or organization may play the role of mediator between the involved parties.  
Usually, the ICRC has a special position that allows its agents to enter the battlefield 
under international treaties such as Articles 10 paragraphs 3 of the Geneva Conventions I, 
II, and III608 and Article 11 paragraph 3 of the Geneva Convention IV,609 which states 
that  
 
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining 
Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of 
this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian 
organization, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by 
Protecting Powers under the present Convention.” 
 
And Article 5 (4) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions610 states 
that 
If, despite the foregoing, there is no Protecting Power, the Parties 
to the conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be 
made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or by any 
other organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and 
efficacy, after due consultations with the said Parties and taking 
into account the result of these consultations, to act as a 
substitute. The functioning of such a substitute is subject to the 
consent of the Parties to the conflict; every effort shall be made 
by the Parties to the conflict to facilitate the operations of the 
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substitute in the performance of its tasks under the Conventions 
and this Protocol. 
 
 
Additionally, ICRC can enter a battlefield under formal agreements with 
belligerents, or because of the decades-old custom that permits it to intervene as an 
“impartial humanitarian body”611 in order to ease the plight of civilian populations by 
protecting their lives and health, and insuring respect for their dignity.  
Usually, the ICRC plays a remarkable role in both internal and international armed 
conflicts by calling the warring parties to adhere to IHL principles. Such efforts start with 
contacts between ICRC delegates and representatives of the involved parties. Later, these 
contacts are summed up in a public statement. The public statement could be “a press 
release, as in the Greek Civil War (February 26, 1947) or to the Jewish and Arab 
populations of Palestine (March 12, 1948), or a radio announcement, as in Guatemala 
(1954), Hungary (1956), and Cuba (1958).”612 Further, ICRC appeals can take the form 
of “an extensive campaign of dissemination by the press and the radio, and the 
distribution of booklets and posters as in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe or with the armed forces of 
the government in El Salvador.”613 For instance, a group of Peruvian rebels broke into 
the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru in December 1996, and took som
diplomats, Peruvian government officials, and members of the press as hostages. 
Thereafter, the ICRC played a significant role by entering the Ambassador’s residency to 
verify the condition of the hostages.
e 
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toilets,”616 as well as blankets, pillows, daily clothing, bottled water and food.617 The Red 
Cross also delivers messages from hostages’ families.618 The ICRC undertakes “the bulk 
of protective activities conducted under humanitarian law,”619 and has a general right of 
humanitarian intervention. This right is subject to the consent of the parties concerned.620 
The statute of the ICRC provides in Article 4 (2) that ICRC “may take any humanitarian 
initiative which comes within its role as a specifically neutral621 and independent 
institution and intermediary, and may consider any question requiring examination by 
such an institution.”622  
Since the ICRC has been mandated by the international community “to work for 
the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof,”623 it is naturally 
directly concerned by the problem of the protection of the environment in time of armed 
conflict.624 The ICRC has a vital role to play, in cooperation with other bodies expert in 
environmental matters, in taking the initiative to fight environmental hazards in 
wartime.625 However, ICRC cannot replace environmental organizations such as the 
IUCN, in its task of safeguarding nature and the environment, and by analogy, the IUCN 
cannot replace the ICRC in its task of protecting people in times of armed conflicts. But 
both can be unified in the task of environmental protection, for the ICRC as a necessary 
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element of humanitarian protection, and for the environmental organization because of its 
specific mandate.  
A number of environmental organizations, such as the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), may play a consultative role to 
ICRC agents during both peacetime and times of armed conflicts. For example, a neutral 
body could act as a representative of the environment, and be involved with establishing 
and supervising environmental sanctuaries, rendering advisory opinions as to whether 
regarding weather certain military activities are permissibly ‘proportional,’ and 
supervising or assisting with cleanup or remediation actions conducted in the zone of 
military operations.626 
Consequently, humanitarian organizations and environmental organizations 
should maintain a kind of cooperation, in order to introduce environmental agents into 
humanitarian missions. Environmental agents could report any situations related to their 
competence regarding environmental matters, while humanitarian agent report violations 
of civilians’ and/or combatants’ rights. Therefore, it is important that ICRC establish a 
sort of cooperation with environmental organizations. Such cooperation will make 
possible an enviro-humanitarian mission, composed of both environmental agents and 
humanitarian agents, to prevent, control, and treat any humanitarian or environmental 
violations.  
 
B-The Environmental Protection Provisions in the IHL  
The laws of war focus on the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, and the 
use of weapons of mass destruction, but neglect environmental protection. However, IHL 
does not ignore environmental protection completely. Its modest environmental concerns 
related to the human protection. As long as environmental degradation does not affect 
human health and welfare, IHL does not formally encompass it.627 For example, IHL 
does not condemn desertification, or deforestation of unoccupied areas, because such 
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events do not affect human health or welfare directly. Therefore, in spite of the inclusion 
of some environmental protection provisions in the IHL, the environment is still subject 
to flagrant abuses, and the actual mechanism of environmental protection in the IHL is 
defective.  
The environmental protection provisions that adopted by the IHL might be 
divided into general provisions and specific provisions as follows:  
 
1. General Provisions 
For the purpose of this thesis, general provisions will be identified in IHL 
instruments that can be read broadly to include both humanitarian protection and 
environmental protection. The goal of these provisions is to limit the ability of 
belligerents to choose methods and means of warfare that might affect the environment.  
 
a. The Choice of Methods or Means of Warfare or Injuring the Enemy is not 
Unlimited 
 
The U.N. Charter prohibits war and most armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the use of 
force is justified if used in self-defense, as authorized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.628 
However, when war occurs, combatants should seek specifically to neutralize the other 
party’s armed forces, and not to cause unnecessary harm to civilian population or the 
natural environment. Therefore, environmental warfare should be prohibited completely. 
The limit on belligerents’ choice of methods of warfare was set forth in the Declaration 
of St. Petersburg of 1868 as follows: 
 
[T]he only legitimate object which States should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest 
possible number of men; that this object would be exceeded by 
the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings 
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; that the 
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employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the 
laws of humanity.629 
 
This rule, established 132 years ago, condemns the use of arms that exceed the 
goal of war, which is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. This limit might be 
extended to protect the environment, since the use of weapons in a way that affected the 
environment is also likely to “aggravate” the suffering of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable.”  
Thirty one years later, this limit was confirmed in Article 22 of the Regulations 
Annexed to The Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
of 1899 and 1907. Article 22 states that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of 
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”630 Unlike the terms used by the St. Petersburg 
Declaration, the language of The Hague Conventions was quite broad. That language 
may be interpreted to protect both civilian populations and the environment as well 
enemy combatants. Humanitarian harm may be inflicted through environmental 
destruction. For example, polluting drinking water supplies, destroying chemical or 
nuclear complexes and releasing toxic emissions in the air, and destroying sewage 
treatment facilities and dumping raw materials in water bodies, will affect the 
environment primarily and the people secondarily. 
Seventy years later, Article 35 (1) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, iterates The Hague Convention’s terms, except that the limit 
imposed on belligerents was extended to apply also to internal armed conflict. Article 35 
(1) states that “in any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”631 
Unlike The Hague Conventions, the Additional Protocol I does not limit the 
means of injuring the enemy, but it does limit the choice of methods or means of warfare. 
The technological development of modern armaments evoked the adoption of the new 
term; high-tech means of warfare do not necessarily injure people despite their ability to 
                                                          
629 Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Certain Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grams in 
Weight, para. 2 St. Persburg, 1868, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 95. 
630 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land , July 29, 1899, Annex art. 22, 32 Stat. 
1803 [hereinafter The Hague Convention (II) of 1899]; The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 
(205) Annex, art. 22. 
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devastate the environment. Therefore, the term used by Article 35 (1) of Additional 
Protocol I as a general provision is the most advanced and effective regarding the 
environmental protection.  
 
b. Principle of Discrimination 
 
To be lawful, weapons and tactics must clearly discriminate 
between military and non-military targets, and be confined in 
their application to military targets. Indiscriminate warfare is 
illegal per se, although indirect damage to civilians and civilian 
targets is not necessarily illegal.632 
 
The term ‘discriminate’ is a purely military term, under which the combatant 
“must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and 
combatants and military targets on the other.”633 During armed conflict, harm should be 
limited to the combatants and military targets only. Civilians or civilian objects should be 
immunized from being attacked by the involved parties. For example, schools, hospitals, 
worship places, parks, bridges and dams should be excluded from military operations. 
Therefore, indiscriminate warfare including the carpet-bombing634 or an attack likely to 
cause collateral damage to civilian population or objects “which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,”635 is considered illegal 
per se. 
Practically, the application of this principle is not easy, especially when military 
commanders protect their combatants and targets by placing them under the cover of 
civilian objects. For example, during World War I the “Germans were using a particular 
                                                                                                                                                                             
631 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 35 (1). 
632 Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in Environmental Protection 
and the Law of War: A ‘Fifth Geneva’ Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment in Time of Armed Conflict 84 (Glen Plant ed., 1992) [hereinafter Falk, The 
Environmental Law of War].  
633 Heike Spieker, Civilian Immunity, in Crimes of War “What the Public Should Know,” 
84 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999) [hereinafter Spieker]. 
634 Carpet-bombing intensively used by the American military in Vietnam, Gulf War II and in Afghanistan 
2001.  
635 Spieker, supra note (633) at 84. 
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church belfry as a sniper’s post in a town in the Rhineland, making it a legitimate military 
target for the Allies.”636 Similarly, during Gulf War II, the Iraqi President, Saddam 
Hussein, in order to protect some strategic sites from the coalition’s attack, recurred to 
this illegal method of warfare. He placed some Western citizens, which he described as 
‘Iraq’s guests,’ as a human shell around these sites. Later he placed a civilian shelter on 
top of a military communication center in Ameriyya, which thus became a legitimate 
military target, even though attacks on it caused “an estimated 200-300 causalities.”637 
Moreover, the massacre occurred in Ghana, Lebanon, in April 11, 1995, Israel, under the 
pretext of striking back over Hizballah Guerrillas targeting Israeli cities, attacked 
civilians sheltered in a United Nations installation, in Ghana, Lebanon.638 Around 100 
civilian casualties resulted directly from this attack.639 This attack also destroyed the 
United Nations building that sheltered the victims. Therefore, under the means of 
attacking military targets or combatants, the environment will be frequently subject to 
military atrocities. 
This rule was created to restrict warfare operations to military objects and 
combatants. However, armed forces may go beyond this rule, to the minimum extent 
possible, in order to eliminate an enemy’s force, especially when the enemy uses civilian 
populations as a cover for military targets and personnel.  
 
c. Principle of Proportionality 
 
To be lawful, weapons and tactics must be proportional to their 
military objective. Disproportionate weaponry and tactics are 
excessive, and as such, illegal.640  
 
                                                          
636 Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism, The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 559, 
569 (1999) [hereinafter Wedgwood, Resonding to Terrorism]. 
637 Normand & Jochnick, supra note (593) at 396 fn. 34. 
638 Joel Greenberg, Civilian, Illegal Target of, in Crimes of War “What the Public Should 
Know,” 85 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999). 
639 Nada Al-Duaij, The Mandate System of the Secretary General: A Comparative 
Study to the Systems in the United Nations, Arab League and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council 84 (L.L.M. paper presented in Arabic to the Faculty of Law, Kuwait 
University, 1997-8). 
640 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 84. 
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The proportionality principle places limits on belligerents in choosing methods 
and tactics of warfare. The proportionality principle requires the comparison between two 
elements, the military target and the environmental effects. Prior to destroying a natural 
resource site by military activity, the military authority should balance the expected 
environmental harm vis-à-vis the military benefits expected to be gained.641 Whenever 
the environmental damage outweighs the military advantage, the military operation 
should be avoided. Even when the enemy misuses the civilians, the “attacking forces are 
still obliged to meet the test of whether predictable harm would be proportional to the 
military advantage.”642 If the harm is “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated,” it is considered a war crime.643 Similarly, military 
operations that cause environmental damage are illegal if they are disproportional to the 
military advantage. For example, destroying a protected area of endangered species,  and 
nay be judged as a ‘war crime’644 if that destruction outweighs any military benefit. 
According to Article 57 (2) (b) of the Additional Protocol I, “an attack shall be suspended 
if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special 
protection […] which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.” 
For example, the direct environmental assault during the Vietnam war - when the 
United States sought to subdue its guerrilla enemy using among other things herbicides, 
high explosive ammunitions, and mechanical land clearing to effectuate large-scale 
deforestation and crop destruction- was disproportional, because the environmental loss 
clearly outweighed the realized military objectives.645 Another example is the oil well 
fires by Iraqi troops in Kuwait, in 1991. To decide whether a military action is 
proportional or not is a commander’s responsibility. Even though such decision may be  
“performed under condition of imperfect information,”646 military commanders should be 
held responsible before the competent international court, or tribunal.  
                                                          
641 Diederich, supra note (626) at 160. 
642 Gaby Rado, Legitimate Military Targets, in Crimes of War “What the Public Should 
Know,” 228 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999) [hereinafter Rado]. 
643 Id., 
644 Id., 
645 Diederich, supra note (626) at 149. 
646 Rado, supra note (642) at 228. 
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The proportionality principle may be particularly relevant when a more 
sophisticated army is involved in a war with a developing force that lacks equally 
advanced weaponry.  The advanced force “should employ only weapons similar to those 
in the possession of its weaker opponent”647 or the war, in such case, will be deemed an 
unjust war. 
The proportionality principle is set forth in Articles 35 (2), 51 (5)(b), and 57 
(2)(a)&(b) of the Additional Protocol I of Geneva conventions as follows: 
 
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering,648 […or to engage in a]n attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injur
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated
y to 
                                                          
649 […w]ith respect to attacks, the 
following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who plan or decide 
upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects 
and are not subject to special protection but are military 
objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and 
that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack 
them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects; (iii)refrain from deciding to launch 
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack 
shall be canceled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection 
or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of  
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”650 
 
647 See Fenrick, The Role of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98Mil. L. Rev. 91 
(1982) [hereinafter Fenrick]. 
648 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 35 (2). 
649 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 51 (5) (b). 
650 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 57 (2) (a) (b). 
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The Additional Protocol I offers great protection to civilians and civilian objects. 
This protection can be extended to apply to the environment. However, that will create 
two dilemmas, First, such protection does not prohibit environmental damage that may be 
considered proportional, from a military point of view. Second, it does not offer a criteria 
or a standard upon which military commanders can determine whether a particular 
operation is or is not proportional to a legitimate military objective. 
Moreover, it is obvious that military targets are always placed in the environment, 
whether on the ground, water, or the air. Consequently, any attack would necessarily 
affect the environment or at least one of its elements. Therefore, the need to minimize 
unnecessary environmental harm suggests that a new provision should be created to 
strictly prevent any attack directed to civilians, civilian objects, military personnel, or 
military targets, that may cause environmental harm disproportional to the military 
advantage. Accordingly, combatants will avoid any use of force that may cause excessive 
environmental harm. 
 
d. Principle of Humanity 
 
To be lawful no weapon or tactic can be validly employed if it 
causes unnecessary suffering to its victims, whether this is by 
way of prolonged or painful death or is in a form calculated to 
cause severe fright or terror. Accordingly, weapons and tactics 
that spread poison or disease or do genetic damage are generally 
illegal per se, as they inflict unacceptable forms of pain, damage, 
death and fear; all forms of deliberate ecological disruption 
would appear to fall within the sway of this overall prohibition.651 
 
The duty to refrain from targeting civilian populations was iterated in the U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 2444, “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict” 
adopted on December 18, 1969.652 The Resolution states that “a) the right of parties to a 
conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; b) it is prohibited to 
launch attacks against the civilian population as such; c) a distinction must be made at all 
                                                          
651 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 84-85. 
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times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian 
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible…”653 Accordingly, 
IHL attempts to humanize war to the extent possible, by preventing the unnecessary 
suffering of victims. Therefore, a number of tactics and methods of warfare were 
prohibited, such as spreading poisons, diseases, or doing genetic damage.  
Modern arms technology make possible both adherence to, and violation of, this 
Principle. First, technology makes it possible to electronically direct ammunitions to 
destroy the intended military target without causing non-military damage. However, the 
second, the negative side of this technology, allows combatants to affect both military 
and civilian population by threatening very wide-scale damage. The second face of the 
technology should be eliminated and prohibited. For example, despite the use of the 
United States Army to the most modern arms technology, in 2001 a number of civilian 
objects, such as the Red Cross installation, mosques, and hospital were mistakenly 
targeted in Afghanistan.654 Another casualties occurred in 1991 in Ameriyya Shelter, 
Iraq.655 
Despite international efforts to eliminate and prohibit such tactics and methods of 
warfare, a number of states are still offering fortunes to get this fatal technology, and use 
them against their enemies and their own population too. A significant example was 
when Iraq used chemical agents against Kurds in Halabjah, located in the Sulaimaniya 
province near the Iraq-Iran border, in 1988.656 Iraqi forces dropped cluster bombs, 
containing a combination of mustard gas, nerve gas and cyanide on Halabjah.657 Within a 
few hours approximately 5,000 people were dead, the majority children, women, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
652 G.A. Res. 2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 164, 
U.N. Doc. A/7433(1968). 
653 Id. 
654 See, Cnn.com, Walter Rodgers: U.N. take on hospital bombing, Oct. 23, 2001, available at  
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/23/ret.rodgers.otsc/index.html>, (last visit Nov. 12, 
2001); Cnn.com, Taliban accuse U.S. of ‘genocide’, Oct. 22, 2001, available at  
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/22/ret.taliban.ambassador/index.html>, (last visit 
Nov. 12, 2001); Cnn.com, U.S. admits mistakenly targeting Red Cross warehouse, Oct. 17, 2001, available 
at  
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/17/ret.pentagon.redcross/index.html>, (last visit Nov. 12, 2001). 
655 Normand & Jochnick, supra note (593) at fn 34. 
656 Brenda K. Uekert, Rivers of Blood: A Comparative Study of Government 
Massacres 71 (Praeger, 1995) [hereinafter Uekert]. 
657 John Bulloch & Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic 
History of the Kurds 142 (Oxford University Press, 1992.) 
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elderly.658 Mustard gas is one of the fatal chemical agents that is long-lived in the 
environment, which means that long-term environmental effects will occur.659 Similarly, 
in World War I, mustard gas was used in some battlefields; however, in 1997 there is still 
some exposure from mustard gas to underwater disposal areas.660 However, despite the 
Halabjah massacre that impacted people and the environment, the international 
community did not respond. Even countries in the Middle East did not monitor such 
atrocity, nor condemn the act. Further, there are a number of signs that Iraq also used 
chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent known as Tabun, against 
Iran in 1984,661 and against the coalition during the Gulf War II.662 The massacre, and the 
absence of response to it, should be a call to the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and other humanitarian and environmental organizations to cooperate to prevent 
such actions in order to save the globe.  
The use of such methods and tactics of warfare will certainly affect the 
environment, and its prohibition will ameliorate the actual environmental situations. In 
the case of Halabjah, for example, the city was clean and healthy before the chemical 
attack, and after the attack, corpses lay undisturbed for months, seeping deadly toxins 
into the earth, and reportedly contaminating the soil and the water.663 Furthermore, 
“agricultural output has dropped dramatically, pomegranate orchards have dried out, and 
other fruit trees have become unproductive.”664 Chemical agents had a direct impact on 
reptiles, so that “snakes and scorpions have become more poisonous since the attack.”665  
In fact, war to some extent has been humanized. But always there are outlaw 
states, which do not care about their international obligations, and violate the minimum 
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standards of humanitarian principles. They should be subject to international liability, as 
the final part of this thesis will discuss. 
 
e. Principle of Necessity 
 
To be lawful, weapons and tactics involving the use of force must 
be reasonably necessary to the attainment of their military 
objective. No superfluous or excessive application of force is 
lawful, even if the damage done is confined to the environment, 
thereby sparing people and property.666 
 
As a rule, the use of force is prohibited, except in the case of self or collective 
defense667 according to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which states that “nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”668 
Any other use of force will be considered illegal.  
In both legal and illegal wars belligerents should be restricted by the principle of 
necessity, which means that the use of tactics and methods of war should be limited to the 
minimum extent possible. For example, the use of gases by the Iraqi army against the 
Kurd population in Halabjah was not necessary to repress their resistance, because the 
Iraqi regime could have used other methods of warfare against them, such as air force 
attacks, terrestrial attacks, or even by siege. Moreover, the level of arms and ammunitions 
used by the coalition during the Gulf War II exceeded any necessity. Weapons of mass 
destruction were used for the first time in the Gulf, and they impacted the environment 
severely. Recurring to the use of force to settle any international or national matter is a 
declaration of a failure of diplomacy. By successfully using diplomacy, a country can 
                                                          
666 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 84. 
667 In the introduction to his Annual Report to the 15th General Assembly for the Year 1959-60, Dag 
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realize its goal without using any arms or ammunitions, and without causing any 
humanitarian or environmental harm. 
The observance of this principle will assure the minimization of humanitarian and 
environmental loss, especially when armed conflict is taking place between a developed 
armed force and developing one, such as the war against terrorist in Afghanistan occurred 
between the U.S. Army with the most universal sophisticated arms and the Taliban armed 
forces on the horses back.  
 
f. Principle of Neutrality 
 
To be lawful, no weapon or tactic can be relied upon if it seems 
likely that it will do harm to human beings, property, or the 
natural environment of neutral or non-participating countries. A 
country is neutral or non-participating if its government declares 
its neutrality and acts in a neutral manner, pursuing in relation 
to the armed conflict a policy that can be assessed to be impartial 
in view of its behaviour and situation.669 
 
 
The law of neutrality is codified in The Hague Convention V in the Case of War 
on Land670 and The Hague Convention XIII in the Case of Naval War.671 Moreover, The 
Hague Convention V provides that “the territory of neutral powers is inviolable.”672 The 
inviolability concept includes transboundary damage, along with environmental 
damage.673  
Armed conflict involves the parties directly concerned. Any other parties will be 
considered neutral. A country can demonstrate its neutrality by avoiding making any 
statement, or casting any vote in international organizations, to condemn one party 
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against the other. This act will protect the neutral state’s population and environment674 
against any attack from the parties in conflict. Any attack directed against a neutral 
power, its population, or its environment, will be considered as an act of aggression. For 
instance, during World War II, “[c]ompensation was paid to Switzerland [a neutral State] 
in cases where collateral damage was caused in Swiss territory from attacks on targets in 
neighboring areas of Germany […]”675 
During the Gulf War II, neutral powers were harmed by Iraq. For example, Iraq 
required the closing of all the foreign embassies in Kuwait, claiming that because Kuwait 
is its nineteenth Province there should be no embassies in Kuwait. Further, the Iraqi 
armed forces threatened that after a specific period of time, refusal to close an embassy 
could result in the loss of diplomatic immunity.676 Another example is the pollution 
caused to the air, land, and water pollution in the Gulf region during the Gulf War II, 
which affected Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Iran, most of which are neutral 
States. Last but not least, on January 18, 1991, Iraq “launched 39 ground-to-ground 
ballistic missiles into Israel,”677 which was not involved in the war, killing a total of 
thirteen people.678 
In any armed conflict, the environment of a neutral and non-participating country 
should be protected from any violation. Otherwise, environmental harm should be 
considered as an aggression, as the environmental impact has a transboundary effect and 
it is not limited to the first place of the incident.  
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Watch Report, 1991) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. 
678 Id. 
 108
g. Principle of Intergenerational Equity 
No weapon or tactic can be employed if it inflicts pain, risk of 
harm and damage, or if it can be reasonably apprehended to do so 
upon those unborn.679 
 
In biology, a species that does not care for future generations will be replaced by 
another that does. However, humans comparatively do care for their future 
generations.680 The term “intergenerational equity” term was used nationally for the firs
time in 1993, when the Philippines Supreme Court referred to intergenerational 
responsibility in a case involving a group of children as representatives of themselves and
future generations to protect their rights to a healthy environment.
t 
 
 
d on the 
erned.”682 
681 The Court held that
“their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be base
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful 
ecology is conc
Moreover, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 on Environment and 
Development recognizes the intergenerational equity principle when stating that: “[T]he 
right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.”683 The term was used 
internationally for the first time in the 1993 case of Denmark v. Norway, a maritime 
boundary delimitation case,684 where the Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 
declared that “[r]espect for these elemental constituents of the inheritance of succeeding 
generations dictated rules and attitudes based upon a concept of an equitable sharing 
which was both horizontal in regard to the present generation and vertical for the benefit 
of generations yet to come.”685 
                                                          
679 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 85. 
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681 Minors Oposa v. Secretary Of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 33 I.L.M. 173 
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682 Id., at 11-12. 
683 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 15/26, 
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684 Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.) 1993 I.C.J. 38 
(June 1993) [hereinafter (Den. v. Nor.)]. 
685 Id., at Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry at 277. 
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The intergenerational equity principle also arose in 1995, when New Zealand 
challenge the proposed French underground tests in the Pacific before the ICJ, as 
discussed earlier. Judge Weeramantry declared in his dissenting opinion that the 
intergenerational equity principle is “an important and rapidly developing principle of 
contemporary environmental law […] which must inevitably be a concern of this 
Court.”686 
Further, the Preamble of the 1997 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International 
on Responsibility and Liability under International Law for Environmental Damage 
recognized that “international environmental law is developing significant new links with 
the concept of intergenerational equity [which is] influencing the issues relating to 
responsibility and liability.”687 
Accordingly, the wrongful act of a generation should never affect the future 
generations. When an armed conflict occurred, combatants should keep future 
generations in their consideration. No methods of warfare or tactics should be used if 
they might affect future generations. The effects of warfare, if they cannot be completely 
eliminated, should be limited to the generation who decided to recur to the force, or who 
cannot prevent the war from occurring.  
For instance, the effect of atomic radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki surpassed 
the 1945 generation, to affect the future generations.688 Similarly, the American veterans 
who returned from the Gulf were contaminated with D.U., and many of their babies were 
born with different kinds of defects, such as “missing eyes, missing ears, blood 
infections, respiratory problems and fused fingers.”689 The intergenerational equity 
principle was confirmed after the Vietnam war,690 by the conclusion of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modificatio
Techniques (ENMOD), of 1976, which uses the term ‘long-lasting’ and the Additional 
n 
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Protocol I to the Geneva conventions, which uses the term ‘long-term’.691 Thus, both 
ENMOD and the Additional Protocol I realized that environmental effects cannot be 
limited to the present generation only, and can impact future generations also.  
 
2. Specific Provisions 
A number of IHL instruments include a kind of environmental protection during 
armed conflict. Some of these instruments refer to the protection of one environmental 
element or more, without addressing the environmental protection in general. Examples 
include the protection of private and public properties, and the protection of cultural 
heritage. Some other instruments address environmental protection more broadly. 
Here, we will examine these instruments, classified according to their date of 
conclusion, starting from The Hague Conventions, the fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, the Additional Protocol I of 1977, the Additional Protocol II of 1977, and the 
Marten’s Clause. 
 
a. The Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 
1899 and 1907 
 
The Hague Conventions are part of The Hague law, which 
 
consists of the treaties adopted by the two Hague conferences. 
The first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, which was a step 
towards international disarmament, resulted in three conventions: 
for the peaceful adjustment of international differences; regarding 
the laws and customs of war on land; and for the adaptation of 
maritime warfare of the 1864 Geneva Convention. There were 
also three declarations: to prohibit the launching of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods; to 
prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the 
diffusion of the asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and to prohibit 
the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body (‘dum-dum’ bullets). A second Hague Peace Conference 
was held in 1907. This conference revised the three 1899 
                                                          
691 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 35 (3). 
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conventions and adopted ten new conventions: respecting the 
limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract 
debts; relative to the opening of hostilities; relative to the status 
of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities; respecting 
the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war 
on land; relative to the conversion of merchant ships into 
warships; relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact 
mines; respecting bombardment by naval force in time of war; 
relative to the creation of an International prize Court; and 
concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war. 
Also the 1899 declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons was revised.692 
 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which are considered authoritative 
sources of customary international law, provide that “the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”693 The laws of war were comprehensively 
codified in the 1907 Hague Convention, which presents a degree of protection to the 
environment. Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Convention proscribed the destruction or 
seizure of the enemy’s property, “unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
war.”694 That provision does not offer real protection to the environment because it 
justified the wanton destruction of the environment, when military necessity arises.  
For example, in World War II, the German General Lothar Rendulic ordered the 
evacuation of all the inhabitants in Finmark province, Norway, and destroyed all 
villages.695 Although the Nuremberg Military Tribunal later accused General Rendulic of 
wanton property destruction, the tribunal excuplated him on the basis that military 
necessity justified his actions at that time.696 On the other hand, some scholars consider 
Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Convention, an adequate protection of the environment, 
                                                          
692 Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare, 5-6 (St. Martin’s Press) 
(1984)[hereinafter Suter]. 
693 The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) Annex art 22; The Hague Convention IV, supra 
note (205) Annex art 22. 
694 The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) Annex art. 23 (g). 
695 Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons: “Greening” the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an 
Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 793, 815 (1996) [hereinafter 
Yuzon]. 
696 United States v. List, XI Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 757, 1295-97 
(1946-49), see, Id., at 815. 
 112
since the environmental resources of a country are the property of a state or of its 
citizens, which the Article seeks to protect.697 
In addition, Article 23 (a) of the 1907 Hague Convention forbids the use of 
poisonous weapons, stating that it is “especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned 
weapons,” and 23 (b) prevents the unnecessary suffering of civilians and combatants.698 
Poison gas had been used in World War I in violation of the Convention. 
Additionally, both instruments, the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions, put 
the invaders in the position of “administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings, 
real property, forests and agricultural works belonging to the hostile state, and situated in 
the occupied country”699 and require the invaders to “protect the capital of these 
properties.”700 These elements are not classified as spoils of war, and the invaders are 
prohibited from treating them as such. The destruction of public buildings may affects the 
cultural heritage, especially when such buildings deemed a history for the nation. 
Therefore, for example, destroying the Seif Palace in Kuwait, the Satellite Station of 
Omm Eleish, and Kuwait University, by the Iraqi troops should be considered a violation 
of Article 23 of the Annexed Regulations of The Hague Conventions II and IV.  
The Annexed Regulations of the 1899 Hague Convention II and the Annexed 
Regulations of the 1907 Hague Convention IV further enumerate more prohibited 
actions, including actions that cause unnecessary suffering or destroy the enemy’s 
property, towns and cultural artifacts. Under those provisions, it is forbidden to “destroy 
or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessity of war.”701 Further, Article 27 of the Annexed Regulations of 
the 1899 Hague Convention II and the Annexed Regulations of the1907 Hague 
Conventions IV protect cultural monuments and charitable enterprises,702 as a part of 
                                                          
697 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 124. 
698 The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) Annex, art. 23 (a) & (b). 
699 Id., Annex, art. 23; The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) Annex, art. 23;  
700 Id.  
701 “In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden […] (g) To 
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war.” The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) Annex, art. 23 (1)(g); The Hague 
Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) Annex art. 23 (1)(g). 
702 “In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. 
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible 
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cultural heritage.703 In fact, cultural artifacts, monuments, and historical sites are of a 
great value and may take a long time to be rebuilt with the risk of the loss of their 
historical value. However, harm to nature often cannot be restored or repaired, and even 
if it can be restored it may take decades if not centuries. Thus, these provisions can be 
read to prohibit environmental damage as well. 
Article 53 of the Annexed Regulations to the Hague Convention IV provides that  
 
[a]n army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, 
and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the 
State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, 
and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which 
may be used for military operations. All appliances, whether on 
land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or 
for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed 
by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of 
munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private 
individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when 
peace is made.704 
 
 
Some scholars interpret this article to include rubber, timber, and cotton, as 
munitions, thus justifying their destruction in their natural environment.705 However, this 
interpretation of Article 53 confuses the natural environment with the tools of war. The 
natural environment, like civilian populations, is not created for military purposes or to 
be used as a weapon. For example, if combatants target civilian populations during armed 
conflicts, this does not legitimize the destruction of civil populations. And in the worst 
case, civilian objects can be destroyed only under the precautionary and proportionality 
principles. Similarly, destroying the environment, including rubber, timber, and cotton, is 
always illegal, but when the environment is targeted precautionary and proportionality 
principles should be considered.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.” The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note 
(630) Annex, art. 27; The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) Annex, art. 27. 
703 The Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, will be examined latter in 
Part IV “The Environmental Law Rules.” 
704 Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) annex art. 53. 
705 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, CBW and the Law of 
War 69 (1973) [hereinafter CBW and the Law of War], cited in Yuzon, supra note (695) 831 fn. 
200. 
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In order to update the humanitarian provisions, forty-two years later, the Geneva 
law appeared. It included much more specific environmental protection and became the 
source for more effective humanitarian protection. 
 
b. The Geneva Convention Relevant to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (Fourth Convention of 12 August 1949) 
 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 replaced the two Geneva Conventions of 
1929.706 They were created in response to the World War II,707 to be applied in armed 
conflict to provide special protections for ‘protected persons.’708 The Geneva law is 
composed of four conventions and two protocols. The four conventions are the Geneva 
Convention I Relevant to the Wounded and Sick in the Field; II Relevant to the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea; III Relevant to the Prisoners of War; IV 
Relevant to Civilians. In addition, Geneva IHL includes the Additional Protocol I 
Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, and the 
Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts. Of the four Geneva Conventions, the fourth one is the only one that protects 
both civilians and elements of the environment.709 Several non-combatant provisions of 
the Geneva Convention IV cover some aspects of environmental harm.710  
Article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention711 prohibits the destruction of real or 
personal property, by articulating that:  
 
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal 
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, 
or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or 
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such 
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations.712 
                                                          
706 L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 41 (Manchester University 
Press, 1993). 
707 Popovic, supra note (619) at 73. 
708 Id. 
709 Id., at 74. 
710 Id. 
711 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 53. 
712 Id. 
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In all cases, this rule protects State, co-operative, and individual property. It is 
notable that Article 53 protects one environmental element, which is property.713 
However, this limitation is unsuitable for indigenous people, many of whom do not 
recognize or follow “western” concepts of property or property law.714 However, some 
legal systems identify all valuable things, including the environment, as the property of 
the state if it has no owner. For example, the Kuwaiti legal system grants the government 
the ownership of all properties that have no owner, along with all the territories situated 
beyond the municipality line.715 Thus, any violation of such properties will be considered 
as destruction of co-operative, private, or state’s property. 
Furthermore, Article 55 of the fourth Geneva Convention ensures maintenance of 
food and medical supplies of the population.716 Article 55 fails to protect the environment 
per se or the many other things the environment contribute to human survival and 
fulfillment.717 
Finally, Article 56 of the Convention provides for maintenance of medical 
facilities and services.718 Article 56 also indirectly provides protection for the 
environment, through measures to control diseases.  
 
c. Additional Protocol I Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts  
 
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions do not address environmental warfare expressly. 
However, in 1977, in light of the Vietnam War, the United Nations added Protocol I to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict719 was drafted by 
                                                          
713 Popovic, supra note (619) at 74. 
714 Id. 
715 Ghanon Ragom 18/1969 Fy Sha’an Tahdeed Amlak Adawlah Kharij Khat Atantheem Ala’am, [Law No. 
18/1969 Concerning the Indication of the State Properties beyond the Public Organization Limit], May 7, 
1969, art. 1. 
716 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 55. 
717 Popovic, supra note (619) at 74. 
718 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 56. 
719 Additional Protocol I, supra note (79). 
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the ICRC between 1974 and 1977.720 The United States signed the Protocol in 1978, but 
has not yet ratified it. Nevertheless, the United States considers Protocol I as international 
customary law and thus binding.721  
Protocol I represents a considerable development of the IHL regarding 
environmental protection in times of armed conflict. It contains the most explicit 
environmental protection provisions of humanitarian law, aimed at limiting ecological 
destruction during armed conflicts.722 This protocol recognizes that environmental 
protection is necessary to human health and survival. Protocol I thus makes explicit the 
environmental protection requirements its predecessors only imply.723 
Article 35 establishes the basic rules regarding environmental protection. It 
forbids the use of weapons and methods of warfare that may cause unnecessary injury to 
humans or the environment. Article 35 states that 
 
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited…3. It is 
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment.724  
 
However, despite the great environmental protection offered by Protocol I,725 it 
does not govern all environmental destruction. It affects only the destruction intended or 
reasonably expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the 
                                                          
720 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 126. 
721 Id. 
722 Popovic, supra note (619) at 75. 
723 Id. 
724 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 35 (1)(3). 
725 Here, it is necessary to alert the reader that international experts and authors used to mention the 
environmental protection offered by the Additional Protocol I along with the environmental protection that 
included in ENMOD, see, Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting 
the Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 1047 (1999) [hereinafter Richards & 
Schmitt]; Schwabach, supra note (477) at 126; Major Richard M. Whitaker, Environmental Aspects of 
Overseas Operations, Jul. Army Law. 17 (1995)[hereinafter Whitaker]; Betsy Baker, Legal Protections 
for the Environment in Times of Armed Conflicts, 33 Va.J.Int’l L. 351 (1993)[hereinafter Baker]; 
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 187; Captain William A. Wilcox, Environmental Protection in 
Combat, 17 S. Ill. L. J. 299, 306-09 (1993). However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will follow 
different path by including the Additional Protocol I in the IHL provisions, and mentioning ENMOD in the 
enviro-humanitarian law, a term uses to refer to the international instruments usually formulated by military 
commandors, and offers a protection to both people and environment. 
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environment.726 It would seem that all three elements must be met for the prohibition to 
apply,727 a very stringent standard. Arguably, environmental damage that meets any of 
the three elements is more than the international community should tolerate, even in 
wartimes.728 Therefore, some experts do not consider the environmental damage caused 
by the Iraqi Army from the oil well fires in Kuwait, and the oil spill in the Gulf water, to 
be violations of Additional Protocol I.729 
Further, Article 55 provides that:  
 
1) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. 
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or 
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause 
such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice 
the health or survival of the population. 2) Attacks against the 
natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.730  
 
Here, similarly, the environmental protection of Article 55 requires the presence 
of the three elements together. Additionally, Protocol I contains further provisions, in 
Article 54 and 56, which contribute indirectly to environmental protection in times of 
armed conflict. 
Article 54 (2) prohibits the destruction of the means of survival of the civilian 
population: 
 
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-
stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies 
and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for 
their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse 
Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out 
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.731 
 
                                                          
726 Popovic, supra note (619) at 75. 
727 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 236. 
728 Popovic, supra note (619) at 76. 
729 L. C. Green, supra note (842) at 237. 
730 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 55 (1)&(2). 
731 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 54 (2). 
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And Article 56 (1) protects works and installations, whose destruction would 
endanger the civilian population: 
 
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely 
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not 
be made the object of attack, even where these objects are 
military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity 
of these works or installations shall not be made the object of 
attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
from the works or installations and consequent severe losses 
among the civilian population.732 
 
Thus, these provisions do provide significant and explicit protection of the 
environment and natural resources. On the other hand, Article 85 (3) of the Additional 
Protocol I requires “human injury” for a violation to be considered a grave breach. It does 
not mention the environment in the provisions on grave breaches. However, the 
environment is included in the prohibition of “extensive destruction of property” 
contained in the definition of grave breaches in the relevant articles common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.733 
Moreover, the failure of many major powers, including the U.S.,734 to ratify 
Protocol I limits the environmental protection of such instrument. At the time of signature 
of the Additional Protocol I, the United States delegation formally requested the 
exclusion of environmental damage resulting from using nuclear weapons from the scope 
of Articles 35 (3) and 55.735 In addition, it appears that Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the 
Additional Protocol I need to be reformulated to include the precautionary principle as “a 
                                                          
732 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 56 (1). 
733 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art. 50; Geneva Convention (II), supra note (56) art. 51; Geneva 
Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 147. 
734 Popovic, supra note (619) at 80. 
735 Richard Falk, The Inadequacy of the Existing Legal Approach to Environmental Protection in Wartime, 
in The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific 
Perspectives 147 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000) [hereinafter Falk, The 
Inadequacy]. 
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limit on military activities,” since Additional Protocol I appeared at a time when that 
principle had not yet taken its position in international law.736 
Further, the prohibition of Protocol I applies only when environmental damage is 
“widespread, long-term, and severe,” thus limiting the effectiveness of that provision.737 
Moreover, Additional Protocol I applies only to the situations of international armed 
conflicts, not to civil wars. Provisions related to internal armed conflicts are set forth in 
the Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts. 
 
d. Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts 
 
The Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts738 specifically addresses internal conflicts, but it is less 
accepted among States than the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocol II 
does not mention environmental protection. However, its Article 14 states, “[s]tarvation 
of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, 
destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works.” Article 14 is parallel to Protocol I’s Articles 54 (protection of objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) and 56 (prohibition of attacks on 
environmental-related targets.)739 Moreover, Article 16 of the Additional Protocol II 
provides considerable protection for monuments, works of art, and places of worship, 
because they are part of the human environment. Article 16 states that “without prejudice 
to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility 
directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute 
                                                          
736 Bothe, The Protection of the Environment, supra note (675) at 58. 
737 Falk, The Inadequacy, supra note (735) at 146. 
738 Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76). 
739 Popovic, supra note (619) at 76. 
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the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military 
effort.”740  
It appears that Protocol II provides indirect protection for the environment. And to 
apply Protocol II, one of the involved parties to the conflict must be a government, that 
is, a recognized regime that has a right and duty to practice its authority over a population 
whenever a violation of Protocol II is committed.741 
 
e. The Marten’s Clause 
The Marten’s Clause, one of the IHL’s landmarks, was originally designed to 
provide supplementary humanitarian rules for the protection of all persons in times of 
armed conflict.742 The Marten’s Clause was drafted originally in 1899, when there were 
relatively few agreed laws about armed conflict. It provided that unforeseen situations 
should not be left to the arbitrary and capricious judgment of military commanders, but 
should be governed by articulated rules.743  
The Marten’s Clause inspired a comparable further action by the international 
environmental law community, in 2000, a century later, when the IUCN Amman Clause 
was adopted to govern environmental matters.744  
The “Amman Clause” Resolution states that 
 
“RECALLING that Recommendation 1.75 (Armed Conflict and 
the Environment), which was adopted by the 1st Session of the 
World Conservation Congress, endorsed the promotion of the 
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Hostile Military Activities 
in Internationally Protected Areas; 
REAFFIRMING the awareness expressed in the World Charter 
for Nature that mankind is a part of nature and life depends on 
the uninterrupted functioning of natural system; 
                                                          
740 Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76) art. 16. 
741 Allison & Goldman, supra note (84) at 158. 
742 Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 
A.J.I.L. 78, 78 (2000)[hereinafter Meron. 
743 Dina Shelton & Alexandre Kiss, Adoption of The Marten’s Clause for Environmental Protection 2, a 
paper prepared for the Second World Conservation Congress, Amman, Jordan (Oct. 4-11, 2000)[hereinafter 
Shelton & Kiss]. The full text of the 1899 Marten’s Clause will be examined in the next few pages. 
744 For purposes of this thesis, The Marten’s Clause that was adopted in the IUCN World Conservation 
Congress in Amman to cover environmental matters will be called IUCN Amman Clause. 
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ALSO REAFFIRMING that every form of lifes is unique, 
warranting respect regardless of its apparent worth to man; 
CONSIDERING the adoption of the 8th Preambular paragraph in 
the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (18 October 1907), which is also known as the 
Marten’s Clause, and which is reiterated in Article 1 (2) of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts; 
RECOGNISING the fundamental importance of The Marten’s 
Clause in providing a judicial standard governing the conduct of 
all persons in times of armed conflict in the absence of 
conventional law; 
REAFFIRMING the need for appropriate measures to protect the 
environment at the national and international, individual and 
collective, private and public levels; 
The World Conservation Congress at its 2nd Session in Amman, 
Jordan, 4-11 October 2000: 
URGES all United Nations Members States to endorse the 
following policy: 
Until a more complete international code of environmental 
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by 
international agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all 
its constituent elements and processes remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established customs, from dictates of the public 
conscience, and from the principles and fundamental values of 
humanity acting as steward for present and future 
generations.”745 
 
This clause was adopted unanimously by the seventy-two States in the IUCN 
World Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan, 4-11 October, 2000. That action was 
one of the most fruitful efforts of the Amman Congress.746 The Marten’s Clause provides 
                                                          
745 The Marten’s Clause for environmental protection Resolution No. CGR2.CNV019, Adopted by the 2nd 
World Conservation Congress, Amman, Jordan 4-11 Oct. 2000, available at <http://www.iucn.org>, (last 
visit Jan. 14, 2001) [hereinafter IUCN Amman Clause]. 
746 The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) also known as 
the World Conservation Union founded in 1948. IUCN is unique among international organizations in that 
it is a membership organization comprising governments, both international and national non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s), as well non-voting affiliate Members. The IUCN objectives “shall be to influence, 
encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and the diversity of nature and 
to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable.” It includes six 
commissions: Education and Communication, Environmental Law, Environmental, Economic, and Social 
Policy, World Commission on Protected Areas, Species, Survival, and Ecosystem Management. IUCN 
headquarters is in Switzerland. Comprising a staff of 930. It has eight Regional Offices: Meso-America, 
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a foundation for all contemporary IHL, from its adoption for the first time in the 1899 
Hague Convention, its iteration in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, its reiteration in 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II to the Geneva Conventions, its inclusion in 
Resolution XXIII of the 1968 U.N. Conference on Human Rights, its revision in the 1980 
Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons, and recently, its adoption by the IUCN Second World Conservation Congress, 
in Amman. This background is also important to understand the potential future scope of 
the IUCN Amman Clause which will be discussed in section 4. In order to discuss IUCN 
Amman Clause, it is necessary to address the origin and the application of The Marten’s 
Clause, the dictates of public conscience, and the adoption of the IUCN Amman Clause. 
 
1) The Origin and the Application of The Marten’s Clause  
The Marten’s Clause is “based on paragraph 3 of the Declaration of June 20, 
1899, read by Friedrich von Marten’s, the Russian delegate who chaired the 11th meeting 
of the Second Committee of the Second Commission on the occasion of the First Hague 
Peace Conference of 1899.”747 Later, The Hague Convention of 1899 with Respect to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its revision of 1907 adopted the following text of 
The Marten’s Clause,748 and it has been included in the Preambular paragraph nine of the 
1899 Hague Convention as follows: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, 
the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in 
cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
North America, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Northern Africa, South and South East Asia, and 
West Asia.  See Statutes of 5 October 1948, revised 22 October 1996 (Including Rules of Procedures of the 
World Conservation Congress), and Regulations revised 22 October 1996 (ISBN2-8317-0410-3)(published 
for IUCN by Imprimerie SADAG, Belgrade, France 1997), at 2, see also, Nicholas A. Robinson, Note on 
the Legal Status of IUCN, Opinion of the Legal Advisor of IUCN 1-2 (Gland, Switzerland, 
1998)[hereinafter Robinson, Note on the Legal Status of IUCN]. See in general Martin Holdgate, 
The Green Web: A Union for World Conservation (Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1999) 
[hereinafter Holdgate]. 
747 Shigeki Miyazaki, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law, in Studies and 
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 129, at 132 
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) [hereinafter Miyazaki]. 
748 The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) pmbl para. 9; The Hague Convention (IV) of 
1907, supra note (205) pmbl. para. 8. 
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inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from 
the usage established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.749 
 
The revised Hague Convention IV of 1907 also includes The Marten’s Clause in 
the Preambular Paragraph eight.750 The preamble of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague 
Conventions is considered a significant part of these conventions, and showed the real 
will of the contracting parties to be bound by The Marten’s Clause.751  
The Marten’s Clause of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions was adopted 
to protect two categories of persons: inhabitants and belligerents. It does not cover the 
environment. However, it is hard to separate people from their environment, since any 
harm that may affect the environment will reflect on the people, as they need to live in a 
clean and healthy environment. Thus, the protection offered to inhabitants and 
belligerents by The Marten’s Clause will primarily safeguard their lives, and secondarily 
secure the environment where they live. The inclusion of The Marten’s Clause in the 
Preamble of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions provided a foundation for 
protecting inhabitants and belligerents directly, and in maintaining the environment 
indirectly. The Marten’s Clause reflects a basic principle of law, and as discussed earlier, 
since it is included in the preamble of an international treaty, The Clause binds to the 
contracting parties.752 
Further, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in order to restrict the impact of 
denouncing the Conventions states that: 
 
                                                          
749 The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) pmbl. para. 9. 
750 The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note (205) pmbl. para. 8. 
751 According to Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties: “the context for the 
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annexes.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31 (2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331[hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties]. 
752 According to the ICRC report of the directional principles of the military booklets and principles 
directives regarding the environmental protection in times of armed conflict, the environment remains 
under the protection of international law principles derived from established custom, from the principles of 
humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience in other situations not covered by international 
agreements. International Committee of the Red Cross, Following up the Works of the International 
Conference on the Protection of War Victims (1993), 48 Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross 247, 250 
(1996) (Arabic Version.) 
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[T]he denunciation [of the convention] shall have effect only in 
respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the 
obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to 
fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they 
result from the usage established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.753   
 
The denouncing party remains bound to fulfill obligations arising from the 
principles of the law of nations. Thus, the Marten’s Clause still binds even a country that 
denounces the Convention generally. Moreover, unlike The Hague Conventions, the 
Geneva Conventions apply the protection of The Marten’s Clause generally, without any 
limitation to inhabitants and belligerents. This generality could offer the protection to the 
environment along with the protection of inhabitants and belligerents.  
In 1968, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights754 paraphrased The Marten’s 
Clause in Resolution XXIII, which stated that “inhabitants and belligerents are protected 
in accordance with the principles of law of nations derived from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of the public 
conscience.”755 That text is similar to the text of the Geneva Conventions, except that it 
delimited, again, the protection of The Marten’s Clause to inhabitants and belligerents. In 
order to protect the environment, this delimitation requires a nexus between belligerents 
or inhabitants and the environment, otherwise The Marten’s Clause will be incompetent 
to protect the environment. Thus its reach under this Resolution is more limited and less 
effective than it could be. Significantly, according to Marten’s Clause, the protection of 
inhabitants and belligerents will be seen as a short-term goal, while the environmental 
protection will be considered as a long term objective. 
Furthermore, the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions756 included 
The Marten’s Clause in Article 1 (2), which states that “in cases not covered by the 
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
                                                          
753 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art 63; Geneva Convention (II), supra note (56) art 62; Geneva 
Convention (III), supra note (56) art 142; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art 158. 
754 International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 Apr.-13 May 1968. 
755 Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Apr. 25-May 
9, 1968, 5 Res. XXIII, A/CONF.32/41 (1968), U.N. Sales No. E. 68.XIV.2, [hereinafter Res. XXIII/1968]. 
756 The Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79). 
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custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”757 A 
remarkable shift in The Marten’s Clause text was witnessed during the adoption of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I, when the negotiators of this instrument replaced the term 
“usages” with “established custom,” which according to some international humanitarian 
experts may have deprived The Marten’s Clause of its coherence and legal logic.758 By 
such replacement, “the protocol conflates the emerging product (principles of 
international law) with one of its component factors (established custom) and raises 
questions about the function, role, and necessity of the uncodified principles of humanity 
and dictates of public conscience.”759 However, it is not clear that such conclusion was 
intended by the protocol’s negotiators.  
On the other hand, the Additional Protocol II of 1977 adopted The Marten’s 
Clause in its Preamble, which states that “in cases not covered by the law in force, the 
human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates 
of the public conscience.”760 Protocol II did not distinguish between combatants and 
civilians, and offers its protection for all human persons. Unlike all other documents, 
Protocol II did not point to the international law, or the law of nations, as a source of The 
Marten’s Clause rules, which might be attributed to the fact that it deals with non-
international armed conflicts. In extending its protection to internal armed conflicts, the 
Clause of Additional Protocol II guarantees basic rights to all people, regardless of the 
nature of the combat. It also extends protection against environmental damage regardless 
of the nature of the combat. Thus, it seeks to focus on protection, rather than on the 
source of damage.  
Moreover, in 1980, The Marten’s Clause was been adopted by the Preambular 
paragraph five of the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons.761 That paragraph declares that “the civilian population and the 
combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles 
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity 
                                                          
757 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art 1 (2). 
758 Meron, supra note (742) at 81. 
759 Id. 
760 Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76) pmbl. 
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and from the dictates of public conscience.”762 The inclusion of The Marten’s Clause in 
that document affirmed its importance again in protecting civilian populations and 
combatants as they consider substantial part of the environment. 
This review of The Marten’s Clause makes clear that the evolution of the Clause 
has excluded large areas of environmental issues. For example, The Marten’s Clause just 
covers civilians and belligerents without any explicit reference to the environment or its 
components such as biodiversity, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere which need 
to be protected in times of armed conflict as well. However, environmental protection 
principles may be derived from The Marten’s Clause indirectly, since protection of 
civilians seems necessarily to include protection of their environment. The Amman 
Clause reaches that conclusion, and explicitly excludes the Marten’s Clause to include 
environmental safeguards. The environment should be protected from war and any other 
hostilities. 
 
2) The Dictates of Public Conscience 
It is necessary to analyze the dictates of public conscience to address the 
following issues: the origins of general principles of international law, whether The 
Marten’s Clause is a general principle of international law, or is only soft international 
law, or only binding if in a treaty, and the same questions about the nature of The IUCN 
Amman Clause. 
 
a) The Origins of General Principles of International Law 
General principles of the international law, known as jus cogens, present a 
common foundation for the international legal system.763 Jus cogens norms are 
peremptory764 and have a magnificent status within international law.765  
                                                                                                                                                                             
761 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons Which may 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons].  
762 Id., pmbl. para. 5. 
763 Paul Reuter, Droit International Public 118 (Presses Universitares De France, 1983) 
[hereinafter Reuter]. 
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Jus cogens norms were defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 as the “norms recognized by the international community of 
states as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”766 The Vienna Convention did not list specific jus cogens norms, because of 
the absence of an agreement on the content of these norms.767 Nevertheless, the 
International Court of Justice can determine whether a norm is considered a jus cogen or 
not,768 since according to Article 9 of the Court Statute it is the sole international court 
that has judges elected to represent all countries.769 Thus, their decisions regarding the 
creation of general principles of international law will be recognized by all civilized 
nations.770 
Moreover, jus cogens norms may not derive from the international legal system 
solely. National legal systems may serve as a rich source of these general principles of 
international law.771 Some international law experts believe that only the international 
legal system is a valid source of the general principles.772 Others believe that the general 
principles of international law should include general principles derived from national 
legal systems773 along with those of the international legal system in order to enrich the 
international law sources and treat all its lacunas.774 Further, Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute states that general principles are those “recognized by civilized nations.”775 This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
764 Joseph G. Bergen, Note, The Federal Republic of Germany: Why the Courts Should Find That Violating 
Jus Cogens Norms Constitutes An Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 14 Conn. J. Int’l L.169, 171 
(1999) [hereinafter Bergen]. 
765 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859, F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
766 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art. 53. 
767 See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogen) in International Law: 
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status 178 (Lakimiesliton Kustannus Finish 
Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1988) [hereinafter Hannikainen]. 
768  See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). 
769 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, art 9, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 
1052 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ].  
770 Michel Virally, The Sources of International Law, in Manual of Public International Law 
116, 146 (Sorensen ed., 1968).  
771 Reuter, supra note (763) at 118. 
772 David RuziÉ,Droit International Public 48 (Dalloz 1989) [hereinafter RuziÉ]. 
773 Rasheed Al-enezy, Public International Law, and A Specific Studies 
Regarding the Attitude of the International Law of the Iraqi Occupation to 
Kuwait, (in Arabic) 53 (Kuwait, 1997) [hereinafter Al-enezy]. 
774 Id. 
775 Statute of the ICJ, supra note (769) art. 38 (1)(c). 
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Article sets forth the importance of national legal systems in providing general principles 
of international law. For instance, some juridical substantive principles such as the “pacta 
sunt servanda,” acquisition of rights, abuse of rights, and good faith, in addition to some 
juridical procedural principles such as res judicata, and the equality of parties before the 
law that apply to the ICJ legal system were inspired by national legal systems.776  
The jus cogens norms hold the highest hierarchical position in international 
law.777 As a consequence, jus cogens norms are deemed to be peremptory and non-
derogable.778 However, subsequent to the definition of the general principles of 
international law, it is necessary to clarify why are they binding. 
There exist two theories in which the jus cogens norms may find their foundation. 
The first theory is derived from the law of nature. The law of nature, natural law, is not a 
system of legal norms, but a system of ethical principles.779 According to this theory, the 
jus cogens norms find their power in the nature of their original source whether from 
international custom, from moral or religious principles, or from some combination of 
such factors.780 It may be believed that the traditional Marten’s Clause of 1899 emerged 
from the natural law, because it “recognized the existence of absolute ideals or principles 
higher than positive law.”781 Jus cogens norms, thus, may derive from moral or religious 
concepts prohibiting causing harm to people, and counseling peace, since man is an 
essential part of the universe, and has a special position among its other parts. For 
example, in Sharia, the Islamic law, the duty “of care and nurture for man’s good works 
are not limited to the benefit of the human species, but rather extend to the benefit of all 
created beings; and (there is a reward in doing good to every living thing).”782 Moreover, 
                                                          
776 Al-enezy, supra note (773) at 55-56. 
777 M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law” 11 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 768, 801-09 (1990). 
778 M. Cherif Bassiouni, States of Emergency and States of Exception: Human Rights Abuse and Impunity 
Under Color of Law, in Non-Derogable Rights and States of Emergency 125 (Daniel 
Premont ed., 1996.) 
779 Lester H. Woolsey, Editorial Comment: Natural Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International 
Law, 55 Am. J. Int’l. L. 951, 958 (1961.) 
780 Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 5 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 273, 282 
(1975). 
781 John E. Noyes, Christianity and Late Nineteenth-Century British Theories of 
International Law, in The Influence of Religion on the Development of 
International Law 85 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) [hereinafter Noyes]. 
782 AbubakAr Ahmed Bagader et al., Environmental Protection in Islam 2 (IUCN, 
Gland & Cambridge, 1994) [hereinafter Bagader et al.]. 
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Islamic rules and principles prohibit torture and killing whether in times of armed 
conflicts or in peacetime. Such acts interfere with the mercy principle that Islam based 
on,783 as shown by the Prophetic Speech that “God will curse those who torture 
people.”784 
Another such principle can be derived from ancient Hindu India, where wars were 
to be fought according to “Dharma Yuddha, the rules of righteousness in war.”785 
Civilian populations ( non combatants) such as “those who look on without taking part in 
the fight, those afflicted with grief, those who have set their hearts on emancipation, 
those who are asleep, thirsty or fatigued, or are walking along the road, or have a task on 
hand unfinished, or are proficient in fine art,”786 were exempted from warfare atrocities. 
Significantly, the protection extended to include even combatants, who “should not be 
killed, including a warrior whose armour has fallen off, who has laid down his weapon, is 
mortally wounded, who is weak with wounds, or is fighting with another.”787 
These religious principles offer great protection to human life whether in times of 
armed conflicts or peacetime, combatant or civilian, and these same principles are 
reflected in the traditional Marten’s Clause. Natural law pre-exists treaties, and under the 
theory of natural law, thus gives the jus cogens norms power, even if they are not written 
in an international agreement. 
The power of jus cogens depends on the number of States that recognize a norm 
as a jus cogen. For example, to consider a norm as a jus cogens the consent of a large 
majority of States, reflecting the essential components of the international community, is 
required 788 A state or a small group of states cannot veto the formation of jus cogens 
                                                          
783 Abdulghani Mahmood, International Humanitarian Law: A Comparative Study 
with the Islamic Sharia, (in Arabic) 22 (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia, 1991). 
784 Id. 
785 Ved P. Nanda, International Law in Ancient Hindu India, in The Influence of Religion on 
the Development of International Law, 54 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) [hereinafter 
Nanda].  
786 Translation by Georg Buhler, The Laws of Manu (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 25, 1886.) Manusmriti  
is divides into twelve Books and has 2,694 couplets or slokas. Citations to Manusmriti are to books and 
slokas. See generally Manusmriti, VII, 91-3; Nanda, supra note (785) fn. 64. 
787 Id., fn. 65. 
788 Statement of U.N. Reps. Yasseen (Iraq) at U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, Mar. 26-
May 28, 1968), in U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., at 427, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 
(1969), see also Hannikainen, supra note (767) at 210 etc. 
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norms.789 Nonetheless, both the majority that consider them as jus cogens norms, and the 
minority that did not, are bound by the jus cogens norms.790 
However, the second theory is derived from the positive law. One of the 
positivists, Lassa Oppenheim, wrote in 1905 that “we know nowadays that a Law of 
Nature does not exist. The philosophy of the positive law has overcome the fanciful rules 
of the so-called Law of Nature.”791 According to this theory, jus cogens norms find their 
power in existing treaties, i.e. written law. Thus, party states are bound by the jus cogens 
norms integrated in the international conventions. However, such norms are applicable 
even against those states that have not accepted them.792  
 
b) Is The Marten’s Clause a General Principle of International Law? 
To define whether The Marten’s Clause is a general principle of international law, 
and therefore a jus cogens, it is necessary to refer to the United Nations International Law 
Commission Report, which states that “there is no simple criterion to identify a general 
rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.”793 Nonetheless, in order 
to develop a means of identifying jus cogen norms, Uhlmann, an international law expert, 
created four criteria794: the norm should aim to protect the state community interests, it 
must have a foundation in morality, it must be of an absolute nature, and vast majority of 
states should accept it as a jus cogens.795 By applying these criteria to Marten’s Clause, it 
will appear that The Marten’s Clause is a well accepted general principle of international 
law. 
 
 
                                                          
789 Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global 
Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms 11 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 101, 113 
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790 R. St. J. Macdonald, Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law, 25 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 
115, 131 (1987). 
791 Noyes, supra note (781) at 85. 
792 Uhlmann, supra note (789) at 101. 
793 Report of the United Nations International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 247-48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966. 
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The Marten’s Clause and the Protection of the State Community Interests 
The Marten’s Clause does aim to protect state community interests, by seeking 
the protection of individuals or groups of individuals,796 specifically the belligerents or 
combatants and civilian populations. The protection of these groups serves the benefit of 
the community,797 by seeking to prevent harm to large segments of the population. 
Moreover, the ultimate purpose of the international legal order is to guarantee respect for 
human beings,798 which The Marten’s Clause seeks directly to promote.  
 
The Marten’s Clause and its Foundation in Morality 
A moral norm generates obedience not because of a juridical incentive, but 
because of an internal incentive.799 A moral obligation forces the application of the jus 
cogens norms, even if they were not adopted by an international convention. 
Consequently, the derogation of such moral obligation, even if it is not legally 
enforceable, is internationally condemned. This was the situation prior to 1899, date of 
the first legal adoption of Marten’s Clause, when the combatants and the populations 
were not covered by any kind of legal protection, and morality was the only basis for 
humanitarian protection. 
At that time, the protection of civilians “can partly be explained by fear that the 
gods or the spirits of victims might wreak vengeance, or by a desire to restore normal 
relations with a neighboring tribe.”800 Other instances of humanitarian treatments were 
based on “justice and integrity,”801 or on a religion requirement, such as passages in the 
Bible.802 The Judeo-Christian tradition proclaimed that all men are created in the image 
of God, that all were children of the same father and all were offered eternal life.803 If all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
795 See W.T. Gangl, The Jus Cogen Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J. 63, 74-
77 (1980). 
796 Uhlmann, supra note (789) at 108. 
797 Id. 
798 Id. 
799 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Part I of the 
Metaphysics of Morals 20 (John Ladd Trans., 1965). 
800 Jean Pictet, Development And Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 
7 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) [hereinafter Pictet]. 
801 Id., at 8. 
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men were brothers then to kill was a crime, and there would be no more slaves.804 
Nations follow this guidance by adoption of criminal laws establishing the act of killing 
as the crime of murder. In peacetime, the killer is put in prison or even put to death 
sometimes. On the other hand, in wartime, a person who kills enemies on behalf of his 
country is considered a hero granted medals, and may be “immortalized in a statue or on 
a postage stamp.”805Additionally, other religions had a great influence in the 
development of international law at the time of the first adoption of The Marten’s Clause 
(1899) as we discussed earlier.  
h 
                                                          
 
The Marten’s Clause as an Absolute 
A norm is absolute if it applies to all situations, international and internal, against 
member States that approved it and those who contest it, and is not be limited to the law 
of treaties but is also applicable to unilateral acts.806 A norm can be considered absolute 
if it applies at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances.807 This is the case wit
The Marten’s Clause, which is applicable in international conflicts governed by The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,808 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,809 the 
Additional Protocol I of 1977,810 and the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on 
the Use of Certain Conventional weapons of 1980.811 Moreover, The Marten’s Clause is 
applicable in situations of internal armed conflicts that governed by the Additional 
Protocol II of 1977.812 Thus, the clause applies both to internal and to international 
conflicts. The Clause applies both to actions by nations and by individuals. Moreover, the 
United Nations International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
maintained, in Articles 18, 29, and 33, a close relation between the concept of 
804 Id. 
805 Spanier & Wendzel, supra note (134) at  468-469. 
806 Uhlmann, supra note (789) at 110. 
807 Pictet, supra note (800) at 159. 
808 The Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note (630) at pmbl. para. 9; The Hague Convention (IV) of 
1907, supra note (205) at pmbl. para. 8. 
809 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art 63; Geneva Convention (II), supra note (56) art 62; Geneva 
Convention (III), supra note (56) art 142; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art 158. 
810 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 1 (2). 
811 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note (761) 
pmbl.  
812 Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76) pmbl. 
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international crime in Article 19 and the violation of jus cogens norm.813 Thus, the 
Clause can be considered to have universal, or absolute, application. 
                                                          
 
The Vast Majority of States Have Accepted The Marten’s Clause 
The vast majority of the States have accepted the Marten’s Clause throughout its 
historical development. For instance, The Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs 
of War of 1899 has been accepted by forty-nine states,814 The Hague Convention on the 
Laws and Customs of War of 1907 has been accepted by thirty-five states,815 the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 were being accepted by 186 states,816 the Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 has been accepted by 157 states,817 the Additional Protocol II of 1977 
has been accepted by 150 states,818 and the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction 
on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons of 1980 has been accepted by eighty four 
states.819  
Thus, it can be concluded that the Marten’s Clause meets all four criteria, and 
therefore, it should be classified as a general principle of international law that has a jus 
cogen character. 
 
c) Soft International Law 
Soft law is refers to “(1) treaty provisions, capable of entailing legally-binding 
obligations, that are drafted in weak substantive terms, and (2) declarations, guidelines, 
standards, and other international materials adopted by States, intergovernmental 
organizations, or their organs that are not normative in character but which have some 
pre-or subnormative effect, usually on the immediate behavior of States or on the future 
813 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, infra note (2051) arts. 18, 29, 33, see also, Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1969).  
814 International Red Cross, The International Humanitarian Law Databases <www.icrc.org> (last visit Dec. 
14, 2000). 
815 Id. 
816 Id. 
817 Id. 
818 Id. 
819 Id. 
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formation of principles of customary international law.” 820 However, traditionally, treaty 
law (hard international law,) is the primary source of binding international law. 
Nonetheless, soft law provides a form of international law that usually obtains more 
readily than in the case of treaties. Moreover, when a principle expressed in a soft law 
instrument, its character may not be exclusively “soft”. A soft law instrument can refer to 
a treaty or a general principle of law which is re-affirmed in a hard law instrument. For 
example, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights imported much of The Marten’s 
Clause in Resolution XXIII,821 as mentioned earlier. 
Further, some international environmental law experts note that soft international 
law can be a reflection of a vary well-accepted general principle of international law 
arising from the dictate of public conscience, and therefore a principle may be binding 
even though it is not in a treaty, such as the Stockholm Conference’s Principle 21,822 and 
The Marten’s Clause as well. Soft international law can also be a reflection of the duty 
that positivists would say is only advisory for the States, such as “the duty to restrain 
consumption of resources through avoiding waste.”823 Thus, IUCN’s Commission on 
Environmental Law found that as States debated the Draft Covenant on Environment and 
Development,824 the well accepted general principles of international law would be 
considered as “hard law,” while the reflection of the duty remains “soft law.”825 On the 
other hand, the draft Covenant contains three types of provisions: “(a) those which 
consolidate existing principles of international law, including those ‘soft-law’ principles 
which were considered ripe for ‘hardening’; (b) those which contain very modest 
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progressive developments; and (c) those which are more progressive than in (b) which we 
felt were absolutely necessary.”826 
The international community often turns to soft law in order to develop 
international environmental law. For instance, Charles Di Leva, an international 
environmental specialist, provides a significant example when stating that when “a native 
Indian tribe filed a civil action in a Nicaraguan court, they claimed that the World Bank’s 
policy, [which reflects soft international law], on the territorial rights of indigenous 
people supported their request that the court require government action on their 
behalf.”827 
Such reliance on soft law within a national jurisdiction may help in recognizing 
soft law in state practice, and therefore, it may become binding international law.828 
However, even documents approved at the highest level of the United Nations 
acknowledge that “the boundaries of positive law (or between ‘law’ ‘and pre-law’ or ‘soft 
law’) cannot always be clearly defined.”829 
In sum, it can be argued that The Marten’s Clause is a reflection of a very well-
accepted general principle of international law arising from the dictates of public 
conscience, and therefore The Marten’s Clause itself is binding even though it is not in a 
treaty. Moreover, since the traditional Marten’s Clause and its iteration were included in 
international treaties, as discussed earlier, its binding character as a jus cogen norm 
should be respected by the international community. 
 
d) The Nature of the IUCN Amman Clause 
Like the traditional Marten’s Clause adopted in the 1899 Hague Convention, the 
IUCN Amman Clause is a general principle of international law that has jus cogens 
character. The IUCN Amman Clause has a duplicate nature. On one hand, it was adopted 
by the IUCN, an intergovernmental organization, as a resolution that was not included in 
an international treaty. In addition, the IUCN Amman Clause is a reflection of a genuine 
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well-accepted general principle of international law arising from the dictates of public 
conscience, and therefore it is binding by itself even though it is not included in a treaty. 
No single treaty includes The IUCN Amman Clause. Some aspects of the principle are 
found in treaties, such as ENMOD and the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, but not expressed as fully or completely as in Amman. Both ENMOD and 
the Additional Protocol I are applicable in wartime exclusively, while The IUCN Amman 
Clause can be applied both in times of armed conflicts and peacetime as well. Thus, the 
IUCN Resolution is in its form considered a soft international law. On the other hand, the 
IUCN Amman Clause arises from a general environmental law principle, which is the 
right to a clean and healthy environment for present and future generations, as expressed 
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. The 
inclusion of that right in these declarations reflect that it is a well accepted general 
principle of international environmental law, which is the responsibility of not to harm 
other States environment. For instance, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration has 
been relied upon “by governments to justify their legal rights and duties.”830 Similarly, 
the Philippines Supreme Court in Minors Oposa v. Secretary Of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources831 found that the Philippines Constitution, and 
natural law, required the government to preserve a balanced and healthful environment 
for children and future generations.832 Remarkably, the Court stated that although the 
right to a balanced and healthful ecology  
 
is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State 
Policies [in the Constitution of the Philippines] and not under the 
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any 
other of the civil and political rights enumerated in the letter. 
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether 
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation – aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners – the 
advancement of which may even be said to predate all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
829 G. M. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community 20 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993) [hereinafter Danilenko]. 
830 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
420, 422 (1991)[hereinafter Dupuy]. 
831 Oposa, supra note (681). 
832 Ted Allen, The Philippine Children’s Case: Recognizing Legal Standing for Future Generations, 6 
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 713, 718 (1994) [hereinafter Allen]. 
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governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic 
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are 
assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. If they are now 
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of 
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a 
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as 
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their 
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn 
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the 
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost 
not only for the present generations, but also for those to come – 
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth 
incapable of sustaining life.833  
 
That decision affirms that the right to live in a healthy environment is a basic right 
and pre-exists any constitution. Thus, the environmental protection is confirmed by 
natural law prior to any positive law. 
In sum, the IUCN Amman Clause is binding from two sides, first as a soft 
international law that reflects a well-accepted general principle of international law 
arising from the dictates of public conscience, and second as general environmental law 
principle which has existed the inception of mankind, however, both mankind. Therefore, 
humanitarian protection cannot be brought into fruition without real environmental 
protection. 
 
e) The Adoption of the IUCN Amman Clause 
Recently a clause inspired by The Marten’s Clause was adopted unanimously by 
seventy-two States, ministries, and NGO’s assembled in the Second World Conservation 
Congress held in Amman, Jordan, 8-11 October 2000 to govern armed conflict and 
environmental matters. The IUCN Amman Clause states that:  
 
Until a more complete international code of environmental 
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by international 
                                                          
833 Oposa, supra note (681) at 14. See also Nicholas A. Robinson, The Draft Covenant on Environment and 
Development: A Sustainable Model for International Lawmaking, in Human Rights 
Environmental Law and the Earth Charter 37 (Boston Research Center for the 21st Century, 
1998) [hereinafter Robinson, The Draft Covenant]. 
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agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all its constituent 
elements and processes remain under the protection and authority 
of the principles of international law derived from established 
customs, from dictates of the public conscience, and from the 
principles and fundamental values of humanity acting as steward 
for present and future generations.834 
 
The IUCN Amman Clause was drafted by the Commission on Environmental 
Law835 (CEL) members, Dinah Shelton, Professor of Law, Notre Dame University and 
Alexander Kiss, President of the IUCN Scientific Committee (CIEL). The IUCN Amman 
Clause was sponsored by: 
-The International Commission for the Protection of Alpine Regions, 
Liechtenstein. 
-Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald Bundesverband, Germany. 
-Vereiningung Deutscher Gewässerschutz (VDG), Germany. 
-Berhm Fonds Für Internationalen Vogelschutz, Germany. 
-Verband Deutscher Sportfisher, Germany. 
Te draft resolution of the IUCN Amman Clause was forwarded to the 
representatives of the Amman Congress, in order to have their opinions and comments. 
For example, in the case of the U.S.A., it was forwarded to Washington D.C. for review 
by several agencies, headed by the Department of State, which had no objection on it. 
Later, the resolution was presented to the plenary meeting of the IUCN Congress which 
was headed by the IUCN President, the IUCN Director General, and the IUCN Legal 
Advisor, and was adopted by consensus.  
The IUCN Amman Clause is unlike the traditional Marten’s Clause because The 
Marten’s Clause focused on environmental protection only during wartime. The Amman 
Clause, in contrast, applies in times of armed conflicts as well as peacetime. The text of 
The Marten’s Clause specifically noted that it was intended to apply “until a more 
complete code of the laws of war has been issued.” Thus, it was designed as part of a 
                                                          
834 IUCN Amman Clause, supra note (745). 
835 A formal Working Group of IUCN’s Commission on Environmental Law was established in November 
1989 under the chairmanship of Dr. Wolfgang E. Burhenne. The Group included international law experts, 
governmental lawyers, judges, academics, and private practitioners. See Robinson, The “Rio” 
Environmental Treaties, supra note (823) at 139.  
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wartime code, and meant to apply only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, the 
IUCN Amman Clause text articulated that it was intended to apply “until a more 
complete international code of environmental protection has been adopted,” which 
reflects the drafters’ intention to promote environmental protection, both in peacetime 
and times of armed conflicts as well. The Amman Clause reflects the fact that 
environmental destruction may result from military activities in peacetime. For example, 
military sites and bases generate huge amount of toxic and hazardous wastes; military 
testing, storage, and stockpile of ammunitions, and military maneuvers can result severe 
environmental impacts even during peacetime. Consequently, the Amman Clause sought 
to guarantee the same environmental standards under all conditions. 
Further, civilian activities may be considered a real threat to the environment. 
Particularly in developing countries, environmental concerns may attract little attention, 
and many activities may degrade the environment, e.g., deforestation, desertification, the 
increasing use of greenhouse gases which deplete the Ozone Layer, disposing of raw 
sewage or industrial waste in water bodies, and the overuse of farmlands which may 
affect the topsoil. 
All the above activities can affect environmental resources even when they are not 
owned by a specific nation or country, and what affects one country can affect others as 
well. Accordingly, it was important to adopt the IUCN Amman Clause to provide both 
peacetime and wartime environmental protection.  
Further, the IUCN Amman Clause urges the U.N. member states to adopt a 
comprehensive international code of environmental protection. 836 Such a code would 
address environmental matters not governed by existing international environmental 
laws, or by laws that do not provide real environmental protection. For example, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques does not include peacetime environmental modification 
techniques. However, military activities and operations even in peacetime may cause 
long-lasting, widespread, or severe environmental effects, and these operations are not 
covered by the Convention. The Amman Clause would seek the provide protection in 
those circumstances, although it does not set forth specific criteria for doing so. In 
                                                          
836 IUCN Amman Clause, supra note (745). 
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attempting to begin the formulation of a comprehensive code of environmental protection 
the Amman Clause goes far beyond the Marten’s Clause from which it sprang. While the 
Marten’s Clause mentioned environmental concerns only as a small part of its focus on 
the regulation of war, the Amman Clause focuses directly on the environment. That fact 
certainly reflects the increased global awareness of the importance of environmental 
concerns.  
Last but not least, Amman Clause does not consider the present generation only, 
but future generations as well. The Clause specifically refers to the “…fundamental 
values of humanity acting as steward for present and future generations.”837 That 
language reflects the fact that environmental harm may take decades to be repaired, and 
even if it is repaired, the natural resources may lose their original values. As a result, 
humans will suffer and bear the burden of such degradation. Not only will the present 
generation suffer, but future generations as well. 
Significantly, the IUCN Amman Clause was adopted by both environmental 
ministries and NGO’s,838 and its hybrid status is considered unique among international 
instruments. Moreover, according to the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
50/195 of 17 December, 1999, the IUCN is participating in the work of the U.N. General 
Assembly as an observer. The consensus needed for the IUCN Amman Clause is 
somewhat limited. The IUCN Amman Clause is “soft international law,” if it is viewed as 
merely a declaration, and is not binding. However, if it is a general principle of law 
arising from the “dictates of public conscience,” then it is binding. 
                                                          
837 Amman Clause, supra note (745). 
838 States in principle are not obliged only by decision that adopted by intergovernmental organizations in 
which its official representatives participate. Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
states that “1. A person is consider as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the 
text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if: (a) he 
produces appropriate full powers; or (b) it appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other 
circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as representing the State for such purposes 
and to dispense with full powers. 2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, 
the following are considered as representing their State: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty; 
(b) heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting 
State and the State to which they are accredited; (c) representatives accredited by States to an international 
conference or to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a 
treaty in that conference, organization or organ.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 
(751) art. 7. 
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The effect of the IUCN Amman Clause depends on each state separately. For 
example, an the national level, most of the representatives have to engineer a long chain 
of initiatives to convince their national governments about the importance and the 
necessity of adopting the IUCN Amman Clause. Some of the NGO’s delegations can 
bring great pressure on their governments, which may result in a national adoption of the 
IUCN Amman Clause. However, non-members now need to press their defense 
ministries to honor the IUCN Amman Clause. 
In sum, for all the above mentioned reasons, the international community, 
represented by the seventy two States that attended the IUCN Congress, adopted the 
IUCN Amman Clause, which will offer great environmental protection by itself and will 
pave the way for additional environmental protection. Under the Clause, States are 
required to apply the international minimum standard of environmental protection 
derived from principles of international law, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience in peacetime and during armed conflicts as well. 
 
C-The Shortcomings of IHL in Protecting the Natural Environment 
Most jurists admit the shortcomings of the IHL regarding the environmental 
protection.839  They attribute this lacuna to the fact that the environmental law is a new 
field that appeared only in the 1970s. Therefore, IHL texts adopted before then made no 
reference to the environment as such, because the concept did not even exist at the 
time.840 
Moreover, even after the 1970s, two famous documents-the Additional Protocols I 
and II to Geneva Conventions- were introduced as IHL without offering a real and direct 
environmental protection. They were designed to ameliorate human suffering, and any 
environmental benefit was merely secondary.841 The priority given to human suffering 
vis-à-vis environmental harm necessarily reflected on the level of environmental 
protection, especially when there is interference between these two interests. 
                                                          
839 Bouvier, Protection of the Natural Environment, supra note (81) 577; Jozef Golbalt, Legal Protection of 
the Environment Against the Effects of Military Activities, 22 Bull. Of Peace Proposals 399, 299-
403 (1991). 
840 Id., at 571-72. 
841 Diederich, supra note (626) 143. 
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Even when the ICRC itself condemned the use of weapons of mass destruction842 
in 1973, in the introduction to the draft Protocol I, it affirmed that ICRC would not 
address environmental problems when declaring that: 
 
[P]roblems relating to atomic, bacteriological, and chemical 
warfare, including the environmental effects, are subjects of 
international agreements or negotiations by governments, and in 
submitting these draft Protocols the ICRC does not intend to 
broach these problems.843 
 
That provision shows that ICRC had no intention of getting involved in 
environmental protection in times of armed conflict. Even if it works on this issue 
occasionally, it is not considered a significant goal of the ICRC. 
 
[T]he IHL, including its environmental protection, is dependent 
on the application of customary principles and on the sweeping 
generalization of Article 35 (3) of the Geneva Protocol I. Such a 
dependency is a major deficiency, as considerations of military 
expediency are specially difficult to constrain in the absence of 
treaty norms, and even allegations about enemy conduct tend to 
sound propagandistic if based purely upon such general, vague, 
prescriptive principles.844 
 
The legal norms embodied in IHL are very general, vague, and subject to 
‘military necessity’ exceptions, and are not directed to stop belligerent practices of the 
sort most likely to generate environmental harm.845 Unfortunately, the effect of IHL is 
limited by the ‘military necessity’ concept; most IHL provisions are subject to that 
constraint, such as the ‘necessity of war’ term used in article 23 (1)(g) of the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV846 or the ‘necessary by military operations’ term used by article 53 of the 
fourth Geneva Convention. 
                                                          
842 L. C. Green, The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, 29 The Canadian Y.B. of 
Int’l L.223, 228 (1991) [hereinafter L. C. Green]. 
843 Id. 
844 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 93. 
845 Id., at 79. 
846 The Hague Convention of (IV) 1907, supra note (205) art 23 (1)(g). 
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Military necessity is a “legal concept used as a part of the legal justification for 
attacks on legitimate military targets that may have adverse, even terrible, consequences 
for civilians and civilian objects.” 847 A great deal environmental destruction has taken 
place during armed conflict under the pretext of military necessity. For example, during 
the Vietnam War, the United States considered environmental modification techniques 
necessary to interfere with the guerrilla tactics of North Vietnam.848 
Even under the Additional Protocol I, action is limited to preventing only 
“widespread, long-term, and severe” environmental damage, thus weakening the 
environmental protection offered by the IHL.849 The Additional Protocol I does place 
some limit on the mindless mayhem which normally accompanies war. However, 
precisely what limit is as yet unclear.850 
Punishment plays a great role in assuring the respect and the applicability of law. 
Therefore, IHL considers ‘the grave breach’ of its rules and principles as a war crime.851 
Some experts affirmed this idea by saying that:  
 
[t]he use of napalm in Vietnam and the deliberate burning of oil 
in the Persian Gulf probably qualify as grave breach. The 
perpetrators should therefore be subject to criminal prosecution 
and the other Geneva law parties should be required to bring the 
perpetrators to justice.852 
 
IHL criteria as to whether a breach is grave depends on its effects on civilian 
populations. Thus, if civilian populations are directly and considerably affected by the 
environmental breach, the act then it will be considered a ‘grave breach’ of IHL 
principles. 
                                                          
847 Françoise Hampson, Military Necessity, in Crimes of War “What the Public Should 
Know,” 251 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999) [hereinafter Hampson]. 
848 Guerrilla warfare in Vietnam was based on the teachings of Mao Tes-Tung, who stressed the need of 
quick and effective actions to surprise the enemy. It requires the use of natural environment for cover and 
camouflage during attack, and to disguise supply bases. Lawrence Juda, Negotiating a Treaty on 
Environmental Modification Warfare: The Convention on Environmental Warfare and Its Impact Upon 
Arms Control Negotiations, 32 Int’l Org. 975, 976 (1978) [hereinafter Juda]. 
849 Falk, The Environmental Law of War, supra note (632) at 93. 
850 Schafer, supra note (384) at 308. 
851 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 85 (5). 
852 Popovic, supra note (619) art. 78. 
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However, to address the problems of the IHL in protecting the natural 
environment, it would be necessary to cover the IHL enforcement, the difficulty of public 
access to information, the inapplicability of the IHL on revolutions and disorders, and 
finally, the failure of IHL in controlling terrorism. 
 
1. The Enforcement of IHL 
IHL rules applicable to international armed conflicts are largely unenforceable 
and often disregarded.853 However, even where IHL might apply to environmental effects 
of armed conflict, limitations in application and enforcement mechanisms hinder the 
effectiveness of its provisions.854 
Theoretically, IHL provisions apply not only to the contracting parties, but also 
the non-contracting States, because they “are so broadly accepted as to be considered 
customary law.”855 Practically, however, a number of violations of these provisions have 
been detected in times of armed conflicts. The IHL provide a number of rules to backup 
the States fulfillment to their obligation. For example, Article 80 of the Additional 
Protocol I requires the parties to take all necessary measures for the execution of their 
obligations.856 And Article 81 requires that parties accommodate the needs of ICRC to 
carry out its appointed mission.857 Article 82 calls on making legal advisors available to 
their armed forces.858 Further, Article 83 demands the application of the Conventions and 
this Protocol in both peace and times of armed conflicts.859 Article 84 calls on the 
engagement in interstate communication of implementation measures.860 Article 87 
instructs the parties “to require military commanders, with respect to members of the 
armed forces under their control, to prevent and where necessary, to suppress and report 
                                                          
853 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note (121) at 122.  
854 Popovic, supra note (619) at 77. 
855 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 257. 
856 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 80. 
857 Id., art. 81. 
858 Id., art. 82. 
859 Id., art. 83. 
860 Id., art. 84. 
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to competent authorities breaches of the Convention and of this Protocol.”861 But if the 
local authorities are ignorant of a breach, this provision provides little help.862 
The ICRC is supposed to act as a tool to enforce IHL rules. For example, when a 
violation of an IHL rules or principle detected by the ICRC, a confidential report will be 
sent to the responsible authority urging it to comply with the applicable norms. However, 
the ICRC only rarely will issue a public statement of the violations. For example, the 
ICRC issued a statement to express its concern about the Iraqi resort to illegal chemical 
warfare, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war,863 which is a rare occurrence. 
 
2. The Difficulty of Public Access to Information 
It is necessary to provide public access to information, about environmental 
damage, particularly in cases like the destruction of a nuclear facility or the 
contamination of a drinking water supply, where the harm may affect human life, health, 
and the environment on a broad scale.864 The duty to inform concept appeared in the 
Stockholm Declaration of 1972865 by a proposed Principle 20 that would have imposed a 
duty to inform, by providing that “[r]elevant information must be supplied by States on 
activities or developments within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they 
believe, or have reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk of 
significant adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their national 
jurisdiction.”866 The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, of 1998 Åarhus, 
Denmark,867 affirms the right of every person of present and future generation to live in a 
healthy and balanced environment through guaranteeing the right to access to 
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in 
                                                          
861 Id., art. 87. 
862 Popovic, supra note (619) at 77. 
863 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 258. 
864 Popovic, supra note (619) at 79. 
865 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822). 
866 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/4, Annex, para. 20, at 4 (1972), quoted in Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment, 14 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 423, 496 (1973).   
867 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 750201 [hereinafter 
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environmental matters. Article 4 (1) of the Convention states that “Each Party shall 
ensure that [p]ublic authorities, in response to a request for environmental information, 
make such information available to the public [i]ncluding copies of the actual 
documentation containing or comprising such information.”868 Such a duty would 
enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, public awareness of 
environmental matters, public expression of its concerns, and therefore, would enable 
responsible officials to respond to such concerns.   
However, the IHL does not consistently guarantee public access to information. 
Often information about environmental or humanitarian damage is not made known until 
decades after the fact, or perhaps not at all. Article 90 of the Additional Protocol I,869 
created a fact-finding commission, but provides that it “shall not report its findings 
publicly, unless all parties to the conflict have requested the commission to do so.”870 For 
example, throughout the Russian-Chechen armed conflict no independent human rights 
monitors have been allowed to enter Chechnya by Russian authorities, and so could not 
obtain information. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights was authorized to enter the Republic at the end of February 2000,871 which gives 
the perpetrators enough time after the armed conflict to cleanup the scene of their crimes. 
Public access to information under the IHL may be achieved in three ways. First, military 
commands should inform civilians about any prospective attack, its time, and the nature 
of the weapons that will be used in the attack so the civilian population can abandon their 
homes and lands in order to protect their lives from the military attack. Second, once an 
attack takes place, there should be a kind of initial assessment of the civilian casualties 
and the environmental damage in order to inform people as to what exactly happened. 
Finally, after the military attack there should be a full ecological evaluation and a 
systematic survey of the direct and indirect effects of war on public health, in order to 
take the necessary and immediate measures to rehabilitate both the affected population 
and the impacted environment. For example, following the death of an Italian soldier who 
                                                          
868 Id., art. 4 (1). 
869 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 90. 
870 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 90 (5)(C). 
871 Amnesty International’s Recommendations to the 56th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, Russian Federation Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the 
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served in the peace-keeping troops in Kosovo and Bosnia, the Italian Prime Minister said 
that Italy would seek a probe regarding the use and effects of uranium at the next meeting 
of NATO’s Atlantic Council in Brussels, as the uranium may be the cause of cancer 
among soldiers and civilians.872 An Italian foreign ministry official added: “[w]e are 
looking to get the maximum exchange of information about the issue between NATO 
countries and the alliance’s headquarters.”873 
 
3. The Difficulty of Applying IHL to Revolutions and Disorders 
The IHL rules are applicable in times of armed conflict. Armed Conflicts may be 
internal or international. But if the conflict does not meet the criteria set out by either 
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or the 1977 Additional Protocol II, 
then the situation cannot be described as an armed conflict874 and it will not be subject to 
IHL enforcement.875 Thus, in situations of revolutions and disorders, the environmental 
protection provisions in IHL will be inoperative, and the environment will be subject to 
severe abuse. This inadequacy is a direct result of the fact that the environment is not 
protected per se in the IHL. 
Further, ICRC humanitarian intervention will be greatly restricted in times of 
revolutions and disorders. ICRC intervention depends on the consent of the concerned 
State. For example, ICRC can visit places of internment or detention in order to urge 
humanitarian observance.876 An ongoing disorder, started in September 29th, 2000, in 
Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Jerusalem, clearly affects both human life and the 
environment. However, because it is not deemed to be an “armed conflict,” IHL can play 
no effective role. IHL provisions should be amended to include revolutions and disorders, 
so that humanitarian violations and the environmental damage caused by these events can 
also be addressed. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Chechen Republic, available at <http://www.amnesty.org>, (last visit March 14, 2001) [hereinafter 
Amnesty International’s Recommendations]. 
872 Blitz & Nicoll, supra note (24) at. 2. 
873 Id. 
874 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 326. 
875 David P. Forsythe, International Humanitarian Assistance: The Role of the Red Cross, 3 Buff. 
J.Int’l. L. 325, 238 (1996-97). 
876 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 326. 
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4. The Inadequacy of IHL in Controlling Terrorism   
Incidents of terrorism can have a major effect on the environment as well as on 
civilians and soldiers, even if no governmental military operations are involved. 
Terrorism is violence, or a threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere 
of fear and alarm.877 According to Article 1 (2) of the Convention of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism of 1999,878 terrorism 
means “any act of violence or threat thereof not withstanding its motives or intentions 
perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of 
terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, 
security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property 
to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or 
international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or 
sovereignty of independent States.”   
During the last decade, terrorists became increasingly interested in mass 
destruction,879 which is a real threat to human life and the environment. A number of 
incidents, such as the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995,880 the Tokyo Subway Sarin gas 
attack in 1995,881 the detonation of the American Navy Warship in Yemen in October 12, 
2000, the terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, underscore this trend. 
The environmental terrorism can cause the same kind of environmental damage as 
conventional warfare. Terrorists can use destructive ammunitions and arms in their 
attacks nowadays, such as poisonous gases and high capacity explosions. Moreover, the 
environmental effects resulting from terrorist acts are similar to those resulting from 
                                                          
877 See Kevin J. Riley & Bruce Hoffman, Domestic Terrorism: A National 
Assessment of State & Local Preparedness 3 (1995, The Rand Corporation). 
878 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, July 
1, 1999, Ouagadougou, in International Instruments Related to the Prevention and 
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880 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?, 8 Jane's Intelligence Rev. 422, 422 (1996) 
[hereinafter Cameron], cited in Timothy Schofield, The Environment as an Ideological Weapon: A 
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armed conflicts. Both involve the utilization of the environment as a weapon. The sole 
difference between environmental warfare and environmental terrorism is that the first is 
committed publicly under the cloak of international disagreement between two nations or 
more, whereas terrorism is committed as an act of reprisal or revenge. This difference 
raises the danger of the environmental terrorism vis-à-vis environmental warfare. 
Additionally, environmental warfare is controlled by the law of war. However, 
environmental terrorism is subject to the national laws of each State, and each State 
applies its own rules. An act of environmental destruction might be classified as an act of 
terrorism in one State, but not in another State.  
Examples of the environmental terrorism can be highlighted through the terrorist 
attacks committed against the United States establishments, interests, citizens, and 
environment by a group terrorist called “AlQaeda,” that takes from Afghanistan a 
location to plan their activities and train their personnel. AlQaeda is a group of 
fundamental Muslims, leaded by militant, exiled Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden,882 
interpret the humanitarian Principles of Islam in a wrongful way to serve their goals.  
This group was behind the explosion of an American establishment located in 
Alkobar, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. A powerful truck bomb tore through apartment buildings 
at U.S. Air Force complex in Saudi Arabia killed at least 23 Americans and injured more 
than 300.883 The explosion was so powerful, it blasted a crater 35 feet deep and 85 feet 
across, hit an U.S. military housing area at the edge of a Saudi base near Dhahran in 
eastern Saudi Arabia. British, French and Saudi troops were there too. Officials said that 
the Saudis also might have suffered casualties.884  
Furthermore, AlQaeda was behind the car bomb explosion that took place outside 
the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar El Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
881 Id. 
882 Osama Bin Laden is a Saudi-born millionaire and radical Muslim leader suspected of international 
terrorism. He strongly opposes United States policies in the Middle East, particularly the U.S. support of 
Israel and the presence of the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. See, World Book Online Americas Edition, 
available at <http://www.aolsvc.worldbook.aol.com/wbol/wbPage/na/ar/co/749895>, (last visit Sep. 24, 
2001).   
883 Houston Chronicle News Services, 23 Die, Hundreds Injured in Saudi Arabia Explosion, (June, 25, 
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1998,885 which wounded 4,500 people, and killed twelve Americans and 200 or more 
Kenyans and Tanzanians.886 This group of terrorists acts in a dramatical way against 
human health and the environment. For example, their attack against the American 
Navy’s Warship U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, took place in the Gulf of Aden, and caused 
various causalities, as well as environmental harm to the Gulf itself. Nevertheless, the 
environmental damage was largely ignored by the involved countries in particular, and 
the international community in general.  
The forecited attacks were committed against the United States, but outside its 
territory. However, the most recent, blatant and devastate acts of terrorism were 
committed by AlQaida in the United States mainland.887 On September 11, 2001, 
terrorists committed the most active attacks in New York and Washington (D.C.), when 
four planes hijacked, two of them smashed into New York’s World Trade Center (WTC), 
and the third one rammed into the Pentagon. However, the fourth hijacked plane crashed 
south of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.888 
The twin towers of the WTC is considered a historical architectural site in New 
York City, each contains 110 stories. However, the American Airlines Flight 11, carrying 
92 people from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the first tower. Eighteen minutes 
later, the United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people on the same Boston to Los 
Angeles route, tore through the South Tower with an even larger explosion.889 Both 
crashes killed all passengers and crew members. The unprecedented attacks sent a huge 
fireball into the air and spread debris over the city.890 According to the latest information, 
human casualties in the WTC are 276 dead, 2,250 wounded and 6,453 missing and 
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presumed dead.891 Almost 300 emergency personnel in New York -- 78 missing police 
officers and 200 firefighters -- are presumed dead.892 
Debris from the collapse of concrete from the twin towers had damaged the 
surrounding buildings. Gas lines in the areas were affected as well.893 Flames shrouded 
the south side of the structure for 30 minutes before it fell.894 About “2,000 rescue 
workers have been moving debris at a rate of 3,000 cubic yards a day, but estimated 2 
million cubic yards remains.” When they tunnel into “the pile,” as the wreckage has 
become known, “it lets in more air and often has the effect of feeding oxygen to the 
smoldering fires and hot debris.”895  
Additionally, further massive environmental impacts resulted from such violent 
attacks. For instance, the asbestos, pulverized concrete dust, burning plastic, sediment, 
glass, and the chemical products of combustion, including materials such as rubber, and 
paper are sprayed after the attacks in the surrounded environment,896 and washed into the 
Hudson River surrounding New York during the heavy precipitation. Moreover, 
according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Reports, toxic chemicals such 
as dioxins, PCBs, benzene, lead and chromium have been detected in the soil and air 
around the rubble of the WTC at levels exceeding federal safety standards.897 These 
substances can irritate the lungs, trigger asthma attacks and otherwise aggravate lung 
conditions, as well as irritate the eyes, nasal passages and throat.898 Allergists do not 
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believe asbestos is a significant health hazard beyond the very immediate center of the 
recovery effort.899 The irritants in the dust can combine with other allergens in the air to 
make patients with lung conditions and allergies especially sick, allergists warned.900 
They also urged those with asthma or other chronic lung diseases to wear good quality 
masks and consult with their physicians quickly if they experience new or worsening 
respiratory symptoms.901 It has been also reported by the CNN that the reported cases of 
West Nile Virus victims were increased fifty percents since September 11 attacks. Future 
assessments will necessarily show that even surrounded environment has been also 
harmed, some species may die or immigrate.  
Flight 77 from Dulles to Los Angeles, a Boeing 757 slammed into the West Side 
of the Pentagon, killing all 64 passengers and crew members.902 The five-sided building 
suffered heavy damage, with a portion of the structure collapsing.903 Inside the Pentagon, 
125 were dead, and 76 were wounded.904 Witnesses reported that smoke could be seen 
miles away.905 The fourth plane United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 45 people from 
Newark to San Francisco,906 which crashed south of Pittsburgh,907 left no one alive.  
In fact, it should be noted that if killing innocent people considered one of the 
horrid pictures of terrorism, environmental destruction is considered another malicious 
picture of terrorism. Admittedly, September 11 terrorist attacks violated international law 
principles such as the laws of humanity, dictates of public conscience, and principles of 
law resulted from the usages established among civilized nations, which is what Marten’s 
Clause about.908   
The environment can be victimized by acts of terrorism, especially when terrorists 
use modern techniques of armament that cause indiscriminate harm. Nowadays,  
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"terrorist weaponry has not been limited merely to guns and explosive devices.”909 The 
hand of terrorists reaches modern technology, such as D.U., chemical and biological 
devices. “[T]he House of Representatives Internal Security Subcommittee investigated 
the DoD’s policy of surplus explosives, and found that 26 million pounds have been sold 
to commercial applicants with almost no controls exerted over the sale. Apparently, some 
of these explosives have already found their way into the hands of the U.S. domestic 
terrorists.”910 American authorities believe that AlQaeda possesses chemical and 
biological weapons that may be used in future terrorist attacks.911  
Two attacks by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, also involved weapons of 
modern technology. The first was in 1994, in Matsumoto, in the central highlands of 
Honshu, Japan, where nerve gas was used in a terrorist attack causing the death of seven 
civilians and injuring dozens more.912 The second attack was in 1995 in the Tokyo 
subway,913 caused twelve deaths914 and approximately 5,000 injured.915 Moreover, a 
Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamyl Bassayev, informed a Russian television network that 
four cases of radioactive cesium had been hidden around Moscow.916 The network 
discovered thirty-two kilograms of explosives placed in Moscow's Ismailovo Park.917  
Just as terrorist attacks can cause environmental damage, so too can acts of 
reprisal committed by the offended State. For instance, in 1998, the Americans attacked 
Afghani918 sites classified as Bin Laden training camps.919 They also attacked El Shifa 
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Pharmaceutical Factory, in Sudan,920 which was also suspected as a source of production 
or transfer of gas chemical weapons and their precursors.921 The United States knew that 
the site was used for producing chemical gases and weapons, from the soil sample taken 
from the factory’s ground by an agent.922 Thus, the attack clearly risked great 
environmental damage, and could result in the release of a deadly cloud of gas.923 
Similarly, the strike against Taliban and AlQaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan, on 
October 7, 2001, used several kind of military techniques, including P 52 bombers, which 
would necessarily cause collateral damage of humans and to the environment as well. 
Despite the great believes that Bin Laden possess weapons of mass destruction, the 
American troops bombed the training camps of the terrorist groups in Afghanistan, 
which, if these believes were facts, present a great threat to the environment. 
Reprisal actions through military forces should not be considered as a primary 
choice. The United States of America adopted the principle of fighting terror through 
long and safe battle. In stead of recurring to massive military attacks that may cause 
another humanitarian and environmental losses. The U.S. adopted developed measures to 
eliminate any terrorist activities in the future, or at least make them almost impossible. 
The United States declared that States have two choices only, whether to support the U.S. 
in it war against terror, or support the terror itself.924 The American President Bush 
signed an executive order to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists.925 Such procedure 
would be able to weaken the terrorist groups and eliminate their activities without 
causing any harm to innocent people or the environment.  
When an act of terrorism is committed, both humans and the environment are 
direct victims. But when there is only a threat of a terrorist act, while the civilian 
population will be affected by the fear and horror, there will be no actual harm to the 
environment. An example of a threat of terrorism was "in mid-November, 1977, when the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirmed an extortionist threat to place a deadly 
                                                          
920 Campbell, supra note (918) at 1090. 
921 Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism, supra note (636) at 566. 
922 Id., at 570. 
923 McClintock, supra note (150) at 637-38. 
924 President George W. Bush, Statement before the Congress, Sept. 20, 2001. 
925 Bush Goes After Terrorists’ Assets, supra note (911). 
 155
botulism poison in the Miami, Florida, water supply unless a demand for a 1.6 million 
dollar payment was met.”926  
The IHL “cannot provide direct answers to most questions raised by terrorism,”927 
because IHL is applicable only to armed conflict as defined in IHL documents. 
Moreover, acts of terrorism are usually committed in times of peace, when IHL is 
inapplicable. Nevertheless, IHL prohibits terrorist acts and provides for their repression. 
In accordance with IHL principles, States can cooperate in prosecuting terrorists, or 
extraditing them to the competent State to prosecute them. The international community 
is united to face states that support terrorism. Under such pressure and according to the 
U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 731/1992928 Libya handed over the two Libyan 
nationals929 suspected of conducting the 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie,930 to be prosecuted in the Netherlands, a neutral country, under the 
jurisdiction of the Scotch law. Recently, the three Scottish judges voted unanimously to 
find Al-Megrahi guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.931However, the second 
Libyan, Fhimah, was acquitted.932 Here, the same attitude should be taken by 
Afghanistan by handing over Osama Bin Laden to the United States to stand before th
justice for terrorist attacks committed against the Unites States interests, citizens, and 
environment. Facing the Afghani refusal to bring Bin Laden to the American justice, the 
United States should consider the Afghani proposal to hand over Bin Laden to a third 
neutral State, and The Hague, Netherlands, would be the best State to bring him to justice
according to the American or the inte
e 
 
rnational laws. 
                                                          
Significantly, the Arab States signed the Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism933 at Cairo, Egypt on April 22, 1998. This Convention considers 
926 Friedlander, supra note (909) at 147. 
927 Statement by the ICRC, Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N., G.A., 
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931 David Johnston, Courts a Limited Anti-Terror Weapon, N.Y. Times, February 1, 2001, at A12 
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environmental protection in its provisions while stating that terrorism is any act or threat 
of violence that aims “to cause damage to the environment or to public or private 
installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or [aim] to jeopardize a national 
resource.”934 The Convention excludes the destruction of public property and public 
services from being considered as political crimes.935 Therefore, any environmental 
destruction, even if committed for political motives, is subject to this Convention’s 
provisions and considered a terrorist offense.936 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Furthermore, Article 2 (a) of the Convention states that “[a]ll cases of struggle by 
whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for 
liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, 
shall not be regarded as an offense[…].” According to international law rules, nations 
have rights to liberation and self-determination even though they recur to force. Here, 
however, environmental protection has no priority. Thus, the environment will be 
exposed to all forms of damage and destruction as an unprotected victim. 
Additionally, the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) adopted the Convention on Combating International Terrorism937 at Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, on 1 July 1999. The Convention requires all the Contracting States, as 
preventive measures, to bar their territories from being used to plan, organize, or execute 
terrorist acts.938 The Convention also prevents the Contracting Parties from hosting, 
training, arming, or financing terrorists.939  
Moreover, the Convention requires all the Contracting States to arrest perpetrators 
of terrorist acts and prosecute or extradite them.940 Article 3 (II) (B) (5) of the 
Convention encourages cooperation between the concerned organs in the member States, 
and citizens, in order to help uncover terrorists and arrest them. For example, the 
 
Terrorism(United Nations Publication, 2001) Sales No. E.01.V.3, at 152[hereinafter The Arab 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism]. 
934 Id., art. 1 (2). 
935 Id., art. 2 (b) (v). 
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objective in any of the Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests, that punishable 
by their domestic law.” See, Id., art. 1 (3). 
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940 Id., art. 3 (II) (B)(1). 
 157
concerned authorities in each Contracting Party should extend appropriate incentives
ensure effective protection to witnesses on terrorists and their crimes, in order to urge 
citizens to inform
 and 
 on such crimes. 
                                                          
The Convention on Combating International Terrorism strongly excludes “[the] 
destruction of public properties and properties geared for public services […]”941 from 
being considered as political crimes even when politically motivated. Thus, 
environmental damage during any act of terrorism is considered a terrorist crime942 and is 
subject to this Convention’s provisions. 
This Convention not only considers that terrorism constitutes a severe violation of 
human rights in freedom and security, but also considers that damage to the environment 
caused as part of a terrorism act, including the destruction of public properties and public 
services is also a violation. It should be noted, however, that Article 2 (a) states that 
“[p]eoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, 
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance 
with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.” 
Finally, no State should protect terrorists, even if they are its citizens, in order to 
prevent terrorists from finding safety in “sympathetic States” that are unwilling to 
prosecute them despite the international pressure.943 Under the current international legal 
system, and the competent international courts of justice, all governments should 
cooperate to respond to terrorist acts, by considering such acts as war crimes, rather than 
treating them as crimes within the national criminal jurisdictions.944 “[T]errorism cannot 
be viewed as a criminal justice matter, like a bank robbery or a homicide. Instead, it is a 
national security threat that should be dealt with by military force when State sponsorship 
is proven.”945 Recently, following the verdict against the two Libyans charged in the 
bombing of Pan American Flight 103, when the Justice Department brought charges 
941 Id., art. 2 (II) (c)(5). 
942 For the purposes of the Convention, terrorist crime means “any crime executed, started or participated in 
to realize a terrorist objective in any of the Contracting States or against its nationals, assets or interests or 
foreign facilities and nationals residing in its territory punishable by its internal law.” See, The OIC 
Convention on Combating International Terrorism, supra note (878) art. 1 (3). 
943 Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the 
United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 Naval L. Rev. 49, 78-79 (1988). 
944 Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal 
and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 349, 356-66 (1996). 
945 Johnston, Anti-Terror Weapon, supra note (931) at A12. 
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against the two Libyans in 1991, William P. Barr, the attorney general said: “justice has 
been done in the case. But the main question is whether the criminal justice system is in 
itself the right response.”946 
In conclusion, IHL contains formidable provisions to protect the environment. 
However, they can not prevent humanitarian and environmental disasters from occurring. 
Moreover, existing legal structures often allow perpetrators to avoid punishment, victims 
to remain without a remedy, and the environment to be left wrecked. The existing IHL 
rules should be ameliorated to provide better environmental protection. For example, 
victims of the environmental destruction, and NGO’s, should be allowed to complain 
against atrocities committed during armed conflicts.  
Another approach to strengthen IHL protection is to allow another field of law to 
reinforce the environmental protection of the IHL rules. Environmental law and the 
enviro-humanitarian rules would be helpful in this field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
946 Id. 
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Part III:  
The Environmental Law Rules 
 
Contemporary environmental law is not concerned primarily or narrowly with 
armed conflict, but rather focuses more broadly on maintenance of public health and 
conservation of natural systems. Nonetheless, environmental law does apply to the 
phenomenon of eco-war, i.e., aggression aimed deliberately against the environment as a 
means of gaining collateral advantage against the enemy. Since environmental law rules 
were created primarily to secure and maintain the environment, these rules should fully 
apply both in peacetime and in times of armed conflict, to the extent possible. This 
section examines the role of environmental law in both situations, by (1) defining 
environmental law in order to discuss when it can be applied, and what areas it covers, 
and (2) identifying the environmental law rules relative to military activities both in times 
of armed conflicts and peacetime, and classifying them into international environmental 
law rules, comparative environmental law rules, and national environmental law rules. 
Finally, (3) we will examine obstacles to effective environmental protection in times of 
armed conflicts and peacetime.  
 
A- Definition 
The environmental law deals with the “biosphere,”947 and creates the rules for 
managing the effects of human society on the biosphere. Although environmental law can 
be simply defined as “that body of law to which the label environment has, to date, been 
attached,”948 it can be more usefully defined as “the aggregate of all the rules and 
principles aimed at global protection of air, water, earth, and forms of life that are not 
unreasonably injurious to humans (environment) and controlling activities of man within 
national jurisdictions that may affect another state's environment or environments beyond 
                                                          
947 The Biosphere is “(A) [t]hat portion of the solid and liquid earth and its atmosphere where living 
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national jurisdiction.”949 This broad definition takes into account not only the narrower, 
more conventional conceptions of “environmental law,” but also has specific application 
to the effects of military conflict. The environmental law can also be defined as the “body 
of law [which] is concerned with protecting the natural resources of land, air and water 
and the flora and fauna which inhabit them.”950 
Further, some regional groups of states have adopted a definition of 
environmental law in order to match the purposes of a specific convention. For example, 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation951 defines the 
environmental law as “any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, the 
primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a 
danger to human life or health.”952  
Environmental law consists of numerous rules and regulations designed to 
safeguard nature and promote environmental protection. If, for example, the environment 
has been harmed, the environmental law presents the legal norms for environmental 
rehabilitation, and therefore, defines the parties liable for the restoration and the 
governmental authority responsible for directing the cleanup.  
In general, the wider the definition of environmental law, the more secure the 
environment will be. In its earliest stages, environmental law focused upon persons and 
individual property rights; now, however, the law often seek to develop rules for 
protecting shared resources, common ecosystems and natural values. Furthermore, 
environmental law has become increasingly integrated into other disciplines, such as 
international law, commercial law, administrative law, health law, labor law, safety law, 
agricultural law, military law, and transportation law.  According to Agenda 21 the 
“[e]nvironmental law and regulation are important but cannot alone be expected to deal 
with the problems of environment and development.”953 This provision shows that 
environmental law is not an isolated field of law that works independently.  
Environmental law extends across many sectors of socio-economic activity, and provides 
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procedures for integration of environmental and development issues that will lead to the 
achievement of human basic needs, better protected ecosystems and a safer future.954 
Historically, the Code Civil, promulgated in Ancient Rome, has been concerned 
with the protection of people and their properties more than anything else. Thus, civil law 
generally was never developed to protect environmental systems such as the lithosphere, 
the hydrosphere, the biosphere, and the atmosphere. Thus, environmental protection in 
the countries that adopted civil law must be accomplished through either public law or 
administrative law.  
Having noted the ramifications of defining the environmental law, generally, we 
will survey the environmental law rules relative to the armed conflicts. Such rules can be 
international, comparative, or national. International environmental law rules can be 
classified into hard international law and soft international law. Hard international law 
encompasses global instruments, regional instruments. Hard law rules are compulsory. 
Soft international law encompasses the Stockholm Declaration, the Action Plan of the 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (1972), the World Charter for Nature, 
the Rio Declaration, and the International Organizations’ Resolutions of States Parties. 
Soft law rules are usually not binding, with some exceptions. For example, if a genuine 
well-accepted general principle of international law is included in an international 
declaration, such as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, then, this principle is 
binding on all States, because it is a general principle of law, and its status as such does 
not change because it was included in a soft law instrument. On the other hand, 
comparative environmental law rules will be classified into comprehensive 
environmental rules relevant to military activities, environmental protection in general, 
environmental pollution, fauna and flora protection, air pollution control, water resources 
conservation, soil pollution, hazardous wastes, and citizen suits. And finally, national 
environmental law rules that are both general and specific to the military cover military 
activity in peacetime, such as military bases and the preparation for armed conflicts. 
Additionally, national environmental law rules can encompass military operations during 
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times of armed conflict. Since nations use widely varying definitions of national 
jurisdiction, national environmental law rules and regulations can vary also. For example, 
an issue which may be considered of a great environmental importance in the United 
States, may not be necessarily so in Kuwait, and vice versa.  
On the other hand, since there is a major link between environmental law and 
environmental science, it is necessary to refer to the scientific definition of the 
environment. The definition of “environment” can be either a comprehensive one or one 
more narrowly applied to a specific aspect of natural systems. Nevertheless, there is 
broad “congruence” among these definitions.  
Some international conventions define the environment. For example, the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage955 defines the 
environment as the “natural resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, 
fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors; property which forms part 
of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic aspects of the landscape.”956 Another 
example of the definition of the environment is found in Article II of the Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques: “the earth, […] its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of 
outer space.”957 In the former Soviet Union, environmental protection is a synonymous 
with ecology, and environmental laws are referred to as ecological laws. For example, the 
sector that deals with environmental law in the Academy of Science’s Institute of State 
and Law is called “The Sector on Ecological Law.”958 And according to the late Prof. 
Oleg S. Kolbasov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Science of the Russian 
Federation, the ecology is “understood to be a complex global, national, and historical 
problem. A major factor necessary to solve this problem is peace. […] At the same time, 
the solution to this problem demands the mobilization of the attention and efforts of all 
peoples, the willingness to allocate the necessary resources and equipment, and the 
capability to balance and coordinate economic development with observance of 
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 163
ecological requirements.”959 It was provided in the USSR that, according to the Soviet 
Council of Ministries decree of April 12, 1983, “On the USSR Red Book”, any act that 
can result in the destruction of the habitat of endangered species, or populations is 
prohibited and a similar law is continued in the Russain Federation.960  
Other definitions of the environment can be found at the national level. For 
example, the United States’ Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) provides that the 
environment “includes water, air, and land and the interrelationship which exists among 
and between water, air, and land and all living things.”961 The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) defines the environment as “[t]he sum of all external conditions affecting 
the life, development and survival of an organism.”962 Moreover, the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in Section 101 (a) describes its environmental 
mission in terms of “the continuing policy of the Federal Government […] to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and 
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations.”963 
In addition, NEPA Section 101 (b), while addressing the continuing responsibility of 
Federal Government to use all practicable means to impose Federal plans and programs, 
states in Paragraph (4) that it is necessary to preserve historic, cultural, and natural 
aspects of the national heritage, and to maintain an environment that supports “diversity 
and variety of individual choice.”964 Accordingly, the Regulations implementing NEPA 
in the Code of Federal Regulations965 provide that the term “environment” includes 
ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health elements.966 On the 
other hand, the Kuwaiti Law Establishing the Environmental Public Authority defines the 
environment as the “biosphere including living species such as man, animal and plant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
958 Nicholas A. Robinson, Perestroika and Priroda: Environmental Protection in the USSR, 5 Pace 
Envt’l L. Rev. 351, 379 (1988). 
959 Oleg S. Kolbasov, Modern Ecological Policy and the Utilization of a Global International Protection 
Strategy, 5 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 445, 446 (1988). 
960 Id., at 453. See, The Federal Law on Protection of the Environment (No. 7-F2), adopted by Duma and 
Council of the Federation (Dec. 2001), signed by President Putin (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter The Federal Law 
on Protection of the Environment (No. 7-F2)]; see, infra note (1281). 
961 TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2602 (5), § 3 (5). 
962 EPA Terms of Environment, available at <http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms>, (last visit Feb. 16, 2001). 
963 NEPA, § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331 (a). 
964 NEPA, § 101 (b) (4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331 (b)(4). 
965 The Regulations implementing NEPA in the CFR Title 40-Protection of Environment. 
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together with all its surroundings, air, water, soil and what they contain in the form of 
solid, liquid, gas or natural radiation plus fixed or mobile structure built by man.”967 
Similarly, the United Kingdom Environmental Protection Act of 1990 defines the 
environment as “consist[ing] of all, or any of the following media, namely, the air water 
and land; and the medium of air includes the air within buildings and the air within other 
natural or man-made structures above or below ground.”968  
In sum, in light of these definitions of the environment, and for the purposes of 
this thesis on the environmental law of armed conflict, the overall definition of the 
environment should be a comprehensive one, in order to cover all components of the 
ecosystem. Armed conflict threatens the degradation of all aspects of the human 
environment, natural environment, and cultural environment, including drinking water 
supplies, sewage treatment facilities, historical buildings, cultural monuments, fresh air, 
endangered species habitats, soil, forests, and national parks, in order to achieve military 
victory. Therefore, the definition of the environment should include all the elements that 
may be affected by wartime activities in order to provide effective environmental 
protection. This broad definition of environment will be the meaning intended in this 
thesis. 
 
B- Environmental Law Rules Relative to the Armed Conflicts 
 
Environmental law rules can be categorized into international and national levels. 
The first category includes hard law such as international treaties and conventions, in 
addition to the well-accepted customs and general principles of international law. These 
are supplemented by soft law such as international resolutions, declarations, and 
recommendations which, in general, are not binding on States. The second category 
includes national environmental statutes, rules, regulations, standards, and requirements 
applicable to military activities both at home and when deployed abroad. In addition, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
966 CFR, Title 40-Protection of Environment Chapter V “Council on Environmental Quality” Part 1500 § 
1508.8. 
967 Ghanoon Insha’a Alhaya’ah Alaamah Lilby’ah 21/1995-16/1996 [Law Establishing the Environmental 
Public Authority No. 21/1995, modified by Law No. 16/1996] art 1 (6) [hereinafter the Kuwaiti 
Environmental Public Authority Law]. 
968 Susan Wolf & Anna White, Principles of Environmental Law 1 (Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 1997). 
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relevant to address comparative environmental law rules in order to provide a whole 
image.  
The fact that we can discuss the environmental protection in terms of 
international, comparative, and national environmental laws is itself a positive aspect, 
since it shows that environmental problems are being seriously addressed by lawmakers 
in all these contexts. 
 
C- International Environmental Law Rules 
 
Since the inception of the field of international environmental law in the late 
1960s,969 a number of international environmental law rules have been created to govern 
environmental relations among states.  
The environmental law rules that apply in peacetime have been, more often than 
not, successful in reducing the environmental effects of human activities. But they 
frequently fail to protect the environment during armed conflicts. The use of weapons of 
mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, can cause severe damage to human health and 
the environment.970Some international law scholars believe that all environmental law 
rules should be waived during armed conflicts, and that the law of war is the only source 
of law that would be applicable.971 That attitude is favored by military personnel and 
governmental armed forces as they are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with very 
immediate and short-term questions of winning an armed conflict. They try to waive 
environmental law rules according to the principle of military necessity, which may allow 
any humanitarian or environmental harm that cannot be avoided in the battlefields. 
Military personnel would aim to achieve their military objectives and attack their targets 
                                                          
969 Stephanie Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International 
Legal Reform 29 Stan. J. Int’l L. 165, 188 (1992) [hereinafter Simonds]. 
970 The ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion of the World Health Organization request on August 27, 1993, to 
address the issue of the effect of war on international treaties, declared that “[t]he use of nuclear weapons 
can cause damage to human health and the environment in the territory of the State which uses a nuclear 
weapon, the target State or territory, third countries, and other areas beyond national jurisdiction. It can also 
violate fundamental human rights, including the right to life.” See Roger S. Clark, International Court of 
Justice: Advisory Proceedings on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Questions Posed 
by the General Assembly): The Laws of Armed Conflict And the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
7 Crim. L. F. 265, 283 (1996). 
971 Michael N. Schmitt, Green War An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed 
Conflict, 22 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 46 (1997) [hereinafter Schmitt]; Baker, supra note (725) at 354. 
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even if those targets are historical sites, cultural monuments, a drinking water facility or 
any other natural resources. These waivers, clearly, cannot be allowed if the environment 
is to be worth having after the armed conflict is over. Furthermore, if the international 
environmental rules were waived, States that are not involved in the armed conflict, 
neutral States and global commons would never be protected from environmental damage 
caused by the armed conflict. 
Other scholars believe that environmental law rules are applicable, along with the 
laws of war, in wartime since there is no authority that would preclude their application. 
This interpretation is the most internally consistent and can be defended for several 
reasons. For purposes of this discussion, activity related to war can be divided into three 
phases, before, during, and after armed conflict.  
1) Military preparation for warfare. This phase should not pose a serious problem 
to the applicability of environmental law rules, where the warfare is not yet raging. 
Peacetime environmental law should apply fully to the military during peacetime as it 
does to all other human activities. However, some, if not most, States still avoid requiring 
their military to obey environmental laws, in order to give their armed forces the freedom 
to build a massive arsenal without any consideration to the environmental laws that  
apply to all other sectors of the government. There is no objective reason to excuse the 
military from compliance with environmental laws. For instance, the United States, as we 
will discuss later in this part, provides a great example by requiring its military to respect 
national environmental regulations and standards, whether at home or abroad, in 
peacetime.  
2) During armed conflict. Some commentators agree that international 
environmental laws should be suspended during armed conflict because environmental 
protection is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of war.972 Others argue that 
environmental laws, along with the laws of war, should apply to armed conflicts. In 
particular, these writers argue that international customary law relating to armed 
conflict973prohibits belligerents from causing unnecessary damage to the environment, 
                                                          
972 Paul Fauteux, The Use of the Environment as an Instrument of War in 
Occupied Kuwait, in Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the 
Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment 42 (H.B. Schiefer ed., 1992). 
973 Such as principles of proportionality and military necessity. 
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and that existing international law instruments not only prohibit unnecessary 
environmental harm, but also provided for “personnel criminal liability and official 
financial liability.”974 In this view, belligerents have a duty not to destroy the basic 
ecological systems that people need to live in, as well as the duty to protect human rights. 
Thus, military personnel need to be trained to protect the environment not only in 
peacetime, but during armed conflict also, and armed forces should be prohibited from 
destroying the environment in times of armed conflicts. 
Some jurists hold civilians responsible for collateral damages caused during 
armed conflicts, based on the failure to use reasonable precaution to remove themselves 
from the area of military targets.975 The environment is even more vulnerable, since it 
cannot run away from the severe effects of armed conflicts. Consequently, protection of 
the environment should receive as much attention as protection of persons. However, as 
the environment is increasingly used as a weapon in warfare, then there will be growing 
danger that environmental destruction will become a part of military strategy. As a rule, it 
is accepted that war, by itself, does not suspend peacetime treaties between belligerents 
States.976 While there are no specific criteria to determine which treaties apply in times of 
armed conflicts and which do not, if the IUCN Amman Clause, which was examined in 
Part Two of this thesis, is taken as jus cogen, then the standing order to the military 
should be to protect the environment unless extreme military necessity dictates otherwise 
in the heat of military action. 
3) Aftermath of Armed Conflict. In this phase the hostilities have ceased and the 
law of war no longer functions. In this phase, international environmental law rules, 
particularly rules regarding reparations, are the sole legal authority for regulating 
damage, rehabilitating the environment, and defining the liability. For example, following 
the Gulf War II, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 686 and 
687/1991 that reaffirmed this rule when it held Iraq liable, under international law, for the 
environmental damage that occurred during its occupation of Kuwait in 1990. It was the 
                                                          
974 ICRC, Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed 
Conflict 15 (Geneva, April 27-29, 1992) [hereinafter ICRC Report of the Meeting of Experts of 1992]. 
975 Infeld, Precision-Guided, supra note (157) at 123. 
976 Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 
Am. J. Int’l L.  653, 1183, art. 1 (Supp. 1935); 1985 Resolution of Institute of International Law, cited in 
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first time the international community recognized that wartime environmental damage is 
compensable, reflecting the increasing international concern for the environment.977  
The ICRC, at its meeting of experts in 1992, was the first international body to 
discuss State responsibility for wartime environmental damage and the need for a sound 
study of that issue.978 Given that the environment is increasingly and deliberately 
exploited in times of armed conflict, it was significant that one expert declared that  
 
[u]nder Security Council resolution 687, Iraq’s responsibility for 
severe damage to the environment had led to a procedure of 
compensation for such damage, and that raised the important 
question of legal qualification of severe damage and the legal 
regime governing such damage. With regard to legal 
qualification, the damage perpetrated during the Gulf War might 
fall under Article 19 of Part 1 of the draft convention on State 
responsibility, currently being considered by the United Nations 
International Law Commission, which defined ecological crimes 
by States as violations of legal norms regarded as particularly 
important by the international community and listed such crimes, 
including massive damage to the environment, thus providing a 
certain legal basis for qualifying the violation. The applicable 
legal regime raised more difficult problems, however, and the 
Compensation Commission set up by the Security Council had 
not made much headway in defining the necessary criteria. On 
the other hand there was a clear need to lay down the special 
primary obligation of all States to refrain from inflicting massive 
damage on the environment, and such an obligation might be 
presumed to exist in general customary international law.979 
 
A State, such as Iraq, may chose not to be bound by a rule of customary 
international law by displaying its opposition to the rule from the time of its inception.980 
However, Iraq did not oppose the rule establishing a duty to repair warfare environmental 
damage, and “failed to formally assert any right to deviate from” such duty until such 
customary rule was already established.981 Therefore, Iraq still will be held liable for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ingrid Detter Delupis, The Law of War 301 (1987); see also, Lord McNair, The Law of 
Treaties 696 (1961). 
977 The State responsibility for wartime environmental damage will be examined in the final part of this 
thesis. 
978 ICRC Report of the Meeting of Experts of 1992, supra note (974) at 24 & 30. 
979 Id., at 30-31. 
980 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 75 (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
981 Suzanne M. Bernard, Environmental Warfare: Iraq’s Use of Oil Weapon During the Gulf Conflict, 6 
N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 106, 113-14 (1993)[hereinafter Bernard]. 
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environmental damage caused in Kuwait and the region, despite its tentative to escape 
from environmental responsibility. 
 
1. Hard International Law 
The main body of rules of international law is usually considered hard law, or 
treaty law. Treaty obligations must be compulsory or they will have no effect.982 Treaties, 
together with general principles of law and international customs are the main sources of 
hard law rules.983 Law developed in these areas requires time. For instance, “custom 
takes time, and often a lot of State practice, before it hardens into a legally enforceable 
rule.”984 Likewise treaties usually take a considerable time, from their negotiation, draft 
approval, and signature, to their ratification, which is necessary for a treaty to enter into 
force.  
 not 
new treaty requires 
an ofte
 
 where they are located. Regional 
struments cover countries of the same region.  
a. Inte
ied 
 
                                                          
Nonetheless, despite the long time required to produce hard law instruments, that 
time is necessary to assure the stability of the international society, because States do
easily accept changes to existing international law rules. Thus, States often prefer to 
modify an existing treaty rather than to introduce a new one, since a 
n lengthy process of negotiation, acceptance and ratification. 
Hard law instruments can be classified as either world-wide or regional. The
first category covers all member States no matter
in
  
rnational World-wide Hard Law Instruments 
There are many international environmental law instruments that may be appl
to armed conflicts. The basic agreements constituting world order today include the 
United Nations Charter, Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law
982 Dupuy, supra note (830) at 420. 
983 Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways To Make International Environmental Law 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 259, 269 
(1992) [hereinafter Palmer]. In the international law, there exist basic general principles that States must 
accept in order to effectuate treaty law and customary international law and unless States accepted such 
principles it would be impossible to regard any treaty as binding. One such principle would be “pacta sunt 
servanda” which reflects that promises should be kept. See, Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules 
and International Society 52 (Oxford University Press, 1999) [hereinafter Arend]. 
984 Palmer, supra note (983) at 269. 
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Commission, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Antarctic Treaty, and 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Specific environmental agreements 
include the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Climate Change 
Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention for the Protection of t
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the United Nations Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft.
Finally, this paper will examine general principles of law articulated un
he 
 
der Principle 21 
of the Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. 
1) The U
 
nited Nations Charter 
The U.N. Charter985 provides a foundation for all international relations. A 
number of international instruments refer to, or rely upon the U.N. Charter as a basis
for their provisions. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea declares, in the Preambular paragraph seven, that “the development of the law of
the sea will strengthen peace, security, cooperation and friendly relations among a
nations according to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.
Another example is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Co
 
 
ll 
” 
ntext, which in Preambular paragraph five the relevant provisions of 
the U.N
rticle 1 (3) of the U.N. Charter encourages States to: 
 
ing effective 
blems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character.  
 2 (3) and (4) of the Charter 
articulates, as general principles of the organization, that: 
                                                          
. Charter. 
A
1- maintain international peace and security by tak
measures to prevent threats to the peace,  
2- develop friendly relations among nations, and  
3- solve international pro
 
These purposes encourage the cooperation among nations, including 
cooperation in environmental protection. Similarly, Article
985 U.N. Charter supra note (71) art.1, para. 3. 
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om 
nner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.986 
 
erve 
eaceful 
 Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations
ity Council’s Decision 661/1990,988 since its aggression 
on Kuw
up 
nd 
                  
3.All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered. 
4.All Members shall refrain in their international relations fr
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other ma
 
The direct goal of these principles is to preserve the international peace and 
security. However, these principles also reflect the need for international environmental 
protection, because “refrain[ing …] from the threat or use of force against […] any State”
and “settl[ing the] international disputes by peaceful means” would necessarily pres
the environment from any harm may be caused by the use of force. Eventually, the 
prevention of the use of force in the international relations, and the appeal to the p
settlement of the international disputes were confirmed in the 1970 UN General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and
.987  
The U.N. has imposed international sanctions against a number of States that 
violated Article 2 (3) and (4). For instance, Iraq is still subject to the United Nations 
sanctions imposed by the Secur
ait of August 2, 1990.  
In effect, the ICJ found a duty to cooperate in the case concerning the  
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project between Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary argued that if 
the proposed dam had been built, the “bed of the Danube upstream would have silted 
and, consequently, the quality of the water collected in the bank-filtered wells would 
have deteriorated in this sector.”989 Slovakia denied that the project would cause any ki
                                        
986 Id., art. 2 (3) and (4). 
987 U.N. General Assembly’s Friendly Relations Resolution, supra note (86).  
988 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. (Aug. 6, 1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 661/1990]. 
989 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) General 
List No. 92, at 35-36. 
 [hereinafter Hungary v. Slovakia]. 
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of “ecological state of necessity.”990 The Court found that Hungary was not entitled 
suspend work on the project, and required both countries to negotiate in good faith
take all necessary measures to ens
to 
 and to 
ure the achievement of the goals of the Treaty of 
Septem -
 
se, such as 
 
ns provide a framework, which would require U.N. member 
States t r 
cal extension of the obligation of the 
ollective self-defense that they must take the necessary precautionary measures in order 
 
ber 16, 1977 concerning the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo
Nagymaros System of Locks.991  
Significantly, in a separate opinion, Vice-president Christopher Gregory
Weeramantry referred specifically to environmental concerns raised in the ca
sustainable development, development, and environmental protection. Justice 
Weeramantry said that “[t]he Court must hold the balance even between the 
environmental considerations and the developmental considerations raised by the 
respective Parties. The Principle that enables the Court to do so is the principle of
sustainable development.”992 Justice Weeramantry added: “the protection given to 
Hungary [can be described] as the principle of continuing environmental impact 
assessment.”993 Such decisio
o follow the rules of international law regarding international cooperation in orde
to protect the environment.  
Moreover, the U.N. Charter prohibits any armed conflict except by an act of the 
Security Council. That prohibition on armed conflict should also apply to actions harmful 
to the environment, because it is considered as a logi
c
to protect civilian populations and the environment. 
2) Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission 
Among hard international law instruments, as yet not fully accepted, are the 
Draft Articles on the State Responsibility of the International Law Commission 
(ILC).994 It is an effort to codify existing international law of State responsibility.995 
                                                          
f the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, 
ident Weeramantry at 88. 
ng research and 
inafter International Law Commission Draft Articles]. 
990 Id., at 37. 
991 Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation o
Sept. 16, 1977, Czech.-Hung., 32 I.L.M. 1247, 1249.  
992 Hungary v. Slovakia, supra note (989) The separate opinion of vice-pres
993 Id., The separate opinion of vice-president Weeramantry at 88. 
994 International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 1980, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
26, U.N, Doc. A/35/10. In 1947 the U.N. General Assembly established the ILC for prepari
drafting conventions purposes [here
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Although the Articles have not yet been offered for adoption by States, they have been 
offered for comment.   996
Article 19 (3) (d) goes beyond recognizing the environmental effects of warfare, 
it recommends that “a serious breach of an international obligation of essential 
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as 
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas,” should be 
considered an international crime.997 Although, the ILC Draft Articles are silent on 
responsibility for environmental damage directly caused by armed conflict,998 it was 
significant that they identified certain kinds of environmental degradation as 
criminal.999 That article appeared to be “aspirational” during the decades when 
environmental protection was becoming a major international concern.1000 However, in 
1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted, giving legal 
effect to the aspiration of the Draft Articles.  
 
3) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court on July17, 1998. Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines war 
crimes. In particular, Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) provided that, among other serious violations 
of the international law rules and customs that apply to international armed conflict, 
severe damage to the environment that exceeds military necessity is considered a war 
crime. Under that Article, 
“‘war crimes’ means: […] (b) Other serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the 
established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: […](iv) [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause […] widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
i, supra note (347) at 383. 
supra note (994) art. 19 para. 3 (d). 
t. 8 (2)(b)(iv).  
995 Cerv
996 Id. 
997 International Law Commission Draft Articles, 
998 Schwabach, supra note (477) f.n. 93. 
999 Rome Statute, supra note (191) ar
1000 Schmitt, supra note (971) at 44. 
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clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
1001
 
 
l 
ote tion under those Articles is triggered by the presence of all three 
elemen
 in 
y 
gle 
e” eans serious damage to 
human 
f 
of the 
because
                                                          
military advantage anticipated[.]”  
 
By this definition, Rome Statute expresses a great concern for the natural 
environment. The language of the Rome Statute draws on both the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I and Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). Articles 35 and 55 of the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibit any “method of warfare 
which is intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe 
damage to the environment.” “Widespread” is defined as damage that affects severa
hundred square kilometers. “Long-term” should be measured in decades, twenty to 
thirty years, and “severe” refers to any act that “prejudices the health or survival of the 
population.”1002 Pr c
ts together.1003 
ENMOD prohibits the manipulation or use of the environment as a target. 
Article 1 states that: “[e]ach State party to the Convention undertakes not to engage
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injur
to any other State party…” This language seems to require the presence of any sin
element: widespread, long-lasting, or severe damage. According to ENMOD, the 
meaning of “widespread” includes several hundred square kilometers. The term “long-
lasting” means damage extending beyond a season. “Sever  m
life, natural or economic resources or other assets.1004 
It appears that Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute requires the presence o
the three elements together, like Article 35 of the Additional Protocol I.  Moreover, 
Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) uses the same “long-term” language as do Articles 35 and 55 
Additional Protocol I. Those Articles grant the environment a limited protection 
 they require the presence of all three elements together.  
1001 Rome Statute, supra note (191) art. 8 (2)(b)(iv). 
1002 Whitaker, supra note (725) at 38. 
1003 Id. 
1004 Baker, supra note (725) at 368. 
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Nevertheless, the Rome Statute is significant in that it analogizes environmental 
damage to other war crimes such as killing and pillaging, which reflects an increase in 
environmental awareness within the international community, and that people cannot be 
nvironment.1005 separated from their e
 
4) Antarctic Treaty  
The Antarctic Treaty  was the first agreement that sought to protect a specific 
portion of the earth’s environment from nuclear weapons and warfare.  Article 1 
prohibits any aggressive military use of Antarctic. It states that “Antarctica shall be used 
for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a 
military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying 
out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.”  Thus, it 
prohibits any military activity, before, during, or after armed conflict on its territory. 
Establishing military bases, practicing means of warfare, storing or testing armame
dumping warfare debris a violation of the Antarctic Treaty. Furthermore, Article 5 of th
Antarctic treaty emphasizes that the nuclear arms should be totally excluded from 
Antarctic. It states that “Any nuclear explosion in Antarctica and the disposal there of 
radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.”  This article directly prohibits any 
nuclear explosion, whether as a test, such as the French tests in Mururoa, or during ar
conflicts, such as the explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, it can be used 
as a legal basis for prohibiting any dumping
1006
1007
1008
nts, or 
e 
med 
 of radioactive waste materials, whether 
produc ot 
                              
1009
ed by peacetime activities or during armed conflicts. However, the treaty does n
prevent the peaceful use of Antarctica.1010  
                            
and a State’s international criminal responsibility will be discussed in the final part. 1005 Rome Statute 
1006 Antarctic Treaty, 1 December, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]. 
1007 Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 191. 
1008 Antarctic Treaty, supra note (1006) art 1 (1). 
1009 Id., art 5 (1). 
1010 Id., art 1 (2). 
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Here, it is relevant to refer to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources1011 (CCAMLR) which was concluded as a result of the
of the Antarctic Treaty to refer specifically to the ocean surrounding the continent.
 failure 
ive 
that 
harvest principles. 
f all Contracting Parties to any activity 
which, 
early 
 encourages the participation of NGO’s and 
intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s). Thus, both the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee are required to cooperate with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and “other Specialized Agencies.”1018 
                                                          
1012  
The goal of CCAMLR is outlined in Article II (2), which states that “the object
of the Convention is conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, and 
ing of those resources is to take place only in accordance with named 
These principles are: […] the prevention or minimization of the risk of changes to the 
marine ecosystem not potentially reversible over two or three decades.”1013 
CCAMLR includes no specific enforcement procedures to allow the 
Commission1014 to implement its measures.1015 Nevertheless, Article X (2) provides that 
“[t]he Commission shall draw the attention o
in the opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation by a contracting 
Party of the objective of this Convention.” Article X (2) is the provision that most n
amounts to an enforcement mechanism.1016 
CCAMLR sets up a number of organs to facilitate its goal in conserving marine 
living resources in the Southern Antarctic Ocean, including the Commission and a 
Scientific Committee consisting of representatives of each contracting Party.1017 
Article XXIII of the CCAMLR
 
1011 Conv ntion on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, U.K.T.S. No. 
48, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980) [hereinafter CCAMLR]. 
1012 Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty limits the Treaty area to land and ice shelves. See, Stuart Kaye & 
Donald R. Rothwell, Australia’s Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries, 26 Ocean Dev. & Int’l 
L. 195, 203 (1995). 
e
1013 CCAMLR, supra note (1011) art. II (3) (c). 
1014 A Commission is “the body charged with the fulfillment of the objectives defines in Article II of the 
Convention. Its membership consists of each original Contracting Party, and those acceding partied 
engaged in research or fishing interests in the Southern Ocean.” Id., art. VII. 
1015 Stuart B. Kaye, Legal Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Convention foe the Conservation of Antaractic Marine Living Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut 
Hole Convention, 26 California Western Int’l L.J. 75, 85 (1995). 
1016 Id. 
1017 CCAMLR, supra note (1011) art. XIV (2). 
1018 Id., art. XXIII (2). 
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5) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1019 is the first global 
attempt to limit marine pollution in any comprehensive way.1020 It took twelve years, 
from its adoption in 1982 to its entry into force in 1994.  
The Convention on the Law of the Sea contains aspirational language 
use of the seas for peaceful purposes.1021 Moreover, it devotes a specific part, XII, to the 
“Protection and the Preservation of the Marine Environment.”1022 
Article 192 of the Convention states that “States have the o
limiting the 
bligation to protect and 
preserv e 
er of 
 
 
al 
e 
                                                          
e the Marine environment.” This obligation requires member States to protect th
marine environment, which can be done by enacting laws, modifying existing ones, and 
refraining from committing any act that may cause destruction to the marine 
environment. According to Article 194, member States are required to apply a numb
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, and are 
required to harmonize their policies in order to achieve that goal. 
Accordingly, Article 206 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea stresses the
growing international use of the environmental impact assessment. It states that “[w]hen
States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their 
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potenti
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of th
1019 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 
[hereinafter Convention on the Law of the Sea]. 
1020 Schmitt, supra note (971) at 47. 
1021 Mark E. Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Time For A Fresh Look, Symposium: 
Contemporary Issues in Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 29, 36 (1997) [hereinafter Rosen]. 
1022 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note (1019) Part XII. 
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results of such assessments in the manner provided in article 205.” Thus, Article 206 
requires Contracting Parties to prepare an EIA if the planned project may have a major 
environ r 
e 
that may have 
a signif
ures necessary to ensure 
that act mage 
read beyond the areas 
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.” 
Tha which 
prohibits St
Sign aval 
auxiliary, o rvice by a 
government
 Convention regarding the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any 
warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or 
 act in a 
cable, with 
this Convention.1024  
mental impact on the marine ecosystem, and to provide access to the EIA to othe
nations, so that they can examine the environmental threat of the project and discuss 
either its cessation or alternatives in order to provide greater protection to the marin
environment. Article 206 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, like Principle 17 of 
the Rio Declaration, requires the preparation of EIA for proposed activities 
icant environmental impact. 
Article 194 (2) outlines that: “States shall take all meas
ivities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause da
by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from 
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not sp
t Article is similar to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
ates from polluting other States’ environment.1023 
ificantly, according to Article 236 of the Convention, warships, n
ther vessels or aircraft owned or operated in non-commercial se
 are excluded from the jurisdiction of this convention. 
 
The provisions of this
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
government non-commercial service. However, each State shall 
ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing 
operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft 
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft
manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practi
 
Apparently, this means that war on the marine environment is contrary to the 
convention. But, since the whole point of the Convention is to protect the marine 
                                                          
1023 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration will be discussed later. 
1024 The Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note (1019) art. 236. 
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environment, that environment should be protected from military activities and 
operations whether in peacetime or in times of armed conflict.  
 
6) The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer  recognizes the 
global consequences of ozone
1025
 depletion and states in Article 2 (1) that “[t]he parties 
shall…[p]ro ulting or 
likely to res ozone 
layer.”1026 T
regarding th Systematic 
Observation” and “Information Exchange.”1027 The former Executive Director of UNEP, 
Dr. Mo
 
depleti 9  
efforts of Finland and Sweden produced a Resolution of the Vienna Conference in March 
1985 to conclude a protocol regulating CFC’s.1030 Therefore, a Protocol to the Vienna 
tect human health and the environment against adverse effects res
ult from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the 
he Vienna Convention was a success in that it provides an umbrella treaty 
e ozone layer depletion, along with annexes on “Research and 
stafa Tolba outlined: 
 
This is the first global convention to address an issue that for the 
time being seems far in the future and is of unknown proportions. 
This convention, as I see it, is the essence of the anticipatory 
response so many environmental issues call for: to deal with the 
threat of the problem before we have to deal with the problem 
itself.1028 
 
Moreover, the Vienna Convention applies to rocket emissions that cause ozone
on. However, its lack of specific restrictions does little to alleviate that threat.102
Furthermore, following the adoption of the Vienna Framework Convention, the 
                                                          
1025 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 097. 
1026 Id., art. 2 (1). 
1027 Peter H. Sand, Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention Is Adopted, 27 Envt. 19, 41
(1985). 
 
e Effects of Chemical 
avid D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International 
mental Lawmaking, 14 HST. Intl. Comp. L. Rev. 755, 759 (1991) [hereinafter Caron]. 
1028 Excerpt from statement of Dr. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP, delivered at the Vienna 
Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, Austria, reprinted in Id., at 20.  
1029 Lynn Anne Shapiro, The Need for International Agreements Concerning the Ozon
Rocket Propulsion, 4 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary LJ. 739, 757 (1995).  
1030 D
Environ
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Convention calling for fifty percent reduction in the production1031 and consumption103
of specified CFC’s over ten years period was adopted in Montreal in September 1987.
2 
 
sphere 
 
es not provide substantive 
assistan t be 
, 
 
at 
yer. One example is the burning of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) at 
the petr
nna 
                                                          
1033
However, even after the adoption of Montreal Protocol in 1987, two important 
issues arose. The first regarded the Antarctic ozone hole that was reported by a British 
research group in May 19851034 and confirmed by American satellite measurements in 
late summer 1986.1035 The hole was attributed to high chlorine levels in the strato
over Antarctica.1036 Such findings were confirmed after the meeting in Montreal which 
resulted in partial coverage of the Antarctic hole finding in the Protocol.1037 The second
issue arose from statement by highly populated States such as China and India that they 
would never sign the Montreal Protocol because it do
ce to developing countries.1038 Since the protection of the ozone layer canno
achieved without cooperation between developing countries and industrialized States
member States went on to negotiate the adjustments and amendments in the 1990 London
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol.1039 
Warfare is the human activity that most menaces directly our environment, 
particularly warfare operations that result in the release of substances and gases th
affect the ozone la
ochemical plant1040 during the NATO raids against former Yugoslavia. Military 
use of CFC, especially during warfare, constitutes a breach to Article 2 (1) of the Vie
1031 “‘Production’ means the amount of controlled substances produced minus the amount destroyed by 
technologies to be approved by the Parties and minus the amount entirely used as feed stock in the 
manufacture of other chemicals.” See, Montreal Protocol, supra note (527) art. 1(5). 
1032 “‘Consumption’ means production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances.” See, Id., art. 1 
, 
tellite Measurements of the Springtime Antarctic Ozone Decrease, 
08, 808 (1986). 
n, supra note (1030) at 760. 
 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
NEP/OZL. Pro. 2/3, 
 Amendment].  
es for the Environment, supra note (35) at 32. 
(6). 
1033 Id. 
1034 J. C. Farmen et al., Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal CIOx/NOx Interaction
315 Nature 207, 207 (1985). 
1035 R. S. Stolarski et al., Nimbus 7 Sa
322 Nature 8
1036 Caro
1037 Id., at 761. 
1038 Id. 
1039 Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the
Ozone Layer, United Nations Environmental Program (Agenda Item 7), U.N. Doc. U
Annex II (1990) [hereinafter London
1040 The Kosovo Conflict: Consequenc
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Conven
ontreal Protocol does more than prohibit military uses, however, its call for 
reductions in CFC consumption and production covers all human activities whether 
ase the ozone layer 
depletion. 
tion.1041 It also constitutes a breach of the Montreal Protocol and London 
Amendments.1042 
The M
conducted by civilians or military as long as these activities can incre
For instance in the United States, the protection of the ozone layer was a major 
concern in the mid-1970s, leading to the prohibition of the use of CFC’s in aerosol 
spraying.1043 
 
7) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change1044
1045
1046
1047
 (FCCC) is 
outgrowth of the Earth Summit. It has been described as one of the most important 
accomplishments of the 1992 Summit.
an 
 
ion 
is 
 harming another State’s 
environ
“[t]he Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the 
                                                          
 The FCCC has been ratified by 152 States and
the European Union.  The Earth Summit took place at a time of international attent
to the environmental effects of the Iraqi atrocity during the Gulf War II, and that 
circumstance was reflected in the content of the provisions of this convention. For 
instance, the FCCC reaffirms, in its preamble, the principle of State “responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”  Th
Preambular paragraph reaffirms a State duty to refrain from
ment, in both peacetime and times of armed conflicts. Article 3 (3) goes beyond 
this principle to incorporate a version of the precautionary principle. It provides that 
1041 Hannah, supra note (519) at 92. 
Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15 
hange, May 9, 1992, U.N.Doc. 
 Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Personal Correspondence, Feb. 
1042 Caron, supra note (1030) at 760. 
1043 Dale S. Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent 
Harvard Envt’l L. Rev. 275, 275 (1991). 
1044 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate C
A/CONF.151/26 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. 
1045 William C. Burns, Global Warming: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Future of Small Island State, 6 Dick. J. Envt’l. L. & Pol. 147 188 (1997) [hereinafter Burns]. 
1046 United Nations Framework
21, 1996, cited in Id., fn. 147. 
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causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures…”1048  
The Framework Convention also addressed threats to air quality. It noted that, a
a result of the increment a use of fossil fuels by civilian and military sectors, “humans 
began to interfere seriously in the composition of the atmosphere.”
s 
ing of the 
c 
concentration of other greenhouse gases, such as “methane and nitrous oxides.”1051 In 
 before, during, or after armed conflict, can 
generate huge amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane, which contribute 
signific ew
in
8) The Convention on Biological Diversity
1049 The burn
fossil fuels resulted in the production of about six gigatons of carbon annually in recent 
years.1050 Furthermore, anthropogenic activities have caused definite atmospheri
particular, military activities and operations,
antly to global warming. Under the Fram ork Convention, belligerents should 
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or m imize these activities.  
 
 
The t the Earth 
Summit, on to a volume 
published jo ironment in 
Geneva, the Biodiversity Convention is called:  
                                                                                                                                                                            
 Convention on Biological Diversity1052 was opened for signature a
 June 5, 1992. It was signed by 157 States.1053 In an introduction 
intly by the IUCN and the International Academy of the Env
 
[…]simply an enabling document and treaty. It sets out what 
governments have agreed on regarding mutual support to national 
efforts to conserve the wealth of the planet, and collaboration to 
enable biological resources to be developed and used to the 
maximum possible benefit of people.1054 
 
1047 Climate Change Convention, supra note (1044) pmbl. 
n Houghton, Global Warming: the Complete Briefing 31 (Lion Publishing plc, 
 
ed in Burns, supra note (1045) fn. 25. 
y: The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 
ole F. Krattiger, al. Eds., 1994). 
1048 Id., art. 3 (3). 
1049 Fred Pearce, World Lays Odds on Global Catastrophe, April 8 New Sci. 4, 4, (1995). 
1050 Joh
1994). 
1051 Intergovernmental Panel Climate Change (IPCC), Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC
Second Assessment Report SPM.1 (IPCC-Doc.3) (1995) cit
1052 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note (374). 
1053 Catherine Tinker, A “New Breed” of Treat
13 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 191, 191 (1995). 
1054 Martin Holdgate & Bernard Giovannini, Biodiversity Conservation: Foundations for the 21st Century, 
in Widening Perspectives on Biodiversity 3,4 (Anat
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The convention recognizes the fact that “biological diversity is being significantl
1055
y 
reduced
ity for 
 in 
 
 
n, damages occurring 
beyond
tracting 
tional organizations, in 
respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest, for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”1059  
 the Bio-Diversity Convention,1060 member States 
rotocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
 by certain human activities.”  The environmental effects caused by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the major event that overshadowed the climate of the Earth Summit, 
led the parties to agree that environmental warfare is one of the human activities that 
reduces biological diversity. The Bio-Diversity Convention states that “it is vital to 
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity at the source,”1056 a statement that certainly includes armed conflict activities. 
Article 3 of the Bio-Diversity Convention places on States the responsibil
environmental effects of military activities under their jurisdiction, including activities
maneuver areas or occupied territories. It states that “[States have] the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”1057
Furthermore, Article 4 (b) applies to activities that affect biological diversity regardless
of where their effect occurs. That Article places responsibility on any nation for 
“processes and activities, regardless of where their effects occur, carried out under its 
jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”1058 Unlike damages occurring within a natio
 the national jurisdiction require specific measures for the conservation and 
sustainable use of bio-diversity. For example, Article 5 states that “[e]ach Con
Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting 
Parties, directly or, where appropriate, through competent interna
Responding to Article 19 (3) of
adopted the Cartagena P
                                                          
1055 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note (374) pmbl. 
1056 Id. 
1057 Id., art. 3. 
1058 Id., art. 4 (b). 
1059 Id., art. 5. 
1060 “The Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of protocol setting out appropriate procedures, 
e effect on the 
including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of 
any living modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have advers
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Diversity.10 s protocol,1062 
which has b
modified organisms resulting 
om modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
ce of 
ainable use of Bio-Diversity should be prevented. 
For exa
e 
 
posed projects that are likely to have substantial adverse 
impacts on biological diversity. Article 14 further requires public participation in the 
preparation of EIA to ensure that the environmental consequences of proposed activities 
61 The precautionary principle plays a fundamental role in thi
een confirmed in Article I of the Biosafety Protocol. 
 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to 
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe 
transfer, handling and use of living 
fr
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking 
also into account risk to human health, and specifically focusing 
on transboundary movements.”1063 
 
The precautionary principle requires member States to take necessary measures to 
assure the safety of biodiversity, and to protect the environment even in the absen
any proved specific damage. Accordingly, any use of modern technology that may have 
adverse effects on conservation and sust
mple, the development of certain arms may considered a violation of the 
principle, and therefore, illegal, if those weapons are likely to have adverse effects on th
sustainable use of biological diversity.  
Finally, the Bio-Diversity Convention reinforces the EIA concept in Article 14 (a)
which requires an EIA for pro
are taken into consideration. 
 
9) Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 
(374) art. 19 (3). 
1061 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, January 29, 2000, available 
Biosafe-Prot.html>, (last visit March 11, 2000) 
. 10048 (2001). 
ra note (1061) art. 1. 
at <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/Protocol/html/
[hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. 
1062 David P. Fidler, Challenges to Humanity’s Health: The Contributions of International Environmental 
Law to National and Global Public Health, 31 Envt’l L. Rep
1063 Biosafety Protocol, sup
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The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage  
is an attempt to protect the irreplaceable items of nature and cultural heritage for all the 
people of the world, on an international scale.  Article 6 (3) of the Cultural and Na
Heritage Convention states that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not 
take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultu
natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States 
Parties to this Convention.”  Thus any destruction of cultural  or natural herit
during armed conflict should be interpreted as a violation of this provision. However, 
Article 6 (3) explicitly links Convention membership and damage to the natural a
cultural heritage. That is, the protection offered by this provision extends to member 
States only; non-members, cultural and natural heritage are not covered by this 
protection. For example, Iraq, a signatory of this convention,  deliberately burned 
Kuwaiti oil wells, and spilled oil into the Gulf waters, which damaged the natural 
heritage of Convention signatories: Saudi Arabia,  Iran,  and other countrie
The Iraqi atrocity during the Gulf War II threatened species of plants and animals of 
outstanding universal value, such as dolphins, sea turtles, birds, plankton, and dugongs. 
                                                          
1064
1065 tural 
to 
ral and 
age1068 
nd 
s.1072 
1066 1067
1069
1070 1071
1064 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Her
Sellected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the En
itage, Nov. 23, 1972,reprinted in 
vironment 276 (A. Kiss ed., 
1983) [hereinafter Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention]. 
t. 6 (1). 
 
g 
ral 
nd 
or 
ding universal value from the point of view of science, 
, 1978. 
he Environment, 10 Dick. J. Int’l L. 515, 529 (1992) [hereinafter Ross, 
Environmental Warfare]. 
1065 Id., pmbl. & ar
1066 Id., art. 6 (3). 
1067 “For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “cultural heritage”: 
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an 
archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of buildings: groups of separate or 
connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape,
are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or 
the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstandin
universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” Id., art. 1. 
1068 “For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “natural heritage”: natu
features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of 
outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical 
formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals a
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites 
precisely delineated natural areas of outstan
conservation or natural beauty.” Id., art. 2. 
1069 Iraq signed the Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention since Dec. 17, 1975. 
1070 Saudi Arabia signed the Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention since Nov. 7
1071 Iran signed the Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention since Dec. 17, 1975. 
1072 Marc A. Ross, Comment, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Combat 
Intentional Destruction of t
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In addi
ention because Kuwait, to date, is not a party to this Convention. The importance of 
the natural and cultural heritage of non-member States could be recognized by revision of 
the languag ce 
regardless o
Furt al heritage involves 
two States o atural heritage 
is threatene ticle 6 (3) 
does not ap tes 
that  
, 
 The 
same result should have followed in Iraq also, where Saddam Hussein, in order to combat 
tion, military operations during the war impacted marine biological systems, and 
other natural sites of beauty.1073 Nevertheless, the State of Kuwait, which was subject to a 
considerable destruction to its cultural and natural heritage, such as the Seif Palace and 
the national and the scientific Museums of Kuwait, has no protection under the 
Conv
e of the Convention, thus protecting areas of international importan
f any single nation’s internal political situation. 
hermore, as long as the protection of the cultural and natur
r more, Article 6 (3) is concerned. But where the cultural and n
d in an internal armed conflict within the territory of one nation, Ar
ply. However, internal armed conflicts are subject to Article 4, which sta
 
“[e]ach State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of 
ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation 
and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural 
heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its 
territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to 
this end, to the utmost of its own resources and, where 
appropriate, with any international assistance and co-operation, in 
particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it 
may be able to obtain.”1074 
 
Thus, Article 4 imposes a duty on each State to protect and conserve cultural and 
natural heritage situated in its territory.1075 This duty requires national authorities to 
refrain from causing any damage to the natural and cultural heritage defined by this 
convention. Thus, when the Iraqi Republican Guards damaged holy places in South Iraq
Najaf and Karbala, the Convention should have had full application under Article 4.
op ents in South Iraq, drained the Southern marshes, and destroyed the unique culture pon
                                                          
1073Id. 
1074 Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention, supra note (1064) art. 4. 
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of the Marsh Arabs,1076 which affected the marine ecological life in Southern Iraq and th
Gulf in which these waters end. Similarly, the Convention should have applied when, in
e 
 
March 2001, Taliban authorities in Afghanistan destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan, a 
ead calls for improving the protection of the 
cultura
 
10) The ents 
cultural monument that reflected Afghan cultural property.1077 Moreover, the destruction 
of the Buddhas of Bamiyan led to widespr
l heritage. The Director General of UNESCO described such act as “a crime 
against the common heritage of humanity” and various calls have been made to adopt a 
new legal convention to ensure the prevention of such crimes and their punishment.1078
 
 United Nations Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movem
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
 
The Basel Convention was adopted by 116 member States of the United Na
on March 22, 1989,1079 in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Convention is a 
comprehensive effor
tions 
t to limit waste transportation across boundaries of U.N. member 
States a  
eps to 
tive way of protecting human health and 
                  
nd to promote disposal of hazardous waste in an “environmentally sound
manner.”  
Article 2 (8) of the Convention provides that the “[e]nvironmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes or other wastes means taking all practicable st
ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will 
protect human health and the environment against adverse effects which may result 
from such wastes.” 
Moreover, the third and the seventeenth paragraphs of the Convention’s 
preamble requires the reduction of hazardous waste generation, by stating that the 
parties are “[m]indful also that the most effec
                                                                                                                                                           
jurisdiction. 
1076 Ambassador David J. Scheffer, The International Criminal Tribunal Foreword: Deterrence of War 
Crimes in the 21st Century, 23 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 1, 8 (1999). 
1077 UNESCO, Afghanistan Crisis, <http://www.unesco.org>(last visit March 12, 2001). 
1075 On the other hand, Article 4 can be extended to apply to sites in other States. However, it aims at 
protecting and conserving cultural and natural heritage whether within a State or outside its national 
1078 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Protection of the Cultural Heritage: 
Acts Constituting “A Crime Against the Common Heritage of Humanity”, 162nd  Sess., 162 EX/14 Paris, 
2001, Item 3.5.1 of the Provisional Agenda. 
1079 The United Nations Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. 
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the environment from the danger posed by such wastes is the reduction of their 
generation to a minimum in terms of quantity and/or hazard potential,” and “[a]ware of 
the nee y sound 
um the generation of hazardous wastes and 
other wastes.” Therefore, the Basel Convention tries to minimize the problem at its 
source befo
Each gislation to 
assure comp s waste 
generation i  the economic, technological, and social forces in 
each State.1
The  
transbounda  dangers. 
Article 4 (9) of the convention states that:  
 
ore, Article 10 calls for international cooperation in the reduction of 
waste g ate in 
 
practice,1082 observing hazardous waste management impacts on human health and the 
               
d to continue the development and implementation of environmentall
low-waste technologies, recycling options, good house-keeping and management 
systems with a view to reducing to a minim
re severe environmental effects. 
 contracting party to the convention must implement national le
liance with the convention’s provisions and to assure that hazardou
s minimized according to
080 
 Basel Convention further identifies the conditions under which
ry movement of hazardous waste is allowable, in order to limit its
Parties shall take the appropriate measures to ensure that the 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste only be allowed if: 
(a)The State of export does not have the technical capacity and 
the necessary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites in order 
to dispose of the wastes in question in an environmentally sound 
and efficient manner; or 
(b)The wastes in question are required as a raw material for 
recycling or recovery industries in the State of import; or 
(c)The transboundary movement in question is in accordance 
with other criteria which do not differ from the objectives of this 
Convention. 
 
 
Furtherm
eneration and transport.1081 Significantly, parties are required to cooper
making information available for the harmonization of technical standards and codes of
                                           
1080 Id., art. 4 para. 2 (a) 
1081 Id., art. 10. 
1082 Id., art. 10 para. 2 (a), (e).  
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environment,1083and developing, implementing, and transferring new low-waste 
technologies1084 for the benefit of developing States.1085 Thus, Article 10 clearly urges 
membe n. 
 under 
amage 
resulting from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes and other 
d. 
 can be argued that the liability for any damage resulting from the 
transbo
1088
r States to use their national laws to advance environmental protectio
Remarkably, the Basel Convention does not include a liability provision
which parties could be held liable for hazardous waste transport in violation of the 
convention.1086 
The convention states that parties will adopt guidelines which “set out 
appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation for d
wastes.”1087 However, a liability protocol for the convention has not yet been adopte
tI
undary transportation of hazardous waste should rest upon the State of 
export.  According to customary international law,1089the State of export is “liable 
regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying act.”1090 That customary law could apply 
equally to military operations, so that an exporting State could be held liable for any 
harmful act with regard to a transboundary transportation of hazardous waste. 
 
11) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and 
Aircraft 
 
State parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,  “pledge themselves to take all possible steps to
prevent the pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create hazards to human 
health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere 
1091  
                                                          
1083 Id., art. 10 para. 2 (b). 
ention, supra note (1079) art. 12. 
ility theory is examined in Galli, Hazardous Exports to the Third World: The Need to 
on the Prevention of the Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb. 15, 
 Harald Hohmann, Basic Documents of International 
tal Law Vol. 2, 886 (Graham & Trotman, 1992). 
1084 Id., art. 10 para. 2 (c), (d). 
1085 Id., art. 10 para. 3. 
1086 Straske II, supra note (1169) at 200. 
1087 Basel Conv
1088 A State liab
Abolish the Double Standard, 12 Colum. J. Envt’l L. 71, 82-84 (1987). 
1089 Id., at 82. 
1090 Id., at 83. 
1091 Convention 
1972, reprinted in
Environmen
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with other legitimate uses of the sea.”  Accordingly, substantive action is required by 
member States to prevent serious pollution caused by dumping substances into the 
marine environment. Marine pollution is considered serious when it threatens hum
health or aquatic life, or interferes with the legitimate use of the sea. The Prevention of 
Marine Pollution Con
1092
an 
vention establishes levels of hazardous substances. It divides 
azardous substances into two categories: the first category is completely prohibited 
n 
permission.1093  The Convention does not exclude governmental ships or aircrafts from 
its applic ovisions 
a e 
s
in
re  of the 
contamination sites.  
 
12) Principl laration
h
from being dumped. The second one includes substances that can be dumped only upo
ation;1094 thus it also applies to military vessels. Nevertheless, such pr
re waived “in case of force major due to stress of weather or any other cause when th
afety of human life or of a ship or aircraft is threatened,”1095 which frequently occurs 
 times of armed conflicts. To give the Convention full application, therefore, State 
sponsibility should be raised in these circumstances, or at least for the cleanup
e 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Dec  
 
Th
Stockholm ,  adopted a Declaration to protect the environment. 
The Stockholm Declaration as a written document is considered a soft law instrument. 
Howev
                                                          
e United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
 on June 16, 1972 1096
er, Principle 21 has been accepted internationally as a part of the hard law.1097 
It requires nations not to harm another nation’s environment, by stating that:  
 
1092 Id., art. 1. 
1093 Id., arts. 5-7. 
1094 Id., art. 15. 
1095 Id., art. 8. 
1096 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822). 
1097 It is necessary to refer to the Trail Smelter Arbitration a well known international law case addressing 
transboundary pollution. There, U.S. farmers suffered injury from sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from a 
Canadian smelter, they were prevented from recurring to U.S. courts because of jurisdictional difficulties. 
One of these difficulties was that the alleged conduct occurred in Canada beyond the U.S. borders. 
Accordingly, U.S. and Canada negotiate a treaty in which Canada beared the responsibility for damages, 
and both parties created an arbitration tribunal to settle such dispute. Where arbitrators decided that “under
the principles of International law,…no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another, or properties or persons therein when 
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” See, 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, (U.S. v. Can.), (1941), 3 U.N. R.I.A.A 1938 (1949). See also,  Lakshman D. 
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 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
nterference from 
another nation, to capitalize on its resources. However, this right is restricted by a 
state’s ma d not to 
allow terri es a legal 
basis for a l 
pollution. nd 687, 
held Iraq l
onsequently, Principle 21 is generally accepted to be a restatement of a 
general
ities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
                                                                                                                                                                          
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other states or of areas beyond the limit of national 
jurisdiction.1098  
 
Principle 21 recognizes the right of each State, without any i
ndatory responsibility not to harm another nation’s environment, an
tories under their jurisdiction to do so.1099 Principle 21 provid
ddressing a State’s responsibility for transboundary environmenta
Under this Principle, the Security Council, in its Resolutions 686 a
iable for environmental damage. 
C
 principle of international law. General principles are binding on all States.1100 
The US agrees that it should be bound by this principle.1101  
Similarly, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration1102 states that: 
 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activ
   
Guruswamy et al. Eds., International Environmental Law and World Order, A 
nafter Guruswamy et al. Eds.]. 
1102
Problem-Oriented Coursebook 341 (1999) [herei
) Principle 21. 1098 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822
1099 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 132. 
1100 In Trail Smelter Arbitration, the general principle adopted by the arbitration tribunal, in deciding that 
any States shall avoid causing transboundary environmental harm to another State, have become one of a 
State’s international responsibility standard. 
1101 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations, adopted by the American Law Institute reaffirms the U.S. 
international obligation under Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in Section 601 (1)(a) in 
articulating that a State has to conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for 
preventing, and minimizing harm to another State’s environment. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, adopted by the American Law Institute, May 14, 1987 [hereinafter 
Restatement Third]. 
 Rio Declaration, supra note (683) Principle 2. 
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to the environment of other states 
1103
or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.  
 
e,  
r II.  
g
Principle 2 is intended to apply both in times of armed conflict and peacetim
as indicated by the fact that the Rio Declaration was adopted in 1992, under the 
pressure of the environmental damage caused by Iraqi soldiers in Gulf Wa
Principle 21 and Principle 2 make it clear that States are responsible for acts 
committed on their territories, or under their jurisdiction, that harm the environment 
including the environment of other States. Accordingly, nations can be held 
responsible under those Principles for any environmental dama e caused by such 
activities. 
 
13) International Organizations’ Resolutions 
 
International organizations can adopt binding resolutions, hard law
their main organs. For instance, by virtue of the power explicitly authorized by the 
Charter to the Security Council,1104 the latter has the right to adopt binding 
resolu
, through 
U.N. 
tions.1105 Thus, any violation of such resolutions also amounts to a violation to the 
Charter itse emanded 
that Iraq pro hemical 
or biologica acilitate 
the mission olution is 
onsidered t o ard law. In addition, the Security Council 
Resolu 1107 n, 
Nevertheless, although the U.N. General Assembly is vested with 
mendatory powers, it can still adopt resolutions that are binding on member 
lf, which granted such power. For example, Resolution 686/1991 d
vide all information and assistance to the U.N. in identifying any c
l weapons in Kuwait, Iraq, and the adjacent waters,1106 in order to f
 of protecting and rehabilitating the environment. That Res
mandatory, i.e., an instrumen f hc
tion 687/1991  placed responsibility on Iraq for environmental degradatio
another example of a binding resolution.1108 
recom
                                                          
1103 Id. 
1104 “1. There are established as the principle organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security 
ic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and 
91). 
Council, an Econom
Secretariat.” U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 7 (1). 
1105 Id., arts. 39-51. 
1106 U.N. Security Council Resolution 686, para. 3(d), Mar. 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 568 (19
1107 S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559) para. 16. 
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States and authorized by the Charter. However, in an advisory opinion, the ICJ dec
that  
[…]the func
lared 
tion and powers conferred by the Charter on the 
 that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with 
recomm om adopting in specific cases within the 
 determinations or have operative 
design.
. 
l 
e 
 aims 
er, 
ry Air Pollution, The 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Convention on the Environmental Impact 
                                                                                                                                                                            
General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, 
the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they 
are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with ‘decisions’ of the 
General Assembly ‘on important questions.’ These ‘decisions’ do 
indeed include certain recommendations, but others have 
dispositive force and effect.1109    
 
Similarly, in another advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that “it would not be 
correct to assume
endatory powers, it is debarred fr
framework of its competence, resolutions which make
1110”  
This authority under the U.N. Charter is similar to that of the European Union
According to Article 14 paragraph three of the Treaty Establishing the European Coa
and Steel Community of 1951, “[r]ecommendations shall be binding as to the aims to b
pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate methods for achieving these
to those to whom the recommendations are addressed.”1111 Thus, as a policy matt
recommendations of the Community’s High Authority are legally binding according to 
the treaty itself. 
 
b. International Regional Hard Law Instruments 
Regional hard law instruments that have provisions applicable in times of armed 
conflict include: The Convention on Long-Range Transbounda
 
1108 Iraq’ International responsibility will be discussed in the final part of the thesis.  
1109 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (1962), 
1962 WL 4 (ICJ). 
 The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, U.N.T.S., Vol. 261, 
at 141. 
s 
1110 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 50 
(1971), 1971 WL 8 (I.C.J.). 
1111
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Assessment in a Transboundary Context, The Kuwait Regional Convention for 
Cooper
 the 
ation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution and its 
Protocols, The Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources, the Regional Convention for the Conservation of
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, and the Bamako Convention on the Ban of 
Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of 
Hazardous Wastes within Africa. We will also look at the General Policies and Principles 
of Environmental Protection in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
 
 
 
 
1) The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979,  
negotiated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), app
only to European States, in addition to Canada and Russia, while considering that 
atmospheric pollution is capable of affecting areas far beyond the European continen
The Convention defines “air pollution” broadly, as any introduction by man into the air
whether direct or indirect, of substances or energy which may result in degradation of
environment and cause harm to humans, living resources, and material property or 
interfere with legitimate use of the environment.  “Long-range” air pollution is def
by the convention as air pollution that originates within, wholly or in part, the jurisd
of one State and results in adverse effects within the jurisdicti
1112
lies 
t.1113 
, 
 the 
ined 
iction 
on of another.1115 The 
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention aims at limiting, reducing and preventing air 
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution 
                     
1114
pollution, both local and long range.1116 To this end, the convention requires the 
Contracting Parties to “protect man and his environment against air pollution [and] 
endeavor to 
                                     
n on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter 
 Air Pollution Convention]. 
1112 Conventio
Transboundary
1113 Id., pmbl. 
1114 Id., art 1, para. (a). 
1115 Id., art 1 para. (b). 
1116 Id., art 2. 
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includi
of 
ol Concerning the 
Contro  
on.”1121 Thus, the Convention 
actively seeks to promote exchange of information as part of the EIA. 
Russia, it may be inconsistent with 
Princip  
ental 
limited
g 
ng long-range transboundary air pollution.”1117 As the concept of exchange of 
information has gained recognition in international practice, the Transboundary Air 
Pollution Convention promotes cooperation among member States in the exchange 
information, research and monitoring, and the development of policies to combat air 
pollution.1118 For example the Contracting Parties concluded the Protoc
l of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Fluxes,1119 which aims at reducing
nitrogen oxides (NO) emissions from major stationary and mobile sources such as 
combustion plants, gas turbines, and motorized vehicles.1120  
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Convention requires member States to exchange 
available information, including “major changes in national policies and in general 
industrial development, and their potential impact, which would be likely to cause 
significant changes in long-range transboundary air polluti
As the Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and its Protocols bind only 
uropean signatories, in addition to Canada and E
le 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which prohibits all nations from causing
damage to the environment of other States. Principle 21 recognizes that environm
harm does not respect any international borders, and that worldwide cooperation is 
necessary to address that problem. The Transboundary Convention being much more 
, can have only a limited impact on such pollution. 
 
2) The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Makin
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
 
The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision 
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Åarhus Convention) of 
                                                          
1117 Id., art 2. 
1118 Id., art 3. 
1119 The Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, 
Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212. 
r Pollution Convention, supra note (1112) art 8 (b). 
1120 Id., Technical Annex I, para. 4, at 222. 
1121 Transboundary Ai
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1998  is an important treaty negotiated by the UN/ECE that combines NEPA-like 
EIA with Freedom of Information Act (F
1122
OIA) and judicial review requirements.1123  
e 
 
er to provide for a complete environmental awareness among 
citizens
tion, 
nmental 
 but the signatories 
affirme a, on 
ation 
ny immediate threat to human health or the 
environ
 
                                                          
According to the Åarhus Convention, information shall be made available to th
“public,” which is defined as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance 
with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups.”1124
Thus, if there is any imminent threat to human health or the environment all the 
information that could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm 
must be made available.1125 The public “shall” participate in environmental decision-
making processes in ord
. And finally, members of the public are granted the right to seek judicial review 
of decisions affecting the environment. 
The Åarhus Convention is consistent with Principle 10 of the Rio Declara
which provides for public participation in decision-making processes in enviro
matters, access to information concerning the environment, and effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings. Åarhus Convention was signed by thirty-nine 
States and the European Community (EC).1126 It is not yet in force,
d their support for it in their first meeting in Chisinau, Republic of Moldov
April 19-20, 1999.1127  
The Convention safeguards the right of citizens to request access to inform
on the environment “without an interest having to be stated.”1128 Contracting Parties 
shall ensure that: “[I]n the event of a
ment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all 
information which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm
1122 Åarhus Convention was discussed briefly in Part Two. 
(2000) [hereinafter Robinson, International Environmental 
 Access to Environmental Information: Delimitation of A Right, 13 Tul. Envt’l 
>, (last visit May 15, 2001). 
1123 Nicholas A. Robinson, International Environmental Legal Trends: Factors Shaping the Practice of 
Environmental Law, SF25 ALI-ABA 527, 532 
Legal Trends]. 
1124 Åarhus Convention, supra note (867) art. 2 (4). 
1125 Id., art. 5 (1) (c). 
1126 Maria Gavouneli,
L.J. 303, 317 (2000) [hereinafter Gavouneli]. 
1127 See, U.N. ECE, “Environment for Europe” Process, available at 
<http://www.unece.org/env/europe/homepage.htm
1128 Åarhus Convention, supra note (867) art. 4 (1) (a), (b). 
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arising from the threat and is held by a public authority is disseminated immediately an
without delay to members of the public who may be affected.”
d 
 
 effect, the Council Directive 90/313/EEC includes a vague list of exceptions 
ng, 
entiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international 
relation
 
lic 
y and 
1129 
However, since the general format of the Åarhus Convention follows the 
Council Directive 90/313 EEC on access to information relating to the environment,1130
The Convention exempts armed forces of the Contracting Parties from providing 
information to the public regarding their activities even if such activities may cause 
significant environmental impacts. 
In
that allow the Contracting Parties to refuse a request for public information affecti
for example, “the confid
s and national defense, public security […].”1131 In light of those exceptions, 
military authorities can refuse requests for information disclosure. This situation also
applies to Åarhus Convention, which reflects the Council Directive 90/313. 
The Åarhus Convention’s provisions are strong insofar as they permit the pub
free access to information and participation in the decision-making process. However, 
since the Convention exempts military authorities, for reasons of public securit
national defense, from its provisions, the environmental protection provided by the 
Convention is so far only limited effectiveness. 
 
3) The Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context 
The Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context of 1991,  negotiate
 
d by the UN/ECE, applies only in Europe, the United 
States a try’s 
 
 
                                                          
1132
nd Canada. It addresses problems that arise from the effect of one coun
activities on the environment of a neighboring country. This convention enumerates
seventeen activities that have potential environmental impact outside the territory of the
0/313/CEE sur 
e Commun 866, 866 (1991). 
on on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, February 25, 
 I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Environmental Impact Assessment Convention]. 
1129 Id., art. 5 (1) (c). 
1130 Directive 90/313, JO 1990, No. L 158, at 56, cited in Ludwing Krämer, La Directive 9
l’Access a l’Information en Matiere d’Environment: Genese et Perspectives d’Application, Rev. du 
March
1131 Council Directive 90/313/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56, art. 3 (2). 
1132 The Conventi
1991, 30
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source 
non-
ctivities, it necessarily has application to those activities, since even in 
peacetime, military bases and installations generate tons of toxic materials, and store 
s the contracting parties to prevent and control 
environ
tal Impact Assessment Convention applies only to Europe, the U.S., and 
Canada
State,1133 including, “nuclear power plants and storage facilities; major 
installations for the initial smelting of cast-iron and steel and for the production of 
ferrous metals; integrated chemical installations; large-diameter oil and gas pipeline; 
and waste disposal installations for the incineration, chemical treatment, or landfill of 
toxic and dangerous wastes[.]”1134 Although the Convention does not expressly address 
military a
nuclear weapons and agents.  
he convention requireT
mental damage resulting from activities that have transboundary effects by 
preparing EIA1135 and notifying any party that could be affected by such activities.1136  
This Convention is also consistent with Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration, which requires nations not to harm other nations’ environment while 
conducting activities that have extraterritorial environmental impact, or outside their 
national jurisdiction. Principle 21 is not limited to a specific region or continent, while 
the Environmen
. 
 
4) Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution  
 
The Arabian Gulf is one of the world's most vulnerable and fragile ecosystems, 
since it r s waters are shallow, it is virtually landlocked, and it receives almost no rain o
fresh water. There is very little flushing in the Gulf; therefore, pollution is not easily 
dissipated.1137 Because of the vulnerable nature of this marine environment, the states of 
the region1138 concluded a regional convention dealing with the Gulf water protection. 
                                                          
1133 Jonathan S. Jemison, The Emerging of International Environmental Law, 195-Feb. N. J. L. 25, 26 
, 
, 2000) 
1138 Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. 
(1999). 
1134 Environmental Impact Assessment Convention, supra note (1132) Appendix I. See, Id., fn. 24. 
1135 Id., art 2 (2). 
1136 Id., 
1137 Computer Technology and Communication Department at Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, available at <http://www.kisr.edu.kw/>, (visited April 13
[hereinafter KISR]. 
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The convention was concluded at Kuwait on April 24, 1978, and entered into force on 
June 30, 1979. 
The Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Pollution1139 is a regional convention that binds the Gulf 
States, 
on 
ember States to take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, and combat 
pollutio rces, 
f 
nally 
s.1143 
of its 
diction which may be established in conformity with international 
law.”11
                                                          
which are: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. This convention applies in peacetime as well as in times of 
war.1140 
Articles III (a), IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the Kuwait Regional Conventi
require m
n of the marine environment.1141 Under those provisions, the Iraqi armed fo
during their occupation of Kuwait, violated the Convention by engaging in a number o
military activities that harmed the marine environment. For example, Iraq intentio
polluted the marine environment of the Gulf by spilling millions of barrels of Kuwaiti 
crude oil into the Gulf,1142 and mining the Gulf with thousands of explosive device
These operations violated the Convention because they polluted the Gulf water, and 
killed the marine life. 
Moreover, Article XV appears to provide a basis for broad application of the 
Convention. Under Article XV, “[n]othing in the present convention shall prejudice or 
affect the rights or claims of any contracting State in regard to the nature or extent 
maritime juris
44 
However, notwithstanding the clear language of the Convention, it was not 
applied to address the marine environmental harm caused during the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. One major raison for that result is that the signatory nations have widely 
divergent political relations with the Iraqi government, and thus were unable to arrive at 
a consensus, despite the Regional Convention. The United Nations Compensation 
1139 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
te (1139) art. III (a), IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII. 
a note (549) at 327. 
onvention, supra note (1139) art. XV. 
Pollution, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 [hereinafter Kuwait Regional Convention]. 
1140 Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 195. 
1141 Kuwait Regional Convention, supra no
1142 Ross, Environmental Warfare, supra note (1072) at 516. 
1143 Malallah, supr
1144 Kuwait Regional C
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Committee, involving nations outside the Gulf Region, has proven to be more affected 
mechanism for assessing responsibility.   
n 
sputes can be established by the 
Counci
ntion. 
cy, (2) Protocol on the Protection 
of Mar l 
an 
f the potential environmental impact of any proposed activity or project 
within its territory, particularly in the coastal areas. 
tes 
cretariat, develop procedures for disseminating of 
informa
ther 
wait Regional Convention, the marine 
environ 1147 ould 
s to 
the marine environment and practicable ways to prevent them, and to study the integrated 
Under the Regional Convention, disputes between member States may be settled 
through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice.1145 Otherwise, a
ad hoc Judicial Commission for the Settlement of Di
l.1146  
To update and increase the member States’ cooperation in the field of 
environmental protection, a number of protocols have been annexed to the Conve
These Protocols are: (1) Protocol of Regional Cooperation to Combat Pollution by Oil 
and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of an Emergen
ine Environment from Pollution Derived from Land-Based Sources, (3) Protoco
on the Control of Marine Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, and (4) Protocol Relative to the Marine Pollution Caused from Exploring and 
Exploiting the Continental Shelf. 
Article XI (a) of the Convention provides that each member State shall include 
assessment o
Moreover, Article XI (b) of the Convention states that “[t]he Contracting Sta
may, in consultation with the se
tion of the assessment of the activities referred to in paragraph (a).” That 
information would allow each contracting party to monitor the marine projects of o
parties that may have potential environmental impact. 
However, despite the signing of the Ku
ment of the Gulf has yet to be accurately assessed.  The Gulf States sh
strengthen their environmental laws and standards, conduct research to identify threat
                                                          
1145 Id., art. XXV (a). 
1146 Id., art. XVIII (b). 
he 
nmental Law in the Arab World, at 9, May 30, 
 Robinson, Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law]. 
1147 Nicholas A. Robinson, Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law (ARCEL) in Cooperation with t
Commission on Environmental Law (CEL) International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN); Project Proposals: Strengthening Enviro
2001 [hereinafter
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coastal zone management (ICZM) laws, EIA laws, and pollution control laws of other 
regions.1148 
 
5) The Asso on of ciation of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservati
Nature and Natural Resources 
985, the member States
 
In 1  of ASEAN signed this Agreement in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia,11 uture 
generations ending, many 
wars have t
rticle 10 of the convention declares that member States should prevent 
environ
prevent 
 generally accepted 
principles of international law the responsibility of ensuring that 
activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
 other Contracting Parties or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.  
                                
49 recognize the importance of natural resources for present and f
. The convention is not yet in force; however, while it was p
aken place in the ASEAN region. 
A
mental degradation.1150 Article 11 defines the environmental harm caused by 
discharges or emissions of pollutants and encourages the contracting parties to 
and reduce such discharges.1151 More significant, however, Article 20 (1)(2) states that: 
1. Contracting Parties have in accordance with
to the environment or the natural resources under the jurisdiction 
of
2. In order to fulfill this responsibility, Contracting Parties shall 
avoid to the maximum extent possible and reduce to the 
minimum extent possible adverse environmental effects of 
activities under their jurisdiction or control, including effects on 
natural resources, beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.  
 
This Article reflect Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which prohibits 
each State from harming another nation’s environment. Although the ASEAN 
Agreement does not specifically address environmental harm caused by armed conflict, 
its provisions are broad enough to encompass such harm. 
 
                          
85, available at <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/asean.natural.resources.1985html.>, 
1148 Id., at 9. 
1149 The Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, July 9, 19
(last visit March 1, 2001) [hereinafter ASEAN Agreement]. 
1150 Id., art. 10. 
1151 Id., art. 11. 
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6) Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
Environment 
 
The Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
Environment1152 was concluded by some of the Arab States situated adjacent to the Re
Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Yemen
and Somali. However, some other neighboring States are not parties to this convention, 
including Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, and Israel.
d 
, 
d 
 doubt that these armed conflicts affect the environment of this region. 
But thi
on, 
 
nt industry, which 
has cau
intly, 
1153 The region has witnessed a number of 
armed conflicts among neighboring States, from the Egypt-Saudi conflict of 1960s, an
the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in 1990s, to the Arab-Israeli conflict which is still taking 
place. There is no
s convention does not respond to such needs.  
The member States acknowledge, in the Preamble, the unique ecological 
characteristics of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the particular vulnerability of its 
coral reefs where most biota exist.1154 The Preamble asserts that all States of the regi
not only member States, have the responsibility of the protection of the Gulf of Aden 
and the Red Sea.1155 In addition, the Preamble links industrial development and the
environment, by requiring that such development should not adversely affect the marine 
environment, living resources, and human health.1156 This text can be interpreted as the 
legal basis to reduce and eliminate the development of the armame
sed severe environmental effects on this body of water in peacetime and times of 
armed conflicts.  
Article III (1) declares that “[t]he Contracting Parties shall, individually or jo
take all appropriate measures, in accordance with the present Convention and those 
protocols in force to which they are party, for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden environment including the prevention, abatement and combating of marine 
                                                          
1152 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, August
1985, available at <http://cedac.ciesin.org.>, (last visit February 15, 2001) [hereinafter Red Sea and G
Aden Convention]. 
 20, 
ulf of 
1153 According to Article XXVI of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Convention Israel cannot adhere to the 
membership of this convention, which states that “Any State member of the Arab League has the right to 
resent Convention and its protocols.” Id., art. XXVI. 
bl. 
accede to the p
1154 Id., pm
1155 Id. 
1156 Id. 
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pollution.” It requires the Contracting Parties to take all the appropriate measures for the 
conservation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden environment.1157 Consequen
military activities that affect the marine environment of the region, including peacetime 
operations, should be eliminated. Similarly, military operations during armed conflicts 
that harm the environment of the region
tly, 
 should be prevented too.  
 
 of 
ned by the 
 of the generally recognized 
international rules that are relevant to the control of the marine pollution. The Convention 
t should 
be 
places serious limits on the effectiveness of the Convention in protecting the marine 
Moreover, this convention can be considered a legal basis to prevent the dumping 
of military wastes in the region. For instance, Article V of the Convention states that 
“[t]he Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and 
combat pollution in the Sea Area caused by dumping of wastes and other matter from
ships and aircraft, and shall ensure effective compliance in the Sea Area with generally 
recognized international rules relating to the control of this type of pollution as provided 
for in relevant international conventions.” The Contracting States intended to prevent 
such dumping whether conducted by their national authorities or by non-contracting 
parties, as indicated by the language of Article V, which provides that “dumping
wastes and other matter from ships and aircraft” which are not necessarily ow
Contracting Parties only, and from the illustration
also prohibits discharges from land-based sources.1158 It sets forth procedures tha
e follow in cases of emergencies.1159 b
Finally, Article VIV (1) of the Convention declares that “[w]arships and other 
ships owned or operated by States, only on government non-commercial service shall 
exempted from the application of the provisions of this convention.”1160 This provision 
                                                          
1157 Id., art. III (1). 
1158 “The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution 
caused by discharges from land reaching internal waters and the Sea Area whether water-borne, airborne or 
 
 
t, any Contracting 
cted by such emergency. 3. The Contracting Parties shall co-ordinate their national 
lution in the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances in a manner 
rt. XIV (1). 
directly from the coast including outfalls and pipelines.” Id., art. VI. 
1159 “1. The Contracting Parties shall, individually or jointly, take all necessary measures, including those to 
ensure that adequate equipment and qualified personnel are readily available, to deal with pollution 
emergencies in the Sea Area, whatever the cause of such emergencies, and to reduce or eliminate damage
resulting therefrom. 2. Any Contracting Party which becomes aware of any pollution emergency in the Sea
Area shall without delay, notify the Organization, and through the General Secretaria
Party likely to be affe
plans for combating pol
that facilitates full co-operation in dealing with pollution emergencies.” Id., art. IX. 
1160 Id., a
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environment of the region. However, Article XIV (2) states that “Contracting Party sh
as far as possible, ensure that its warships or other ships owned or operated by that Pa
and used only on government non-commercial s
all, 
rty, 
ervice, shall comply with the provisions 
of the present Convention.”1161 Thus, although the Convention specifically exempts 
military and other governmental vessels, it urges member States to take on that 
responsibility as well, and can serve as a basis for affixing legal liability for 
environmental damage caused by those vessels.  
 
7) The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa 
sequence of the exploitation of the African countries as dumping grounds 
for haz s 
ntal racism on a global scale,”1162 the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into 
Africa and azardous 
Wastes with
This except South 
Africa and M ardous 
wastes, incl ir 
maritime zo d liability 
as well as jo aste generation.”  Nevertheless, the 
multiple civil wars in the region have in fact contaminated the marine environment as a 
 
As a con
ardous wastes generated by developed countries, which has been described a
“environmental injustice or environme
the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of H
in Africa, on January 29, 1991.1163 
 regional agreement was entered into by every African country 
orocco.1164 The Bamako Convention prohibits all dumping of haz
uding radioactive wastes at sea by the Contracting Parties within the
nes.1165 The Contracting Parties agreed to impose “strict, unlimite
int and several liability on hazardous w 1166
                                                          
1161 Id., art. XIV (2). 
1162 H. R. Marbury, Global Environmental Racism, 28 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 251, 293 
nuary 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 
ko Convention]. 
(1995). 
1163 The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Ja
[hereinafter The Bama
1164 Peter Montague, Philadelphia dumps on the poor, 595 Rachel’s Envt’l & Health Wkly., Apr. 
23, 1998 available at <http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/index.cfm?issue_ID=522> (last visit Sept. 3, 2001).  
1165 The Bamako Convention, supra note (1163) arts. 2 (2), 4 (2). 
1166 Id., art. 2 (3) (b). 
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result o
t and implement the preventive, 
nd 
destruc after 
attacking or destroying natural resources. 
The Bamako Convention was designed to supplement and improve upon the 
United Nations Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
f the dumping of toxic materials in the sea from warships, aircraft, and 
landmines.1167 
The Bamako Convention is the first agreement to adopt the “precautionary 
approach.” Article 4 (3)(f), states that 
 
Each party shall strive to adop
precautionary approach to pollution problems which entails, inter 
alia, preventing the release into the environment of substances 
which may cause harm to humans or the environment without 
waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm. The parties shall 
cooperate with each other in taking the appropriate measures to 
implement the precautionary principle to pollution prevention 
through the application of clean production methods, rather than 
the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on 
assimilative capacity assumptions.1168 
 
The precautionary principle is one of the environmental law principles that exte
beyond the mechanisms existing in prior international instruments.1169 As applied to 
environmental damage caused by warfare, the principle would deter environmental 
tion during armed conflicts, rather than simply providing for a remedial plan 
such destruction. For example, that principle would require armed forces to avoid 
                                                          
1167 See in general, Howard S. Kaminsky, Assessment of the Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import Int
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 
5 Geo. Intl Envt’l L. Rev. 77 (1992) [hereinafter Kaminsky].  
1168 The Bamako Convention, supra note (1163) art. 4 (3) (f). 
1169 The precautionary principle has also bees recognized and implemented in the European Community
(EC). The EC adopted a Council Directive on Supervision and Control of the Transfrontier Shipment of 
Hazardous Waste in 1984. It was the multinational effort to outline the problems of transfrontier shipme
of hazardous waste. The Directive states in Article 1 that “[m]ember States shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Directive, take the necessary measures for the supervision and control, with a view to the 
protection of human health and the environment, of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste both 
within the Community and on its entering and/or leaving the Community.” This Article addresses the goal 
of the Directive to implement a program to monitor hazardous waste shipments across the Contracting 
Parties boundaries. See, Council Directive 48/631/EEC was adop
o 
 
nt 
ted on Dec. 6, 1984. 27 O.J.EUR. COMM. 
 Council Directive 86/279/EEC were adopted on June 12, 1986. 
86); Stephen B. Straske II, The United Nations Basel Convention 
ent of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal: A Comparison with 
ion for a Liability Protocol, III Geo. Int’l. 
ereinafter Straske II]. 
(No. L 326) 31 (1984). Its Amendments in
29 O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L 181) 13 (19
on the Control of Transboundary Movem
the European Community Directives and A Recommendat
Envt’l L. Rev. 183, 185-186 (1990) [h
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Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.1170 That Convention was unanimously adopted by 
116 member States of the United Nations in 1992.1171 The Convention’s signatories 
include most of the industrialized countries as well as many developing countries, but 
e Convention calls for the environmentally sound management of hazardous 
wastes.
lth and the 
 
illegal to ex ort toxic waste to Africa,  and it criminalizes acts of importing wastes by 
any African nation.1176 
 
8) General peration 
remarkably, it includes one African State, Nigeria.1172 
hT
 It calls upon its signatories to “take all practical steps to ensure that hazardous 
wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human hea
environment against adverse effects which may result from such wastes.”1173  
The Bamako Convention is an attempt to redress the weakness of the Basel 
Convention which was remarked by the OAU.1174 For example, the Convention makes it
1175p
Policies and Principles of Environmental Protection in the Gulf Coo
Council  
 
The r states to 
coordinate t
coordinatio cularly the 
protection of the Gulf marine environment. Oil pollution in the Gulf is about 3% of the 
global 
Beach oil, floating oil, and oil on coral reefs occur. High 
concentrations of heavy metals have been recorded in biota and 
 in fish in certain Gulf 
 principles of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) requires membe
heir policies to realize a better future through their unity.1177 This 
n of national policies includes environmental policies, parti
total, or 50 times the average elsewhere for a marine environment of its size.1178  
 
 
sediments. Recently reported arsenic levels
areas are among the highest recorded in literature. Coastal 
                                                          
1170 Basel Convention, infra note (1079).  
1171 Straske II, supra note (1169) fn. 15. 
insky, supra note (1167) at 78. 1172 Kam
1173 Basel Convention, supra note (1079) art. 2 para. (8). 
1174 Kaminsky, supra note (1167) at 77. 
1175 The Bamako Convention, supra note (1163) art. 4 (3)(i)(l)(r). 
1176 Id., art. 4 (1). 
1177 Nassib G. Ziade, Bahrain-Kuwait-Qatar-Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates: Charter Establishing 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Including Rules of Procedure and Unified Economic Agreement, 26 I.L.M. 
1131, 1138 (1987) [hereinafter GCC Policies and Principles]. 
1178 KISR, supra note (1137). 
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resources such as shrimp and fin-fisheries are being degraded by 
extensive dredging and associated sedimentation. Even the Gulf’s 
air is threatened by natural gas flaring and the burning of solid 
s 
lution,  particularly transboundary 
pollution.  
the Gulf region is such that an action by any Gulf State will 
affect other Gulf States. For instance, the release of about 1 million barrels of crude oil 
into the
 of the 
 an 
rm
                                                          
waste which contribute to both local and regional environmental 
problems associated with the long-range transportation of 
pollutants.1179  
 
To facilitate environmental cooperation in the region, the member states adopted 
in December 1, 1985, a number of general policies and principles.1180 These principle
include the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment for marine projects1181 
and a precautionary plan to prevent marine pol 1182
1183
The environment of 
 Gulf waters by the Iraqi invaders in 1990, polluted the entire Gulf region, 
requiring a coordinated response by all affected countries. The interconnectedness
region1184 was recognized by the Secretariat General of the GCC, which launched
Environmental Data Web Project among GCC members to facilitate the exchange of the 
environmental info ation electronically.1185 
 
1179
ational, 
l 
l 
d 
lization within one 
r 
umhitsfound=306&query=Kuwait%20su
=1580&docdb=pr1998&dbname=web&sorting=BYRELEVANCE&o
 Id. 
1180 W. E. Burhenne ed., International Environmental Soft Law, Environmental 
Protection: Collection of Relevan Documents 985:8905 (Kluwer Law Intern
1996) [hereinafter GCC General Policies and Principles of Environmental Protection]. 
1181 Principle 6 of the General Principles and Policies of GCC states “[t]o approve the proper environmenta
evaluation of projects to implement arrangements involving the evaluation of environmental impact as wel
as overall feasbility and to link the mechanisms for certifying such projects by the authorities responsible 
for environmental protection.” Principle 9 states, “to monitor the environmental effects of projects 
developed through external aid given by the GCC to other countries and to encourage these countries to 
implement impact assessment rules when planning and implementing these projects.” GCC Policies an
Principles, supra note (1177) Principles 6 & 9. 
1182 Principle 3 of the GCC Policies and Principles states, “[t]o develop clear plans to mitigate 
environmental problems and to aim at protecting the environment from pollution.” Id., Principle 3. 
1183  and activities of the  Principle 8 of the GCC Policies and Principles states, “[t]o co-ordinate the efforts
member states to minimize the negative impacts of project development and industria
state on its neighbors.” Id., Principle 8. 
1184 Tareq Al-Banai, Issues of Desertification, Drought, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Biodiversity are Majo
Concerns of Second Committee Members, United Nations Press Release GA/EF/2835, Oct. 23, 1998, 
<http://srchl.un.org:80/plweb-
w=unsearch&docrank=24&ncgi/fastweb?state_id=95546050&vie
ble%20development&&docidnstaina
perator=and&TemplateName=predoc.tmpl&setCookie=1> (visited Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter, Al-Banai]. 
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2. Soft 
d 
 difficult 
intain 
nte  
hus, soft international 
law can s, 
d 
O  have emerged as strong advocates for 
new so
les 
interests. Hybrid organizations, such as 
International Law 
The origin of the term “soft law” is attributed to Lord McNair.1186 It is recognize
as a significant element of public international law, and a very rich source for the 
environmental law. Soft law rules are not compulsory and do not bind any State. 
Nevertheless, they have legal significance,1187 although their legal power is often
to identify clearly.1188 Therefore, they have been described as “trouble makers”1189 since 
they are either not yet or not only law.1190 
The relatively short time period required to formulate soft law helps ma
equity and justice in i rnational law, because outmoded or unjust international norms
may be identified and addressed raised by soft law instruments. T
 respond easily to scientific and technological developments.1191 Since the 1950
and the emerging independence of many developing States, soft law has gained 
increasing importance. In part, that emergence of soft law rules results from the increase
diversity of the international community. New nations have often urged that existing 
international rules should be adapted according to the new composition of the 
international society.1192 More recently, NG ’s
ft law norms, and have influenced soft law development. 
Although States are the sole bodies that are capable of creating hard law rules, 
soft law rules can be created by NGO’s.1193 For instance, the International Law 
Association (ILA), or the Institute of International Law (IIL) can propose soft law ru
which do not necessarily coincide with State 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1185 Shaker Mohammed, Alwatan Kuwaiti Daily Journal, Apr. 11, 2000, available at 
<http://www.alwatan.com.kw/today/n12.html>.  
1186 Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 39, 
 Jemison, The Emerging of International Environmental Law, 195-
. 25, 28 (1999) [hereinafter Pollock & Jemison]. 
roit 
aw Making 78-79 (1984). 
187) at 28. 
106 (1987) [hereinafter Sloan]. 
1187 Jeffrey M. Pollock & Jonathan S.
Feb. N.J. Law
1188 Dupuy, supra note (830) at 420. 
1189 Id. 
1190 See Societe Francaise Pour Le Droit International, L’Elaboration Du D
International Public (1975); E. Micwhinney, United Nations L
1191 Pollock & Jemison, supra note (1
1192 Dupuy, supra note (830) at 421. 
1193 Id., at 423. 
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IUCN or ICRC, can adopt norms which are closer to soft law of the type characterize
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly.
d by 
he development of soft law rules in the environmental field can facilitate the 
 In particular, “[t]he basic role of soft law is to raise 
expectations of conformity with legal norms, and to create uniformity in the creation of 
these n
uct 
 which 
n 
nce:  
1194 
T
eventual adoption of hard law.1195
orms. Once there is compliance with a uniform legal norm, the formation of 
binding hard law is a relatively simple task.”1196  
Soft law instruments can be described in terms of three categories: “(1) so called 
‘non-binding’ agreements, such as the Helsinki accords, (2) ‘voluntary’ codes of cond
for transnational corporations, and (3) resolutions of international organizations, of
General Assembly resolutions are the leading example.”1197 Soft law may be embodied i
declarations, action plans, draft articles, and resolutions. In the field of international 
environmental law, the following soft law instruments are of particular importa
 
a. The Stockholm Declaration 
 
The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment  was approved in 1972 by 103 affirmative votes, and twelve absten
without a single negative vote.  Despite the fact that the Declaration does not addr
war explicitly,  it does not completely ignore environmental protection in times of 
armed conflicts. The Declaration sets out several principles and recommendations 
applicable to wartime activities. For instance, Principle 21 requires nations not to harm 
another nation’s environment. Principle 21 is absolute, and actually restates a gen
principle of international law applies both in peacetime and in times of armed 
1198 tions, 
ess 
eral 
                                                          
1199
1200
tions since its first session in 1946, which are not 
upra note (1186) at 43. For more details on this issue, refer to “International 
rnational Law” Section of this thesis. 
supra note (822). 
nternational Law and World Order 
te (969) at 192. 
1194 The U.N. General Assembly adopted resolu
recommendations. Some of these resolutions are legally binding on member States according to the 
Charter. See, Sloan, s
Organizations’ Resolutions in Hard Inte
1195 Palmer, supra note (983) at 269. 
1196 Pollock & Jemison, supra note (1187) at 28. 
1197 Sloan, supra note (1186) at 106-107. 
1198 Stockholm Declaration, 
1199 See B. Weston et al., Basic Documents in I
943 (2nd ed., 1990). 
1200 Simonds, supra no
 210
conflicts.  Similarly, other Stockholm principles can and should apply in times of 
peace or armed conflict. Principle 7 obligates States to take all possible steps to preven
pollution of the se
1201
t 
as by harmful substances, declaring that “States shall take all possible 
steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to 
h o 
in  other legitimate uses of the sea.”  In addition, Principle 22 requires 
States to cooperate in developing mechanisms to compensate victims of environmental 
damage 
o , 
r
c
u  “the 
e ared the effects of nuclear weapons and other means of mass 
destructi
uman health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or t
terfere with 1202
caused by activities occurring within a particular State, which affect areas 
utside that State.1203 Further, Principle 24 urges cooperation between nations to prevent
educe, and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from international 
onditions.1204 Finally, Principle 26 addresses environmental protection in terms of the 
se of the weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons but stating that
nvironment must be sp
1205on.”   
 
b. The Action Plan of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 
(1972)1206 
 
To supplement the principles expressed in the Stockholm Declaration, the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment created an Action Plan of 109 
mendations to protect the environment. The Action Plan outlines procedures for recom
States to implement the Stockholm Declaration. This Action Plan, which is considered 
soft law, addresses environmental assessment, environmental management, and 
supporting measures. 
                                                          
1201 Principle 21 is considered as a general principle of international law that has a binding character to all 
the contracting parties, contrary to the entire document which considered soft law. Therefore, Principle 21 
have been discussed in Section “A. The Hard International Law” rather than this Section which deals with 
the Soft International Law. 
1202 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822) Principle 7. 
1203 Id., Principle 22. 
1204 Id., Principle 24. 
1205 Id., Principle 26. 
1206 Id. 
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Many of these recommendations urge the international community to prep
environmental impact assessments.
are 
environmental 
 
 
nsequences of their actions. Specifically, it requires agencies to 
prepare r 
 
 
at 
 Netherlands, in particular, had already adopted national EIA 
laws.12
  
1207 Five of the recommendations rely on the 
“precautionary principle,” and “encourage countries to assess potential 
impacts before initiating any activities.”1208 Although these recommendations are not
binding, the U.S. has agreed to them. The U.S. had earlier enacted the National 
Environmental Policy Act in 1969, which requires all federal agencies to anticipate the
environmental co
 an environmental impact statement (EIS) before proceeding with any majo
federal action that might significantly impact the quality of the human 
environment.1209 An EIS must set out adverse environmental effects the project will 
cause.1210 It also must clarify all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.1211 
Such requirements embedded in NEPA are also expressed in the recommendations of
the Action Plan. 
In 1985, when the European Community (EC) issued a directive requiring
member States to adopt national Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). By th
time, France and
12 In France, some 4000-5000 EIA’s are prepared annually.1213 In the 
                                                        
07 Id., Recommendations 3, 54, 61, 63, 74 (a)-(c), 102 (f), 103 (d). 
08 Recommendation 6  Stockholm Declaration states: “It is recommended that the Secretary General, 
 co-operation with governments concerned and the appropriate international agencies, provide th
udies be conducted in representative ecosystems of international significance to assess the environmen
pact of alternative approaches to the survey, planning and development of resource projects.” 
he Recommendation 74 (a)-(c) states: “It is recommended that the 
sources of the entire United Nations system, and with the active su
12
12 1 of
in at pilot 
st tal 
im
T Secretary General, drawing on the 
re pport of governments and appropriate 
scientific a ide 
awareness  
p el; 
(c)  national 
pl
The Recommendation 102 (f) states: “It is recommended that the appropriate regional organization give full 
consideration to the following steps:…(f)Encouraging the training of personnel in the techniques of 
 into developmental planning, and of identifying and analyzing 
 alternative approaches.”  
assess environmental impacts before 
2 (2) (C) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (ii). 
2 (2) (C) (iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (iii). 
nsnational Experience, in 
perience 679 (CRC Press, 1993).  
nd other international bodies: (a)Increase the capability of the United Nations system to prov
 and advance warning of deleterious effects of human health and well-being from manmade
ollutants; (b)Provide this information in a form which is useful to policy makers at the national lev
Assist those governments which desire to incorporate these and other environmental factors into
anning processes.”  
incorporating environmental considerations
the economic and social cost-benefit relationships of
Finally, recommendations 54 and 63 encourage countries to 
commencing development project. 
Id., Recom. 54, 61, 63, 74 (a)-(c), 102 (f). 
1209 NEPA, § 102 (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C). 
1210 NEPA, § 10
1211 NEPA, § 10
1212 Nicholas A. Robinson, EIA Abroad: The Comparative and Tra
Environmental Analysis: The NEPA Ex
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Netherlands, the EIA law is annexed to the General Environmental Act (WABM) of 
1979. It became effective in May 13, 1986.1214 Those Specific laws reflect and 
reinforce customary international law rules, which were themselves reaffirmed by 
claration that a State’s activities shall not harm the 
environment of another nation.  
ent 
EPA 
s a model 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm De
In addition, recommendation 3 of the Action Plan encourages nations to 
consult their neighboring countries, if a project proposal might affect the environm
of such countries.1215 This recommendation is consistent with the concept of N
section 102 (2)(F), which recognizes the worldwide character of environmental 
problems, and supports programs designed to increase international cooperation in 
maintaining the quality of the human environment.1216 
Moreover, recommendation 74 (c) encourages international cooperation to 
assist some governments, particularly those of developing countries, to promote 
environmental protections. Thus, it implicitly supports the extraterritorial application 
of national environmental laws, to help developing countries follow them a
and adopt them into their national planning processes. 
 
c. The World Charter for Nature 
 
The World Charter for Nature is a soft law instrument that was formulated by 
the IUCN1217 and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1982,1218 after some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1213 Id., at 686. 
1214 Id., at 687. 
1215 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822) Recommendation 3. 
1216 NEPA § 102 (2)(F), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2)(F). 
1217 The idea of the World Charter for Nature was suggested by the former President of Zaire General 
Mobutu Seso Seko to the IUCN’s twelfth General Assembly in 1975. Former President Mobutu said: “[t]h
seas, the oceans the upper atmosphere belong to the human community […] One cannot freely overuse 
[such] international resources. People of good will […] are looking to you for positive results from this 
Assembly […] That is why, if I had any advice for you, I would suggest the establishment of a Charter of a 
Nature […] 
e 
Insofar as Zaire is concerned, we are ready to help you succeed […] If we were asked to be a 
as by the International Council of Environmental Law (ICEL) under the leadership 
ental Law and reviewed by IUCN’s members of the Commission on 
idt Varlag, 1986) [hereinafter Burhanne 
pilgrim for environmental protection, this we would be willing to be.” However, the commentary on the 
Charter’s provisions w
of the European Council of Environm
Environmental Policy, Law, and Administration. See, Wolfgang E. Burhanne & Will A. Irwin, 
The World Charter for Nature 4 & 14 (Erich Schm
& Irwin]. 
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modifications from the IUCN proposal.1219 The World Charter is not binding; 
however, it reflects a general international law principle and extends it to cover 
military f 
 does 
s, but in 
rests prior 
able technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects 
shall be  damage 
s or 
 
 of Principle 21 of the Charter, as well as of Stockholm Declaration Principle 
21.  
                                                                                                                                    
 activities in peacetime as well as in times of armed conflict.1220 Principle 5 o
the Charter declares that “nature shall be secured against degradation caused by 
warfare or other hostile activities.”1221 Securing and maintaining the environment
not mean only a prohibition of military atrocities in times of armed conflict
peacetime as well. Further, the Charter seeks to protect environmental inte
to any military activity by the preparation of EIA, in order to disclose any 
environmental harm that might result from such activity. Principle 11 (a) states that 
“activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best 
avail
 used; in particular: (a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible
to nature shall be avoided.”1222 Additionally Principle 20 of the Charter prohibits 
military activities that cause damage to nature.1223  
Significantly, Principle 21 (d) and (e) of the Charter reaffirm countries’ duty 
not to harm another nation’s environment, either by activities within their territorie
under their control, which have impact in other countries.1224 Therefore, military 
operations during warfare should be considered with consideration foe the 
environment of other nations, especially neutral parties. For instance, the 
environmental effects of Gulf War II on neutral States, such as the Gulf Emirates, Iran,
India and Pakistan, resulting from the oil pollution in Kuwait, amounted to a severe 
violation
                                         
A/RES/37/7[hereinafter 
Law, 
 [hereinafter Leibler].  
stems located within other states or in the areas 
(e) Safeguard and conserve nature in areas beyond national 
1218 See G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 21, U.N. Doc. 
The World Charter]. 
1219 Schmitt,, supra note (971) at 42. 
1220 Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International 
23 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 67, 68 (1992)
1221 The World Charter, supra note (1218) Principle 5. 
1222 Id., Principle 11 (a). 
1223 “Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided.” Id., Principle 20. 
1224 “Principle 21 of the World Charter provides that States shall “(d) Ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the natural sy
beyond the limit of national jurisdiction. 
jurisdiction.” Id., Principle 21 (d), (e). 
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While some may argue that the World Charter for Nature is a soft law 
instrum nt, and not yet binding on belligerents, nevertheless the World Charter was 
adopted
mmon 
standar ged.”1227 
d
e
 by a vote of 111 in favor to 1 against (the United States).1225 The 
overwhelming support for the World Charter reflects, to some degree, its more binding 
nature. Further, according to some experts, the World Charter expresses a kind of 
general principle of law recognized by the civilized nations, rather than merely an 
aspiration.1226 Finally, the preamble of the World Charter articulates “the co
ds by which all human conduct affecting nature is to be guided and jud
Since, warfare is the human conduct most destructive of nature and natural resources, 
it should be guided and governed by the standards set forth in the World Charter for 
Nature. 
 
. The Rio Declaration1228 
 
On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference in
1992, the United Nations sponsored the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. T
Earth Summit adopted the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 
Climate Change Convention, the 
 
he 
Declaration of “non-binding” Principles on Forest 
Conser
 
                                        
vation, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Agenda 21.1229  
The Rio Declaration represents a restatement and reaffirmation of the 
Stockholm Declaration. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration iterates Principle 21 of the
                  
25 There were eighteen abstentions on the World Charter: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 12
Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Lebanon, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela. Latter, Mexico had voted in favor of the Resolution. See, 
ments of International Environmental Law Vol. 1, 
8) pmbl. 
o 
tion to be binding to a greater degree as soft law instrument, which contains and restates several 
Harald Hohmann, Basic Docu
64 (Graham & Trotman, 1992) [hereinafter Hohmann]. 
1226 Simonds, supra note (969) at 180. 
1227 The World Charter, supra note (121
1228 Rio Declaration, supra note (683). 
1229 Since the foresaid Principles were expressly “non-binding”, it is evident that the States consider the Ri
Declara
general principles of international law. 
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Stockholm Declaration,1230 reflecting a general principle of international law that is 
binding on all States. 
The Earth Summit in1992 took place in a climate influenced by the 
environmental effects of the Gulf War II and its decisions reflect that climate. Thus, 
the Rio Declaration directly addresses environmental protection in times of armed 
conflic
ng 
ther 
w, 
med 
ly 
 care for historical buildings and cultural 
monum  
l 
in 
                                        
t. For example, Principle 24 states that “[w]arfare is inherently destructive of 
sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providi
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its fur
development, as necessary.”1231  
In light of warfare’s destructive consequences for sustainable development, the 
Rio Declaration invokes the application of international conventions, customary la
and general principles of law relevant to environmental protection in times of ar
conflict. The Declaration emphasizes the duty to respect fully the international and 
regional environmental law instruments that were examined in the “Hard International 
Law” Section. Moreover, Principle 24 goes beyond that and requires nations not on
to protect the environment in times of armed conflict, which may be accomplished 
through negative action by avoiding unnecessary harm to the environment, but also 
encourages positive environmental action as well. For instance, nations are urgent to 
ensure that their armed forces take care to provide a suitable climate for endangered 
species, or wildlife. They should also
ents. Thus, although it is aspirational rather than binding Principle 24 seeks to
engage nations in positive environmental activities.  
Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration states that “[s]tates shall develop nationa
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damages. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more 
determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and 
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities with
                  
1230 Principle 2 of Rio Declaration is considered as a general principle of international law, contrary to the 
efore Principle 2 have been examined earlier in Section “A. The Hard International 
ciple 24. 
whole document, ther
Law.” 
1231 Rio Declaration, supra note (683) Prin
 216
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”1232 This provision 
requires States to develop their national and international laws for liability and 
compensation, because no such body of law yet exists. If this provision were followed, 
States with military bases outside their territory would have responsibility for cleaning 
. military personnel 
would be required to follow their stringent national environmental statutes anywhere 
that they have bases, in order to assure 
principle t s is the real 
dilemma, amage 
after the w  any 
State’s ow r any war 
the invade  And, in 
fact, after  for all the environmental 
damage that affected Kuwait and neighboring countries.  
 
e. Intern
up contaminated military sites abroad. Thus, for instance, U.S
the protection of the environment. Otherwise, 
the U.S. international responsibility for environmental injury may not be effectively 
recognized. Such a procedure would also be a recognition of the principle that global 
environment is a common concern.  
Finally, Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration states that “[n]ational authorities 
should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the cost of pollution […].”1233 This principle should apply equally to 
wartime and peacetime environmental damage.1234 In fact, it is easy to apply such 
o peacetime activities. However, applying it to wartime activitie
because countries seldom admit responsibility for environmental d
ar, and it is very difficult under international law to interfere with
n legal definition of liability. Nevertheless, under Principle 16, afte
r armed forces should bear the cost of cleaning up the environment.
the Gulf War II, Iraq was held liable by the U.N.
ational Organizations’ Resolutions  
 
Some decisions of international organizations may be considered hard law, 
such as the binding resolutions discussed earlier in Section A. However, international 
organizations may adopt resolutions and recommendations that are considered soft law 
and yet carry significant weight. For example, the U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 
                                                          
1232 Id., Principle 13. 
1233 Id., Principle 16. 
1234 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 133. 
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while not themselves legally binding (except those concerning the internal operations
of the U.N.),
 
rly 
e 
After quite a long fierce dispute it now seems that the extreme 
views, on the one hand that resolutions have no binding effect at 
member States as authorized by the Charter. Others have an operative role and create 
obligation 1238  out that in 
the last few of some 
of the Gen ] submit 
recommen ation 
reveals tha al rights and 
obligations under the Charter.”1239 Such assertions are binding and characterize the 
General Assembly resolutions to be binding too.1240 These resolutions were 
overwh
 
                       
1235 may constitute evidence of customary international law, particula
if they are adopted unanimously, if they contain legally binding terms, or if th
document has been incorporated into other instruments and national laws.1236 Judge 
Hermann Mosler asserted such a view by stating that:  
 
all and on the other hand that they have a legislative effect, have 
been abandoned and that a generally accepted view is emerging. 
There can be no single answer to the question-resolutions must be 
distinguished according to various factors, such as the intention 
of the General Assembly, the content of the principles proclaimed 
and the majority in favour of their adoption.1237 
 
 
Nonetheless, some of the General Assembly’s resolutions are mandatory on 
s for contracting parties.  Professor Oscar Schachter pointed
 years, the United Nations’ practices witnessed binding character 
eral Assembly resolutions. “Typically, the [General Assembly…
dations to [g]overnments, but an examination of such recommend
t many of them are accompanied by assertions of leg
elming accepted among States. 
                                   
1235 These resolutions concern mainly budgetary and internal organizational matters. See, Sloan, supra note 
(1186) at 139. 
1236 See Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12(Oct. 16); D.H.N. Johnson, The Effects of Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations 32 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 97 (1955). 
 
te (1186) at 43. 
 
5 (1963-II). 
1237 Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community 88-89 
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980.)
1238 Sloan, supra no
1239 Oscar Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics, and Action in the United Nations 109 Recueil Des
Cours 165, 18
1240 Id., at 185-86. 
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It i ing than 
others. Th izations. For 
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental 
organization that deals directly with the environmental effects of nuclear warfare. Its 
General Conference has on several occasions adopted resolutions condemning any 
possible a ent for 
decades to nference  
 
s 
 
competent international organs, every possible effort for the 
and the Statute of the Agency[…] 
4. Affirms the reading of the international Atomic Energy 
international organs, if they so 
 safeguard aspects of the matter[.]1244  
s clear that some General Assembly’s resolutions are more bind
e can be said of resolutions adopted by other international organ
ttacks on nuclear plants, which would certainly harm the environm
 come.1241 For example, Resolution 407/1983 of the General Co
1. Declares that all armed attacks against nuclear installation
devoted to peaceful purposes should be explicitly prohibited; and 
2. Urges all [m]ember States to make, individually and through
adoption of binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks 
against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful 
purposes[.]1242 
 
 
Additionally, Resolution 425/1984 
 
2. Further considers that any threat to attack and destroy nuclear 
facilities in Iraq and in other countries constitutes a violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Statute of the 
Agency[…], and 
7. Reaffirms the right of all nations in exercising their right to 
acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes 
and for their development programme.1243 
 
  
Finally, Resolution 444/1985 
 
2. Considers that any armed attack on and threat against nuclear 
facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitute a violation of 
the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law, 
Agency to assist competent 
ical andrequest, in any techn
                                                          
1241 GC (XXVII)/RES/407, Oct. 14, 1983; GC (XXVIII)/RES/425, Sept. 28, 1984; GC (XXIX)/RES/444 
Sept. 27, 1985. 
1242 Id., GC Resolution 407/1983, paras. 1 & 2. 
1243 Id.,GC Resolution 425/1984, paras. 2 & 7. 
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 Although these Resolutions are not legally binding instruments of hard law
U.N. General Assembly gave them legal force
, the 
-
 Disasters, in Particular in the Basin of the Aral Sea 
and the Region of Semipalatinsk.1248 The Resolution aims at declaring the Aral Sea 
and the Semipalatinsk a zones of global ecological catastrophe, in view of the loss of 
second largest freshwater lake in the world and its impact on the climate of Northern 
Hemisphere and Asia. The Resolution also expresses support for efforts to rehabilitate 
the Aral Sea region. Such Resolution is not binding, but it still has a moral effect on 
the concerned parties, since it was adopted unanimously.    
urther, specialized non-governmental organizations are capable of 
formulating and proposing soft law rules. For instance, the International Law 
Association adopted a resolution, in 1976, to prohibit the destruction of water 
installations containing dangerous materials, such as dams and dikes, when such 
destruction may involve a grave harm to the civilian population or substantial damage 
to the basic ecological balance.1249 Despite the fact that this resolution is not binding, 
it addresses international concerns about the environment in times of armed conflicts. 
Specifically, it recognizes that no international instrument protects facilities that 
contain dangerous materials other than radioactive materials or water,1250and seeks to 
establish that Kind of protection. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1245 by declaring that such attacks were 
the legal basis for an immediate Security Council intervention.1246  
Similarly, the twenty-seventh session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers1247 held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 27-30, 2000, adopted the non
binding, but important, Resolution 40/27-P on the Situation in Regions of the Islamic 
World Affected by Environmental
F
 
1244 Id., GC lution 444/1985, paras. 2 & 4. 
1245 Simonds, supra note (969) at 180. 
1246 See G. . Res. 45/58J, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1991). 
1247 Sessio of Islam and Globalization. 
1248 Resolution on the Situation in Regions of the Islamic World Affected by Environmental Disasters, in 
 
ur d Water Installations in Times of Armed 
Environment and Armed Conflicts 15 (Unpublished Manuscript) presented at The Conference on 
 Reso
A
n 
Particular in the Basin of the Aral Sea and the Region of Semipalatinsk, Res. 40/27-P, 27th Sess. Foreign 
Ministers of the OIC, June 27-30, 2000 [hereinafter Resolution on Environmental Disasters in Aral Sea].
1249 Madrid Resolution on the Protection of Water Reso ces an
Conflict, art. 4, International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Seventh 
Conference, Madrid, 1976, at 237-39. 
1250 Paul C. Szasz, Study of and Proposals for Improvements to Existing Legal Instrument Relating to the 
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tions as 
they ap
rea, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia Singapore, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.  
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D- Comparative Environmental Law 
This section will examine examples of environmental laws of different na
ply to military operations during times of armed conflict, and, during peacetime, 
military used for civil defense in times of natural disasters. Some comprehensive 
environmental rules, while formulated to be applied to civil activities, can be extended to 
include military activities in some nations. Other nations still exclude the military from 
compliance with environmental regulations, as we will discuss in the next few pages. 
Examples will be drawn from the laws of Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Israel, Ko
                                                                  
the Use of the Environment as A Tool of Conventional Warfare (Ottawa, June 
1991) on file with Stanf. J. Int’l L. 
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In addition, it is necessary to refer to the European Union (EU) directives which
are then to be implemented by each State in the EU because the directives are s
 
impler 
than th
nmental 
ng 
ities 
ecause the power shifts from people who have 
guns to a, 
 
 
mportant cultural or natural heritage sites, and the U.S. government formulated 
a “no-f y 
 
, 
national authorities to promote respect for, and protection of, environmental resources in 
med conflicts. 
e laws of each State. The directives will show the customary practices of the EU 
States, as a leading region of the world. 
For the most part, in the United States and some of the EU States, enviro
laws broadly apply to every institution including the military. However, in developi
States environmental laws often apply to civilians only. In many developing countries, 
the military is viewed as a necessary support for the State, and therefore civil author
are reluctant to impose restrictions on military activities. It is often true that the larger the 
economy, the less power the military has, b
 people who have money. And so, in Western Europe, North America and Canad
the military is more likely to be subject to environmental and other regulations. 
In States with a strong civilian environmental law system and a strong economy,
the military is subject to most environmental laws at least to the extent military necessity 
does not override the environmental obligations. For example, in the case of the Gulf War 
II, the U.S. and allies had military officers reviewing whether military operations would
endanger i
ire target list” of those sites.1251 They would actually stop the bombing if the
thought it would damage such sites. So, there is an example, even in an active war, of 
restraint on the military in the name of environmental and cultural protection.  
India imposes similar legal restraints on its military. The Indian Territorial Army 
(TA), charged with promoting and sustaining peace, consists of twenty-seven 
departmental units among which are three ecological brigades called Eco-Task 
Forces.1252 The Eco-Task Forces upgrade depleted areas in Rajasthan, Jammu, and
Kashmir in collaboration with the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests.1253 Thus
here is another example of cooperation between the defense and the environmental 
peacetime and in times of ar
                                                          
 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, Conflict Supplemental Authorization and 
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, Apr. 1992, Publ. L. No. 102-25, 611-612. 
1251
edforces.com/defence/ta.htm>, 1252 Indian Armed Forces, Oct. 14, 2001, available at <http://www.indianarm
last visit (Mar. 6, 2002). 
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This concept should be adopted by other nations, specifically Islamic countrie
since such concept was practiced during the period of prophet Mohammed, not only 
protect nature but to protect civilians as well, when Muslim armies included an officer, 
muhtasib, who had the specific duty to insure that “[t]rees are not burnt, nor unjustifiably 
pulled out and that women, children, the elderly and unoffending priests or monks shou
not be harmed. He also ascertains that water and medicine are given to the prisoners o
war.”
s, 
to 
ld 
f 
vironmental concerns. Even though the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
go on t
 
y 
il war in Colombia, South America, 
even so h civil 
                                                                                            
1254 
However, the world abounds in examples of military operations conducted 
without regard for en
o battlefields, they are very weak. However, this is really courageous that these 
people going to such places where no one respects them. For instance, in April 2001, six
Red Cross nurses and aid workers have been shot to death in northeast Congo while the
were on a routine trip.1255 They were four Congolese nationals, one Swiss and one 
Colombian. The killings occurred in Ituri province, which is under the Congolese 
Liberation Front control.1256 It shows that the kinds of people that are committing such 
crimes have no respect for the same rules that the army has respect for. In my view, the 
only way we can help civil wars is to train civilian population, if civilian population 
believes in nature protection, then they will prevent the rebels from destroying their 
parks, or streams and polluting their rivers. In the civ
me of the belligerents who have taken over parts of the country and establis
governmental controls have been reported to set up rules to protect fishing.1257 So they 
are fighting a war, but once they have control of the territory then they are managing 
conservation questions, and in that case people understand that without managing our 
fishing they will have no more fish, why should they win the civil war if they have no 
more environment. 
                                                                                 
1254 Mawil Y. Izzi Dein, Islamic Ethics and the Environment, in Islam and Ecology, 34 (Fazlun M. 
Khalid & Joanne O’Brien et al. eds., 1992); Laurent R. Hourcle, Environmental Law of War, 25 
Vt. L. Rev. 653, 660 fn. 34 (2001)[hereinafter Hourcle]. 
1255 CNN News, Aid Workers Killed in Congo, Apr. 27, 2001, available at 
ww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/04/27/congo.deaths/index.html>, (last visit May 24, 2001). 
olumbia, Juan Myar, to Prof. Nicholas 
1253 Id. 
<http://w
1256 Id. 
1257 Information conveyed by the Minister of the Environment of C
A. Robinson, in 2000. Interview by author with Prof. Robinson. 
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Nations should take care to protect their environment, even during the chaos and 
destruction of armed conflicts. Education must play an important role in accomplishin
that goal. What IUCN does in having many small NGO’s doing their public education 
and shaping the minds of the people to respect nature so that when the State breaks
or the government collapses, the values of the people are left. In the values of the people 
the family is
g 
 down 
 very important, people take care of their own family first. People love nature 
too and re 
e in 
armed conflicts that the people see any one who is not 
themse
ple, 
, and 
 
nic War of 149-146 B.C., after the Romans 
conquered Carthage, they salted the land to sterilize its soil forever,1258 as though the land 
he U.S. made the same mistake in North Vietnam when they used napalm1259 to 
contam
force 
f the military is exempt from national environmental law, 
                             
 this is just natural. So that if they are educated about ecology then they are mo
apt to not pollute the water if they must drink it. And the more we can educate people to 
respect nature, then during the absence of government, they will act to protect natur
the same way they will act to protect their children.  
It is in the nature of 
lves as the enemy. The same can be said about the environment. There is a risk 
that people will view the territory of the enemy as the enemy not as nature. For exam
in the Gulf War II, Saddam Hussein saw the ecology of Kuwait as part of the enemy
thus had no hesitation in firing the oil wells and destroyed so much of the environment.
This is a very old idea: in the Third Pu
itself was an enemy. 
T
inate areas and destroy vast forest lands,1260 with consequences that continue 
today. The U.S. military at that time viewed the land of the enemy as part of the enemy, 
and therefore felt free to destroy it. In fact, the land belongs to nature, and natural 
systems everywhere are linked to each other. Destruction in one place has consequences 
elsewhere.  
On the other hand, some nations exercise little control over their own military 
during armed conflicts. In those cases, only international force can interfere and en
international law. Even i
                             
pra note (402) at 14; Schwabach, supra note (477) at 121. 
al and International Approach, 22 Mel. Univ. L. Rev. 
awabach, supra note (477) at 126. 
1258 Warfare in a Fragile World, su
1259 Nigel White, The Law of War Crimes: Nation
230, 333 (1998). 
1260 Sch
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interna r 
tal pollution, d. fauna and flora 
protect
 
ver, 
 
the army.”1262 Accordingly, the 
environ
 are 
s or 
 control 
e armed 
the 
: (i) members of the Singapore Armed Forces and of any visiting forces 
tional law provides for the same duty, therefore, international force can be used fo
environmental protection.  
This Section will address the comparative environmental rules in the following 
contexts: a. Comprehensive Environmental Rules Relevant to Military Activities, b. 
environmental protection in general, c. environmen
ion, e. air pollution control, f. water resources conservation, g. soil pollution, h. 
hazardous wastes, and i. citizen suits. 
 
1. Comprehensive Environmental Rules Relevant to Military Activities 
 
Generally, environmental law rules apply to all governmental sectors. As a rule, 
the military, as one of the sectors that cause environmental degradation, is not exempted 
unless provided so by a specific law. For example, under the Israeli Civil Wrongs Law of
1952, the State is “a corporation for the purposes of defining civil liability.”1261 Howe
it provides that “the State is not liable civilly for defamation, acts done during an army
war operation, or injuries or death of persons serving in 
mental damage caused by the Army during war activities cannot result in 
governmental liability.  
Another example is found in Singapore, where the Arms and Explosives Act1263 
and its rules regulate the flow of arms and explosives. It provides that licenses
required for the import, export, possession, manufacture and sale of any guns, arm
explosives or poisonous or noxious gas.1264 This requirement permits the State to
the environmental effects of arms and explosives.  
However, the Arms and Explosives Act specifically exempts Singapor
forces from its jurisdiction. Article 3 (1)(c) states that: “[n]othing in this Act shall apply 
to any of the following persons or their equipment while in the course of their duty or 
employment
                                                          
1261 Israeli Civil Wrongs Law, 1952, available at 
a_law/b6.html>, (last visit February 24, 2001). <wysiwyg://28/http://www1.huji.ac.il/www_tev
Nicholas A. Robinson ed.
IN-30. 
1262 Id. 
1263 Lye Lin Heng, Environmental Law in Singapore, in Comparative Environmental Law SIN-
28-SIN-30 ( , 1998) [hereinafter Heng, Environmental Law]. 
1264 Id., at S
 225
lawfull
 
” Thus, the 
r to 
l 
 
xample, in Nigeria, the 
ommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is ex oficio a member of the Federal 
1265 of the agency’s goals is to “advise the Federal 
Military Government on national policies and priorities and on scientific and 
technol 1266
 
w 
defined by the 1995 Law on Ecological Experiza, which declares that State ecological 
                             
y present in Singapore; (ii) members of any naval, military, or air volunteer forces 
established under any written law; (iii) members of any additional force established under
any written law providing for compulsory service in the defense of Singapore.
Singaporian armed forces are exempted from the Arms and Explosives Act despite their 
extension use of arms, explosives, and poisonous or noxious gases. Thus, in orde
provide real environmental protection, the Arms and Explosives Act should include a 
provision to cover even military use of such materials.  
In the absence of such exclusions, the military must observe and comply with al
environmental laws. Where the military is subject to such regulations, military 
participation in the work of national environmental agencies would facilitate cooperation
between the environmentalists and military authorities, and would encourage 
environmental awareness among military officials. For e
C
Environmental Protection Agency.  One 
ogical activities affecting the environment.”  According to this provision, the 
agency can advise the government about the environmental consequences of military 
activities. 
A different approach has been taken in Ukraine, where the environmental impact
assessment of proposed activities is regulated by a State ecological expertiza system,1267 
the existing Ukrainian system of environmental review.1268 The 1991 Law on 
Environmental Protection drew the framework for this system.1269 Article 9 of that La
provides for the right of Ukrainian citizens to participate in decision-making by 
commenting on draft legislation relevant to the siting construction, or modification of 
objects that might seriously harm the environment.1270 Moreover, EIA was clearly 
                             
, No. 
epa/envpa2.html>, (last visit February 23, 
ental Impact Assessment: A Case Study in Implementation, 31 
1269 Law of Ukraine on Environmental Protection, No. 1264, June 25, 1991, arts. 26-30. 
1265 Pace Law School Virtual Library, The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act, art. 2, 1988
58, available at <http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerianlaw/
2001). 
1266 Id., art. 4 (a). 
1267 Julie Teel, International Environm
Envt’l L. Rep. 10291, 10292 (2001) [hereinafter Teel]. 
1268 Id. 
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expertizas are obligatory for “activities and facilities posing an increased ecological 
hazard,” as listed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.1271 Additionally, Article 29 o
the Law on the Environmental
f 
 Protection, prohibits implementation of any project 
withou
. 
t 
 
 This provision contains both precautionary and remedial measures to 
protect  
es of 
iges] 
contributes to the release or likelihood of the release […] to report the release, to take all 
er 
 who may be 
                                                                                                                                                        
t the approval of the State ecological expertiza.  
  
 
2. Environmental Protection in General 
 
Environmental protection in general concerns all environmental elements without 
focusing on a specific one, such as water, air, soil, or fauna and flora. The environmental 
laws of many nations approach environmental questions from that general viewpoint
For example, Article 2 (2) of the Korean Natural Environment Preservation Ac
provides that “[t]he natural ecosystem shall be protected from any artificial damage and
pollution, and any damaged natural system shall be restored so as to perform its original 
function[.]”1272
 the natural ecosystem. The precautionary goal is to protect the natural ecosystem
from artificial damage and pollution. The remedial measures are applicable when the 
natural ecosystem has already been damaged. In this case, the Act requires that the 
natural system shall be restored to perform its original function. Unfortunately, this 
provision does not address other kinds of damage, such as the death of a person or the 
ruin of a cultural monument.  
Canadian law also contains both precautionary and remedial measures. In cas
“unauthorized release or reasonable likelihood of unauthorized release in the environment 
of a listed toxic substance, [the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) obl
any person who owns or has charge of the substance released, or who causes or 
reasonable emergency measures to prevent the release, to remedy or mitigate any dang
to the environment or to human life or health, and to notify any person
                     
vironmental Law of Korea, in Comparative Environmental Law Kor-160 
obinson ed., September 2000) [hereinafter So]. 
1270 Teel, supra note (1267) at 10293. 
1271 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Resolution No. 554 on List of Activities and Objects which Constitute 
an Increased Ecological Hazard (July 27, 1995). 
1272 Jiwhan So, En
(Nicholas A. R
 227
adversely affected.”1273 As a precautionary measure, the Statute requires notice of the 
incident and requires the taking of all reasonable measures to prevent the release. The 
remedi
 
to 
 
 
e. Although 
es 
sons as well 
cept in the cases of explicit exclusion. Article 2 of the Korean Basic 
Environ
te the 
ental 
 
military as an arm of the government. However, the military has a special status in 
                                                          
al measure is to remedy and mitigate any danger to the environment or to human 
life or health.  
Some other national laws go beyond these kinds of measures. For instance, the 
Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance of 1992, besides the precautionary
measure of “refrain[ing] from causing or likely to cause the environmental nuisance, or 
desist from the act,”1274 and the remedial measure of “repair[ing] damage or return[ing] 
the situation to the state existing prior to the environmental nuisance,”1275 requires person
causing the nuisance to “do everything necessary to prevent the recurrence of the 
environmental nuisance.”1276 The statute aims not only to prevent the occurrence of
environmental damage and remedy its effects, but also to avoid any recurrenc
the law is thus quite comprehensive in its approach, it apparently does not apply to 
military operations. During the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli armed forc
have caused significant environmental damages without incurring liability under that 
statute. 
Generally, national environmental laws are applicable to private per
as public agents, ex
mental Policy Act provides that “[t]he fundamental idea is to have [not only the 
citizens, but] the State, local governments […] make efforts to maintain and crea
environment in a better state[.]”1277 Similarly, Article 24 of the Korean Environm
Law addresses not only the citizens but the State too when provides that “[t]he State and 
citizens shall make efforts so that the order and balance of the nature are maintained and
preserved […].”1278 Basically, all Korean environmental laws apply to the Korean 
1273 Francis J. F. Handy & Douglas T. Hamilton, Environmental Law of Canada, in Comparative 
Environmental Law 15 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., September 1996) [hereinafter Handy & 
Hamilton]. 
92, art. 2 (1), available at 
/www1.huji.ac.il/www_teva_law/b12.html>, (last visit February 24, 2001) [hereinafter 
). 
1274 Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance, 19
<wysiwyg://36/http:/
The Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance]. 
1275 Id., art. 2 (2
1276 Id., art. 2 (3). 
1277 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-44. 
1278 Id., at KOR-49. 
 228
environmental law. For example, the Korean military is exempted from EIA 
requirements. And most of the Korean military data are restricted from public access 
under the Administrative Information Disclosure Act.1279 Moreover, Korean frontier 
o regular zoning regulations, including environmental 
administration regulations, even though military bases can cause serious environmental 
degrada
 
 
1 
3. Envi
efore 
ion, 
tation, export, and disposal of substances and 
produc
d, the 
                                                          
military bases are not subject t
tion to the surrounding soil and water resources from oil and other 
contaminants.1280 
In contrast, some Russian environmental regulations do apply to the military. On
December 19, 1991, Russia adopted the comprehensive law On Environmental 
Protection, which provides for various mechanisms including standards-setting, 
permitting, and EIA requirements. The Russian military are obliged to obtain permits for
emission and other environmental impacts, just like other governmental organizations. 
Their planned activities are subject to review by a commission of ecological experts,128
under the law On Ecological Expertise of 1995,1282just as the activities of other 
governmental bodies. 
 
ronmental Pollution 
 
Environmental pollution can be caused by a wide variety of pollutants. Ther
some national laws use general formulations to control all kind of pollutants. In the 
Netherlands, “Royal Decrees can limit or restrict the manufacture, import, applicat
availability, storage, trading, transpor
ts if there is a reasonable suspicion that there are undesirable effects for humans or 
the environment.”1283 This provision uses the general term “substances and products” to 
cover any source of threat to the health and the environment. In emergency cases, where 
the environment may be extremely damaged before a Royal Decree can be issue
1279 The Korean Administrative Information Disclosure Act is similar to the U.S. Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). 
r in 
]. 
1280 Information given to the author by Mr. Byung-Chun So, May 3, 2001, Mr. Byung-Chun is affiliated 
with Han Kook University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. 
1281 ), supra note (9 The Federal Law on Protection of the Environment (No. 7-F2 60).  
1282 Information given to the author by Mrs. Irina Krasnova, May 22, 2001, Mrs. Irina is a senior lecture
mental law at the Moscow Juridical Institute [hereinafter Krasnovaenviron
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provision vests in the Minister of Housing, Zoning and the Environment the power to 
“issue such limitations or restrictions by means of ministerial decrees.”1284 The statute 
does no
s in 
accorda
 
e in 
e 
ntific Services,1286 with responsibility for establishing guidelines for 
the man
on 
                                                                                                                                                                            
t specifically exempt military activities from the scope of its effect. 
Admittedly, all kinds of pollutants can harm the environment. However, 
environmental pollution from hazardous substances, particularly those generated by the 
military, such as nuclear weapons, chemical and bacteriological agents, present an 
especially serious environmental threat. Some countries that have nuclear arsenals have 
adopted rules that deal with the environmental safety of radioactive substance
nce with IAEA obligations.  
For example, Article 9 of the Korean environmental law requires the government 
to “take proper measures as to any environmental pollution by any radioactive substance
and prevention thereof.”1285 Although that Article refers to pollution “by any radioactive 
substance,” the military, a major generator of such substances, is not subject to 
environmental regulations. Moreover, the Article does not make clear what measures 
might be “proper.” Thus, the law appears to have a quite limited effectiveness.  
Singapore has taken a different approach, by incorporating scientific expertis
its system. Singapore established a “Radiation Protection Inspectorate”(RPI), under th
Department of Scie
agement and disposal of radioactive waste.1287 Despite the importance of the 
RPI’s works function, its competence is limited to radioactive wastes from laboratories 
and hospitals. Military radioactive wastes are excluded from its competence. 
Furthermore, another hazardous substances that cause serious environmental 
pollution are the chemicals that often used by armed forces. Controlling activities that 
deal with chemicals vary from one national system to another. Article 21 of the Korean 
environmental law requires “[f]or the purpose of preventing any environmental polluti
by any chemical substance and danger and injury to the health, the government [is 
 
in Comparative Environmental 
 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Luigies]. 
 at SIN-28. 
1283 Huug H. Luigies, Environmental Law of the Netherlands, 
Law 35
1284 Id. 
1285 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-46. 
1286 Heng, Environmental Law, supra note (1263)
1287 Id. 
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required to] work out measures to control properly harmful chemical substances.”1288 
This provision did not indicate what are the necessary measures, and left to the 
government a discretionary power to work them out. This discretionary power may 
exclude some governmental facilities, such as military, from the chemical substances 
control measures.  
Canada’s approach to regulation of environmental pollution relies heavily on 
disclosure of information about hazardous substances. For instance, Subsection 4(6) of 
the Canadian Environmental Contaminants Act1289 requires that information be provided 
ironment by any person who manufactures or imports a 
chemical compound in excess of 500 kg during a calendar year for the first time.1290 That 
informa
 
 in his possession respecting any danger to human health or the environment 
posed b
 
her 
n the other hand, the provision does apply to the 
military
er 
                                                          
to the Federal Minister of the Env
tion includes “a. [t]he date of manufacturing or importing; b. [t]he name of the 
compound; c. [t]he quantity manufactured or imported during that year; and d. [a]ny
information
y the compound.”1291 This provision details the required information to be 
delivered, including any related information respecting any danger to human health or the
environment. This provision also specifically addresses information needed to prevent or 
remediate damage within and beyond the national jurisdiction, if it pose a danger to ot
countries. However, limiting the applicability of this provision to only manufacturers and 
importers of chemical compound in excess of 500 kg ignores the environmental effects 
that can be caused by smaller amounts. O
’s handling of hazardous materials. 
 
4. Fauna and Flora Protection 
 
Fauna and flora are often damaged by military activities. Some national laws off
general protection to this category, including protection from the effects of military 
activities.  
U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 
lton, supra note (1273) at 17. 
1288 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-48. 
1289 The Canadian Environmental Contaminants Act is like the 
1290 Handy & Hami
1291 Id. 
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The Environmental Law of Korea states in Article 25 (3) that “[t]he wild anima
and plants shall be protected and their species shall be preserved.”
ls 
rs 
s 
, that 
e, 
gical, botanical, 
geologi
 
o military maneuvers shall be 
execute
ny land 
at 
the nature reserves and protected areas from 
even peacetime military operations. Moreover, Article 11 (1) of the Act provides for rules 
to secur  the safety and welfare of the public during military or air force exercises by 
making specific rules. Parliament is empowered to make such rules when any “public 
1292 This Article offe
general protection for both animals and plants from any kind of threat, present or future. 
The environmental law of Korea does not cover military activities nor it does exempt 
them. However, as a rule, since Korea is one of the developing countries, its armed force
are likely to be exempt from environmental laws and regulations. As a consequence
law does not cover the Korean military.  
In Singapore, the Wild Animals and Birds Act prohibits certain activities, 
including the killing, taking or keeping of any wild animal or bird without license.1293 
Licensing an activity is a method of controlling its effect on the environment. Therefor
under the Act, the government can prevent activities that results in the “willful[] or 
negligent[] [destr[uction], damage or defac[ing of] any object of zoolo
cal, ethnological, scientific or aesthetic interest.”1294 Furthermore, the Act “sets 
aside special areas as bird sanctuaries.”1295 Since there is no specific provision in the
Wild Animals and Birds Act to exempt the military, it would appear to apply to military 
activities as well.1296 Additionally, in Singapore, according to the Military Maneuvers 
Act, military exercises must not be conducted in nature reserves and catchment areas. 
Article 7 of the Military Maneuvers Act provides that: “[n]
d and no military encampment made on any land forming part of the catchment 
area in connection with the impounding reservoir of any public waterworks or a
set apart for the collection of water for the supply of any public waterworks.” Th
provision provides significant protection to 
e
                                                          
1292 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-49. 
ental Law, supra note (1263) at SIN-38. 
ay 16, 2001, Professor Lye-Lin Heng is 
d with the Law Faculty of the National University of Singapore.  
1293 Heng, Environm
1294 Id., at SIN-39. 
1295 Id., at SIN-38. 
1296 Information given to the author by Professor Lye-Lin Heng, M
affiliate
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right”1297 is likely to be affected by such exercises.1298 Thus, by application Parliament 
can act to protect natural resources threatened by military operations. 
se. 
 
aries in order to protect animals and 
plants h nd 
der the federal Environment Protection and 
Biodive
y 
 
                                        
Other national authorities have power that goes far beyond the power to licen
For example, in Australia, the South Australian National Parks and Wildlife Act of
1972,1299 gives the minister the right to “create sanctu
e deems worthy of protection.”1300 Unlike the Singaporian Wild Animals a
Birds Act, that considers the protection of animal life only, the South Australian National 
Parks and Wild Life Act protects both animals and plants. 
Nevertheless, as a general rule, in Australia, State laws, including environmental 
laws, do not apply to the federal military.1301 The Commonwealth assesses the 
environmental impact of projects un
rsity Conservation Act of 1999.1302 
 
 
5. Air Pollution Control 
 
Air can be polluted by both routine and accidental activities of civilians and 
military personnel. Many national laws seek to preserve air quality by controlling 
harmful activities, including those of armed forces.  
In Korea, for instance, an “Atmospheric Pollution Warning” can be issued 
whenever the “atmospheric pollution exceeds the environmental standards [prescribed b
the same law], and might cause any grave danger and injury to the health and property of 
residents or the breeding and growth of the animals and plants.”1303 Only civilian health
                  
rding to Article 11 (4) of the Military Maneuver Act, “public right” means: “any right of 
navigation, anchoring, or fishing.” 
1298 The Singaporian Military Maneuvers Act, Cap. 182, 1985 Rev. Ed. (1963), Article 11 (4).  
1297 Acco
1299 Mindy L. Jayne, Environmental Law of South Australia, in Comparative Environmental Law 
ronment, Heritage and Aboriginal
1302 Id. 
1303 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-57. 
14-SAU-16 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 2000). 
1300 Id., at SAU-16. 
1301 Information given to the author by Mr. John Scanlon, on May 24, 2001, Mr. Scanlon is freelance 
consultant and a strategic advisor. He was the Chief Executive of the Australian Department for 
Envi  Affairs from 1997-2000. 
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and property is addressed by this provision; the Atmospheric Pollution Warning is not 
applicable to the Korean military.  
In Russia, the law On Air Protection, which was adopted in 1999, provide
establishing standards for air quality and emissions limitation. Its provisions call for 
inventory of sources of emissions, and the registration of pollutants.
s for 
an 
logical and other effects of the pollution likely to cause 
unfavo
thorities may prevent activities causing serious air pollution. For 
exampl sition of 
ing 
6 
 suspend some laws under certain circumstances. It does not define which laws 
can be suspended. However, theoretically, environmental laws may be suspended as other 
nflicts, Russian environmental laws can be 
suspended by the President of the State. However, that power has, to date, not been 
exercis e, 
activities involving State secrets are exempt from EIA procedures or public disclosure 
                                                          
1304 There is no 
exemption for Russian military from the law, since its goal is to prevent and reduce 
“harmful chemical, physical, bio
rable consequences for human beings, the national economy, and the flora and 
fauna [not of the national jurisdiction, but] of the world.”1305 Therefore, any military 
action that affects human beings, fauna, or flora is governed by this provision. 
Environmental au
e, a violation of the Russian law On Air Protection “may result in impo
additional emission limits or even a prohibition of the entire operation or activity caus
pollution if public health is deemed to be in danger by any administrative agency.”130
Again, it appears that the Russian Law On Air Protection does not exempt military from 
its jurisdiction, since it is applies to “any administrative agency.”  
Note should be made of the Law On Defense, which was adopted in 1996 
amended in 1999. That statute includes provisions that authorize the President of the 
country to
laws. Moreover, in times of armed co
ed. One commentator has suggested that during the war in Chechnya, for instanc
no one cared about compliance with environmental laws anyway; thus, suspension of 
those laws was unnecessary.1307 
As for peacetime, the Russian military operates as other organizations. However, 
1304 supra 
al Law, 
s]. 
e Russian Federation, in Comparative 
holas A. Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Robinson, 
 Krasnova, note (1282). 
1305 Nicholas A. Robinson, Environmental Law of Belarus, in Comparative Environment
10 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Robinson, Environmental Law of Belaru
1306 Nicholas Robinson, Environmental Law of th
En
viron
vironmental Law 12 (Nic
En mental Law of the Russian Federation]. 
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laws. For instance, radioactive materials are specifically included in by the law On Sta
Secrets dated 1996.
te 
ir 
the 
aration that requires each State not to harm another nation’s environment. 
Under  
hreaten to 
e 
lic 
g 
Damaging the water body may be caused by dangerous or harmful methods of 
osives or poisons is prohibited as a 
                                                                                                            
1308  
However, other legal systems do explicitly cover air pollution that has 
transboundary effects. For example, in Canada, CEPA “prevent[s] air pollution from 
sources that emit air contaminants in Canada that are likely to create air pollution in 
another country.”1309 This provision explicitly holds Canadian sources responsible for a
pollution caused in another country, and represents an application of Principle 21 of 
Stockholm Decl
CEPA, it would appear that Canadian military operations are also subject to that
restraint. 
 
6. Water Resources Conservation 
 
Many national laws seek to control or prohibit human activities that t
harm water resources. For example, Article 1 of the Korean Water Conservation Act 
defines its goal as “preventing potential danger and injury to the national health and the 
environment due to the pollution of water and by properly managing and preserving th
quality of public waterways such as rivers, lakes, marshes, etc.”1310 Accordingly, any 
activity that pollutes the water body in ways that cause potential danger or injure pub
health and the environment is prohibited. It aims “to enable all the citizens of the nation 
to live in a healthy and comfortable environment.”1311 However, the statutes says nothin
about the health and the environment of other nations. Moreover, this provision uses the 
criteria of causing “potential damage,” without enumerating the polluters. The Korean 
Water Conservation Act exempts military from compliance, so it applies to civilian 
activities only. 
fishing. For example, in Singapore, the use of expl
                                                                 
supra note (1282). 
 & Hamilton, supra note (1273) at 16. 
1307 Krasnova, 
1308 Id. 
1309 Handy
1310 So, Environmental Law, supra note (1272) at KOR-94. 
1311 Id. 
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method of trapping fish.1312 Most of such fishing is done illegally by civilians, but 
military maneuvers also can cause a massive marine pollution by using ammunition and 
sea-bed
 
1313 is 
 the 
, which governs 
pollutio
 
nt, or prevent recreational enjoyment of the sea.”1316 Oil is another 
threat t
sed 
 
rson [from] throw[ing], or caus[ing] to flow, into or near a 
water r nce 
                                                          
 mines. The Singaporian law applies equally to civilian and military activities.    
Using bodies of water for the dumping of waste is another source of 
environmental damaging. In the Netherlands, the Sea Water Pollution Act, which governs
ocean dumping by ships and aircraft and the incineration of waste by ships at sea,
designed to prevent toxic and non-biodegradable waste from being disposed of in
sea.1314 Furthermore, the Act for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships
n of the sea by harmful materials discharged from ships,1315 is applicable to 
military activities, such as maneuvers, and spreading in the sea of water explosives. This 
Act defines harmful materials as those which “are dangerous to the public health, harm
the marine environme
o water bodies. The Nigerian Navigable Water Act1317 considers as a guilty of an 
offense any persons responsible for “any oil or mixture containing oil […] discharged 
into waters […] from any vessel, or from any place on land or from any apparatus u
for transferring oil from or to any vessel [.]”1318 Military vessels could be subjected to 
this provision in case of accident, or for using oil pollution as a weapon in warfare.  
The Israeli Water Law, instead of defining harmful substances, adopted a general
rule that prevents “[any] pe
esource any liquid, solid, or gaseous substance or deposit[ing] any such substa
in or near it.”1319 The language of this provision prevents disposal of any kind of 
materials whether solid, liquid or gaseous, hazardous or not, in or near the water 
resources, and applied to military as well as non-military activities.  
mental Law, supra note (1263) at SIN-40. 
igerianlaw/oilwater/oilwater2.html>, (last visit Feb. 23, 2001). 
 Water Law of 1959, art. 20B (b), available at 
http://www1.huji.ac.il/www_teva_law/fresh_water.html>, (last visit Feb. 24, 2001) 
e Israeli Water Law]. 
1312 Heng, Environ
1313 Luigies, supra note (1283) at 26-7. 
1314 Id., at 27. 
1315 Id. 
1316 Id. 
1317 Pace Law School Virtual Library, Oil in Navigable Water Act, art. 3, 1968, No. 34, available at 
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/n
1318 Id., art. 3 (1). 
1319 The Israeli
<wysiwyg://41/
[hereinafter Th
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Unlike the Israeli Water Law, the Nigerian Harmful Waste Act of 1988, does no
define gaseous materials as hazardous wastes. It provides that “dump[ing] harmful wast
under this act if [a person] deposits or dumps the harmful waste, whether solid, semi-
solid or liquid[.]”
t 
e 
ces of 
y 
and 
 a specific court that examines disputes relevant to the 
protect
he 
urces can be 
son 
r 
25 
1320 
Water resources protection in Israel is based on the principle that “[a]ll sour
water in Israel are public property,”1321 and that “every person is entitled to receive and 
use water.”1322 This right is not unlimited, but persons who use the water resources 
should assure that their usage “does not lead to the salination or depletion [of the water 
resources].”1323 The fact that water resources are declared public property means that an
damage or pollution to the water will be considered as a trespass to public property, 
can be punished as such.  
Disputes over water resources are handled differently by different countries. 
However, it is rare to find
ion of water resources only. An unusual example of such a court is found in the 
Israeli “Tribunal for Water Affairs, established by the Ministry of Justice [to execute] t
Water Law [and] the Drainage and Flood Control Law.”1324  
As with other kinds of environmental protection efforts, water reso
protected either by precautionary or preventive measures. For example, Article 20C of 
the Israeli Water Law focuses on precautionary measures. It provides that “[a] per
who has under his control any installation for the production, supply, transportation o
storage of water or for recharging subsoil water resources shall take all reasonable 
measures to prevent such installation or its operation from causing water pollution.”13
In contrast, the Austria Water Law focuses on preventive measures, by providing that 
“[any] person [who] causes water contamination (Verursacher), or causes the imminent 
endangerment (Konkrete Gefahr) of water […] is obliged to immediately undertake all 
measures necessary to prevent the spread contamination already caused, or prevent 
                                                          
1320 Pace Law School Virtual Library, Nigerian Harmful Waste Act, 1988 No. 42, 
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerianlaw/waste/waste.html> (last visit Feb. 23, 2001) [hereinafter 
Nigerian Harmful Waste Act]. 
ater Law, supra note (1319) art. 1. 1321 The Israeli W
1322 Id., art. 3. 
1323 Id., art. 5.  
1324 Id., art. 5. 
1325 Id., art. 20C. 
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contamination from occurring in the first instance, and must also immediately noti
relevant authorities.”
fy the 
 measures are necessary to protect and 
sustain
 
nder) is obligated to 
notify the Federal Environment Ministry of suspected contaminated sites 
). These sites are then prioritized for action based on an environmental 
investigation.”1327 The Israeli Water Law goes beyond that. “[It gives] the Water 
Commissioner, [if he] is satisfied that any 
provision in the hands of the Comm
s caused by m
ple, 
                                                          
1326 In fact, both kinds of
 water resources. 
As an example of a federal system, the Water Law of Austria established a kind of
coordination between local and federal authorities. Under that statute, each “governor 
(Landeshauptmann) of each of the nine states in Austria (Bundesla
(Verdachtsflachen
of the provisions of section 9 is not being 
complied with, [the right to…] take steps to prevent immediate serious damage to a water 
resource if such damage cannot be prevented in any other way.”1328 Thus, in order to 
prevent any immediate serious damage to the water resource, the Israeli law does not 
depend only on the involved persons, but gives the Water Commissioner the right to take 
the necessary measures. However, this provision lacks three elements: first, it does not 
define “immediate serious damage”; second, it does not indicate the steps required to be 
taken by the Water Commissioner; and finally, it does not describe the commissioner’s 
intervention as a duty, but only as an option, thus putting the effectiveness of this 
issioner. 
Unless specifically exempted, the Israeli Water Law applies to military 
operations, and if the immediate water pollution cannot be stopped in any other way, the 
Israeli Water Commissioner can prevent it by taking necessary steps, even though such 
pollution wa ilitary activities. 
 
7. Soil Pollution 
Many harmful human activities occur on the ground, including armed forces 
activities on military bases. National legislation attempts to reduce this risk. For exam
in the Netherlands, a number of Royal Decrees contain rules regarding the use and 
1326 Willibald Plesser, Environmental Law of Austria, in Comparative Environmental Law 16 
96). (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 19
1327 Id., at 17. 
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protection of the soil. There are rules for (1) the disposal of waste matter on or in the soil;
(2) the addition of matter to the soil in ord
 
er to influence the structure or the quality of the 
soil; (3) activities carried out on or in the soil, including clearing or construction of 
s, ground work, or activities using materials that may pollute the 
soil; (4) transport of certain matter by pipeline or vehicles; and (5) the performance of 
activiti
t and restrict the 
problem
that Act, the provincial executive has not only the “authority to carry out site evaluations 
t also] to stop activities resulting in soil contamination[.]”1331 This 
authority should be based on an environmental assessment of the suspected damage on 
such si
, 
sives, 
                                                                          
pipelines or storage tank
es that incidentally introduce substances into the soil.1329  
Those goals are enforced by the Soil Protection Act of the Netherlands, which 
provides that “anyone who carries out the aforementioned activities on or in the soil and 
who knows or reasonably should suspect that the soil may be affected or polluted, is 
obliged to take all measures reasonably required to prevent, restrict, or remedy the 
problem.”1330 This article adopts both precautionary measures to preven
, and remedial measure to rehabilitate the contaminated site. Many military 
activities can affect the structure of the soil and pollute it, and the Act appears to apply to 
such activities. The Interim Act on Soil Cleanup also applies to military operations; under 
and cleanups, [bu
tes. Similarly, in the United States, army bases are subject to soil protection rules 
under CERCLA and other legislation.1332 
 
8. Hazardous Wastes 
 
Armed forces often produce large quantities of hazardous wastes, and national 
laws often seek to regulate the production of such wastes. For example, the Hazardous 
Substances Act of the Netherlands “regulates the transport, packaging, delivery, storage
and removal of dangerous substances, as well as the handling of ammunition, explo
                                                                                                   
w Rules will be discussed in Section 3. 
1328 The Israeli Water Law, supra note (1319) art. 11 (2). 
1329 Luigies, supra note (1283) at 29. 
1330 Id. 
1331 Id., at 30. 
1332 The United States National Environmental La
 239
and fireworks in order to protect public safety and health.”1333 Since armed forces deal 
with the ammunition and explosives they should be subject to this Act. 
For 
ght 
g the armed forces] and private parties for damage to their 
health a
ental 
. 
o 
recogni
Similarly, the Radiation Protection Act of Singapore prohibits the accumulation 
of radioactive waste.1334 This provision eliminates the accumulation of radioactive waste 
produced by military activities, and minimizes the environmental risk of such substances.  
 
9. Citizen Suits 
  
Some national jurisdictions authorize their citizens to invoke environmental law 
provisions by means of citizen suits. Others extend this right even to foreigners. 
example, the Ukrainian Environmental Protection Act of 1991 gives standing to its 
citizens only to sue in environmental matters.1335 It “grant[s] citizens of Ukraine the ri
to sue state bodies [includin
nd property.”1336 Consequently, any environmental damage caused by military 
activities to citizen health and property is subject to citizen suit. However, non-citizens 
are excluded from this right. In contrast, the Canadian CEPA addresses “environment, 
human life, and health,”1337without any restriction as to the citizenship of persons 
involved. Therefore, any person who has sustained environmental damage or loss of life 
or health can bring suit against polluters.  
A different approach is reflected in the Israeli Act of Prevention of Environm
Nuisance, which excludes individual citizens from filing suits in environmental matters
It gives this right only to groups of people.1338 The Magistrate Court of Israel can dismiss 
any action in which “the size of the group does not justify submission of the action as a 
class action.”1339 While perhaps promoting judicial efficiency, this approach grant n
tion of any individual’s right to sue. 
                                                          
1333 Luigies, supra note (1283) at 36. 
1334 Heng, Environmental Law, supra note (1263) at SIN-29. 
1335 Nicholas Robinson, Environmental Law of Ukraine, in Comparative Environmental Law 10 
(Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Robinson, Environmental Law of Ukraine]. 
nmental Law 
 Robinson ed., 1998) [hereinafter Robinson, Environmental Law of Ukraine]. 
1338 The Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance, supra note (1274) art. 10. 
1339 Id., art. 10 (2). 
1336 Nicholas A. Robinson, Environmental Law of Ukraine, in Comparative Enviro
10 (Nicholas A.
1337 Handy & Hamilton, supra note (1273) at 15. 
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The European Union offers different example of the role of citizen suits to protect 
environmental integrity. The comprehensive format of the EU’s Directives and 
Regulations is similar in many ways to the U.S. Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the environmental impact assessmen
requirement of NEPA.
t 
le 
1341 states that: “[m]ember States 
shall ensure that, when a radiological emergency occurs, the population actually affected 
is informed without delay of the facts of the emergency, of the steps to be taken and, as 
appropriate to the case in point, of the health-protection measures applicable to it.” 
emarkably, the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on the 
Environment, Security, and Foreign Policy in 1996. The Resolution calls on “the military 
to end environmentally damaging activities and clean up polluted areas and urges 
[m]emb easures to support this, in particular, by applying civil 
environmental legislation to all military activities.”1342 The Resolution calls upon the EU 
States to eliminate nuclear weapons, and protect the environment from unnecessary 
destruction in times of armed conflicts.1343 Additionally, the Resolution asks the military 
to end all activities which damage the environment and argues that the principle of 
“polluter pays” should apply to military activities.1344 
evertheless, some of the EU’s Directives exempt armed forces from compliance. 
For instance, the Council Directive on the Harmonization of the Provisions Relating to 
1340 
The EU States recognized the environmental protection as a priority by adopting 
the Precautionary Principle as a basis for their environmental policies. Pursuant to Artic
130r (2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community “Community policy on the 
environment is based on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at the 
source, and that the polluter should pay.” 
The EU’s Directive adopted public disclosure and participation in decision-
making. Article 6 (1) of the Council Directive 89/618
R
er States to take m
N
                                                          
1340 Robinson, International Environmental Legal Trends, supra note (1123) at 530. 
1341 Council Directive 89/618/Euratom of 27 Nov. 1989 on Informing the General Public About H
Protection Measures to be Applied and Steps to be
ealth 
 Taken in the Event of A Radiological Emergency.  
 Resolution on the Environment, Security and Foreign Policy, EUR.PARL.DOC. (PE R4-
9, EP Vote 1st Reading) (Jan. 28, 1999). 
1343 Id. 
1342 The
0005/199
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the Placing on the Market and Supervision of Explosives for Civil Uses does not apply to 
 use, in accordance with national law, by 
the arm d 
 the 
 
 
E
necessa
m tions 
in particu
, along with the national environmental law 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“explosives, including ammunition, intended for
ed forces or the police.”1345 While political consideration may demand this kin
of exemption, it undercuts the effectiveness of environmental regulations, since
military can conduct environmentally damaging activities without considering 
environmental standards and limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- National Environmental Law Rules 
After discussing international and comparative environmental law rules, it is 
ry to outline national environmental law rules, in order to examine the 
echanisms applicable to environmental laws and regulations, and to military opera
lar, of each nation individually. 
As a Kuwaiti scholar pursuing my education in the United States, I have opted to 
examine the national environmental law rules, federal regulations, and case law of the 
U.S. as an example of developed countries
 
1344 Id. 
1345 Council Directive 93/15/EEC of Apr. 5, 1993, on the Harmonization of the Provisions Relating the 
Placing on the Market and Supervision of Explosives for Civil Uses. 
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rules of Kuwait as an example of developing countries. Therefore, this analysis involves 
the Am ican example, an idealistic example, which extends the application of 
environ
pply 
well as those that have extraterritorial application. For example, when the 
United States establishes a military base in another nation, it enters into two 
relationships. The first is wi ed by a formal 
agreem t. The second relationship is with that host country’s natural environment, as 
it is tha
both 
 
environ  host country. 
A
o  
A  
A
a
aim 
a lar, 
th
th  Clean 
Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. In addition, the War Crimes Act which 
considers as criminal attack on certain kinds of public properties, we will also be 
nvironmental Policy Act 
er
mental statutes and regulations to all sectors including military activities, as well 
as the Kuwaiti example, which is much less comprehensive. 
 
1. The United States National Environmental Statutes 
 
The following subsection will evaluate U.S. environmental statutes that a
at home as 
th the host country, and is usually secur
en
t environment upon which the base will be situated. Military activity on or 
around the base can, and does, have an environmental impact. This impact occurs 
during periods of peace and of conflict, and it can be subject to international
mental law, the laws of the United States, and the laws of the
ctivities occurring on the base may affect the base directly or the environment 
utside the military base. Activities directly affecting the military base are subject to
merican laws. Activities that affect the environment outside the base could be subject to
merican law or the host country’s laws. 
. The Application of the U.S. Environmental Statutes at Home 
 
The United States has many stringent environmental laws and standards that 
t protecting, restoring, and cleaning up the environment. We will examine, in particu
e National Environmental Policy Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
e Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the
considered. 
 
1) National E
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 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 is the majo
environmental statute. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) recognizes 
NEPA as “our basic national charter for protection of the environment.”
r U.S. 
d 
 
federal government to 
“utilize
 
each fe
Section 101 (b) states that it is the “continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use erations of 
nationa  
r, 
urity 
  
1346 
We can classify the purpose of NEPA into three categories: 
First, it establishes a national policy for all federal agencies, requiring them to 
use “all practical means…to create and maintain conditions under which man an
nature can exist in productive harmony.”1347 Second, it also sets out a number of broad
environmental protection goals, requiring all agencies of the 
 a systematic, interdisciplinary approach…in planning and decision-making 
which may have an impact on man’s environment.” 1348 Finally, it establishes the 
CEQ,1349 which assists the President in preparing an annual environmental quality
report to Congress, along with recommendations for improvements. NEPA directs 
deral agency to prepare an EIS for all “proposals for legislation and other major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”1350 
NEPA does not exempt any facility or agency from compliance.1351 NEPA 
 all practicable means, consistent with other consid
l policy, to improve and coordinate federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources” to protect and enhance a variety of environmental values.”1352 Moreove
when Congress enacted NEPA, it promoted efforts to “prevent or eliminate damage to 
the environment or biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man,”1353 
regardless of the source of that damage. Therefore, NEPA applies to national sec
activities, even though the statute does not say so explicitly. 
One of NEPA’s purposes is to require all federal agencies to prepare an EIS, 
which is supposed to describe the proposed federal action, identify the environmental 
                                                        
46 40 C.F.R. §1500.1(a). 13
1347 NEPA §101 (a), 42 U.S.C.§ 4331(a). 
1348 NEPA §102 (2)(A), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2) (A). 
) (C). 
332(2). 
1349 NEPA §201, 42 U.S.C.§ 4341. 
1350 NEPA  §102 (2)(C), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2
1351 NEPA §102 (2), 42 U.S.C.§ 4
1352 NEPA § 101 (b), 42 U.S.C.§ 4331 (b). 
1353 NEPA §2, 42 U.S.C.§ 4321. 
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impacts of the proposed action, and consider alternatives and their environmental 
impact. It forces agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actio
Indeed, military installations and facilities generate huge amounts of haza
wastes that can directly affect human health and the environment. Thus, American 
legislators did not exempt military activities from being subject to EIS procedures. 
 
2) The Resource Conservation and Rec
ns.  
rdous 
overy Act 
title (C) of RCRA 
govern
nt when improperly 
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.”1355 
Federal agenci astes that  
govern verybody else. The D t of ordinary garbage 
that is
in 
If U.S. military bases abroad produce hazardous waste which constitutes a 
hazard to human health and the environment, RCRA should apply, since its broad 
1359 regardless of location. 
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 aims at protecting 
human health and environment by regulating the management of hazardous waste 
from its generation through disposal, or from “cradle to grave.” Sub
s hazardous waste.1354 According to the statute, wastes are “hazardous” if they 
pose a significant threat to human health or the environme  “
es are subject to the same rules for handling solid w
 e epartment of Defense produces a lo
 “recycled, incinerated, or sent to sanitary landfills. It also generates large 
amounts of hazardous wastes in its different activities.”1356 RCRA insures federal 
facility compliance with “all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements, both 
substantive and procedural…in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any 
person is subject to such requirements.”1357 However, “the president may exempt any 
solid waste management facility of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the 
executive branch from compliance with a such requirement if he determines it to be 
the paramount interest of the United States to do so.”1358 
language applies to all federal facilities,
                                                          
1354 RCRA §§ 3001-3020, 42 U.S.C.§§ 6921-6939. 
1355 RCRA §1004(5), 42 U.S.C.§ 6903(5). 
1356 Dycus, supra note (4) at 60. 
1357 RCRA § 6001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). 
1358 RCRA § 6001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). 
1359 RCRA § 6001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). 
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 Few amendments to RCRA’s provisions would be necessary to accommod
extraterritorial application in status-of-forces agreements.
ate 
t 
(C
s
is lies 
to cy, 
a l 
b the 
s
n
P
a
lthough CERCLA remedial action is expensive, cleanup costs incurred by the 
federal government may be charge ast or present owner of a 
site, or a generator or transporter of the released contaminant.1365 Liability is strict, 
joint, 
 
environment in peacetime military activities is not exempt from CERCLA liability. In 
1360 
 
 
3) The Comprehensive Environmental Response,  
Compensation, and Liability Act 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Ac
ERCLA) of 19801361 authorizes remediation of sites contaminated with hazardous 
ubstances,1362 and it imposes liability for cleanup costs. The CERCLA cleanup process 
 activated by any “release of a hazardous substance”1363into the environment. It app
 federal hazardous waste sites as well as nonfederal sites. “Each department, agen
nd instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicia
ranches of the government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in 
ame manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any 
ongovernmental entity.”1364 In point of fact, CERCLA provides for a remediating 
otentially Responsible Party (PRP) to pursue cost recovery actions under section 107, 
nd actions for contribution under section 113, against other PRPs. 
A
d to PRPs, including any p
and several. Defenses to liability are limited to acts of God, war, and an act or 
omission of a third party.1366 Consequently, if the release or the threat of release of 
hazardous substances was caused in times of war, there is no liability under CERCLA.
In contrast, the release or the threat of release of a hazardous substance which may 
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare of the 
                                                          
1360 Some provisions in RCRA deal with extraterritorial application. See, Section III (A) of this paper. 
ugh the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
at are: toxic, flammable, corrosive, or reactive, except for 
14). 
03 (a). 
LA §107 (b), 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 (b). 
1361 In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA thro
(SARA), Pub. L. 99499, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat.1615. 
1362 Hazardous substance included all materials th
oil or petroleum products. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(
1363 CERCLA § 103 (a), 42 U.S.C.§ 96
1364 CERCLA § 120 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C.§ 9620 (a) (1). 
1365 CERCLA § 120 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C.§ 9620 (a) (1). 
1366 CERC
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one case, “the federal government was held jointly liable for cleanup costs at a 
National Priority List (NPL) site contaminated during World War II by a company that 
manufactured rayon for the war effort under close government supervision.”1367 A
person or a state can file a suit in federal court to enforce compliance with CERCLA 
or with any regulation, order, or standard issued under CERCLA.
ny 
 water 
pollution control where federal agencies work with States and other agencies to prepare 
programs to reduce, eliminate, and  the surface, navigable 
and underground water and to maintain their sanitary conditions.1369 The discharge of any 
polluta
till 
 
sure 
 
 an d 
1368 
 
4) The Clean Water Act 
 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 contains a comprehensive program of
 prevent water pollution from
nt1370by any person is unlawful unless permitted to do so by variance or 
permit.1371 Even if the discharge results from an inspection of a facility, there would s
be a violation.1372 Thus, permit application must be submitted to ensure the State water
quality standards are not violated. Permits may not be issued if the facility cannot en
compliance with water quality standards of all affected States.1373 It is clear that Section
301 of the CWA does not exempt the Department of Defense from compliance, since it 
applies inclusively to all federal agencies. Therefore, U.S. military personnel are 
prohibited from discharging any pollutant into the surface, navigable d undergroun
water, a particularly important provision since preparation for warfare often contaminates 
the water body with discharged materials, fuel, debris, and other toxic substances. 
 
5) Endangered Species Act 
 
                                                          
1367 FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471(E.D. Pa.1992), aff’d 1994 WL 
314814 (3d Cir.). Dycus, supra note (4) at 88. 
1368 CERCLA §§121 (e)(2), 310, 42 U.S.C.§§ 9621 (e)(2), 9659. 
1369 CWA § 102, 33 U.S.C. § 1252. 
sical substance and even non-physical substances such as heat. There 
WA § 502 (6), 33 U.S.C. § 
hings?, supra note (341) at 505. 
 
1370 Pollutant include almost any phy
is no requirement that the pollutant cause adverse environmental effects. See, C
1362 (2). 
1371 CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
1372 Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of these T
1373 CWA § 301 (b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(C).
 247
The Endangered Species Act (E  endangered and threatened 
species and protects their ecosystems to ensure their survival. Section 2 (c)(1) of the 
Endang ral 
nd shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.” 
Section
e 
11 allows any person, regardless of citizenship, to bring a cause of action in U.S. 
courts f l federal 
 
m 
6) War Crimes Act 
Section 2401 of the Act states that “whoever whether inside or outside the United 
States, commits a war crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any 
t to the penalty of 
death.” 
A
in
c e 
G e 
  
SA) of 1973 defines
ered Species Act states that “[i]t is […] the policy of Congress that all Fede
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened 
species a
 7 requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) when a proposed action may jeopardiz
an endangered or threatened species, or destroy their critical habitat.1374 In addition, 
Section 
or any act violating ESA provisions.1375 Again, this statute applies to al
agencies, including the military. Thus, if a military base or installation was built on an
endangered species habitat, the ESA may require that it be removed to another location. 
In addition, during armed conflicts, American armed forces are similarly prohibited fro
harming the endangered species habitat, or attacking protected areas.1376  
 
 
The War Crimes Act1377 (WCA) of 1996 carries out the U.S. international 
obligation under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to establish criminal penalties for war 
crimes. 
term or years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall be subjec
 “war crime” means any act “defined as a grave breach in any of the 
ternational conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such 
onvention to which the United States is a party[…]”1378 According to Article 50 of th
eneva Convention I, Article 51 of the Geneva Convention II, and Article 147 of th
                                                        
74 ESA § 7 (a), 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 13
1375 ESA § 11 (g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g). 
1376 ESA § 9 (a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a) (1) (B). 
1377 War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104. 
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G n 
a t 
u
U  during armed conflicts whether 
internati bligation 
of protec r crime. Thus, it constrains the 
U.S. arm d forces from destroying properties or causing unnecessary environmental 
harm. 
 
b. The E
n 
problems. 
ve 
ly 
ign claimants provision, and  
quirement entails the extraterritorial 
applica
recommendation or report on proposals for…major federal actions significantly 
                                                            
eneva Convention IV, “grave breaches” are those which involve “extensive destructio
nd appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried ou
nlawfully and wantonly.” 
nder that statute, environmental destruction
onal or internal can be considered a grave breach of the international o
ting the natural environment, and therefore a wa
e
xtraterritorial Application of the U.S. Environmental Statutes 
 
Many U.S. environmental laws do not explicitly state that their protectio
extends to include extraterritorial sites. That lack of specificity can create 
Some regulations do explicitly apply to overseas sites. For instance, DoD Directi
6050.7, entitled “Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense 
Actions,” imposes NEPA-like requirements on major DoD actions that may adverse
affect the environment of a foreign nation, a protected natural or ecological resource 
of global importance, or the global commons. This subsection will deal with 
provisions of law that do explicitly apply to overseas facilities: 
-NEPA’s language and legislative history, 
-RCRA’s exportation of hazardous waste, and citizen suit provision, 
-CERCLA’s fore
 
1) NEPA’s Language and Legislative History 
 
Both the requirement of EIS, and NEPA’s language and legislative history, 
urge the statute’s application abroad. The EIA re
tion of NEPA: Section 102 (2)(C)(i) requires that, “to the fullest extent 
possible…all agencies of the federal government shall…include in every 
                                                                                                                 
1378 War Crimes Act, § 2401(c)(2)(A). 
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affecting the quality of human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible 
official on the environmental impact of the proposed action.”1379 According to this 
language, NEPA does not require a federal agency to assess every impact or effect of 
its proposed action, but only those that may have a major impact on the environmen
The application of Section 102 requires an examination of the relationship between the
agency’s action and the change in the physical environment it causes. If an action i
likely to cause a change in the physical environment, then the agency is required to 
prepare a detailed EIS. 
This sweeping language also ensures that every agency will maintain th
relevant environmental information necessary to make decisions on proposed action
Similarly, the Council on En
t. 
 
s 
e 
s. 
vironmental Quality guidelines requires federal 
agencie
e, 
t of 
ce, 
e 
 in the coastal areas which may significantly harm 
the mar r 
                                              
s to assess the environmental effects of any proposed action "as it affects both 
the national and international environment."1380 
The U.S. Military has also developed an environmental ethic.1381 For exampl
the U.S. Army has a comprehensive program for factoring environmental 
consideration into its decision-making and operations.1382 It requires an environmental 
impact assessment of peaceful operations that may affect the environment, even when 
the impact occurs outside U.S. territory. Other countries have adopted the concep
environmental impact assessment first developed in the U.S.1383 to encourage their 
agencies to consider the possible environmental harm of their activities. For instan
the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution1384urges member States to include an assessment of th
environmental impact of any project
ine environment.1385 In addition, the Åarhus Convention1386requires membe
            
 § 102 (2) (C) (i), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2) (C) (i). 
 (3) (i) (1977). 
 supra note (1139). 
1379 NEPA
1380 38 Fed. Reg. 20553 (1973), 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (a)
a note (626) at 154. 1381 Diederich, supr
1382 Id. 
1383 Id. 
1384 Kuwait Regional Convention,
1385 Id., art. XI (a). 
1386 Åarhus Convention, supra note (867). 
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States to subject their activities concerning “environmental matters” to national or 
transboundary EIA procedures.1387 
 and 
 
ral 
 
ts 
s,” and it recognizes 
that act lend 
f 
he legislative history suggests the same conclusion. In the Senate debate, 
Senator H
together, the provisions of section 102 direct any federal agency which takes action 
that it m lity 
g 
sideration of NEPA emphasizes the importance of extending 
NEPA’
 it 
political and geographical frontiers.”1391 
NEPA’s language shows Congress’ concern with the global environment
the worldwide character of environmental problems. The purpose of NEPA is to
"declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony 
between man and his environment...."1388 The Act requires all agencies of the Fede
Government to prepare EIS for major federal actions "affecting the quality of the
human environment."1389 However, it does not explicitly provide that its requiremen
are to apply extraterritorially. NEPA requires federal agencies to "recognize the 
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problem
ions should, “consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, 
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize 
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality o
mankind’s world environment.”1390 
T
enry M. Jackson, the principal sponsor of NEPA, declared that: “taken 
ust take into account environmental management and environmental qua
considerations.” 
Furthermore, the comment of the State Department’s spokesman durin
congressional con
s reach abroad: “The department wishes to call attention to the fact, moreover, 
that the objective of the bill or, for that matter, of any proposition dedicated to the 
protection of the national environment, cannot be effectively achieved unless
recognizes that existing ecosystems are interrelated by nature or by the activities of 
man, and that the environmental forces affecting our natural resources disregard 
                                                          
1387 Id., art. 6 (2)(e). 
1388 NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C.§ 4321. 
1389 NEPA § 102 (2)(C), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2) (C). 
1390 NEPA § 102 (2) (F), 42 U.S.C.§ 4332 (2) (F). 
1391 William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations for the Department o
st st
f State, 
r Henry M. Jackson, reprinted in S.Rep. No.296, 91  Cong., 1  Sess., App. at 43 (1969). Letter to Senato
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Thus, NEPA’s language and legislative history strongly suggest the 
extraterritorial applicability of the statute, and that “Congress intended to bring all 
activities of foreign affairs agencies, even those taking place entirely within the 
territorial jurisdiction of another nation, within the scope of the Act.”1392 
s: 
 as 
g congressional debate on the hazardous waste provision, Representative 
Barbara s from the ill 
effects 
ents to RCRA]. We should take an equally firm stand on the transportation of 
hazardo 1394
.S. environment. RCRA’s stringent provisions protect not only 
U.S. te
ntry unless that country has agreed otherwise. Even 
where s
  
 
2) RCRA’s Exportation of Hazardous Waste, and Citizen Suit Provision
 
The plain language of RCRA, and its legislative history, suggest that the 
citizen suit provision and the exportation of hazardous waste provision were passed
part of a single bill,1393 which indicate a congressional intent to apply RCRA 
extraterritorially. 
Durin
 A. Mikulski stated that “our own country will have safeguard
of hazardous waste upon passage of [the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendm
us waste bound for export to other countries.”  This statement indicates 
congressional intent to protect the global commons and worldwide environment, as 
well as protecting the U
rritory from hazardous wastes, but protect foreign countries as well from 
hazardous waste transportation.1395  
Section 6938 (a)-(f) of RCRA prohibits the exporting of any hazardous waste 
from the U.S. to a foreign cou
uch an agreement applies, the exporter must provide the following information 
to EPA: the types and the estimated quantities of hazardous waste to be exported, the 
manner in which the hazardous waste will be transported to and treated, stored, or 
disposed in the receiving country, and the identification of the final treatment, storage 
                                                        
1392 Nicholas A. Robinson, Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligation of Foreign Affair 
 NEPA, 7 J. Int’l L.& Pol. 257, at 265 (1974). 
 the Law? Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental 
, 6 Geo. Int’l. Envtl. L. Rev. 455, 480 (1994). 
1395 RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C.§ 6938. 
Agencies: The Unfulfilled Mandate of
1393 Jennifer A. Purvis, Note, The Long Arm of
Legislation to Human Activity in Outer Space
1394 Id., at 479. 
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or disposal facility.1396 Then the Secretary of the State, acting on behalf of EPA, is 
required to  
1-Forward a copy of the notification to the receiving country, 
2-Advise that government of the U.S. prohibition against exporting without 
consent, 
3-Describe to the eral regulations 
which would apply to the treatment, storage, and disposal of the hazardous waste in 
the Uni
 or 
n 
erson 
) the 
o is 
ent, 
t regard to the citizenship of the parties to 
enforce the provision,1400 and the use of the term “any person” indicates congressional 
lly. 
These two sections together suggest that a foreign citizen can sue the U.S. 
gover
eign Claimants Provision: 
 
CERCLA authorizes U.S. claimants1401 to sue in the U.S. courts. The citizen 
suit provision grants standing to any person to commence a civil action on his own 
 government of the receiving country the fed
ted States, and 
4- Request the government to provide the Secretary with written consent
objection to the terms of the notification.1397 
When the Secretary receives the receiving country’s response, he must the
forward it to the exporter.1398 
RCRA also includes a citizen suit provision which provides that: “Any p
may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person (including (a
United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency…) wh
alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirem
prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter.”1399 The 
U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction withou
intent to apply that provision extraterritoria
nment in U.S. Federal District Court for the exportation of hazardous waste. 
 
3) CERCLA’s For
                                                          
1396 RCRA § 3017 (c), 42 U.S.C.§ 6938 (c). 
 (d). 1397 RCRA § 3017 (d), 42 U.S.C.§ 6938
1398 RCRA § 3017 (e) 42 U.S.C.§ 6938 (e). 
1399 RCRA § 7002 (a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C.§ 6972 (a) (1) (A). 
1400 RCRA § 7002 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C.§ 6972 (a) (2). 
 CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C.§ 9659. 1401
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behalf against another person, the President of the United States, or any other officer 
of the U.S. including the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for 
the vi
f the country of which the claimant is a 
citizen.1403 He can sue in the U.S. courts,1404 but only if recovery or remediation is 
authorized by a treaty  foreign 
country involved, or if the Sec ign country provides 
a comp able remedy to U.S. claimants.1405 
 
2
 
tw t home, and second, the 
rules tha
 
a. Federa  
 
M ogram, 
a
Management Program (ECAMP) 
  
                                        
olation of CERCLA requirements.1402 Similarly, under CERCLA’s foreign 
claimants provision, any foreign citizen can sue the U.S. military for releases of 
hazardous substances into the shoreline o
 or an executive agreement between the U.S. and the
retary of State decides that the fore
ar
. The United States Federal regulations 
Federal regulations and policies that apply to the U.S. military can be divided into 
o categories: first, the rules that apply to the U.S. military a
t apply to the U.S. military abroad. 
 
 
l Regulations and Policies that Apply to the U.S. Military at Home
This subsection will highlight on the Environmental Compliance Assessment and 
anagement Program, the Department of Energy Environmental Management Pr
nd the Air Force Policy Directive 32-70. 
 
1) The Environmental Compliance Assessment and 
 
                  
1402 CERCLA § 310 (a), 42 U.S.C.§ 9659 (a). 
1), (3). 
e.” 
1 (l) (4). 
1403 CERCLA § 111 (l) (1), (3), 42 U.S.C.§ 9611 (l) (
1404 See, Section III (C) of this paper, entitled “Mechanisms for Implementation of the U.S. Laws off Bas
1405 CERCLA § 111 (l) (4), 42 U.S.C.§ 961
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This Air Force initiative is a comprehensive program management system
achieving compliance with environmental laws. The Air Force issued ECAMP to help 
its installations to comply with all applicable environmental standards, as well as Do
Instructions 4715.6, the Environmental Compliance of 24 April 1996 and 7415.3, a
the Environmental Conservation Program of 3 May, 1996. 
 for 
D 
nd 
According to Chapter 1, 1.2.1., the primary objectives of ECAMP are to 
accomplish the following
-Improve Air Force environmental management to meet compliance standards 
such a
 
l, 
 
 and 
 materials production, and waste storage. Foreign military installations 
perfor
rce Policy Directive 32-70 
 
                               
: 
s those required by RCRA and CERCLA, and 
-Provide funds to meet environmental compliance requirements.   
ECAMP utilizes internal and external evaluations. Internal evaluations are the
foundation of ECAMP, and are normally conducted annually by installation personne
who have technical knowledge and background. In addition, Major Commands 
(MAJCOMs) conduct external evaluations at least once every 3 years.1406 
 
2) The Department of Energy Environmental Management Program 
 
The DoE office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for waste
management, environmental remediation, maintenance of facility safety, 
transportation, and technology development costs domestically at 137 sites in 34 
states. These facilities include sites involved in weapons research, assembly
testing, nuclear
m these very same operations; however, while the DoE’s Office of 
Environmental Management is responsible for environmental remediation at these 
sites in the U.S., no oversight agency is in place at military sites abroad. 
 
3) Air Fo
                           
truction 32-7045, Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management Program, 
Civ g, Jul. 1, 1998, chapter 2. 
1406 Air Force Ins
il Engineerin
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The Air Force Policy Directive 32-70 of 19941407 sets out the Air Force guidelines 
for maintaining environmental quality and compliance with environmental laws. 
Accordin
r
p  impacts; 
m d cultural resources it holds in public 
trust; and eliminating pollution from its activities whenever possible.” 
The D ether 
military or civilians, and contractors be in full compliance with national environmental 
policy140 l 
e
f
r
in
ates 
th
a
he irective reflects a serious commitment by the Air Force both to prevent and 
remediat
b
 
Federal Regulations, Part 855, Air Force Policy Directive 32-70, and the 
. 
ecutive Order No. 12,114 of 1979:1413 
g to 1.1. the Air Force is committed to: “cleaning up environmental damage 
esulting from its past activities; meeting all environmental standards applicable to its 
resent operations; planning its future activities to minimize environmental
anaging responsibly the irreplaceable natural an
irective requires that all Air Force Commanders, employees wh
8 in addition to their compliance with the applicable Federal, State, and loca
nvironmental laws and standards.1409 All Air Force employees are deemed responsible 
or the environmental consequences of their actions.1410 The Air Force will aim at 
educing health and environmental hazards created by past activities at each 
stallation.1411 
More significant, however, is the “pollution prevention” paragraph, which st
at “[t]he Air Force will prevent future pollution by reducing use of hazardous materials 
nd releases of pollutants into the environment to as near zero as feasible.”1412 
T  D
e environmental hazards.  
. Federal Regulations and Policies that Apply to U.S. Military Abroad 
 
This subsection will focus on President Carter’s Executive Order No. 12,114 of 
1979, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, Title 32 of the Code of
Environmental Program in Foreign Countries
 
1) President Carter’s Ex
                                                          
1407 Air Force Directive 32-70, Environmental Quality, Civil Engineering, July 20, 1994 [hereinafter Air 
Force Directive 32-70]. 
1408 Id., at 1.2. 
1409 Id., at 1.3.2. 
1410 Id., at 1.2. 
1411 Id., at 1.3.1. 
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On January 4, 1979, President Jimmy Carter ordered special implementing 
procedures when any federal agency undertakes actions overseas that affect the quality 
of the envi n 
that could affect the “global commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the 
oceans 1414 1415
 
le 
ronment. This requirement applies when the federal agency takes an actio
or Antarctica).”  This Executive Order is implemented by DoD.  Army 
Regulations state that: “the protection of the environment is an Army priority, no 
matter where the installation is located.”1416 As to the global commons, the regulations
go on to state that: “all the nations of the world share the stewardship of these 
areas.”1417 
Under Executive Order 12,114 of 1979 the Army was required to prepare a 
written assessment of the impact of its operations on the global commons. An examp
of such analysis can be found in Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone,1418 where the glob
commons environmental assessment discussed “the effects of the transportation of the 
weapons, from Germany to Johnston Atoll, on water quality, air quality, the risks o
threatened, endangered and special interest species, risks to commercial fisheries
to the human population.”
al 
f 
 and 
Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD)  
 
The “  military 
personnel at each site abroad to develop environmental standards based on DoD’s 
                           
1419 
 
2) Overseas Environmental 1420
Overseas Guidance” was issued by the Pentagon, and directed
                                                                                                                                                  
1412 Id., a
rounds of nerve gas which had been stored in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) since 1968, and  
o Johnston Atoll, to be disposed of in the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System 
t 1.3.4. 
1413 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979). 
1414 Id., para. 2-3 (a). 
1415 Department of Defense Directive 6050.7, (DoD) Final Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 21786 (1979). 
1416 Army Regulations G, H (Apr.23, 1990). 
1417 Id., para. 8-3. 
1418 In 1971, the U.S. removed its stockpile of chemical ammunitions from Okinawa, Japan, at the request 
of the Japanese Government and shipped it to Johnston Atoll, an unincorporated U.S. territory in the 
Central Pacific Ocean, approximately 800 miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii, for storage. Yet in 1986, 
President Reagan entered into an agreement with Chancellor Kohl to remove approximately 100,000 
transport them t
(JACADS). See, Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 1990) [hereinafter Greenpeace 
USA v. Stone]. 
1420 Department of Defense, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, at 1-3 (1992). 
1419 Id., at 761. 
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“suggested criteria” for pollutants. The standards for each overseas facility mus
DoD’s suggested criteria, or host country laws, whichever provides greater protection 
for the environm
t meet 
ent. Foreign standards are generally not enforceable on DoD military 
sites. However, “written findings are accepted, and corrective action is taken, if the 
condition is out of complia FGS) imminent 
and substantial danger to human health and safety.”1421 Those Final Governing 
Standar
ose 
c
e  
in ign 
c ds will 
b
o
re  
of this provision. 
 
4) Air Force Policy Directive 32-70:1424 
                    
nce with the Final Governing Standards (
ds may be those of the host country. DoD submits annual reports to Congress, 
setting out its policy of adhering to U.S. requirements at all bases, including th
located overseas. In addition, DoD requests funding annually from Congress to 
achieve environmental standards, in its overseas activities.1422 The language of this 
directive reflects a serious obligation to protect the global environment from the 
effects of military operations abroad.  
 
3) Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 855:1423 
 
 
Section 855.1.states that “civil aircraft use of Air Force airfields in foreign 
ountries will be subject to U.S. federal laws and regulations that have extraterritorial 
ffects and to applicable international agreements with the country in which the Air Force
stallation is located.” This provision considers the U.S. Air Force airfields in fore
ountries as American territory, and any U.S. civil airplane that uses these airfiel
e subject to U.S. laws as well as international treaties. On the other hand, the language 
f this provision implicitly authorizes Congress to decide which federal laws or 
gulations have extraterritorial effects. Thus, Congress has the power to extend the reach
 
                                      
ra note (42) at 130. 
55.1. 
ective 32-70, supra note (1407). 
1421 Id., at 1. 
1422 Bayoneto, sup
1423 32 C.F.R. § 8
1424 Air Force Dir
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This Direct omplying 
with environmental laws and policy. According to 1.3.2. (compliance) of the 
Directi
ide, and 
 
 
nment. Moreover, the Directive encourages Air 
Force p ing 
rt in an environmentally 
safe ma on, 
A 
y,” 
environmental quality in foreign countries to guarantee long term access to the land, 
air, and water necessary to protect U.S. interests, while conducting day to day 
                                         
ive, as discussed earlier, outlines Air Force standards for c
ve, Air Force operations overseas shall comply with the FGS, or OEBGD of 
DoD. Moreover, “consistent with security requirements, the Air Force will support 
environmental compliance inspections of its operations and activities worldw
will aggressively correct areas not in compliance.”1425 
The Air Force undertakes to reduce imminent and substantial health and
environmental risks caused by Air Force activities at installations located in foreign
countries.1426 More significant, the Air Force also undertakes to use Zero-waste 
management to the extent possible, by reducing the use of hazardous materials and the 
releases of pollutants into the enviro
ersonnel to prevent pollution by stating that “where environmentally damag
materials must be used, their use will be minimized. When the use of hazardous 
materials cannot be avoided, the spent material and waste cannot be reused or 
recycled, dispose of the spent material and waste as a last reso
nner, consistent with the requirements of all applicable laws.”1427 In additi
this Directive implements various statutes and international protocols including NEP
and CERCLA. 
 
 
 
5) The Environmental Program in Foreign Countries1428 
 
This Air Force Instruction implements AFPD 32-70, “Environmental Qualit
by setting forth specific objectives and standards for the activities of the Air Force 
overseas. According to this Instruction, the Air Force undertakes to achieve 
                 
1425 Id., at 1.3.2. 
1426 Id., at 1.3.1. 
1427 Id., at 1.3.4. 
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activities abroad.1429 Under Chapter 2 of the Instruction, sites contaminated by Air 
Force operations must be restored to eliminate known imminent and substantial 
dange
teria do 
plicable international treaties.1432 
Finally, Chapter 5 of the Instruction deals with Pollution Prevention, and 
ons in all operations in foreign countries.1433 Again, that requirement applies 
unless
at 
any cases that deal with the environmental law statutes in the United 
States. 
ases may be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
rs to human health and safety,1430 unless the Air Force is bound by international 
agreement to do more.1431 
Since this Instruction implements an AFPD, Air Force activities in foreign 
countries must comply with the DoD Final Governing Standards; or, where the FGS 
have not been established, must comply with the criteria of OEBGD, if the cri
not conflict with any ap
requires all Air Force personnel to comply with Air Force Policies, Directives, and 
Instru tic
 international agreements such as the Status of Forces Agreements, or bilateral 
agreements, direct otherwise. 
These materials indicate that DoD officials are aware that environmental harm 
anywhere in the world will sooner or later affect the U.S. environment, and also th
good environmental practices help to maintain good relations with host countries. 
Accordingly, they have taken steps to insure that U.S military operations take into 
consideration environmental protection in foreign countries. The fact that the U.S. 
government has taken those steps may encourage other countries to do likewise. 
 
3. The United States Case Law 
 
There are m
This subsection will examine U.S. case law involving environmental laws, 
particularly, NEPA, RCRA, and CERCLA. As with previous sections, these c
classified into two categories: case law relevant to the application of the environmental 
 
1428 Air Force Instruction 32-7006, Environmental Program in Foreign Countries, Civil Engineering, April 
. 
 chapter 5, 5.2. 
29, 1994. 
1429 Id., at chapter 1, 1.1. 
1430 Id., at chapter 2, 2.1. 
1431 Id., at chapter 2, 2.3
1432 Id., at chapters 3, 3.1., 3.1.1.  
1433 Id., at
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statutes at home, and case law relevant to the extraterritorial application of the 
environmental statutes. 
 
a. The United States Case Law Relevant to the Application of the Environmental Statutes 
at Home 
 
Here, we will focus on the U.S. case law relevant to the application of NEPA, 
RCRA, and CERCLA, in particular, on military activities at home. 
In 1988, citizen groups and several members of Congress asked DoD to prepare 
programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for its plans to clean up and 
rebuild the entire weapons complex. They contended that such a state
a 
ment was required 
by the N
mon 
 
e 
re 
 
f the 
n” 
                    
ational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1434 Only such a comprehensive 
analysis, they argued, could furnish the perspective needed to set sound priorities and 
make the most efficient allocation of limited resources. A PEIS would reveal com
environmental problems at various sites, avoiding the need to develop unique responses
on a case-by-case basis, and speeding the overall cleanup. Equally important, they 
insisted, members of the public would be given an opportunity to participate in the 
planning process. 
When DoD failed to respond, the citizen groups asked a federal court to order th
preparation of a PEIS.1435 They maintained that “one of the largest industrial 
rehabilitation programs ever undertaken” required public comment and security. Failu
in planning such a massive cleanup, they pointed out, could led to further contamination
of the air and water and exposure for workers and the public. 
Six months later, before a trial could begin, DoE agreed in a settlement o
litigation to prepare one PEIS for the cleanup process, and another for a “modernizatio
of the weapon complex.1436 The PEIS for the cleanup was to contain a broad 
environmental assessment of the program’s plan. In 1991, public hearing were held in 
twenty-three cities to determine the range of issues that would be addressed in the 
                                      
1434 See, letters to John Herrington, Secretary of Energy, from Dan W. Reicher, National Resources Defense 
Council (December 14, 1988), and from Congressman Mike Synar and other members of Congress 
Council, Inc. v. Department of Energy
(December 14, 1988).  
1435 Natural Resources Defense , Civil Action No. 89-1835 (D.C. 
1989). 
1436 DOE press release, January 12, 1990. 
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stateme blic 
 six regional 
workshops just to develop a detailed strategy for completing it. DoE then proposed to 
eliminate th p 
decisions at  regulators 
and the pub  was issued in 
mid-1995, t se of the final 
PEIS somet fter.1438 
arge area of northern 
Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan to transmit instructions to submerged 
bout 
possible adverse biological effects of such low frequency radiation, the State of 
Wisconsin brought suit to compel the Navy to prepare a supplemental EIS before the 
facility was com
required. It also found that the Navy had failed to overcom
of NEPA should be enjoined, and that no re
purposes of the act.
The Court of Appeals reversed, deci
needed. ation failed 
a  dictum, 
the court went on to declar
NEPA cannot be construed to elevate automatically its procedural 
requirements above all other national considerations. Although 
ecurity as 
                                
nt. DoE received a number of comments concerning the need for greater pu
participation and oversight, public and worker health and safety, adequate resources for 
the cleanup, alternative technologies, and environmental standards.  
The PEIS proved to be so massive and complex that DoE conducted
e environmental restoration alternative from the PEIS, since cleanu
 individual sites had to reflect local conditions and involve state
lic.1437 After additional workshops, a draft impact statement
o be followed by public hearing around the country and relea
e thereaim
Another case arose in 1977, when the Navy prepared an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) for its upgraded and expanded extremely low frequency (ELF) submarine 
communication facility. ELF uses radio antennas spread over a l
submarines around the world. When new information subsequently came to light a
pleted. The trial court found that a supplemental EIS was indeed 
e a presumption that violations 
medy short of an injunction would serve the 
1439 
ding that a supplemental EIS was not 
1440 It found that the new inform to raise concerns of such gravity that 
nother formal, in-depth look at the environmental consequences was required. In
e that even if there had been a NEPA violation. 
 
there is no national defense exception to NEPA, and the Navy 
oes not claim one, the national well-being and sd
                          
. Weinberger,
1437 60 Fed. Reg. 4607 (1995). 
1438 See, Department of Energy, Implementation Plan Executive Summary (DoE/EIS-02000)(1994). 
1439 See, Wisconsin v  578F. Supp. 1327, (W. D. Wis. 1984). 
1440 Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745F.2d 412, at 421 fn. 9, (7th Cir. 1984). 
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determined by the Congress and the President demand 
consideration before an injunction should issue for a NEPA 
violation.1441 
 
The court insisted that its job was to “tailor its relief to fit each particular case, 
alancing the environmental concerns of NEPA against the larger interests of s
ight be adversely affected by an overly broad injunction.”
b ociety that 
m
b
E
hu  in one case the court found no 
congres
1442 
 
. The United States Case Law Relevant to the Extraterritorial Application of the 
nvironmental Statutes 
 
U.S. courts have decided that domestic laws do not apply abroad unless 
Congress makes it clear that they should.1443 T s,
sional intent to apply the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to 
extraterritorial disposal of hazardous waste by private parties.1444 
An older, but particularly instructive, case on the extraterritorial application of 
statutes is Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo.1445 In that case, the United States had 
contracted with Foley Brothers to help build public works in Iraq and Iran. The 
employer hired Filardo as a cook at the construction sites, but did not pay him 
overtime wages for working over eight hours a day. After the employers refused to 
pay him overtime, Filardo sued under the Federal Eight Hours Law.1446 The court held 
that this statute did not cover Filardo’s employment abroad: “nothing in the act itse
as amended, nor in the legislative history, would lead to the belief that the Congress 
entertained any intention” to apply the statute extraterritorially.
lf, 
’s 
content ut s 
r 
                                                          
1447 It also concluded 
that: “administrative interpretation of the act…tended to support petitioner
ion as to its restricted geographical scope.”1448 The court relied on the stat e’
silence as to extraterritoriality. Since Congress did not explicitly provide intention fo
n American Oil Co.
1441 Id., at 425. 
1442 Id., at 426. 
oyment Opportunity Commission v. Arabia1443 Equal Empl , 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
orp.,1444 Amlon Metals Inc., v. FMC C  775 F.Supp. 668 S.D. New York (1991)[hereinafter Amlon Metals 
Inc., v. FMC Corp.] 
, Inc. v. Filardo,1445 Foley Bros.  336 U.S. 281(1949) [hereinafter Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo]. 
1446 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26(1940). 
1447 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, supra note (1445) at 285. 
1448 Id., at 290. 
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the statute application abroad, then the court did not consider the international effects 
of applying the statute extraterritorially, and whether it might conflict with the laws of
the host country. In the court’s view, only an explicit Congressional directive could 
provide a basis for extraterritorial application.
 
1449  
However, the court held that a U.S. statute did have extraterritorial application 
in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.1450 There, Bulova sued the defendant, a U.S. citizen, 
for a pa
 
nd 
in 
tivities 
 
tent infringement that had allegedly occurred in Mexico. The court read the 
statute broadly to cover the defendant’s actions, holding that Congress can enact laws 
governing its citizens in other jurisdictions when the laws do not trespass upon the 
other jurisdiction’s rights. The court also held that “the U.S. had a statutory interest in
the outcome of this case because some of the watches the defendant made had fou
their way across the border, and thus the effects of the defendant’s activity were felt 
the U.S.”1451 Thus, U.S. courts could properly exert jurisdiction over the ac
broadly in some cases.1452 One reason for doing so, perhaps, would arise if such cases 
involve foreign country interests in which U.S. military has installations, to the extent
possible to protect these interests from devastation by military activities.  
The court applied another statute extraterritorially in Skiriotes v. Florida,1453 
which involved the application of a Florida statute to a U.S. citizen whose activities
took place on the high seas, not in Florida’s territorial waters. The court concluded 
that whether the defendant was in Florida waters or not was beside the point because
the “U.S. is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct 
of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights o
other nations or their nationals are not infringed.”
 
 
f 
 
 long 
1454 Thus, the court held that a U.S.
statute can have extraterritorial application even it does not explicitly state so, so
as its application does not interfere with other nations or their citizens’ rights. 
                                                          
1449 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (1940). 
1450 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
1451 Id., at 285. 
1452 Ryuichi Yamakawa, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Employment Laws After 
EEOC v. Aramco, 17 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 71, at 76 (1992). 
1453 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
1454 Id., at 73. 
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NEPA was held to have extraterritorial effect in Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Massey.1455  There, a U.S. research installation in Antarctica generated food wastes 
which w
d 
te to conduct occurring within other sovereign nations, the 
second
plicable 
a 
suit in Wilderness Society v. Morton
ere burned by National Science Foundation (NSF) in an open landfill until 
1991, when asbestos was discovered in the landfill. After that discovery, NSF began 
burning the wastes in an “interim incinerator.” The Environmental Defense Fun
moved to stop that operation under NEPA, claiming that “the incineration of NSF’s 
wastes could produce toxic pollutants and thus would be hazardous to the 
environment.”1456 To determine whether the U.S. statute could be applied to activities 
in Antarctica, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the history of the extraterritorial application 
of statutes in conjunction with the presumption against extraterritoriality. It 
determined that there are three “well-established exceptions to the presumption: the 
first is where there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to 
extend the scope of the statu
 exception applies when adverse effects will occur in the United States if the 
statute is not extended to the foreign sovereignty, and the third exception is ap
where there may be significant effects outside the United States, but the regulated 
conduct itself occurs in the United States.”1457 The court found that NEPA could be 
applied to that situation, because of the “sweeping scope of NEPA and the EIS 
requirement.” The broad statutory language led the court to the conclusion that 
Congress intended to apply NEPA abroad.1458  
Therefore, U.S. environmental statutes can be applied extraterritorially if they 
do not create interference with other countries laws, or any effect on foreign relations. 
NEPA was applied extraterritorially to allow a foreign citizen to intervene in 
.1459 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit authorized a Canadian citizen and a Canadian environmental 
organization to intervene in a suit seeking to require compliance with NEPA prior to 
                                                          
1455 Environmental Defense Fund Inc., v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir.1993). 
1456 Id., at 530. 
1457 Id., at 531. 
1458 Id., at 536. On this issue, the court held that under the Aramco test, the opposite is true, it stated that 
spite of the broad language of NEPA, “Congress failed to provide a clear expression of legislative inten
in 
t 
. 
through a plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect,” and NEPA should not be applied 
extraterritorially. EDF(I), 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (1991), reversed and remanded, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C
Cir. 1993). 
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issuance of a permit for the trans-Alaska pipeline. There were two proposed routes for 
the pipeline: one ran across Canada to the U.S.; while the second terminate
tanker port in Valdez, Alaska, for seaborne shipment to the lower 48 states. 
found that either of the two routes would have a potentially harmful effect on 
Canada,
d at a super 
The court 
e 
ilitary has sites and bases 
can sue
 
 
1460 and thus, it granted the application for intervention. Interestingly, th
court also recognized that foreign policy considerations may at times outweigh 
NEPA’s extraterritorial application. 
Accordingly, a citizen of a country where the U.S. m
 in U.S. courts for injury resulting from military activities under U.S. 
environmental statutes, such as RCRA, and CERCLA. A citizen of the host country
may also have the right to sue U.S. military officials in the U.S. courts when a status
of forces agreement grants that right. In People of Enewetak v. Laird1461, the court 
held that NEPA was applicable to federal actions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. That case involved the use of the atoll for experiments to determine the 
vulnerability of strategic defense to nuclear attack. The Enewetak court concluded th
“NEPA is not restricted to U.S. territory delimited by the fifty states.”
 
at 
s 
, even though Enewetak is located outside 
the U.S
                                                                                                                                                                            
1462 It based thi
conclusion on the legislation’s use of the broader term “Nation” instead of the more 
limiting term “United States.”1463 Moreover
., its people are subject to U.S. authority.1464 The U.N. Trusteeship 
Agreement1465 gave the U.S. “full power of administration, legislation, and 
 
1459 Wilderness Society v. Morton, 463F.2d 1261(D.C.Cir.1972). 
ent, 
1460 Id., at 1262. “The danger to Canada of the overland route was obvious to the court, some of the 
potential impacts from the seaborne shipment option included damage to British Columbia’s fishing and 
logging industries and harm to Canada’s shoreline recreational property”. Thomas E. Digan, Comm
NEPA and the presumption against Extraterritorial Application: The Foreign Policy Exclusion, 11 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 165, at 169 fn37 (1994). 
1461 People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 811 (D.Haw.1973) [hereinafter People of Enewetak v. 
Laird]. 
1462 Id., at 816. 
1463 NEPA § 201, 42U.S.C.§ 434, which deals with Presidential Environmental Quality Reports, setting 
s and condition of the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes, of the 
t and foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utilization of such 
d the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and other requirements of the Nation. 
man and economic requirements of the 
ng 
ocal governments, and non governmental 
forth: “(1) the statu
Nations […](2) curren
environments an
(3) the adequacy of available natural resources for fulfilling hu
Nation in the light of expected population pressures. (4) a review of the programs and activities “includi
regulatory activities” of the Federal Government, the state and l
entities or individuals[….]” 
1464 People of Enewetak v. Laird, supra note (1461) at 818. 
1465 Id., at 818-19. 
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jurisdiction” over Enewetak.1466 The original language which omitted, was more 
precise in saying: “as an integral part of the United States.”1467 Thus, the court 
conclud  can be 
applied r U.S. activities that have significant environmental impact on 
places  military.  
, v. FMC Corp
ed that NEPA applied to activities on that island. By extension, NEPA
 to all majo
outside the U.S. including activities of the
On the other hand, in Amlon Metals Inc. .,1468 the court held that 
RCRA did not apply extraterritorially. There, a U.K. corporation and its American 
agent s
e 
f 
 
“subjec
s did 
ly, was 
ued a Delaware corporation, alleging violation of the Alien Tort statute, and 
two provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: its hazardous wast
exportation provision, § 3017, 42U.S.C.§ 6938,1469 and the term “any person” in its 
citizen suit provision § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. The case raised the question o
RCRA’s applicability abroad.1470 The court held that RCRA did not apply, because
t matter jurisdiction did not exist under Alien Tort Statute, and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act did not apply extraterritorially” because Congres
not clearly express an intent that it should. 
A case where the court stated that NEPA did not apply extraterritorial
Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone,1471 in which the United States Army undertook a plan
remove munitions from Germany to a facility on Johnston Attoll. The transportation 
consisted of three phases: 
-Transportation of munitions from their magazines to a railhead in     
Germany. 
-Shipment by rail to a German 
 to 
port, and 
ithin 
                                                          
-Transport by sea to Johnston Atoll.1472 
 
The court stated that NEPA did not apply to the movement of munitions w
Germany, because it would result in “grave foreign policy implications and would 
1466 Id., at 818 fn. 12. 
1467 Id., at 818. 
1468 Amlon Metals Inc., v. FMC Corp., supra note (1444). 
ort provision require notification of a shipment of hazardous waste abroad to the EPA 
nd to the Government of the receiving country. 
1469 RCRA’s exp
Administrator a
1470 As mentioned earlier in Section III (A)(2) of this paper which entitled “RCRA’s exportation of 
hazardous waste, and citizen suit provisions”. 
1471 Greenpeace USA v. Stone, supra note (1418) at 749. 
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substantively interfere with a decision of the President and a foreign sovereignty in a 
manner not intended or anticipated by Congress.”1473 NEPA could not apply 
extraterritorially there, because of that interference with foreign policy decisions.  
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,1474 onmental organizations challenged 
a Department of Interior regulation limiting some provisions of the Endangered 
Speci
ct 
listed
In some cases, NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for 
on has direct environmental 
impac
 a law of a foreign nation.1476 
 
4. Kuwait E
uwait has a system of environmental laws and regulations. However, many of 
these la
e threat of resource depletion and 
environ
ict.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
 envir
es Act (ESA) to action occurring in the U.S. or on the high seas. The court held 
that Congress intended for the ESA to extend to all agency actions affecting 
endangered species, whether within the U.S. or abroad, since section 7 of the A
requires every federal agency to insure that its activities in the United States, upon the 
High Seas, and in foreign countries, will not jeopardize the continued existence of a 
 species.1475 The court also found that both the act’s plain language and its 
legislative history supported the conclusion that Congress intended to extend the 
application of ESA extraterritorially.  
action taken abroad, especially where the agency’s acti
ts within a foreign country, or where there has clearly been a total lack of 
environmental assessment by the foreign country involved. However, the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to give extraterritorial application to U.S. statutes if doing so 
would conflict with a treaty or with
nvironmental Laws and Regulations 
K
ws and regulations do not respond adequately to the nation’s environmental needs 
as a developing country, and particularly to th
mental pollution. Nonetheless, these laws provide a basis for the restoration and 
maintenance of environmental quality, in times of peace and in times of armed confl
 
1472 Id., at 753. 
1473 Id., at 761. 
1474 Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 122-125 (8th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds, 5
555 (1992). 
1475 ESA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 7 (a) (2), §
04 U.S. 
 1536 (a) (2).  
In A Sovereignless Land ? The Extraterritorial Application 
aw: EDF v. Massey, 19 N.C.J. Int’l L&Com.Reg. 333, at 350 (1994). 
1476 Suzanne B. Krolikowski, Note, A Sovereign 
of United States L
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Under the Kuwaiti legal system, environmental rules can be expressed in the 
constitution, statutes, or rules and regulations. In addition, Islamic laws and teachings 
have an impact on environmental protection. 
 
can 
a. The 
 
not 
…] And as such man is only a manager of 
rietor […] and must use it as a trustee.1477 
 
 
 
ld never butcher in 
Alharam
t, 
when the prophet, upon him be blessings and peace, declared1481 “[i]f any Muslim plants 
 as 
unished by God. 
                                    
Islamic Reflection on the Kuwaiti Legal System 
As an Islamic country, Kuwait stabilizes and protects its environment because it is
considered an Islamic obligation. This obligation originates in the view that man does 
own the environment, that God is the real owner of everything, and therefore any abuse 
to god’s property is unacceptable.   
 
[G]od’s wisdom has ordained to grant human beings stewardship 
(khalifah) on the earth [
the earth and not a prop
 
The prohibition of abuse is stated in the prophetic declaration that “there shall be
no damage and no infliction of damage.”1478  
Moreover, in Islam there are protected areas that must be protected from human
abuse, such as Al-haramaan and Al-Waqf.1479 In those sanctuaries, any harm to the 
natural resources or people, and any harm to the property is strictly prohibited. Indeed,
scriptural law prohibits any warfare in these areas. The Prophet Mohammed said that 
“Any Muslim, believing in God and the day of resurrection, shou
.”1480 
More generally, Islam encourages human beings to develop the environmen
a tree or sows a field, and a human, bird or animal eats from it, it shall be reckoned
charity from him.”1482 Conversely, any destruction of the nature will be p
                      
 Albhooth Alelmeiah, 1986) 
t 18. 
 
1477 Bagader et al., supra note (782) at 2, 18; see also, Zein Edin Abdulmagsood, The 
Environment and Human Beings, an Islamic Vision 19 (Dar
[hereinafter Abdulmagsood]. 
1478 Bagader et al., supra note (782) a
1479 Id., at 26-27. 
1480 Abi Ya’aly, Alahkam Asualtaneiah, 193, cited in Aaref Khalil Abou Eid, The 
Foreign Relations in the Khalpha State 55 (Dar Al-Argam, 1985) [hereinafter Abou Eid].
1481 Hadith of sound authority, related by al-Bukhari and Muslim on authority of Anas. 
See, Bagader et al., supra note (782) f.n. 13, at 33. 
1482 Id., at 3. 
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Therefore, a number of Muslims offers a part of their property to the authorities to treat 
them as Waqf,1483 which is a religious endowment, a property giving revenues, as 
regulated by Islamic law,1484 so that authorities can plant crops, or build a dam
people can benefit from its boons. 
However, Islamic law does not directly mandate environmental protection, as 
contemporary laws and international norms reflect it. But this does not mean that 
influence is completely absent regarding environmental protection. Religious 
considerations may encourage the government to enact laws or regulations that ensur
, so other 
Islam’s 
e 
environ
 
his 
effect of it was to protect the shellfish and oysters.  
 
 
ction to all flora. Moreover, 
recomm
ght to 
                                                          
mental protection. For example, the Kuwaiti Municipal Council, for purely 
Islamic reasons,1485 adopted a rule prohibiting the taking of shellfish and oysters, and
closing the shellfish market.1486 Islamic Fatwa was the reason for the adoption of t
rule, but one 
The Holy Koran1487 also speaks to environmental protection during armed
conflict. For instance, the first Muslim Khalipha, Abu Baker, prohibited his army 
commanders1488 from killing women, children, and aged persons, cutting fruitful trees,
destroying buildings, killing sheep or camels unless for eating, or burning or flooding 
palm trees.1489 Those recommendations included a number of environmental 
considerations. For instance, the prohibition against cutting fruitful trees, or burning or 
flooding palms, should be interpreted as guaranteeing prote
ending the avoidance of killing sheep or camels should be interpreted as 
recommending the protection of all fauna. Finally, recommending the avoidance of 
destroying the buildings should be interpreted as protection of the cultural heritage.  
Apart from Islamic teaching on the environmental, Kuwaiti law has sou
protect ecological interests from the moment of its independence in 1961, Kuwait’s 
1483 In Kuwait there is a Ministry named Wozarat Al-Awqaf Washuoon Alislamiah [the Ministry of Waqf 
qf Department. 
, 2001) 
e, 
u might not find pearl. This gambling is completely prohibited in Islam. 
 
ly Kuwait Journal) <www.alwatan.com.kw/today/n4.html>(visited March 28, 2000). 
ogers]. 
id, supra note (1480) at 203. 
and Islamic Affairs] that creates a division named Wa
1484 Encyclopedia of the Orient, <http://lexicorient.com/e.o/waqf.htm> (last visited Aug. 10
[hereinafter Encyclopedia of the Orient].  
1485 Selling oysters is interpreted as gambling, where you buy something by chance that might be valuabl
which is the pearl, or by chance yo
1486 The Municipal Council According to Fatwa, Decided to Close the Shelf-fish Market and prohibits its
catch, Al-watan (Dai
1487 The Koran was described as the first systematic code of war. See, A. P. V. Rogers, Law on the 
Battlefield 1 (Manchester University Press, 1996) [hereinafter R
1488 The Army Commander is Yazid Ibn Abi Sofian. 
1489 Azargany, Al-Mawte’A, 3rd Part, cited in Abou E
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Constitution included some provisions of environmental protection during armed 
conflict.1490  
Moreover, there are a number of general laws that include environmental 
protection provisions. A number of authorities in Kuwait are charged with ensuring 
environmental protection, such as Kuwait Municipality,1491 the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, the Ministry of Transportation,1492 the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Oil, 
the Ministry of Health,1493 and the Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries 
Patrimony. Some of these authorities have successfully achieved certain environmental 
protections, but some have not, as will be explained later. 
Environmental law in Kuwait is still a new field. Greater attention was given to 
the env Kuwait 
 
niversity’s 
program raduate 
n 
in environmental law in developed countries and thus to benefit from 
ironment after the environmental damage caused by the Iraqi invasion of 
in 1990. The first specific Authority charged with protecting the environment is the 
Environmental Public Authority (EPA), which was created in 1995 by the law 
No.21/1995 amended by the law No.16/1996. Before this date, environmental protection
was the responsibility of a number of ministries and authorities, which resulted in 
contradiction among their duties.  
In 1997, environmental concerns mere introduced into Kuwait U
, where the Faculty of Law started to teach environmental law to underg
students.1494 In 1999, study of the environmental law was incorporated into graduate 
level studies1495 as well. The same year, the Faculty of Law of Kuwait University, for the 
first time offered scholarships to a number of its distinguished graduate students to obtai
an advanced degree 
                                                          
1490 See Kuwait Constitution, Nov. 11, 1962, arts 15, 21, 25, available at 
r Kuwaiti Const.]. 
rssoom Bisha’an Wozarat Almowas’alat, July 81, 1988 [The Ministry of Transportation Decree of 
of Public Health Decree of 
 Public Law Department in Kuwait Faculty of Law is charged of environmental law teaching to graduate 
students. 
<http://www.embassyofkuwait.com/General_Information/constitution.html> (last visit Mar. 6, 2002) 
[hereinafte
1491 Ghanoon Baladiat AlKuwait 15/1972, [Kuwait Municipality Law No.15/1972], [hereinafter Kuwait 
Municipality Law]. 
1492 Ma
June 18, 1988], [hereinafter The Ministry of Transportation Decree]. 
1493 Marsoom Bisha’an Wozarat Asih’ha Al’aamah 1979, [The Ministry 
1979][hereinafter The Ministry of Health Decree]. 
1494 International Law Department in Kuwait Faculty of Law is charged in environmental law teaching to 
undergraduate students.  
1495
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their experiences in the environmental field. And I have the honor to be the first Kuwaiti 
who he
he establishment of an Environmental Court.1496 This Bill has 
been re
 
inal only.1497 To date, 
environmental issues have been resolved by non-specialized courts.1498 
In an important ca d that express 
eglige
onstitution, Kuwait adopted a very 
odest environmental protection system. However, the Iraqi destruction of Kuwait’s 
environment during the Gulf War II provoked the urgent need to address amelioration of 
environmental conditions. 
 
ld this position. 
Nevertheless, environmental law in Kuwait is still in its early stages. To 
ameliorate this situation the Higher Council of the Environmental Public Authority 
adopted a Bill concerning t
cently approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, and is likely to be enacted into law 
by the National Assembly. This future court will be composed of one judge to examine
all environmental questions, but its jurisdiction will be crim
se, the Felonies Court in Kuwait decide
n nce in port or aboard a tanker, during shipping operations, is the main cause of 
Kuwait’s territorial sea pollution.1499 While the Felonies Court has decided such cases, an 
environmental Court is likely to be better equipped to decide more technical matters of 
environmental law. 
 
b. Constitutional Provisions Relevant to Environmental Protection 
In 1963, with the enactment of the Kuwaiti c
m
A number of provisions in the Constitution deal with environmental protection in
general. Moreover, this protection may be extended to cover environmental effects of 
armed forces, in both peace and times of armed conflicts.  
 
                                                          
1496 Mashroa’a Ghanoon Bi’insha’a Watandeem Mahkamah Bi’iyyah [A Bill Establishing and Regulatin
the Environmental Court], Approved by the Higher Council of EPA in its Meeting No. 2/99 in Dec. 2
1999. 
1497 Article 1 of the Bill asserts the establishment of an Environmental 
judge, and specialize in environmental crimes determination. Id., art. 1
g 
9, 
Criminal Court, guided by a single  
. 
1498 The Bill of Establishing and Organizing an Environmental Court. 
 Al 
ting the Sea by Oil, th
ution Cases, 1L.& Sharia J., 193, at 194 (March 
1979). 
1499 Case No. 2445/1978 October 3, 1978, and 1646/78 December 3, 1978, unpublished judgments, See,
Al Awadi Badria, A Commentary on a Judgment Relative to Pollu e Necessity to 
Abandon Negligence as Responsibility Base in Poll
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1) The Prohibition of Offensive Wars 
 
Until Gulf War II, Kuwait had never been involved in an armed conflict, inte
or international. Article 68 of the Kuwait Constitution totally prohibits offensive wars.
rnal 
0 
 
e to 
Article 15 of the Constitution states t “[t]he State cares for public health and 
for the means of prevention ics.” Consequently, 
caring for the public health is a d ch of this duty raises the State’s 
respons
 
 
activity 
 healthy and safety 
environment.  In accordance with Article 15 of the Constitution, a Decree relevant to 
the Ministry of Public Health was issued in 1979. Article 2 of this Decree charged the 
Ministry of Health with responsibility for the prevention and treatment of disease, 
 military activities. However, the Ministry of Health was 
ects of Gulf War II. For example, no 
150
Consequently, any military arms or tactics usable only in offensive war are completely
prohibited and their possession is unconstitutional. This can explain the absence of 
nuclear arsenal in the Kuwaiti armed forces. However, defensive war is allowed.1501 
Upon this right, and under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter Kuwait used forc
liberate its territories occupied by Iraq in 1990-91.  
 
2) Public Health 
 
hat 
 and treatment of diseases and epidem
uty of the State, any brea
ibility before the National Assembly. This provision includes both preventive and 
remedial measures. The armed forces, as a part of the government, also have to consider
both preventive and remedial measures, such as avoidance of any use of arms or tactics
that result in a real threat to the public health. Moreover, whenever a military 
affects the public health, the armed forces have the duty to take remedial measures 
necessary to eliminate and reduce the risk of such effects. 
Even if the military forces were to neglect this obligation, the Ministry of Health 
is charged with maintaining public health, including support of a
1502
including diseases resulting from
not prepared to cope with the environmental eff
preventive measures were taken to isolate the suspected areas of nuclear pollution from 
the general population, and there is a remarkable absence of medical rehabilitation, such 
                                                          
1500 Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art.68. 
1501 Id. 
1502 Ministry of Health Decree, supra note (1493) art. 1. 
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as that provided in the United St administration regarding the 
Gulf W r Veterans’ Illness.1503 
lic 
otect 
h 
tio  of natural resources.  
Constitution addresses warfare damage, by declaring that: “[t]he 
state shall ensure the solidarity of society in shouldering burdens resulting from public 
disasters an rom war 
or military ensating 
victims of w s 
provision d d provide 
compensati over, 
although m ivilians are 
                      
ates by the U.S. Veterans 
a
 
3) Natural Resources Conservation  
and Proper Exploitation 
 
Article 21 of the Constitution protects natural resources and considers them pub
property. Both the State and individual citizens therefore have responsibility to pr
those resources.1504 Consequently, any military activities that destroy public property, 
such as the damage or depletion of natural resources, should be considered a 
constitutional violation, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. This 
article also charged the State with the task of assuring proper exploitation of natural 
resources. Therefore, the armed forces must avoid any activities that may interfere wit
the protection and the proper exploita n
 
 
4) Liability for Damages 
 
Article 25 of the 
d calamities, and it shall compensate damages or injuries resulting f
performance.”1505 This article holds the State responsible for comp
arfare and military injury, during both peacetime and wartime. Thi
oes not detail the nature of the damage for which the State shoul
on, and does not specifically address environmental damage. More
ilitary activities can injure civilian as well as military personnel, c
                                    
1503 About the U.S. efforts to cope with “Gulf War Syndrome”, see, in general Carol H. Picou, Living with 
the Gulf War entagon 
Radiates S  al. eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter Pi rt prepared for 
the Committe ent and Public Works, Gulf Pollution Task Force, 102d. Congress, 2d Session. 
(Environment & Natural Resources Policy Division et al. Eds., 1992) [hereinafter A Congressional Report 
nst., supra note (1490) art.25. 
Syndrom, in Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium, How the P
oldiers & Civilians with DU Weapons (Rosalie Bertell et
cou;] The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, A Congressional Repo
e on Environm
of the Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War]. 
1504 Article 17 of the Constitution states, “Public property in inviolable and its protection is the duty of 
every citizen.” Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 17. 
1505 Kuwaiti Co
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not entitled injuries suffered 
during the I e United 
Nations Co
 
 
Num aiti cultural 
heritage. Fo
 
 
about at the bottom of Fahad 
Al-Salem Street), Shamiya Gate (at the start of Riyadh Street, 
uwait and the 
relics, ethnographic artifacts and archaeological material from 
excavations on Faylaka Island.  
l History Museum, which contains 
battle on February 24, 1990 between the Kuwaiti resistance and 
 
 to State compensation. Thus, the State did not compensate 
raqi invasion, and instead only encouraged victims to apply to th
mpensation Commission.1506 
5) Conserving The Heritage of the State 
erous buildings and sites in Kuwait are considered a part of Kuw
r instance:  
1) Old city wall gates that were left standing as monuments to the
past, including Maqsab Gate (by the sea, down from the Sheraton 
Hotel), Jahra Gate (inside the round
Beraisi Gate (at the end of Mubarak Al-Kabeer Street), and Bneid 
Al-Qar Gate (in Bneid Al-Qar), in the green belt between Soor 
(well) Street and the First Ring Road. The gates were destroyed 
by the Iraqi invaders but have since been rebuilt. 2) Bayt Lothan 
which is a cultural center was set up to preserve the culture, and 
develop skills in the creative arts and crafts of K
Gulf, and to promote fine arts and handicrafts both locally and 
internationally.  
3) Sadu House is the house of weaving, presents a fine example 
of Bedouin camel bags, decorations, tent dividers, carpets and 
cushions.  
4) the National Museum, comprising four buildings and a 
planetarium. It once housed the Dar Al-Athar Al Islamiyah, the 
Al-Sabah collection of Islamic Art, one of the most 
comprehensive in the world. Other buildings housed pearl diving 
5) the Science and Natura
displays of the petroleum industry, natural history, aviation, 
machinery, electronics, space and zoology subjects, as well as a 
health hall and a planetarium.  
6) Tareq Rajab Museum, a private museum that specializes in 
Islamic arts and crafts. 
7) Qurain House, liberation monuments that was site of a bloody 
                                                         
ent and Damage Recovery in International Conflict, 1506 Robin L. Juni, Elliot Eder, Ecosystem Managem
Natural Resources & Environment, 3 A.B.A. Sec. Env’t & Energy & Resources, Winter 2000, 
at 193. 
 275
the Iraqi occupiers. Twelve of the nineteen members of the group 
who took part in the fight died.1507 
 
In addition, cultural heritage sites include the Greek archaeological sites in 
Faylaka, a Kuwaiti I rsity in Shuwaikh, 
and many other buildings. ly devastated during the 
Gulf W r II, either by pillage or by use as military centers.  
 an
this 
. 
 
egislative powers when the Assembly is 
dissolv
 
1) Law zing  
Radiation and Preventing its Hazards 
 
sland in the Gulf, the old building of Kuwait Unive
 These buildings and sites were serious
a
The Kuwaiti Constitution places responsibility on the government to protect the 
Islamic and Arabic heritage. Article 12 of the Constitution states, “the state safeguards 
the heritage of Islam and of the Arabs d contributes to the furtherance of human 
civilization.”1508 The Kuwaiti Monuments Law, which will be discussed latter in 
section, also applies to the forecited sited and buildings. As part of the State, the military 
also share responsibility for safeguarding these sites, and for avoiding damage to them
 
c. Environmental Laws and Decrees 
Under Article 51 of the Constitution, the National Assembly and the Emir1509 of 
Kuwait have authority to enact laws. Accordingly, the Emir exercises the legislative
power along with the National Assembly. The National Assembly has the primary power; 
however, the Emir, through “Decrees,” holds l
ed or on vacation. This subsection will address a number of Laws and Decrees 
addressing the environmental effects of military activities, in peacetime and times of 
armed conflicts. 
 Decree Regulating the Usage of Ioni
                                                          
1507 1998 Kuwait Premier Guide, available at <http://www.kpgonline.com/general.php3> (visited May 12, 
fter Kuwait Guide]. 
Const., supra note (1490) art. 12. 
le 51 of the Constitution states, “Legislative power shall be vested in the Emir and the National 
cordance with the Constitution.” Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art.51. 
2000) [hereina
1508 Kuwaiti 
1509 Artic
Assembly in ac
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The Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing Radiation and Preven
Hazards was enacted in 1977,
ting its 
ut the 
the Ministry of Health.1511 Even with permission, any person using it must 
take all precautionary measures to assure the safety of workers, citizens, and the 
environmen they are also subject 
to these rule  for any 
activities in oreover, Article 4 
of the Decre n activities 
involving Io ilitary or civil authorities or personnel, in 
peacetime and times of armed conflicts. Consequently, any environmental damage 
resultin  of the 
s Law 
partment,” in 
the Min stry of Health,1514 to assure sound environmental practices. 
 
2) Law Relative to the Conservation  
 
or ait 
ili
 
[E]ach delegated in the work, should take all necessary 
1510 and prohibits usage of this kind of radiation witho
permission of 
t.1512 Since ionizing radiation is used by military forces, 
s. Armed forces must obtain permits from the Ministry of Health
volving Ionizing Radiation, such as from use of weapons. M
e expressly requires consideration of environmental concerns i
nizing Radiation,1513 whether by m
g from the use of Ionizing Radiation during military activities is a violation
provision, even if a permit has been granted.  
Since execution of this law requires specialized personnel in the field, thi
Decree created the “Environmental Prevention from Ionizing Radiation De
i
of Petroleum Resources 
Petroleum and natural gas are the maj  resources upon which the State of Kuw
depends. Any environmental limitation to conserve and use this resource applies to all 
government agencies, including the m tary. For instance, Article 3 of the Law 
No.19/1973, concerning the conservation of the petroleum patrimony resources1515 
provides that 
precautionary measures and actions to prevent any damage or 
                                                          
1510 Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Tantheem Istikhdam Alashya’ah Almoai’yanah Walwygayah Min 
/1973] [hereinafter Petroleum Resources Conservation Law]. 
Makhatirha 131/1977 [Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing Radiation and Preventing its Hazards 
No 131/1977][hereinafter Kuwaiti Ionizing Radiation Law]. 
1511 Id., art. 3. 
1512 Id., art 4. 
1513 Id., 
1514 Id., art. 6. 
1515 Ghanoon Bisha’an  Almohafadah ala Masadir Atharwah Alpetroliah 19/1973, [Law Relative to the 
Conservation of Petroleum Resources No. 19
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risk produced from petroleum operations, on human life, public 
health, property, natural resources patrimony, cemeteries, 
religious, antiquarian, or tourism sites. He should also take all 
necessary precautionary measures to prevent air, surface and 
underground water 1516
 
his provision gives priority to environmental consideration in the use of 
petrole  
Acts Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and Agriculture 
its 
n and the preparation of a training or combat field. Any 
violation of that nature is punishable.1519 However, the Decree protects trees and plants 
on public la ainst other 
harmful act ecree 
does not sp ources, and 
minerals. 
uwait, as a member State of the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols I and II, is required ing the protection of cultural 
heritage. Thus, Kuwaiti military feguard historical and cultural 
              
s pollution.  
T
um resources, and specifically requires taking precautionary measures to prevent
air, surface and underground water pollution. This restriction applies to all such 
operations, including those of the military, as a matter of national policy.  
 
3) Law Decree Relevant to the Interdiction of Certain  
 
The Law Decree relevant to the Public Cleanliness and Agriculture1517 prohib
uprooting of trees and plants in public lands.1518 This Decree applies even to military 
operations such as the installatio
nds only, not on private lands. Nor does the Decree protect ag
s, such as spraying harmful substances, or burning. Moreover, the D
ecifically address other natural resources, such as fauna, water res
 
4) Kuwait Monuments Law 
 
K
 to apply their provisions regard
 personnel are obliged to sa
                                            
rt. 3. 
1517 Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ba’ad Alafa’al Almodirah Benadafah Ala’ammah Walmazroa’at 9/1987
[Law Decree No. 9/1987 relative to the Interdiction of Certain Acts Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and 
Agriculture No. 9/1987] [hereinafter Law Decree on Cleanliness]. 
1518 Article 2 of the Law Decree on Cleanliness states, “the uprooting of overland trees, and plants, wh
1516 Id., a
, 
ere 
ever founded in public lands, is completely prohibited.” Id., art. 2. 
an 200 Kuwaiti Dinars will be imposed upon any 
is law provisions.” Id., art. 3. 
1519 Article 3 of the Law Decree on Cleanliness states, “without confrontation to any more restricted 
punishment, a fine that not less than 5 and not more th
violation of th
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sites whether in peacetime or in times of armed conflicts. For example, Article 16 o
Additional Protocol II provides for the protection of historic monuments, works of art o
places of worship. 
f the 
r 
has an 
he 
monuments that exist in its territory according to the international 
conventions rules. Kuwait shall respect Arab and other Nations’ 
monuments that exis
 
Accordingly, both civilian and military f ust comply with this 
law by
 
account called the future generations account, starting from the year 1976/1977.”  
                                                          
Furthermore, Kuwait adopted the Monuments Law in 1960.1520 That law 
extraterritorial effect, since it extends its jurisdiction to protect international cultural 
heritage, and it implements the Kuwaiti Constitution, as discussed above. Article 1 of t
Monuments Law provides that 
 
The State shall protect its cultural heritage, and conserve the 
t outside its territory.1521  
orces in Kuwait m
 avoiding damage to cultural heritage in other States’ territories, whether in 
peacetime operations or in times of armed conflicts.  
 
5) Law Decree Concerning the 
Future Generations Fund 
 
In order to protect its petroleum reserves and avoid their depletion, Kuwait has 
taken steps to guarantee that future generations will be able to enjoy the benefits of the 
wealth that petroleum provides to the people of Kuwait. Accordingly, a Law Decree 
Concerning the Future Generations Fund1522was adopted in 1976, to impose a “ten
percent deduction from Kuwait’s yearly budget to be saved and deposited in a special 
1523
 
 
ial 
iary 
to the Petroleum Patrimony called “Future Generations Fund. The Ministry of Finance is 
1520 Mursoom Ameiry Biganoon Alaathar 11/1960 [Emery Decree Relevant to the Monuments Law No
11/1960][hereinafter The Kuwaiti Monuments Law]. 
1521 Id., art 1. 
1522 Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ehtyaty Alaj’yal Algadimah 106/1976[Law Decree Relevant to the 
Future Generations Fund No. 106/1976][hereinafter Future Generations Fund Law]. 
1523 Future Generations Law declares in Article 1 that “starting from the budgetary year 1976/1977, a
percentage of 10% will be saved yearly from the state’s incomes. ” Article 2 of this law states, “a spec
account will be opened in which these amounts will be deposited. These amounts will be used auxil
alternative 
charged to invest these funds, and add their benefits in this account.” Article 3 states, “the percentage 
mentioned in Article 1 cannot be reduced, and any intake from the Future Generations Fund is not 
allowed.” 
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This law secures future generations from being neglected by the present 
generation. However, this Law Decree does not mention environmental security, by 
providing clean air, clean drinking water, fertile soil, vegetation and agriculture. If its 
purpose is to protect resources for future generations, it should address environmental 
security as well as econom cover the costs of 
environmental reh  
ntion of 
biting 
 
bited, whether by 
dischar  or leaking oil, or any other liquid containing oil, from any ship, any place on 
the land, or any equipment prepare rt it from one place to 
another, on board the ship or on the l entioned in Paragraph 2 of 
the Art
t contains 
oil or liquid mixed with oil and that may pollute Kuwaiti marine areas. 
7) The Law of Kuwait Municipality  
and the Internal Regulations of the Municipal Council 
 
ic security. The fund could be used to 
abilitation that are not covered under any national law.  
 
6) Law of the Prohibition of the  
Navigable Water Pollution by Oil 
 
As a result of the ratification of the International Convention for the Preve
Pollution of the Sea by Oil in 1962, Kuwait issued the Law No. 12/1964 the prohi
Navigable Water Pollution by Oil.1524 Article 1 of the Law articulates that “[p]olluting
naval areas, defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, is completely prohi
ging,
d to store the oil, or to transpo
and[…].  Naval areas m”
icle are “A) Kuwait’s internal waters, and B) Kuwait’s territorial sea.” This law 
prohibits any discharge of oil or other liquid containing oil in those areas, whether from 
military or civil sources. The Ministry of Transportation, in coordination with the 
concerned agencies in the field of the marine environment protection, is charged with 
supervising the protection of navigable waters.1525 The Ministry of Transportation 
coordinates its activities with military authorities regarding any installation tha
 
                                                          
m 12 Lisanat 1964 Bisha’an Man’1524 Ganoon Rago a Talweeth Almiah Asalihah Liulmilahah Bizait [Law 
gable Water Pollution by Oil,][hereinafter Kuwaiti 
 8. 
ry of Transportation Decree, supra note (1492) 2 (6). 
No. 12/1964 Concerning the Prohibition of Navi
ter Pollution Prohibition Act,] art.Navigable Wa
1525 The Minist
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The Law No. 15/1972 relating to K ality and the Internal 
Regulations of the Municipal Council1526 as amended in July 1984, requires the 
Munici  
ecree Relevant to  
nd 
t of 
, and the supervision of public health organizations.1530 That 
authori  
 
military responsibility for environmental damage. Nevertheless, some of its general rules 
reted to apply to the environment. For instance, it defines military operations 
        
uwait Municip
pality Director to take, within municipality competence, all necessary measures to
conserve the public health, safety, and comfort, especially “[…]controlling sites 
containing inflammable substances and limiting their allowed quantities in these 
sites.”1527 Since some armed forces activities involve utilizing flammable substances, 
they too are subject to measures taken by the Municipality Director.  
 
8) Law D
the Ministry of Health 
 
The Law Decree relevant to the Ministry of Public Health of 19791528 assigns to 
the Public Health Ministry the task of maintaining a healthy environment in the state, a
caring for citizens’ health.1529 Article 2 of the law vests the Ministry of Health with a 
number of tasks, among them the prevention of environmental pollution, establishmen
health treatment services
ty also extends to military operations that have effect on public health.
 
 
 
 
 
9) Army Law 
Army Law1531 No. 32 of 1967 sets out general procedural rules for certain army 
activities. It does not address the environmental consequences of military activities, or 
can be interp
                                                  
icipality Law, supra note (1491).  
Health Law, supra note (1493). 
rt. 1. 
 Fey Sha’an Aljaish [Law No. 32/1967 Relevant to the Army]. 
1526 Kuwait Mun
1527 Id., art. 15. 
1528 Ministry of 
1529 Id., a
1530 Id., art. 2. 
1531 Ghanoon Ragom 32/1967
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as “all works and movements by the army or some of its units, in wartimes and during 
internal disturbances.”1532 It can be argued that military operations include peacetime 
activities too, such as military maneuvers.  
Article 25 of that law authorizes the Minister of Defense to compensate military
personnel for damages caused to
 
 their properties, during their service or its consequences. 
It excludes damages caused by victim’s negligence.1533 And the compensation will be 
ts to the victim and his family,1534 without any 
gard to the environmental harm. In other meaning, Article 25 does not compensate 
environmental damage. 
rticle 26 auth ons and 
maneuv 1535 rm, 
 
aw Decree No. 21/1979 Relative to Civil Defense  was enacted to assure the 
safety of the civilian popula ction of buildings, 
public projects and properties, and  emergency.1538 One of the 
Civil Defense duties is to “prepare precautionary plans to avoid warfare risks, by […] 
finding  
 
ules and Regulations 
limited to the value of the necessary objec
re
A orizes damages caused during military operati
ers.  Although it does not specifically address damage for environmental ha
logically it should apply to any damage to the environment, since according to this 
Article a Ministerial Decision can regulate the right to compensate any damage caused to
any person or his properties1536 and people cannot be separated from their environment. 
 
10) Law Decree Relative to Civil Defense 
 
1537L
tion, the safety of transportation, and prote
communications in times of
 unexploded munitions, mines, and bombs and neutralize them.”1539 Neutralizing
these unexploded ammunitions will also save the surrounding environment, including 
human beings, fauna and flora. 
d. Environmental R
                                                          
1532 Id., Annexed Table No. 4. 
1533 Id., art. 25. 
1534 Id., art. 25. 
1535 Id., art. 26. 
1536 Id., 
1537 Marsoom Byghanoon Ragom 21/1979 Fey Sha’an Adeifa’a Almadany [Law Decree No. 21/1979 
Relative the Civil Defense]. 
1538 Id., art. 1. 
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 1) Rules annexed to the Law Relative  
to the Conservation of Petroleum Resources 
 
The Minister of Oil has enacted the Rules annexed to the Law Relative to the 
Conservation of Petroleum Resources.1540 These rules require the preparation of a 
preliminary environmental impact assessment on petroleum projects and operations,1541 
and prohibit any soil disturbance, surface or underground pollution,1542 and discharge in
the surface or the underground of hazardous, so d or liquid substances, in areas under 
Kuwait’s sove
 
li
reignty and its continental shelf. Thus, these rules seek to protect the 
environment as well as to facilitate the exploitation of oil resources.  
 
2) Kuwait Municipality Announcements 
m pact 
he camps 
ited in dedicated sites,1545 and at the end of the camping period, campers 
must clean up and level their sites.1546 These rules addresses spring camp areas; however, 
                                                 
Regarding Camping Areas 
 
The Kuwait Municipality issues yearly announcements to organize and control 
spring ca ping areas, and their terms. These announcements can, and do, have an im
on environmental resources. For instance, announcement No 130/1998 declares that 
camping areas do not require a permit unless they include the construction of Shabra, a 
temporary structure which may be used as a kitchen or a living room.1543 Moreover, 
according to the announcement, sandy fences are prohibited.1544 Garbage from t
must be depos
                                                                                                                            
f Ministry of Oil, Rules of Petroleum Patrimony Resources 
derground and Marine Pollution (1989) annexed to the Petroleum 
note (1515) annex. 
perations, to determine whether these operations need a 
 
hird Condition (C). 
1539 Id., art. 1 (2nd) (3). 
1540 Technical Affairs Department o
Conservation, chapter 4 Surface, Un
Resources Conservation Law, supra 
1541 The Petroleum Resources Conservation Law states in Section 1 of the First Chapter of the general rules 
annexed to this law, “4-the delegated in work shall proceed on a preliminary environmental impact 
assessment of the petroleum projects and o
comprehensive evaluation of their effects on the environment to prepare a detailed environmental impact 
assessment.” See Annex of the Petroleum Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515) Annexe (Part 1)
(1)(4). 
1542 Petroleum Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515) annex (Part 1) (Generalities) (1). 
1543 Baladiat AlKuwait I’alan Ragom 130/1998 [Kuwait Municipality Announcement No.130/1998] 
[hereinafter Kuwait Municipality Announcement,] at the Second Condition. 
1544 Id., at the Third Condition (A). 
1545 Id., at the Third Condition (B). 
1546 Id., at the T
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the envir  to, if 
not much m e w tly, military 
forces shoul 1547 opt 
simi
harm
enta
exam  
facto ose 
threa
inclu
envi
e Environmental  
ustrial Projects 
The Ministerial Decision No. 9/1999, Regulating the Procedures of the 
Enviro  requires 
all gov PA 
before ental impact 
                      
onmental effects caused by military camps in operational areas are similar
or orse than, the effects caused by spring camps. Consequen
d be subject to these requirements  and the Kuwaiti military should ad
lar rules. 
 
3) Decision Concerning the Rules of  
Public Stores that are Annoying and Harmful to Public Health 
 
Decision No.3367/81, establishing the rules of public stores that are annoying and 
ful to public health1548 adopted by the Municipality of Kuwait, in 1981, sought to 
il a 1549 number of activities that would be termed nuisance under U.S. law. For 
ple, mineral fusion shops, carpentry workshops, varnish and oil factories, pesticide
ries, and forage factories are all required to insure that their activities do not p
t to public health.1550 The reasoning of this Decision could logically be extended to 
de military activities that pose similar hazards to the public health and the 
ronment. 
4) Ministerial Decision Regulating the Procedures of th
Impact Assessment for Structural and Ind
 
nmental Impact Assessment for Structural and Industrial Projects,1551
ernment sectors that have infrastructure projects to cooperate with E
they start any major development project to prepare an environm
                                    
h, supra note (549). 
om 3367/1981 Bisha’an La’ihat Almahalat Alaamah Wal Mogligah Lilrahah W
sion No 3367/1981 Relative to the Rules of Public Stores, Annoying, and Harm
after Public Stores Rules]. 
able annexed to the Decision No. 3367/1981 is “Public Stores,” which includes h
ers, entertainment cities, public swimming
1547 Malalla
1548 Garar Rag al Mothirah 
Bisyhah [Deci ful to the 
Health][herein
1549 The first t otels, movie 
theaters, theat  pools and baths, coiffeurs, tailors, laundries and 
anual ironing, shoe repairing, florist, birds and ornament fish stores. The second table is “Annoying and 
Harmful to the Health Stores,” which include asphalt plants, paints plants, car tires plants, cartons factories, 
pesticides plants, smelter plants, ironsmith factories, gas, weld factories by electricity or acetylene or 
oxygen, mechanics, carpentry plants, cemented bricks plants, glass plants, charcoal stores, timber stores, 
sina’eiah 
ion Regulating the Procedures of the Environmental Impact for Structural and Industrial 
90] [hereinafter the Environmental Impact Assessment Ministerial Decision]. 
m
printing houses, motorbikes and bicycles repairing stores, car washing stores…etc. 
Public Stores Rules, supra note (1548) annexed table No.1 & 2. 
1550 Id., art. 1. 
1551 Gharar Bisha’an Tantheem Ijra’a Dirasat Almardood Albei’ey Lilmashroa’at Alinshaeiah Wa
9/1990 [Decis
Projects, No. 9/19
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as  
ude 
ealth or 
 safety life, 
and thus, armed forces should prepare an EIA for all projects that can cause 
 the environment.  
d future generations, 5- threats to the ecosystem and 
 
n contrast, in the 
United States, under NEPA, the military as part of the Federal Government is required to 
prepare an EIA for any m on the human 
environment.1555 The EIA is d federal actions, discuss 
ental impacts of the proposed action, and consider alternatives and their 
environm
                                                          
sessment.1552 Article 2 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Decision states,
“[p]rojects eligible to prepare and submit an environmental impact statement incl
those likely to lead directly, or indirectly, either alone, in combination or through 
interaction with other factors, to pollute the environment, to threaten public h
interfere in any way with healthy life and making good use of property.”1553 Since 
the armed forces are part of the Kuwaiti government, they are subject to this 
Decision. Military activities, in peacetime and times of armed conflicts, can pollute 
the environment, threaten public health, and interfere with healthy and
significant impact on human health and
An EIA should investigate and elaborate the 
 
1- Impacts on inhabited areas, 2- effects on ecological systems in 
the areas impacted by the project, 3- expected deterioration in the 
aesthetic values of the area or any recreational, cultural, scientific 
properties, or any other important environmental aspects of the 
area, 4- effects on areas or buildings that have historical, 
scientific, archaeological, cultural or social importance for the 
present an
wild life, 6- significant demand on natural resources, especially 
those which are rare or non regeneratable, and 7- cumulative 
environmental effects that may take place as a result of present or 
future activities of the project.1554 
 
This provision has not yet been applied to the Kuwaiti military, even though its
operations can affect quality of the human environment in Kuwait. I
ajor activity that has a significant impact 
 supposed to describe the propose
the environm
ental impacts. U.S. law, in contrast to Kuwait law, requires agencies, including 
the military, to consider the environmental consequences of their actions. 
 
1552 Gharar Majlis Alwozara’a Ragom 906/1994 [Council of Ministries Decision No. 906/1994]. 
1553 Id., art.2. 
1554 Id., art.3 (A). 
1555 NEPA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2)(C), § 4332 (2)(C). 
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e. The Role of Environmental Authorities  
In the wake of the Gulf War II, environmental awareness among the Kuwaiti 
people and government officials has increased dramatically. That awareness is reflected 
in the establishment of the Environment Public Authority, the adoption of the 
Environm
dle East and 
 
ARCEL and IUC r and the Commission 
on Environmental Law, propose to do a comparative study of environmental laws 
applicable to the Baltic, the Med
tation on 
Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs”1559 (PAAFPA). 
PAAFPA is responsible for agricultural development, protection of the natural 
landscaping, beautification, and greenery, and for the development and protection of 
ental Court Project, and in the September, 2000, launched of the Arab Regional 
Center for Environmental Law (ARCEL) at the Faculty of Law in Kuwait University. 
ARCEL will work in the Arabic-speaking world, across North Africa, Mid
1556the Gulf Region.
N, through the Environmental Law Cente
iterranean, and the Great Lakes regions, in order to 
strengthen the provisions of the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution of 1978.1557  
 
1) The Public Authority for Agriculture  
and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs 
 
In 1968, the government established a modest Agricultural Department in the 
Ministry of Public Works, while a mandate to conduct research and experimen
various plants and animals to determine those best suited to Kuwait’s natural 
environment. 1558 In 1984, this department became an independent entity called “The 
various fish resources.1560  
                                                          
1556 Robinson, International Environmental Legal Trends, supra note (1123) at 534. 
1557 Robinson, Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law, supra note (1147) at 10. 
1558 Hawally Governorate, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, available at 
<http://www.hawally.com/agriculture.html>, (visited Feb. 9, 2000)[hereinafter Hawally]. 
1559 Law No. 94/1983 Establishing the Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs, 
y Law Decree]. 
te for Scientific Research, The Public Authority for Agriculture Affairs and Fish 
ble at <http://www.kisr.edu.kw/events/gebaz05.htm>, (visited Feb.15, 2000).  
amended by the Law Decree No. 6/1988 [hereinafter Agriculture Authorit
1560 Kuwait Institu
Resources, availa
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One of its goals is to “protect and assure the best use of land and water.”1561 
Accordingly, any activities that interfere with the best use of land and water should be 
elimina
lishing the Environmental Public Authority1562 (EPA) vests the 
Author  of 
 
s” that 
trophes and take necessary actions 
 
ard 
sing 
 
ted, including military activities that occur on land and water.  
 
2) The Environmental Public Authority 
 
The law estab
ity with the power to carry out activities and functions to assure the protection
the environment in the State. In particular, the EPA is to “[p]repare and supervise the 
execution of the complete Action Plan relating totally to the protection of the 
environment in the short and long terms in co-ordination with the concerned Authorities
in the country[…]”1563 Since the armed forces in one of the “concerned authoritie
deals with activities harmful to the environment, the armed forces should co-ordinate 
their activities with EPA, identify potential environmental problems, and seek to avoid 
damage to the environment.1564 Moreover, EPA is empowered to “[p]repare a 
comprehensive plan against environmental catas
required in time of war and peace in coordination and cooperation with the concerned 
authorities.”1565 That language also suggests that military operations should be subject to
environmental regulation. 
In fact, there has already been effective cooperation between EPA and the 
Administration of Military Installations Engineering in the Kuwaiti Military, with reg
to the environmental standards when establishing a new military base, or when choo
maneuver sites.1566   
The Kuwaiti military is also helping in many other environmental protection 
issues. For example, they provided heavy-duty equipment for the landfill rehabilitation in
                                                          
1561 Article 2 of PAAFPAA Law states, its goals are to “fulfill the charges of agricultural development, in 
all its sectors, flora and fauna, increase and protect the Fisheries Patrimony. To achieve its goals, the 
upervise the land and water use for agriculture and fishery purposes, to assure the 
, 2) Supervise and regulate the fishing to assure the increase of 
 3 (2). 
art 3 (6). 
art 3 (12). 
lallah, supra note (549). 
Authority shall 1) S
proper exploitation and its protection
Fisheries Patrimony.” Agriculture Authority Law Decree, supra note (1559) art. 2 (1) (2). 
1562 The Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967). 
1563 Id., art
1564 Id., 
1565 Id., 
1566 Ma
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Al-Qurain, “the smelliest neighborhood in Kuwait.”1567 For three decades, an aband
quarry in Al-Qurain was used for dumping household garbage, construction waste, a
chemicals, which resulted in emitting toxic substances such as “methane, carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen-sulfide.”
oned 
nd 
s follows: 
“First [
g methane.”1570  
 
rs, 
stipulated by law.1572 Since its creation in 1995, the HC has never included military 
personnel in its membership.1573 It may be argued that HC is a civilian council and the 
 
ership should include 
military matters.  
                                  
1568 Finally, the EPA, led by Chairman and 
Director General Dr. Mohammed Al-Sarawi decided to turn the dump into a clean, free 
source of natural energy for about 300 homes surrounding the landfill.1569 The steps that 
they were followed were described a
EPA’s team] scraped of some 28,000 truckloads worth of garbage off the top of 
the heap, leveling the area. Then they brought in about 400,000 cubic meters of ‘gatch’-
Arabic for a pebbly semi-porous sandstone from the desert-and spread it over the top of 
the leveled garbage. Fires died. Smells grew fainter. Then they degassed the site by 
drilling 300 bore holes into the gatch-covered landfill. They inserted pipes and later 
connected them together in an underground gridwork. And engineers discovered a 
fortuitous byproduct of the off-gassin
According to Article 4 of the EPA Law, EPA’s Higher Council (HC) is comprised
of “1) Minister of Transportation, 2) Minister of Oil, 3) Minister of Trade and Industry, 
4) Minister of Public Health, 5) Minister of Information, 6) Municipal Council President, 
7) Director General of Public Authority of Fisheries Patrimony and Agriculture Affai
and 8) Director General of Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research.”1571 The HC is 
concerned with drafting general objectives and policies of EPA and other functions 
military has no place in it. Nevertheless, HC’s goals are to protect the environment from
any threat, including military activities. Therefore, the HC’s memb
experts in enviro-
                        
 May 
gust 
1567 Miriam Amie, Against all Odds, Kuwait Turning Dump into Desert Oasis, April 26 Christian 
Science Monitor (2001) <http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/04/26/P7s2.htm> (last visit
1, 2001). 
1568 Id. 
1569 Id. 
1570 Id. 
1571 Decree No. 190/1999 Forming the Higher Council of the Environmental Public Authority, of Au
15, 1999. 
1572 The Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967) art. 4. 
1573 Id. 
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The Board of Directors,1574 the executive body of EPA, is required to “prepare the
systems and criteria that might be found upon determination of the location or establish 
or use or remove of any establishment or production of materials or carry out operat
 
ions 
or any other activity that may lead to environmental pollution. [EPA] shall carry out and 
execute [EIA] of the developmen ral formulation of this provision 
does not exclude military authorities, and in fact suggests that the Board can exercise 
authori
rs 
prevent the use of any material if they have a significant 
environ r 
 
cal 
3) Kuwait Municipality 
uwait Municipality was established in 1964, by Law No.11/1964, amended by 
law No. 15/1972. 1581 The municipality is charged with managing wastes in the State,1582 
                                                          
t projects.”1575 The gene
ty over military projects.1576  
Under the EPA Law, the Board of Directors has the right to claim compensation 
for environmental damage1577 resulting from the violation of this provision. Moreover, 
according to Article 10 of EPA’s law, the HC upon the proposal of the Board of Directo
can suspend any activity or 
mental impact.1578 In cases of emergencies, the HC shall authorize the Directo
General to issue the suspension order for a period not exceeding seven days.1579 All 
administrative authorities and concerned parties are subject to such an order.1580 Military
authorities should be subject as any other governmental agency. However, as a practi
matter, the Board is unlikely to exercise that kind of control over military projects. 
 
 
K
1574 Id., a  7, 8. 
1575 Id., a  8. 
1576 Id., a  8. 
1577 Article 8 of the Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law states: “the Board of Directors may 
further claim for compensation for the environmental destruction due to any act that might result in 
environmental damage, in addition to the claim of other competent authorities and the consequences of 
such an act including fine and Court decisions in accordance with this law.” Id., art.8. 
1578 Article 10 para. (I) of the Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law states that “the Higher Council 
shall upo  the proposal of the Board of Directors and after notifying the official Authority, decide to stop 
work in any establishment or any activity or preventing use of any instrument or material wholly or 
partially if the progress of work or the action results in pollution of the environment, the cessation shall be 
for one week duration and might be extended to another week.” Id., art.10 para. (I). 
1579 Id., art. 10 para. (IV). 
rts. 6,
rt.
rt.
n
1580 Id., art. 10 para. (II). 
1581 Kuwait Municipality Law, supra note (1491).  
1582 Department of Environmental Affairs in Kuwait Municipality, The Role of Kuwait Municipality in the 
Environmental Protection, [hereinafter The Department of Environmental Affairs,] at 2. 
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including military wastes. The Ministry of Public Health, for example, has established its 
own incinerator to manage ble facility for wastes 
generated by the military.  
 
 that their primary goal is human protection. These rules were examined in 
Part Two of this thesis, entitled “Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian 
Law.” On the other hand, international environmental rules that were examined in Part 
Three, entitled “The Environmental Law Rules,” are concerned with environmental 
protection, principally in the absence of armed conflicts. There exists, in the international 
h 
 medical wastes. There is no compara
After examining the environmental law rules (international, comparative and 
national) it appears that the environment is still not completely secured during military 
operation of peacetime and in times of armed conflict. Therefore, it would be necessary 
to find other source of law to reinforce the environmental protection during military 
operations. The rules of disarmament instrument, enviro-humanitarian law, would 
provide further assistance in the goals seeking by this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part IV:  
Enviro-Humanitarian Rules 
 
An examination of international humanitarian rules relevant to armed conflicts
demonstrates
law, a third sort of instruments that are not expressly adopted to protect only either 
humans or the environment. They can be classified as “enviro-humanitarian rules,” whic
 290
combine elements of both the humanitarian and the environmental law rules, and aim at 
protect
ed that 
an and environmental consequences of armed conflict have 
given r
. As the 
l. 
A- Env
 
 arms control and disarmament, which 
ek to reduce the danger of the level, type, and disposition of armaments to the 
inimum.1585 In recent decades, as advanced technology has been used increasingly to 
                                                        
ing people amidst nature. The former President of the United States, William J. 
Clinton, referred the essential relationship between man and nature when he declar
“[w]hen we work to restore nature, we are also working to enhance the health and well-
being of our economy, our communities, our families. Human well-being is inextricably 
connected to the quality of the environment, and our future.”1583 
The terrible humanitari
ise to environmental law rules and humanitarian law rules. From the idea of 
humanizing and “environmentalizing” warfare enviro-humanitarian rules emerge
former Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, said, “The 
Charter of the United Nations Charter governs relations between States. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights pertains to relations between the States and the individua
The time has come to devise a covenant regulating relations between humankind and 
nature.”1584 
 
 
 
iro-Humanitarian Rules Criteria 
This section will delineate the elements of enviro-humanitarian rules in order to
distinguish these rules from those in related fields, such as environmental law and 
international humanitarian law. International rules relevant to military activities that are 
hybred of both environmental and humanitarian considerations may be defined as enviro-
humanitarian rules (EHR) based on the fact that such rules address both environmental 
and humanitarian protection.  
The EHR are analogous to the systems of
se
m
  
 Defense Environmental Restoration Program, Words of The former President William J. Clinton, in 
oreword of Sherri W. Goodman, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, available at 
<http://www.dtic.mil/envirodod/derpreport96/vo11/foreword.html> (last visit Jul. 20, 2001). 
1584 Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, Report of the Secretary General of The United Nations, 30 (United Nations 
-Sept. 1990-3M. 
1583
F
Publication, 1990) DPI/1095-40650D
1585 Luard, supra note (85) at 140. 
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serve the evil of war, the EHR become very important to assure the safety of the people 
and to promote environmental protection as well. This situation is similar to that in “a 
crime-r t us 
nimize the 
nd 
by a 
th 
h 
 
 
Conventions1588 and their Additional Protocols I1589 and II,1590 which have been 
examined previously. Most environmental law instruments are enacted either by national 
idden city, when citizens, in order to combat the crime, said to each other: le
undertake to hold, dispose and display the arms we have in a such way as to mi
danger we present to each other.”1586 Likewise, EHRs seek to minimize the danger 
presented by the modern technologies of war, by placing limits on the use, disposal, a
“display” of those technologies. 
EHRs have the following common characteristics: 1) they are formulated 
competent State organ, often under the supervision of military authorities; 2) they are 
applicable in times of armed conflicts; 3) they are included in bilateral or multilateral 
conventions that seek regulate or eliminate the use of certain weapons or tactics of war; 
4) generally, only State parties to the EHR conventions can investigate compliance wi
these rules; 5) unlike International Humanitarian Law, they do not vest the ICRC wit
any major role; and 6) parties to EHR conventions have the right to withdraw at any time.
Each characteristic can be examined as follows: 
 
 
 
 
1. Rules Formulated by Competent State Organs, Often under the Supervision of Military
Authorities: 
 
In the International Humanitarian Law, ICRC played a principal role in the 
preparation of most of the instruments,1587 including drafting the four Geneva 
civil authorities as in the case of national and comparative environmental law, or by 
                                                          
1586 Luard, supra note (85) at 140. 
1587 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 126; ICRC, Extract from “International humanitarian law : Answers to 
rc.org> (last visit Aug. 18, 2001). 
a note (56); See, Maurice Aubert, The International 
xcessively Injurious or Indiscriminate Weapons, 279 
your questions” Dec. 1, 1990, <http://www.ic
1588 Geneva Convention (I), (II), (III), (IV), supr
Committee of the Red Cross and the Problem of E
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 477, 478 (1990) [hereinafter Aubert, The International Committee]. 
1589 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79). 
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international environmental organizations such as UNEP or IUCN in the case of 
international environmental law. In contrast, in the case of disarmament agreements, 
usually  of 
 
roved 
uring 
authority of the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense.1591  Another example is 
the participation of the Kuwaiti Minster of Defense in the work of the Convention on the 
f Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997. The Minister was authorized to sign the 
instrum
er, it 
also achieve if a nation’s over-all security is to be assured. Therefore, military authorities 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 it is the military authorities that are concerned with the quantity and the nature
arms that can be safely disarmed consistent with goals of national defense and security. 
Each armed force has a limit beyond which they will not go. For example, the Israeli 
limit of armament is not similar to the limit of Switzerland; nor is the limit of North 
Korea the same as Japan’s. Very often military commanders have the authority to define
and enforce that limit. Therefore, these rules are often negotiated, formulated, app
and sometimes signed by military authorities. For instance, the Kuwaiti delegates d
the work of the Brussels Conference for the Landmines held in June 24-27, 1997, were 
subject to the direct 
Prohibition of the Use, of Stockpiling, Production and Transfer o
ent, or raise objections to it. Under this authority the Kuwaiti delegate decided not 
to sign this convention.1592 Another example is the Declaration on Arctic Military 
Environmental Cooperation,1593 which was signed by the defense ministers of Norway, 
Russia, and the United States.  
Unfortunately, too often military authorities consider such agreements from a 
purely military perspective, without giving any concern to the environment. Howev
is increasingly recognized that environmental security1594 is a goal that the military must 
 
1590 Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76). 
1591 KCSR, Landmines, supra note (540) at 405. 
1592
e 
9-20 
nmental Law? 18 
 Kuwait refused to sign the convention because of the risk and threat threaten the country from the Iraqi 
military which is tremendously powerful than Kuwaiti Military.  Which increase the possibility of 
landmines use in a future aggression against Kuwait. 
1593 Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 26, 1996, Nor., Russ., U.S., availabl
at <https://denix.cecer.army.mil/denix/Public/Intl/AMEC/declar.html> (last visit Jan. 29, 2002).  
1594 The term “environmental security” is used to include “the reasonable assurance of protection against 
threat to national well-being or the common interests of the international community associated with 
environmental damage.” Chad Weinstein, Book Note, The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared 
U.S. and Russian Perspectives; Edited by James M. Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov; Island Press; 
Washington, DC (1994); ISBN 1-55963-236-4; 328 pp. (PBK), 23 Denv. J. Int’l L. Pol’y  619, 61
(1995) For more details about environmental security see, Jutta Brunnee, Environmental Security in the 
Twenty-First Century: New Momentum for the Development of International Enviro
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can and should consider the environment as part of their national security concerns, by 
consulting or adjoining environmental experts in their delegation to international 
weapon
 
med 
xpressed in Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conven
y 
n 
 weapons, such as nuclear, chemical, poisonous gases, and anti-personnel mines, 
are another source of EHR. Finally, EHR are also derived from international conventions 
                  
s regulation conferences. Negotiations regarding issues of disarmament or 
security should consider issues of environmental protection. Those that do so, comprise
environmental law. 
 
2. Rules Applicable in Times of International Armed Conflicts: 
 
A significant difference between EHR and humanitarian or environmental rules is 
that humanitarian law rules are usually applicable to both international and internal ar
conflicts. For example, the IHL rules e
tions, the Additional Protocol I aims at the protection of the victims of 
international armed conflicts, while the Additional Protocol II is relevant to the 
Protection of the Victims of the Non-International Armed Conflicts.1595 Similarly, 
environmental law rules are found at both international and internal levels, and thus appl
to both internal and international armed conflicts since the environment will suffer eve
in the event of civil wars.1596  
However, EHR applies only at the international level. International conventions 
relevant to arms control and the disarmament of military forces are the main source of 
EHR. States do not demilitarize their armed forces capacity unless an international 
convention, bilateral or multilateral, assures the national security and safety of such 
State.1597 Multilateral arms control conventions relevant to the prohibition of the use of 
certain
                                                                                                                                                           
1595 Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III) and (IV), supra note (56) common arts. 3; Additional Protocol (II), 
ham Int’l L. J. 122 (1998); Popovic, supra note (619). 
1597 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 2 (1). 
Fordham Int’l L. J. 1742 (1995); Bernard A. Weintraub, Environmental Security, Environmental 
Management, and Environmental Justice, 12 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 533 (1995). 
supra note (76); the Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79); Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76). 
1596 For more information see, Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and the Environment, 28 Denv. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol’y 265 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move from 
War Crimes to Environmental Crimes, 22 Ford
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that are directed to restrain military activities that may harm the environment during 
armed conflicts, such as ENMOD.1598 
Although current EHR applies only to international conflicts, EHR should be 
applied to internal armed conflicts as well. This is so because the nature of arms, 
weapons of mass destruction, and techniques used in international armed conflicts
similar to those used in internal armed conflict, and thus can result in the same lkind o
damage. Civilian populations can be targeted in both international and internal armed 
conflicts. And the environment is subject to severe destruction in 
 are 
f 
times of international 
and int l 
s 
War: 
d 
 
city 
 
n and should be restricted to achieve the sole goal for which they are 
intende
L seeks 
environment often benefits from 
such restriction, since immunizing non-combatants, civilian objects and cultural sites, and 
                                                          
ernal armed conflicts. Because internal armed conflicts can also harm internationa
interests in the environment, States cannot claim that internal armed conflict is a purely 
internal affair beyond the competence of the international community. The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court acknowledges that internal armed conflict “crimes” 
can be cognizable internally. Therefore, EHRs should apply to internal armed conflicts a
well. 
 
3. Rules Aimed at Reducing Damages of Modern Technology and Techniques of 
 
EHRs are negotiated and codified under international pressure to humanize an
environmentalize warfare. The atrocity of modern warfare is made worse by the use of 
modern technology and techniques in military operations, such as nuclear, biological, 
chemical weapons. In order to humanize and environmentalize warfare, such technology
and techniques should be restricted or prohibited to reduce and eliminate warfare atro
on civilians, the environment and the combatants themselves. Accordingly, warfare
activities ca
d: to paralyze the opponent’s military capacity. EHRs seek to immunize non-
combatants and civilian objects from military attacks that do not distinguish between 
military targets and civilian objects or cultural and natural sites.  
IHL, in some respects, provides serves environmental protection also. IH
to prohibit unnecessary suffering or excessive pain. The 
1598 ENMOD, supra note (957) art. I. 
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securing combatants from excessive suffering will necessarily reflect on the environment 
at the same time. If warfare aims solely at weakening an enemy’s armed forces, then it 
will no
y 
 impose 
n. For instance, States 
may ob y 
n 
ut also to 
itary forces 
t to the EHRs Can Investigate 
tional 
national security and enviro-humanitarian rules are thus closely linked, only military 
ed, 
ting parties. Consequently, international humanitarian and 
t focus on attacking the environment. 
On the other hand, EHRs seek to assure protection by prohibiting the militar
from using some weapons altogether. Admittedly, examining many arms control 
conventions shows that the goal is not to completely disarm military forces, but to
regional, and international balances between military powers. The balance of power 
approach does not assure protection of the environment or of civilia
tain environmentally destructive arms and ammunitions, and yet still completel
comply with the EHRs. However, balancing military power through EHRs can result i
provoking military forces to an arms race in order to reach the level of the opponent 
armed forces. This is seen in the case of the Iranian-Iraqi, and the Indian-Pakistani 
situations. 
To achieve effective environmental protection, EHRs should not only seek to 
diminish the effects of modern technology and techniques on the environment, b
develop and increase environmental protection in general. In other words, mil
should not just avoid harmful activities to the environment, but should also act 
affirmatively to ameliorate the environmental situation  
 
4. Generally Only State Parties to the Conventions Relevan
Compliance with these Rules: 
 
In environmental law, national authorities supervise compliance with the na
environmental law rules. International environmental organizations along with the 
member States supervise compliance with international environmental law rules. In IHL, 
member States and the ICRC supervise compliance with the humanitarian rules. 
However, with a few exceptions, such as the germ warfare agreement of 2001, only 
member States are qualified to assure compliance with the EHRs.  
Because EHRs often involve purely military information, and because States’ 
forces of the contracting States are in a position to monitor the tactics and arms produc
ported or used bim y the contrac
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environmental organizations are excluded from formally supervising States’ complian
with the EHRs. For instance, the ICRC cannot monitor the complex of arms used or 
intended to
ce 
 be used by military forces, since its mission is limited to addressing 
humanitarian concerns in times of armed conflicts. Similarly, environmental 
onmental harm that may result during military operations. 
Howev
 a 
hen Cuba had a mutual 
military
he 
HR 
the 
e both seek 
to restrict military activities. However, unlike the EHRs, IHL rules attribute to the ICRC 
no such role. Where treaties do not provide for 
monito
organizations cannot supervise the nature of arms processed by military forces; they can 
only seek to prevent the envir
er, Greenpeace, a non-governmental organization, has sought to play a role in 
pressuring States about their observance of the EHRs.1599 
Furthermore, in observing compliance with the EHRs, States can closely monitor 
international military cooperation between other signatory nations, and determine 
whether such cooperation includes suspicious activities that can be interpreted as
violation of the EHRs. Even outside of formal agreements, States enforce their balance of 
power. For example, in the Cuba missile crisis of 1962,1600 w
 agreement with Russia regarding the establishment of a Russian military base in 
Cuba, the United States monitored the military cooperation between Russia and Cuba to 
protect its own interests. Moreover, internal military actions may also be subject to t
contracting parties’ monitoring. More routinely, States can monitor increments in the 
budget for the national defense purposes. Increases in arms spending may indicate E
violation. 
 
5. Unlike International Humanitarian Rules, Enviro-Humanitarian Rules Do Not Vest 
ICRC with any Major Role: 
 
There exists some similarity between the IHL rules and the EHRs, sinc
a great role in fulfilling the position of a neutral body.1601 This role is clearly absent in 
the EHRs, where treaties provide 
ring or supervision, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
                                                          
1599 Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental 
Organizations Under International Law, 6 Indiana J. Global Legal Studies 579, 580 (1999) 
tion (II), supra note (56) art. 10 
par t
[hereinafter Nowrot]. 
1600 Luard, supra note (85) at 165. 
1601 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art. 10 par. 3; Geneva Conven
. 3; Geneva Conven ion (III), supra note (56) art. 10 par. 3. 
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public international law which provide the rules for supervising treaty compliance, only 
member States can supervise the State’s compliance with the EHRs. 
However, there have been some indications that neutral NGOs may be able to 
participate in monitoring compliance with EHRs. In the statement of the former Presid
of the Security Council of the United Nations, Njuguna Mahugu, of May 20, 1998, 
regarding Sierra Leone, the Security Council recognized “the important role played by 
[…] no
ent 
n-governmental organizations” in the peacekeeping process in that area.1602 
NGO’s
 law 
rules, and providing assistance in the environmental protection and humanitarian law 
-Humanitarian Law could and should refer to such 
elevant to the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules have the 
g from their agreements. 
 
 
 like Greenpeace and Amnesty International are playing a significant role in the 
enforcement of international law by observing States’ compliance with international
areas.1603 It is my thesis that Enviro
NGO’s, in addition to the ICRC, in order to enforce its rules internationally.  
 
6. State Parties to the Convention R
Right to Withdraw at Any Time: 
 
Until 1949, date of the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions, IHL did not 
prohibit member States to the IHL instruments from withdrawin
For example, the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land,1604 and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land,1605 do not prohibit the right to withdraw. However, since the
IHL rules stabilized, IHL conventions started to restrict the right of member States to 
withdraw, and either impose conditions on withdrawal or prohibited it outright. This is 
                                                          
1602 U.N. SCOR, 3882nd mtg., at 1-2, U.N.Doc. S/PRST/1998/13 (1998). 
1603 Nowrot, supra note (1599) at 579-80. 
1604 Article 5 of the 1899 The Hague Convention (II) provides that “In the event of one of the High 
Contracting Parties denouncing the present Convention, such denunciation would not take effect until a 
year after the written notification made to the Netherlands Government, and by it at once communicated to
all th
 
e other Contracting Powers. This denunciation shall affect only the notifying Power.” The Hague 
nds 
supra note (205) art. 8. 
Convention (II), supra note (630) art. 5. 
1605 Article 8 of the 1907 The Hague Convention (IV) provides that “In the event of one of the Contracting 
Powers wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the 
Netherlands Government, which shall at once communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all 
the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was received. The denunciation shall only have 
effect in regard to the notifying Power, land one year after the notification has reached the Netherla
Government.” The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, 
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the case in Geneva Convention IV,1606 Additional Protocol I,1607 and Additional Pr
II.
otocol 
, the 
 to be established and stabilized prior to 
giving 
IHL 
ned in 
l Impact Assessment in 
1608 
Similarly, environmental law conventions do not restrict or prohibit the right to 
withdrawal, primarily because environmental matters are new agenda items in both 
national and foreign policy.1609 States would refrain from participating at all in an 
international environmental convention if it denied their right to withdraw. Therefore
majority of environmental law instruments offer member States the right to withdraw. As 
with the IHL, environmental law rules need
rise to a duty that would restrict or prohibit a State from withdrawing. Only then 
could such a duty be accepted by the nations of the world. Since 1970, national and 
international environmental law rules have begun to be as clear and stabilized as the 
rules, so perhaps that time is approaching.  
It would be useful to note that, of all the conventions that have been exami
the Third Part of this thesis, only the Convention on Environmenta
                                                          
1606 Article 158 of the Geneva Convention (IV) provides that “Each of the High Contracting Parties sh
at liberty to denounce the present Convention. The denunciation shall be notified in writing to th
Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties. 
denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the Swiss Fed
Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denounci
Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after 
operations connected with the release, repatriation and re-establishment of the persons protected by t
present Convention have been terminated. The denuncia
all be 
e Swiss 
The 
eral 
ng 
he 
tion shall have effect only in respect of the 
denouncing  
bound to fu
, on 
before operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establishment of the persons protected 
by the Convention or this Protocol have been terminated.” Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) art. 99 
d 
ocol, the denunciation shall only take effect six months after receipt of the instrument of 
 
 Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain
lfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” Geneva 
Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 158. 
1607 Article 99 (1) provides that “1. In case a High Contracting Party should denounce this Protocol, the 
denunciation shall only take effect one year after receipt of the instrument of denunciation. If, however
the expiry of that year the denouncing Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article I, the 
denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict or occupation and not, in any case, 
(1). 
1608 Article 25 (1) of the Additional Protocol II provides that “In case a High Contracting Party shoul
denounce this Prot
denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of six months, the denouncing Party is engaged in the situation 
referred to in Article 1, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. Persons
who have been deprived of liberty, or whose liberty has been restricted, for reasons related to the conflict 
shall nevertheless continue to benefit from the provisions of this Protocol until their final release.” 
Additional Protocol (II), supra note (76) art. 25 (1). 
1609 Nicholas A. Robinson & Gary R. Waxmonsky, The U.S.—U.S.S.R. Agreement to Protect the 
Environment: 15 Years of Cooperation, 18 Envt’l L. 403, 437 (1988) [hereinafter Robinson & 
Waxmonsky]. 
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A Transboundary Context restricts the withdrawal right.1610 This restriction may be 
interpreted as a first step in a transition towards the absolute prohibition of withdrawal 
from environmental law conventions, as happened in the case of IHL, in order to 
reinforce the environmental law rules and attain their constancy.  
The development that occurred in IHL, and is likely to occur in environmental 
absent in the EHRs. This is 
because EHRs directly involve military activities as well as environmental and 
humani
, the military concerns predominate. Where 
that is so, nations demand an unrestricted withdrawal right. Nevertheless, some Enviro-
Humanitari ents and 
therefore do Prohibition of 
Restrictions emed to be 
Excessively ific 
Nuclear Fre . However, 
those instru
                      
law rules, regarding the right to withdraw is completely 
tarian issues. If EHRs were seen focusing primarily on environmental and 
humanitarian concerns, then as with IHL and the environmental law instruments, 
withdrawal would be restricted or prohibited.  
However, with most of the EHRs
an conventions have been seen as primarily non-military instrum
 restrict any right to withdraw. For instance, the Convention on 
 on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be De
 Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,1611 and the South Pac
e Zone Treaty,1612 restrict the right of member States to withdraw
ments are the exception, not the rule.  
                                    
 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Convention provides th1610 Article 19 at “At any time after four 
years from the ate on which this convention has come into force with respect to a Party, that Party may 
withdraw from this Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary. Any such withdrawal shall 
take effect on the ninetieth day after the date of its receipt by the Depositary. Any such withdrawal shall not 
affect the application of Articles 3 to 6 of the Convention to a proposed activity in respect of which a 
le 3, 
l 
by the 
ons concerning situations in which peace-keeping, observation or similar functions are performed by 
t 
ision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the 
 right to withdraw; from the Treaty.” South Pacific 
 d
notification been made pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 1, or a request has been made pursuant to Artic
paragraph 7, before such withdrawal took effect.” Environmental Impact Assessment Convention, supra 
note (1132) art. 19. 
1611 Article 9 (2) of the Convention on Prohibition of Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventiona
Weapons provides that “High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article 1, 
the Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed 
Protocols until the end of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any case, until the termination of 
operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establishment of the person protected 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in the case of any annexed Protocol containing 
provisi
United Nations forces or missions in the area concerned, until the termination of those functions.” 
Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note (761) ar
9 (2). 
1612 Article 13 (1) of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty provides that “This Treaty is of a 
permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any 
Party of a prov
spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the
 300
 
B- When Enviro-Humanitarian Rules can be Applied 
Environmental law rules are applicable both in peacetime and in times of arm
conflicts, to prevent ac
ed 
tivities harmful to the environment. However, under the pretense 
of emergency situations, som
of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that 
 
y 
 
 
 de ision to that effect is made by a majority 
vote of the members constituting the Assembly. In all cases the 
nce 
with the foregoing procedure, every three months.  
 
And late the 
Courts of v . Except 
when Marti ilitary 
offenses co its 
specified by
Moreover, the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, in Article 236, that  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
e of these rules may be suspended. For example, Article 69 
The Amir shall proclaim Martial Law in the cases of necessit
determined by law and in accordance with the procedure 
specified therein. The proclamation of Martial Law shall be by 
decree. Such decree shall be referred to the National Assembly 
within the fifteen days following its issue, for a decision on the 
future of Martial Law. If the proclamation takes place during the
period the National Assembly is dissolved it shall be referred to
the new Assembly at its first sitting. Martial Law may not 
continue unless a c
matter shall be referred to the National Assembly in accorda
1613
 Article 164 of the Kuwaiti Constitution states that “[l]aw shall regu
arious kinds and degrees and specify their functions and jurisdiction
al Law is in force. Military Courts shall have jurisdiction only over m
mmitted by members of the armed and security forces within the lim
 law.”1614 
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any 
warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or 
operated by a State and used, for the time being only on 
government non-commercial service. However, each State shall 
ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing 
operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft 
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a 
 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, art. 13 (1), Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter South Pacific Free 
Zone Treaty]. 
1613 Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 69. 
1614 Id., art. 164. 
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manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with 
this Convention.1615 
  
And the Kuwait Regional Convention, Article XIV, states that  
 
Warships or other ships owned or operated by a State, and used 
only on Government non-commercial service, shall be exempted 
from the application of the provisions of the present convention. 
Each Contracting State shall, as far as possible, ensure that its 
warships or other ships owned or operated by that State, and used 
only on Government non-commercial service, shall comply with 
the present Convention in the prevention of pollution to the 
marine environment.1616  
 
 
The IHL rules are applicable in times of international and internal armed conflicts 
only. But they are no longer apply after armed forces are withdrawn from occupied 
territories, refugees are returned home, bodies are buried, sick and injured are recov
prisoners of war are exchanged, and criminals of war are prosecuted. Similarly, EHRs
apply only in times of international armed conflicts. For example, when Iraq used 
unlawful arms and chemical weapons during the Gulf War II,1617
ered, 
 
 Iraq was internationally 
held responsible for violating enviro-humanitarian international law.1618 
conflicts. One example is the bilateral convention of disarmament, the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile
 
 
lies 
also in times of peace.  
In contrast, some agreements apply both in peacetime and times of armed 
s,1619 concluded between the U.S. and Russia in 1972. Compliance with this 
convention is the domain of military forces of both nations. This convention seeks to 
avoid the use of weapons that employ high-risk technology, and thus focuses on military
activities directly related to war. On the other hand, even in peacetime, according to the 
bilateral convention’s provisions, the U.S. and Russia monitored each other to assure
compliance, monitors were posted in each other’s countries. Thus, the document app
                                                          
1615 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note (1019) art. 236.  
1616 Kuwait Regional Convention, supra note (1139) art. XIV. 
1617 See, Hearing Before the Committee of Veteran’s affairs, supra note (662). 
1618 S.C. Res. 687, supra note (559). See, Bernard, supra note (981).  
1619 This Treaty will be examined in Section III “Billateral Conventions of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules.” 
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Whenever EHRs apply, detecting violations can be very difficult. The producti
or obtaining of arms is always considered a national security matter not subject to public 
disclosure. So proving such violation is not an easy task since no data is available. 
However, some mechanisms have been suggested for dealing with the difficulty. For
on 
 
exampl  
ember State’s violation. 
 Enviro-Humanitarian 
Rules 
s 
ble 
 
apons and 
 
d, 
he Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use 
                                                        
e, one mechanism can be a fact-finding mission. Another could be forming a
committee of experts to investigate a m
  
C-Arms and Disarmament Conventions are the Main Source of
 
In the wake of most armed conflicts, the survivors or worried non-belligerent
negotiate rules for the next war that they would, in retrospect, like to have seen applica
during the previous war.1620 Conventions concluded to attenuate atrocities and regulate 
methods and means of war are most likely to be concluded after wars. These arms control
and disarmament conventions are the main source of the EHRs. These conventions 
“recognize, at least in part, that weapons of modern warfare threaten destruction of 
humanity via alteration or destruction of the environment.”1621 While their provisions 
often do not cover the environment per se,1622 because of the fear of certain we
techniques of war that resulted in the restriction or the prohibition of their use, the duties
agreed upon in these agreements are coincident with the environmental protection.  
This section will classify the instruments that include EHRs into universal, 
regional, and bilateral as follows: 
 
1. Universal Instruments of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules 
 
Universal instruments of the EHRs are those involving all countries of the worl
such as (a) the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water; (b) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (c) 
T
  
20 George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in Studies and 
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 132 
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aldrich]. 
16
1621 Popovic, supra note (619) at 82. 
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of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; (d) Convention on the Prohibition o
Development, Production, and
f the 
 Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons; (e) 
Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Biological and Germ Warfare; (f) 
Convention r of Anti-
Personnel M
Emplaceme Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-
Bed an
The Geneva Protocol for 
the Pro
 Warfare, and (j) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. These are all clear 
examples o tions 
System of D f the EHRs. 
 
 
 
a. Treaty B  in Outer 
Space and Under Water  
., 
st all 
 all times.1625 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfe
ines and on their Destruction; (g) Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
t of Nuclear Weapons and other n
d the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; (h) Convention on the Prohibition 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to 
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; (i) 
hibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and 
Bacteriological Methods of
f the Enviro-Humanitarian conventions. Finally, (k) The United Na
isarmament will be examined among the universal instruments o
anning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere,
 
[The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space, and Under Water]1623 was the first concrete result 
of 18 years of efforts by the United States to impose limits on the 
nuclear arms race.1624 
 
The aim of the three original parties to the Treaty, the U.S., Russia, and the U.K
was to put an end to the armament race and eliminate the incentive to produce and te
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, at
 
ace and Under Water (Partial 
. 
ate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Executive M., Washington, 1963, at 
ter 
1622 Id., at 83. 
1623 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Sp
Test Ban Treaty), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, [hereinafter PTBT.] 
1624 See, Message from the former President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy to the U.S. 
Senate Transmitting the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before the U.S
Sen
2.  
1625 Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Ou
Space and Under Water, IX Annals Air & Space L. 391, 400-01 (1984) [hereinafter Matte]. 
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The PTBT has only five articles. Article I contains the main prohibition against 
nuclear tests. It states that 
  
[each Party] to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and 
d. 
 
s 
pressly prohibited. 
he PTBT prohibits all nuclear tests carried out in outer space regardless of the 
r space.1627 Therefore, 
celestial bodies are covered by such prohibition of nuclear tests, since they constitute part 
of oute
 
9 Thus 
only to nuclear tests and not conventional, chemical or biological tests, even though they 
can also contaminate the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. 
fective in preventing state Parties from conducting 
ar 
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other 
nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:  
(a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space; or 
under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or  
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive 
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under 
whose jurisdiction or control such explosions is conducte
 
According to Article I, nuclear explosions are prohibited in all environments 
except underground tests that may carried out within the territorial limits of the member
States. Although the phrase “in any other environment” seems to include underground 
tests, the treaty does not expressly prohibit such tests, as it does with regard to nuclear 
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.1626 However, underground test
which may cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the 
concerned State party are ex
T
distance of their sites from the Earth, since there is no limit to oute
r space and testing could result in their contamination.1628 
Moreover, a careful reading of Article I shows that the phrase “any other nuclear
explosion” covers “peace-time nuclear explosions that are not weapons tests.”162
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are also prohibited. This prohibition applies 
Article I (2) of the PTBT is inef
nuclear tests. For example, India, a party to the Treaty, concluded underground nucle
                                                          
1626 Nambiar, K. R., The Test Ban Treaty, 1963: Form and Content, 3 Ind. J. Int’l L. 315, 317 (1963). 
1627 Matte, supra note (1625) at 402. 
1628 Id. 
1629 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearing before th the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, 88  
ession, Executive M., Washington, 1963, at 77, 13.  Congress, 1st S
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tests,1630 and other countries such as “Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Br
Argentina, Taiwan, France, and China” have developed and are developing their
weapons capacity.
azil, 
 nuclear 
eaty 
s in 
luded 
 the 
eful 
ording to the nuclear capacity of each State. The Non-
Prolifer
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
                                                          
1631 These acts could be considered severe violations of the tr
provisions, and might lead to the State’s international responsibility, as we will discus
the final part of this thesis. 
 
b. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968,1632 was conc
based on the fear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance
danger of nuclear war.1633 Therefore, it looks to decrease and eliminate nuclear 
technology as a weapon in armed conflicts. However, it does not prevent any peac
use of nuclear power; indeed, it even requires cooperation in this field.1634 The Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty sets upon member States a number of 
obligations that vary acc
ation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty was ratified by 61 countries, including four 
major powers: China, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States.1635 
According to the Treaty, nuclear powers are required in the first place to engage 
in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear 
arsenals.1636 Since such powers are considered the main source of nuclear technology, if 
they can agree to control such technology, the risk of a new nuclear war would be 
reduced. Moreover, nuclear powers have the duty “not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
1630 See, David Albright, The Shots Heard Around the World, 54 Bull. Atom. Scientists (1998), 
available at <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/ja98/ja98albright.html> (last visit Nov. 6, 
2001)[hereinafter Albright, The Shots]. 
pact of Weapons Test Restrictions, Adelphi Paper No. 165, 1981, at 11 (citing U.S. 
on-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, [hereinafter Non-
, available in <http://untreaty.un.org> (last visit 
Aug. 17, 2001). 
1636 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. VI. 
1631 Husssain, F., The Im
Dept. of Energy and Swedish National Defense Research Institute source). 
1632 Treaty on the N
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.] 
1633 Id., pmbl. 
1634 Id., pmbl., art. IV. 
1635 United Nations Treaty Series-UNTS Document Display
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encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
 acquire 
explosi
n-
cial 
it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-
nuclear the case 
State allied to a nuclear power or associated with a nuclear power in carrying out or 
sustaining t  
occasion,164 he world.  
It w CJ) does not 
completely elf-defense 
is in questio  of nuclear 
weapons th arter and that 
fails to mee t violates 
international law rules and standards.  
violation of the Charter of the United Nations […is considered 
ve devices.”1637  
The nuclear powers have a negative and positive duty towards the non-nuclear 
States. For example, nuclear powers are committed not to attack or threaten to attack no
nuclear States, and they should assist them if they might be attacked by nuclear 
weapons.1638 Accordingly, the United States, during the 1978 United Nations Spe
Session on Disarmament, pledged that 
 State party to the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Weapons Treaty except in 
of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a 
he attack.1639 That exception, which has been confirmed on another
0 is quiet broad and can include many of the armed conflicts in t
ould be useful to mention that the International Court of Justice (I
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. It allows their use whenever s
n. However, it provides that: “a threat or use of force by means
at is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Ch
t all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful,”1641 since i
This trend is reinforced by the 1961 United Nations Declaration on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, which provides that  
 
the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the 
spirit, letters and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct 
                                                          
1637 Id., art. I. 
1638 Thomas Graham, International Law and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 49, 49 fn. 60 (2000) [hereinafter Graham]. 
1639 George Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use Pledges? 26 Arms 
Control Today 7, 7 (1996) [hereinafter Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options]. 
1640 In 1995, the U.S. former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, delivered to the non-nuclear
assurance of the United States that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuc
 States the 
lear State party to 
ception on this assurance, 
: 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. However, he included an ex
which contains the same meanings, but was updated to match the actual situation, especially after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. See, George Bunn, Arms Control By Committee
Managing Negotiations With The Russians 8 (Stanford Univ. Press 1992). 
1641 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note (83) at 43. 
 307
as] war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also 
ag
inv
ainst mankind in general, since the people of the world not 
olved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated 
n 
munity should be more specific 
in applying destruction 
are involved
O ty to never 
develop or n if the 
nuclear pow ar 
weapons ris d so long as non-nuclear States refrain from receiving 
such technology. The nuclear risk will increase only if both the sender and receiver States 
violate th For 
 
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
indirectly; 
by the use of such weapons. Any State using such nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the 
Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of 
humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and 
civilization […].1642 
 
Except the former Soviet Union, all the major nuclear powers opposed this 
declaration, which reflected on its international acceptance. Eventhough the Declaratio
does not bind member States, it refers to the United Nations Charter as a source of such 
obligation. From my point of view, the international com
 self-defense conditions, particularly, whenever weapons of mass 
.  
n the other hand, non-nuclear States are committed under the Trea
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.1643 Therefore, for example, eve
ers do not comply with their obligations under the Treaty, the nucle
k will still be limite
eir obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 
example, Iraq breached its obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Treaty provided in Article II,1644 when it provides that  
[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
                                                          
1642 U.N.G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Schindler & 
Toman eds., 1988), cited in Leslie C. Green, State Responsibility and Civil Reparation for 
Environmental Damage, in Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflicts 
422-23 (R. Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Green, State Responsibility]. 
1643 Non-Proliferation
at 
 of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. II. 
1644 Berhanykun Andemicael et al., Measure for Measure: The NPT and the Road Ahead, available at 
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull373/priest.html>, (last visit June 22, 2001) 
[hereinafter Andemicael]. 
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assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. 
 
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty greatly expands the 
verification system nd assigns a much more considerable role to the IAEA. According 
to Article III of the Treaty, the non-nuclear States are subject to the safeguard system o
the IAEA.
, a
f 
n 
ly
f 
1645 However, the North Korea breached its obligations under the Treaty whe
it refused to be subject to the IAEA safeguard system as provided in Article III.1646 
According to the general rules of international law, particular  the “Pacta Sunt 
Servanda,”1647 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty is binding, and this was 
confirmed by the ICJ Advisory Opinion relating to the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.1648 In its Advisory Opinion the ICJ reaffirms that any use or threat o
use of nuclear weapons would “generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
                                                          
1645 Article III of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty provides that “1. Each non-nuc
weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be 
negotiated and concluded with 
the International Atomic Energy
lear-
the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of 
 Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of 
verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special 
l 
 
, use or 
e 
 
 
or 
 
 the original entry into force of this 
ents of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, 
such deposit. Such agreements 
clear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. III. 
pra note (1644). 
ntion on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art. 26. 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note (83) Disenting Opinion of Justice 
fissionable material 
whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such 
facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable materia
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless 
the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. Th
safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of
this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or 
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of 
nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful 
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the 
Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements
with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually 
together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from
Treaty. For States depositing their instrum
negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of 
shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.” Non-
Proliferation of Nu
1646 Andemicael, su
1647 Vienna Conve
1648 Legality of the Threat or 
Higgins, para 40.  
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applicabl arian 
f 
ry foundations on which 
that syste
hich non-nuclear States are subject to an inspection, 
even thou I of the 
ms 
y 
 
eview 
Conference every five years.1655  
e in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanit
law.”1649 The ICJ declared that “the environment is under daily threat and that the use o
nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment.”1650 It added that the 
“destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They 
have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.”1651 
Significantly, Justice Weeramantry confirmed that “the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons is incompatible with international law and with the ve
m rests.”1652 Because the use of nuclear weapons has the ability to destroy 
nations and entire ecosystems, any such threat would contravene the principles of 
international law embodied in the United Nations Charter, the basic document of all 
international instruments. 
According to the non-nuclear States, the worst part in the Treaty is the 
discriminatory regime,1653 under w
gh the nuclear powers are not fulfilling their obligations under Article V
Treaty, which states that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear ar
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”  
The Treaty is given a twenty-five years life span from 1970, the date of its entr
into force, with options to extend it permanently, for an increment of years or to have no 
extension thereafter.1654 States’ dissatisfaction was reflected in their position during the
1995 Review and Extension Conference. During the Conference, participant States 
completely rejected the idea of a permanent treaty, and instead agreed to hold a R
                                                          
1649 Id., para 105. 
1650 Id., para. 29. 
1651 Id., para. 35. 
1652 Id., dissident opinion of Justice Weeramantry, at 312. 
ham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1654 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. X (2). 
1655 Graham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1653 Gra
 310
However, the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament1656 was negotiated during the Conference as an associated 
consensu
ates 
 
es 
 Moreover, it confirms the contents of Article VII by 
encourag
ar 
States’ nforces 
n 
ject to the 
verifica
                                                          
s agreement. It aims at reinforcing the existing regime and thus to keep the 
treaty in effect. It sets forth a number of primary objectives. For example, member St
should universalize the membership and adherence to the treaty. In addition, the 
Statement of Principles and Objectives reaffirms Article VI of the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty and requires member States to pursue, in a good faith, measur
related to eventual disarmament.1657 The Statement calls for the commencement of the 
negotiation for a fissile material cutoff treaty, which is the effort by the nuclear powers to 
reduce nuclear arsenals.1658
ing the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.1659 Finally, it requires 
further steps to protect non-nuclear States from threats from nuclear powers.1660  
To assure compliance with its provisions, the Non-Proliferation of Nucle
Weapons Treaty established a verification system,1661 which was subject to member 
reservations.1662 However, the Statement of Principles and Objectives rei
the verification system for the compliance with the Treaty. The Statement includes a
agreement to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification 
system with regard to non-nuclear States.1663 However, it still fails to include the nuclear 
powers under the verification system, and only non-nuclear States are sub
tion requirements.  
The environmental aspects were considered by the IAEA during negotiation of 
an enhanced safeguards protocol that enabled the IAEA to use environmental monitoring 
1656 U.N. Dep’t for Disarmament Affairs, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the Fact Sheet 5, Decision 2 (Press Kit, 2000) U.N. Doc. DPI/2085 
bjectives, number of nuclear 
 Latin America, South Pacific, and Africa. 
(2000) [hereinafter the Statement of Principles and Objectives]. 
1657 Andemicael, supra note (1644). 
1658 Id. 
1659 Id. Responding to this objective of the of the Statement of Principles and o
weapons free zones were established in
1660 Id. 
1661 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. III. 
1662 Graham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1663 Id. 
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techniques to detect trace amounts of residue left behind during the production of 
enriched uranium and plutonium.1664 Unfortunately, that protocol is not yet in force. 
While the nuclear powers accepted some responsibilities under the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, they have been privileged by the right to 
suspend
 of 
, 
or 
 
 
dditionally, the dissatisfaction of Russia, France and China with the American 
n 
technology can pierce any antimissile defense shield.”1669 And a Russian Tu-95 MS 
(“Bear”
                                                          
 any amendment to the Treaty. Article VIII (2) provides that “[a]ny amendment 
to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, 
including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.”1665 
Practically, the intention of the U.S. Dept. of Defense, under Presidents William 
Clinton and George W. Bush, to deploy a national defense missile system, in violation
the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM), which will be discussed in the next few pages
has seriously affected the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty’s regime. F
instance, the former Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, stated that “[unilateral U.S.] 
deployment of a national anti-missile defense system would have extremely dangerous
consequences for the whole disarmament process.”1666 Moreover, the Russian President 
Vladimir Putin has stated that the national missile defense (NMD) “will create insecurity,
breach the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, disrupt strategic arms reduction 
talks (START III), and provoke a new arms race.”1667 
A
project has moved these States to expand their strategic nuclear arsenals.1668 For 
example, a Russian military official said: “recent weapons tests prove that moder
) long-range strategic bomber launched an air-basesed strategic missile on 
February 16, 2001 and another bomber, a Tu-22 (“Backfire A”), launched two tactical 
II (2). 
ing, Feb. 11, 
reinafter Yeltsin Warns]. 
ww.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9911/02/clinton.putin/index.html> (last visit, June 15, 2001). 
i Karash, Russia Responds to U.S. Missile Shield with Massive Missile Tests, Missile Defense, 
1664 Strengthened Safeguard System: Additional Protocols, International Atomic Energy Agency 
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/updates/safeguards.html> (last visit June 13, 2001). 
1665 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. VI
1666 Yeltsin Warns Clinton Not to Undermine ABM Treaty, BBC Worldwide Monitor
1999 available in <http://www.lexis.com> (last visit Aug. 20, 2001)[he
1667 Simon Tisdall, Foreign Fears Won’t Deflect Bush on Missile Shield, 
<http://english.sohu.com/20010122/file/0888,244,100014.html> (last visit Aug. 17, 2001).  
1668 John King, Clinton, Putin Exchange Complaints in Oslo Meeting, 
<http://w
1669 Yur
<http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/launches/missile_defense_010216.html> (last visit Aug. 17, 
2001). 
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missiles during training exercises.1670 The Americans’ use of anti-ballistic missile shield, 
and the Russians’ missile tests, significantly increase the possibility of massive 
radioactive contamination that will harm the environment. If nations believe they must 
choose between national security and environmental protection, they are likely to give 
priority to national security, by virtue of the old-fashioned thinking that the strength of 
any nation is measured by the capacity of its military arsenal. As a result, we nee
increase nations’ awareness of environmental protection as a high priority for any heal
society. 
  
c. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Dev
d time to 
thy 
elopment, Production, 
Stockp
eapons and on their Destruction1671 (CWC) was ratified by 143 
States, he 
at of 
to 
apons have been used against it; (b) 
Riot co
 the 
CWC deals more specifically with chemical weapons.  
To achieve its goals, the CWC urges that further steps be considered, such as 
                                  
iling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical W
including the five major powers: France, China, Russia, United Kingdom, and t
United States,1672 which shows an international concern regarding chemical weapons and 
their use. The CWC restricts not only the use of chemical weapons, but even the thre
their usage. Article X (8) of the CWC provides that: “[e]ach State Party has the right 
request, and […] to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of 
chemical weapons if it considers that: (a)Chemical we
ntrol agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or (c) It is 
threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for State Parties by 
Article I.”1673 Unlike the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
imposing “a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, 
                        
l Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available in <http://untreaty.un.org> (last 
ote (1671) art. X (8).  
1670 Id. 
1671 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) [hereinafter CWC.] 
1672 Multilatera
visit Aug. 17, 2001). 
1673 CWC, supra n
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acquisi
r non-persistent 
the 
rity to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environ
ts 
y has 
ful for 
tion, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their 
destruction […].”1674 
Chemical agents are “fast-acting synthetic compounds”1675 designed to poison 
enemy armed forces, animals, and plants. They come in either persistent o
form.1676 A persistent chemical agent has long-lasting environmental effects. Some 
experts believe that it is easy for anyone who can make pesticides to make chemical 
weapons.1677 Moreover, chemical weapons are frequently used in an active armed 
conflict in order to poison enemy troops and destroy his land. 
In order to avoid ambiguity, the CWC clearly defines the substances that are 
covered under its jurisdiction. For example, it expressly affirms the prohibition of 
herbicides embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international 
law.1678 It prohibits also the use of riots control agents as methods of warfare.1679  
The CWC is one of the few international conventions that expressly considers the 
environment. In three of its provisions the Convention requires member States to assure 
the protection of the environment. It provides that: “[e]ach State Party, […] shall assign 
the highest prio
ment.”1680 Moreover, in executing the CWC, each member State is required 
assure the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons within i
national jurisdiction. For example, the United States now has “successfully destroyed 
6,000 tons of chemical weapons by incineration, [and] has learned that there is no silver 
bullet solution for [chemical weapons] destruction.”1681 Furthermore, the U.S. Arm
concluded that on-site incineration is safe and efficient and carries environmental 
consequences that are “quite limited in scope and significance.”1682 It would be use
                                                          
1674 Id., pmbl. 
1675 Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 93. 
1676 Harry Levins, How To Kill Lots and Lots of People: Weapons of Mass Destruction Come in Three 
Varieties and You’d Be Surprised Who Has Them, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 23, 1997, at B1. 
1677 Id., at B1. 
emical Weapons, Sept. 2000 
militarization, Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final 
ronmental Impact Statement 2.3-2.5 (1988) at 4-1. 
1678 CWC, supra note (1671) pmbl. 
1679 Id., art. I (5). 
1680 Id., art. IV (10), V (11), VII (3). 
1681 Mikhail Gorbachev, Time to Abolish Ch
<http://www.gci.ch/GreenCrossPrograms/legacy/articles/cwupdate.html> (last visit June 6, 2001) 
[hereinafter Gorbachev, Time to Abolish]. 
1682 Program Manager for Chemical De
Programmatic Envi
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the people and the environment as well, while destroying chemical weapons, to reduce to
the minimum the effects of their destruction. States are under the international obligatio
to destroy chemical weapons and to prevent their humanitarian and environmental
However, the safety and the mechanism of such destruction are left to the consideratio
of each State. 
The CWC establishes an independent international agency, the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with the mission of implementing, 
monitoring, and enforcing the Convention’s provisions.
 
n 
 perils. 
n 
to declare to the OPCW all the information regarding their chemical arsenals. For 
 called the challenged inspection. The first inspection 
kes place after a State’s declaration to the OPCW.1688 However, the 
1683 Member States are required 
instance, OPCW is authorized to verify chemical weapons, abandoned chemical 
weapons, production facilities, other facilities designed or constructed or used primarily 
for development of chemical weapons, and riot control agents.1684 The CWC vests the 
OPCW with the right of inspection, and, at the same time requires all State Parties to 
enact the necessary legislation to ensure the ability of OPCW to carry out its 
activities.1685 The OPCW’s inspection is based either upon the declaration of a member 
State,1686 which is called the initial and periodical inspection, or upon another member 
1687 which isState’s request,
systematically ta
challenged inspection takes place only after a request for such inspection is made by 
another member State and submitted to the OPCW according to the procedures enacted 
                                                          
1683 CWC, supra note (1671) art. VIII. 
1684 Id., art. VIII. 
1685 Article VII of the CWC provides that “1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it 
shall: […] 4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate or 
establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization 
and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the tim
that this Convention enters into force for it. 5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the 
legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention. 6. Each State Party shall treat 
as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the 
Organization in connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information and 
data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in accordance w
the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex. 7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with
Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technic
Secretariat.” Id., art. VII (4)-(7). 
1686 Id., art. IV (4). 
1687 Id., art. IX (8). 
1688 Id., art. IV. 
e 
ith 
 the 
al 
 315
by Arti
. 1690 
 of 
 
cle IX of the CWC.1689 Such inspections include on-site investigations by an 
international verification agency, and will cost an estimated $33-500 million per year
The attitude of the CWC member States substantially affects the effectiveness
the OPCW inspection system. Some States introduced reservations that frustrate the
OPCW verification system. For example, the United States Congress included three 
                                                          
1689 Article IX of the CWC provides that “8. [e]ach State Party has the right to request an on- site challe
inspection of any facility or location in e territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control 
any other State […] by an inspection team designated by the Director- General […]; 9. Each State Party is 
under the obligation to […] provide in the in ection request all appropriate information on the basis of 
which a concern has arisen regarding possible non- compliance with this Convention; 10. […E]ach State 
Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on- site challenge inspection; 11. […T]he 
inspected State Party shal
nge 
 th of 
sp
l have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to 
demonst m to fulfill its 
mandate f establishing 
 
d to 
this Convention[…]; 12. […] (a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected 
State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third 
State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection. (b) The inspected State Party shall then 
grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex. (c) The inspected State Party shall, 
e 
 inspection 
 
ssible, consistent with 
n 
The Director- General shall 
ate 
 of the inspected States Parties, as 
rt of 
ess the 
ith this Convention[…]” Id., art. IX (8)-(23). 
macy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a 
[hereinafter Vacts & Zilinskas.]  
rate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection tea
; (b) The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose o
facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non- compliance; and (c) The right to take measures to
protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not relate
as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall b
recorded in the final report […]; 13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an 
on- site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director- General for 
immediate processing […]; 14. The Director- General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection 
request meets the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if 
necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the
request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin […] 15. The 
Director- General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry […]; 16. After having received the 
inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director- General's actions on the 
request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its 
deliberations shall not delay the inspection process […]; 17. The Executive Council may [decide] against 
carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or
clearly beyond the scope of this Convention […] Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall 
participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, 
preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States 
Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly […]; 18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection 
mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection […]; 19. […]The inspection team shall be guided by 
the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner po
the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission […] 21. The final report shall contain the factual 
findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperatio
granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. 
promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected St
Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director- General shall further transmit 
promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and
well as the views of other States Parties […] 22. The Executive Council shall[…] review the final repo
the inspection team; 23. […T]he Executive Council […] shall take the appropriate measures to redr
situation and to ensure compliance w
1690 Detlev Vacts & Raymond A. Zilinskas, Book Review, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 984, 986 (1990) (reviewing 
Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplo
Treaty in Force 1975-85 (1988) 
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‘poison-pill’ provisions introduced by treaty opponents that could impair the CWC 
inspection’s system.1691 First, it authorizes the President of the U.S. to refuse a 
challenged inspection on “national security grounds.”1692 Second, it prevents the r
of samples from U.S. territory for analysis,
emoval 
 
 upon 
the U.N th so 
 of the OPCW is composed of the member States’ representatives, 
which m
 the 
1693 and finally, it limits the number of U.S. 
chemical plants that are subject to inspection.1694 These positions of the U.S. can have 
unfortunate consequences, because other countries may be inclined to put forth similar 
limitations on OPCW inspections.  
Furthermore, when a member State refuses to comply with the CWC 
requirements, or to cooperate with the OPCW, the OPCW can suspend its privileges 
under the CWC,1695 impose collective measures by other State Parties,1696 or impose 
measures in accordance with the General Assembly or Security Council of the United
Nations.1697 It would be useful if the OPCW had the authority to directly impose 
measures against the State that violated the CWC provisions, without having to rely
. General Assembly or the Security Council. These bodies are concerned wi
many delicate international situations that they may not be able to deal effectively with 
specific issues of chemical weapons inspections. 
Despite the apparent strength of the OPCW measures, their effectiveness is 
contingent upon their adoption by the Conference of the OPCW, which is a political 
organ. The Conference
eans that they may consider the interests of their States over the interests of 
human well being and the environment. Additionally, some States may be subject to
OPCW measures, while some others may not, because of political considerations. 
                                                          
1691 Jonathan B. Tucker, Director of the Center of Non-Pproliferation Studies, The Current Status of
BCW Regimes, Paper Delivered to the Hoover Institution Conference on Biologica
Chemical Weapons at 7 (Stanford University, Nov. 16-18, 1998). 
1692 Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological an
Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminal
477,485(1999) [hereinafter Scharf]. 
 the 
l and 
d 
ization, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
1693 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to 
be codified at 22 U.S.C.A § 302). 
e (1671) art. XII (2). 
1694 Scharf, supra note (1692) at 485. 
1695 CWC, supra not
1696 Id., art. XII (3). 
1697 Id., art. XII (4). 
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Finally, as a rule, any international convention binds its contracting parties 
only.1698 Thus, the provisions of the CWC do not bind non-member States, even if they 
obtain chemical weapons. These States still present a major threat to human health and 
the environment, since they can use such chemical weapons, and even distribute them to 
other non-parties to the CWC, such as non-member States, combatants in internal armed 
conflicts, or terrorists. 
ustomary law and the 
general principles of international law, such as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, a
e 
e ed forces 
are still usin
By ending development of biological weapons and forbidding their use even in 
he United States helped to develop an international 
 powers. 
Even States which have not ratified the CWC are prohibited from harming the 
environment of other nations according to the international c
nd the Martens Clause and the IUCN Amman 
Clause which was examined in Part Two of this thesis. As long as the use, export, sale, 
production, or possession of chemical weapons is considered a great threat to human 
health and the environment, their use should be prevented immediately. Even non-
member States to the CWC must be in compliance with such general principles of 
international law in order to protect the common globe. 
The question of the legality of herbicides and certain other chemical agents’ usag
is still subject to arguments. One argument suggests that the prohibition of their usage has 
becom  a stable principle in international customary law.1699 Nevertheless, arm
g herbicides and other chemical agents during armed conflicts in order to 
defoliate enemy lands.1700  
 
d. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons 
 
retaliation for biological warfare, t
standard against any use of biological weapons. The outlawing of biological warfare 
would preserve the American, Russian, or Chinese strategic positions as nuclear
Since they are cheaper and easy to build, biological weapons could give poorer nations a 
                                                          
1698 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art. 26. 
1699 Schafer, supra note (384) at 301-03. 
1700 Sharp, supra note (509) at 55-56. 
 318
weapon es.1701 
nd 
r 
1707 This provision may cover 
military  
y into 
                                                          
 that could “balance” or level the strategic advantage of the nuclear Stat
Biological weapons can be easily obtained by developing countries, and countries 
currently suspected of developing biological programs include China, Cuba, India, 
Iran,1702 Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Russia, Japan, and Syria.1703  
However, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, a
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons1704 (BWC) of 1972 seeks to 
completely eliminate bacteriological and toxin weapons through their destruction or 
conversion to peaceful purposes. It is considered the first convention that completely 
outlaws an entire category of weapons.1705 The BWC was ratified by 28 countries and 
remarkably none of the major powers is a member-State to it.1706 
Article I (1) of the Convention provides that “[e]ach State Party to this 
Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whateve
their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
 production, use, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons since they
cannot be described as protective and peaceful. Furthermore, Article II of the BWC 
provides that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to 
peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entr
force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery 
specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its 
jurisdiction or control.  In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety 
precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.” Article II 
1701 George W. Christopher, Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 JAMA 412, 415-16 (1997). 
1702 About the Iranian nuclear arsenal, see, Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A 
Jurisprudential Assessment, 1 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 65 (1996). 
1703 William S. Cohen, Preparing for a Grave New World, Wash. Post, July 26, 1999, at A19. See also, 
ical Weapons, Dec. Sci. Am. 60, 62 (1996). 
 on the Prohibition of the Development, production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and 
t of 
 Responsibilities, 760 Pli/Comm 533, 537 (1979) [hereinafter Connaughton & Goldman]. 
 Database of the ICRC, available at <http://www.icrc.org>, (last visit Aug. 17, 2001). 
. 
Leonard A. Cole, The Specter of Biolog
1704 Convention
Toxin Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/2826[hereinafter BWC.] 
1705 Anne Q. Connaughton & Steven C. Goldman, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Departmen
Commerce
1706 IHL
1707 BWC, supra note (1704) art I (1)
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gives m  
ns 
e 
 
n the 
 any 
ed that on the day of the outbreak all the victims were “clustered along a straight 
line downwind from the military facility” and the livestock in the same area also died of 
                                                          
ilitary forces the possibility of possessing biological weapons, under the condition
of transferring their use into peaceful purposes.1708 
Responding to the fact that member States may not completely comply with the 
BWC, and non-member States are excluded from BWC jurisdiction, the U.S. Army 
created a special program to deal with the States that have aggressive biological weapo
program, the Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP). The funding of that 
program grew by 400 percent from 1980 to 1988.1709 Some of the States, particularly th
developing States, obtained their technology from the U.S. For instance, Iraqi scientists
ordered and received lab samples of biological warfare agents from the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control.1710 On the other hand, in 1996, the United States expanded its domestic 
implementation of the BWC to punish crimes associated with possession of biological 
weapons components.1711 
In 1979, an accident at a covert Russian biological weapons plant resulted i
outbreak of an epidemic of anthrax in Sverdlovsk,1712 Russia, and killed up to one 
thousand persons.1713 The Russian government denied that the deaths were caused by
activity relating to biological weapons. But thirteen years later, in 1992, the former 
Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, admitted that the anthrax outbreak was the result of 
military activity at the facility.1714 He allowed a team of Western scientists1715 to 
investigate the outbreak in Sverdlovsk in June 1992 and August 1993.1716 Their results 
show
1708 Id., art II. 
1709 Robert Gould & Nancy D. Connell, The Public Health Effects of Biological Weapons, in War And 
Public Health 106 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., 2000) [hereinafter Gould & 
Connell.] 
vsk, available at  
a molecular biologist who has written about 
ity’s Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology. 
s/plague/sverdlovsk/meselson.html> (last visit Aug. 20, 
 1979 Anthrax Leak, supra note (1714). 
1710 Id. 
1711 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 30. 
1712 Now called Ekaterinburg. 
1713 Vacts & Zilinskas, supra note (1690) at 986. 
1714 The 1979 Anthrax Leak in Sverdlo
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sverdlovsk/>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001) 
[hereinafter the 1979 Anthrax Leak]. 
1715 Western scientists were including Dr. Matthew Meselson, 
biological agents and is the Thomas Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural Sciences in Harvard 
Univers
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/show
2001). 
1716 The
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anthrax.1717 The team concluded that the outbreak resulted from a release of an aerosol o
“anthrax pa
f 
thogen” at the military facility; however, they were unable to determine what 
caused the release specifically.1718 In the Sverdlovsk accident, the BWC proved its 
inefficiency.
appoint a co
ary 
ential business information at risk.”1720 
The draft Protocol aims at enforcing the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
e Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons 
WC), which bans germ weapons. The Protocol aims at providing compliance 
rovisions that were lacking in the BWC, because when the Convention was adopted in 
 Its weakness consists in the absence of verification and enforcement 
provisions, since no authority could investigate the situation in Sverdlovsk to assure 
Russian compliance with the BWC provisions. Nevertheless, in such environmental 
disasters and even in the absence of enforcement measures, the involved countries can 
mmission composed of military and environmental experts and may seek the 
assistance of experts from neighboring countries to monitor the violation and investigate 
the State’s compliance with its duty under the BWC and under international custom
law. 
 
 
 
e. Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Chemical and Germs 
Warfare 
 
The Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Biological and Germ 
Warfare of July 20011719 has been rejected formally by the United States. The U.S. chief 
negotiator, Donald A. Mahley, said: “In our assessment, the draft protocol would put 
national security and confid
th
(B
p
                                                          
1717 Id. 
1718 Id. 
1719 Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Rejects New Accord Covering Germ Warfare, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2001, A5 
; U.S. Rejects Anti-Germ Warfare Accord, 
> (last visit Aug. 17, 2001) [hereinafter 
jects Anti-Germ Warfare Accord]. 
5. 
[hereinafter Olson]
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001/07/25/antigerm.htm
U.S. Re
1720 Id., at A
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1972, during the Cold War, negotiators ignored enforcement issues, thinking that one 
would ever use germ weapons.1721 
The Protocol was drafted to create a way to inspect biological weapons sites 
without in
n compliance” 
and it will not prevent som
provision
deter som
resorting to germ
 
 and 
Convention as a  “landmark step 
of landm 26 
interpreted as a violation of the Protocol’s provisions as long as civilians are not 
terfering with other legitimate facilities.1722 However, Mr. Mahley added “[t]he 
draft will not improve our ability to verify Biological Weapons Conventio
e countries from developing their biological weapons.1723 
The negotiators set November 2001 as a target to complete the enforcement 
s, which will be important to ensure compliance with the BWC’s provisions and 
e countries from using or threatening to use or develop biological weapons and 
 warfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction  
 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan described the conclusion of the Ottawa 
in the history of disarmament.”1724 
Before 1997, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices of 1980,1725 was the only instrument that officially 
recognized the danger from landmines. Protocol II does not completely prohibit the use 
ines, but only restricts member States from directing them against civilians.17
Therefore, using landmines to harm combatants or the environment may not be 
                                                          
1721 U.S. Rejects Anti-Germ Warfare Accord, supra note (1719). 
1722 Id. 
1723 Id. 
1724 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, addressed to the Signing Ceremony of the Anti-Personnel M
Convention, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997. 
ines 
. 
. 
1725 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, Oct
10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter Protocol II on Mines and Booby-Traps]
1726 Id., art. 3. 
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concerned. However, the Protocol does recognize the importance of protecting civilians. 
On May 3, 1996, Protocol II was amended and promulgated1727 at the Review 
Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations on Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention (UNCCW). The Amended Protocol II of the UNCCW extends to internal 
armed conflicts, whereas the original Protocol was limited to international armed 
conflicts and certain wars of national liberation.
 
t for 
ntal 
 landmines whether in international armed conflicts or during civil wars. 
Even th rmed 
 
e 
strict 
Stockp , 
. The 
1728 This extension is importan
combatants who use mines in internal conflicts, such as in Cambodia and Angola.1729 
Thus, the Amended Protocol II will reduce civilian casualties from landmines and 
booby-traps. Nevertheless, the Amended Protocol II does not include environme
protection from
ough it considers the danger from the use of these weapons in internal a
conflicts on civilians, it ignores their threat to nature and the environment. 
As the effects of landmines have grown more apparent, it has become evident
that the existing international legal protection is too weak and inadequate to cover the 
atrocities caused by these weapons. Existing law it does not include measures to enforc
compliance with the international conventions’ provisions and does not impose a 
liability on States that use landmines. Complete protection from landmines needs to be 
provided for civilians and the environment in times of armed conflicts and even in post-
armed conflict situations. Therefore, the international community formulated a new 
instrument to cover that need. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
iling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction
(Ottawa Convention), was adopted in 19971730 to prevent the use of landmines. The 
Ottawa Convention was ratified by 118 States, including France and the United 
Kingdom.1731 
The Ottawa Convention prohibits completely the use of anti-personnel 
landmines. It also forbids their development, production, stockpiling, and transfer
                                                          
1727 Protocol on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
amended May 3, 1996, U.S. Treaty Doc. 105-1, at 37, 35 I.L.M. 1206 [hereinafter Am
 Other Devices, 
ended Protocol II]. 
1728 Protocol II on Mines and Booby-Traps, supra note (1725) art. 1 para. 2. A list of wars of national 
liberation can be found in Article 1 (4) of the Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
1729 Michael Lecey, Passage of Amended Protocol II, March Arm. Law. 7, 8 (2000). 
1730 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997) [hereinafter Ottawa Convention]. 
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Conven
tes 
i-
e 
 
tion of 
sions of this Convention.”1732  
States’ obligations according to the Ottawa Convention are to cease the use of 
vities. The use of anti-personnel mines would kill people in 
one ha
f 
party 
nt ban 
orts in 1998.  
 
g. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
 on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and 
            
tion requires the destruction of anti-personnel landmines whether they are in 
stockpiles or are already placed in the ground. Article 1 of the Ottawa Convention sta
that “1.[e]ach State Party never undertakes,  under any circumstances: (a) To use ant
personnel mines; (b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or 
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; (c) To assist, encourag
or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruc
all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provi
anti-personnel mines, to prohibit their development and production, to prohibit their 
stockpile, to prohibit their transfer, and to never assist, encourage, or induce anyone to 
engage in the forecited acti
nd and harm the environment on other hand, since cadavers may contaminate the 
soil, or water bodies where it may be dumped. Moreover, the destruction of anti-
personnel mines can also harm the environment since toxic materials and other 
hazardous substances may be released into the ground, water, and air.  
Furthermore, the use of landmines by a signatory State is considered a breach o
its international obligations, since under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties, “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
purpose of a treaty when [...] it has signed the treaty.” Although, the U.S. is not a 
to the Treaty, the White House in a Statement issued September 17, 1997, declared a 
new United States landmine policy. The United States would observe a permane
on landmines’ export, increase funding for landmine alternatives, and commit 
substantial funding to de-mining eff 1733
other Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Subsoil Thereof  
                                                                                                                                                                 
1731 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available in <http://untreaty.un.org> (last 
visit Aug. 17, 2001). 
1732 Ottawa Convention, supra note (1730) art. 1. 
1733 See, Transcript of Clinton’s Remarks on Landmine Elimination, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 17, 1997, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. 
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 On December 7, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Treaty 
on the P ss 
 
r 
f the 
ited States, and Russia on May 18, 
1972, t
emilitarization of the sea-bed.1737 Bulgaria introduced a proposal 
to be in l not 
738 
 
y 
rohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Ma
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, known as 
the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (SACT)1734 by Resolution 2660 (XXV). On February 
11, 1971, the SACT was signed in simultaneous ceremonies held in London, Moscow,
and Washington, the capitals of the depository States. In addition, more than sixty other 
nations also signed the Treaty.1735 At the signing in Washington, President Nixon said 
that the Treaty is only another step “towards a greater goal: the control of nuclea
weapons on earth and the reduction of that danger that hangs over all the nations o
world as long as those weapons are not controlled.”1736 Upon ratification by the 
depository governments, the United Kingdom, the Un
he SACT entered into force. 
It is necessary to examine the historical background of the SACT in order to 
understand its provisions. 
At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Bulgaria was the first 
country to suggest the d
cluded in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, that a coastal State shal
use the continental shelf for the purpose of building military bases or installations.1
Bulgaria’s proposal was replaced by India’s analogous proposal.1739 The Indian proposal
read as follows: “[t]he continental shelf adjacent to any coastal State shall not be used b
the coastal State or any other State for the purpose of building military bases or 
installations.”1740 However, India’s proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to 
                                                          
1734 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass 
 701, 
 Mass 
ritime L. & Com. 107, 107 (1971-72) [hereinafter Krieger].  
ll. 289-90 (1971), cited in Id. 
alczyk].  
e, The United Nations Conference on The Law of The Sea, 
.Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82, cited in R. Platzoder ed., The Third United Nations 
 of the Sea: Documents 185 (1984). 
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 7337, [hereinafter SACT]. 
1735 Walter W. Krieger, The United Nations Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Destruction on the Ocean Floor, 3 Ma
1736 46 Dept. State Bu
1737 Wojciech Góralczyk, Legal Problems of the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor: 
Denuclearization, 5 Polish Y.B Int’l L.43, 45 (1972-73) [hereinafter Gór
1738 A/Conf. 13/C. 4/L. 41 and Rev. 1, se
“Official Records”, Vol. 6, at 137. 
1739 A/Conf13/C. 4/L. 57. 
1740 U.N
Conference on the Law
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eighteen, with six abstentions, because the western States were not ready to take an 
obligation of demilitarizing the continental shelf.1741 
On March 18, 1969, Russia, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at that 
time, submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use
of the sea-bed ocean floor and the subsoil thereof for military purposes.
 
ed 
ay 22, 1969, the United States submitted its counter-proposal to the 
Disarm
l 
supplem n 
e treaty 
f SACT, the parties committed themselves not to implant 
or emp l 
1742 It was bas
on the complete prohibition of military uses and strict control over compliance with the 
treaty’s provisions.1743 
On M
ament Committee, The Draft Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty.1744 It aimed at 
banning the emplacement on the sea-bed, ocean floor and the subsoil thereof of nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction.1745 Accordingly, the U.S. draft treaty provided 
that the prohibitions should apply beyond the three-mile coastal zone. Russia realized 
that, without cooperation with the U.S. and its supporters, there could not be any 
satisfactory seabed arms limitation. Thus, on October 7, 1969, Russia and the U.S. jointly 
submitted a revised draft treaty.1746 The joint draft treaty was amended on October 30, 
1969,1747 and as amended was presented during the General Assembly session on Apri
23, 1970.1748 Further discussion in the Disarmament Committee resulted in a revised and 
ented draft on September 1, 1970.1749 This text was presented at the 25th sessio
of the General Assembly, and was accepted by ninety-one votes to two (El Salvador, 
Peru) with six abstentions.1750 At the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, th
was accepted by 104 votes to two (El Salvador, Peru) with two abstentions (Ecuador, 
France).1751 
According to Article I o
lace on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and on the subsoil thereof beyond the coasta
                                                          
1741 Góralczyk, supra note (1737) at 45. 
1742 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), 240, March 18, 1969. 
1743 Góralczyk, supra note (1737) at 48. 
1744 Id. 
1751
1745 ENDC/249, May 22, 1969. 
f the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 269.  1746 The Conference o
1747 CCD/269/Rev.1. 
1748 CCD/269/Rev.2. 
1749 CCD/269/Rev.3. 
rst Committee A/8198, at 8. 1750 The Report of the Fi
 A/PV. 1919, at 21. 
 326
zone defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass 
destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities sp
designed for storing, testing, or using such w
ecifically 
eapons and also not to assist, encourage or 
duce any State to carry out these prohibited activities and not to participate in any other 
 also 
applies to biological and chemical weapons, as it covers all weapons of mass destruction. 
hich may 
 
“extraordinary events” related to the Treaty. Finally, SACT does not directly solve the 
 an 
e of “how common interests, representing a compromise among several 
in
way in such actions. The prohibition includes different types of nuclear weapons, but it 
does not include nuclear installations of a peaceful, non-military, character.1752 It
Article III provides that each State party shall have the right to verify, through 
observation, the activities of other States parties on the sea-bed, ocean floor, and subsoil 
thereof beyond the 12-mile coastal zone, provided that such observation does not 
interfere with such activities. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the treaty does not 
provide for the free access to all projects and installations arousing suspicion, w
affect the verification system. 
Article VIII of SACT provides that a nation has the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it determines that its “supreme interests” are being jeopardized by 
problem of the demilitarization on the sea-bed, ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, and 
o does not cover activities on the sea waters. Nevertheless, SACT couldals  be cited as
exampl
competing interests, could be achieved.”1753 
 
h. The United Nations Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
al Weapons, which may be Deemed to be Use of Certain Convention
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects  
 
The United Nations Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980,1754 and its additional Protocols1755 are different 
                                                          
1752 Krieger, supra note (1735) at 119-20. 
1753 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, The Seabed Arms Control Treaty: A Study in the Contemporary Law of t
Military Uses of the Seas, 4 Maritime L. & Com. 67, 92 (1972-73) [hereinafter Rao]. 
1754 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note 
(761).   
he 
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from other enviro-humanitarian rules instruments because this convention and its 
additional protocols deal with specific modes of conventional weapons.1756 Other env
humanitarian rules deal with unconve
iro-
ntional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. 
, 
ethods 
read, long-
term an
es 
5 (3) 
  
Article 1 of the Inhumane Weapons Convention provides a link between this 
convention1757 the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I.1758 Therefore
the Inhuman Weapons Convention has been described as an extension of those earlier 
agreements.1759 It was ratified by 85 States, including China, France, Russia, United 
Kingdom, and the United States.1760 
The Preamble to the Convention provides that “it is prohibited to employ m
or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widesp
d severe damage to the natural environment.”1761 Here, the Preamble reiterates 
Article 35 (3) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which address
environmental damage in times of armed conflicts. It will be recalled that Article 3
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
ns 
we
resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers 
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound 
by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.” 
their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the Charter of the 
nciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
(4). 
ral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available in <http://untreaty.un.org> (last 
1755 There are three Additional Protocols to the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of 
Certain Conventional weapons, which are: 1) the Non- Detectable Fragments, 19 I.L.M. 1529 
(1980)[hereinafter Non-Detectable Fragments Protocol]; 2) Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Mines, Booby Traps and other Devices, 19 I.L.M. 1529 (1980) [hereinafter Booby Traps Protocol]; and 3)
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 19 I.L.M. 1534 (1980) [hereinafter Protocol on Incendiary Weapons]. 
1756 Yuzon, supra note (695) at 823. 
1757 Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapo
provides that “[t]his Convention and its annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 
2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any 
situation described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions.” Convention 
on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note (761) art. 1. 
1758 Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions provides that “[I]n addition to the provisions which shall be 
implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise bet en two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III), and (IV), supra note (56) Common art. II; The Additional Protocol (I) 
provides in Principle 1 (4) that “4. The situations referred to in the proceeding paragraph include armed 
conflicts in which people fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of 
United nations and Declaration of Pri
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” Additional Protocol (I), 
supra note (79) art. 1 
1759 Yuzon, supra note (695) at 823. 
1760 Multilate
visit Aug. 17, 2001). 
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of the Additional Protocol I’s text offers less than ideal environmental protection, 
because it applies only to damage that is severe, long-term, and widespread.  
Because it links human injury to environmental injury, the Inhumane Weapons 
Convention also provides collateral environmental protection while recalling “[t]he 
general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of 
hostilities.”1762 In times of armed conflicts, civilian populations are subject to direct a
indirect injury from the weapons of war. By seeking to avoid such injury, the convention 
also seeks to protect the environment. However, its Additional Protocol on Prohibitio
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Boo
nd 
ns 
by Traps and Other Devices, provides for much 
more p
 
 
uently, national parks, 
zoo, res s, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
rotection for civilian populations than the protection provided in the Inhumane 
Weapons Convention itself. For instance, Article 3 (2) of the Booby Traps Protocol states
that “[i]t is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, 
either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians.”1763 This Article prohibits any attack by mines, booby traps 
or other devices against civilian populations, whether in offensive or defensive cases. It 
also prohibits indiscriminate uses of mines, booby traps and other devices.1764 Moreover, 
it requires combatants to avoid foreseeable injury to civilians or civilian objects.1765 
Civilian objects are defined, in Article 2 (5) of the Booby Traps Protocol, as “all objects 
which are not military objectives.”1766 A military object is defined as “any object which 
by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”1767 Conseq
ervoirs, rivers, and forests are considered by their nature civilian objective
unless they misused by military forces.  
 
1761 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note 
hibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note 
rotocol, supra note (1755) art. 3 (2). 
). 
(761) pmbl. 
1762 Convention on Pro
(761) pmbl. 
1763 Booby Traps P
1764 Id., art. 3 (3). 
1765 Id., art. 3 (3) (c
1766 Id., art. 2 (5). 
1767 Id., art. 2 (4). 
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The Booby Traps Protocol requires member States to take all feasible precautions
necessary to assu
 
re the protection of civilian population from the effects of weapons.1768 
Therefo  
e use of 
 
n 
i) 
cluding 
n lead 
ilian 
3 
 strictly forbidden. Moreover, once again environmental protection has no 
priority
e 
re, any severe, widespread, and long term environmental damage that may reflect
on the public health and safety should be avoided. The Protocol also prohibits th
mines, booby traps, and other devices in areas of concentration of civilians, such as cities, 
towns, and villages, except for explicit military proposes, since the booby traps can affect
both people and any animals that trigger them.1769 Moreover, Article 6 (2) of the Protocol 
prohibits causing any superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.1770 Civilian protectio
does not end by the cessation of combat, it continues after the combat. Article 7 (3) (a) (
declares that combatants should “take all necessary and appropriate measures, in
the use of  [records of minefields, mines and booby-traps], to protect civilians from the 
effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps.”1771 The absence of these records ca
to the harm of the civilian population as well as the environment.  
Similar protection is offered to civilians by the Additional Protocol of the 
Inhuman Weapons Convention on Incendiary Weapons, which prohibits incendiary 
weapons attacks against civilian population,1772 or areas with a concentration of civ
populations.177
Article 2 (4) of the Incendiary Weapons Protocol provides that “[i]t is prohibited 
to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary 
weapons[…].”1774 This provision seeks to eliminate the “tectonic of burned land” used by 
some military forces during international or internal armed conflicts. Unfortunately, this 
tactic is still not
 over military necessity. Accordingly, Article 2 (4) grants the armed forces the 
right to ignore the protection of natural resources if they are “used to cover, conceal or 
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military 
objectives.”1775 Just as the international community should deal with combatants who us
                                                          
1768 Id., art. 3 (4). 
). 
apons Protocol, supra note (1755) art. 2 (1). 
 (4). 
1769 Id., art. 4 (2). 
1770 Id., art. 6 (2). 
) (i1771 Id., art. 7 (3) (a
1772 Incendiary We
1773 Id., art. 2 (2), (3). 
1774 Id., art. 2 (4). 
1775 Id., art. 2
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civilian populations as a cover to benefit from their protection, it should prohibit 
combatants from using nature and natural resources as a cover during armed conflicts. 
The preamble of the Inhumane Weapons Convention reaffirms the inadequacy of th
existing rules of armed conflicts and emphasizes “the need to continue the codification 
e 
and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in armed 
col 
tes that “it is prohibited in all circumstances to use […] booby-traps which are 
in any w places 
o 
, 
 
ity 
rtens 
 
i. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of 
                      
conflict.”1776  
Another direct environmental protection is provided in the Booby Traps Proto
when it ta s
ay attached to or associated with […] historic monuments, works of art or 
of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; animals or their 
carcasses.”1777 
Significantly, the Inhumane Weapons Convention adopted the Martens Clause t
cover all the cases that are not covered by its provisions, the three Additional Protocols
or other international agreements. It provides that “the civilian population and the
combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles 
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of human
and from the dictates of public conscience.”1778 Unlike the IUCN Clause, the Ma
Clause does not deal directly with the environmental protection, and offers its protection 
only to civilian populations and combatants.1779 Therefore, the environment is not 
considered as high a priority in the Inhumane Weapons Convention as injury to persons. 
warfare 
 
The international community fought to ban the use of poisonous gases and 
teriological wbac eapons a long time ago. Yet that campaign has not resulted in significant 
                                    
e 1776 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra not
(761) pmbl. 
1777 Booby Traps Protocol, supra note (1755) art. 6 (1) (b) (ix), (x). 
1778 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note 
(761) pmbl. 
1779 See, for more details on the IUCN Amman Clause and the Martens Clause, Part Two of this Thesis 
“Martens Clause”. 
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victory. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 expressly banned the employment of 
poisoned projectiles used to disburse gases.1780 Eight years later, while adhering to 
letters of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the German Army launched the first 
chemical attack in modern warfare without using poisonous projectiles.
the 
w 
 
ter the 
h, English and Americans developed their own chemical 
weapon
as 
Treaty deals with gas warfare, which addresses the only German military forces, and a 
1781 They 
positioned chlorine-filled containers along a four-mile front, waited until the wind ble
toward the French positions, and then opened the canisters and released a cloud of 
chlorine gas.1782 Technically, the German did not violate the Hague Conference 
agreements because they did not use the projectiles to release the poisonous gas, instead 
they used the wind to transmit the gas to the enemy’s line. However, such action can be
interpreted as a violation of the general principle of international law, i.e., the good faith 
codified in Article 15 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.1783 Af
German action, the Frenc
s and retaliated.1784 Chemical weapons caused 1.3 million casualties during 
World War I.1785 As a result, Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles prohibits g
warfare, by providing that “[t]he use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and 
importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.”1786 Only one article of the Versailles 
                                                          
1780 First International Peace Conference, The Hague 1899, reprinted in 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 103, 105 (Supp
1907) See also, The Second International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, reprinted in 2 Am. J. I
L. 106 (Supp. 1908). 
1781 Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare 17 (Univ. of Ill
. 
nt’l 
inois Press, 1986) [hereinafter 
edical Effects and 
rs A Go, A Yellow Pall of Terror, 
. 
to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention 
treaty, 
ed.” 
9 
l 
Spiers]; see also, Leonhard S. Wolf, Chemical and Biological Warfare: M
Consequences, 28 Mcgill L.J. 732, 735 (1983) [hereinafter Wolf, Chemical and Biological]; see also, 
David Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical Convention, 15 
Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 3 (1990). 
1782 Spiers, supra note (1781) at 15-16; see also, Tom Buerkle, 80 Yea
Int’l Herald Tribune, Apr. 22, 1995, at 1[hereinafter Buerkle]
1783 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention provides that “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which defeat 
the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
constituting the treaty subject 
clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the 
bending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delay
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art. 18. 
1784 Buerkle, supra note (1782) at 1; Spiers, supra note (1781) at 17-20. 
1785 David B. Merkin, The Efficiency of Chemical Arms Treaties in the Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, 
B.U. Int’l L. J. 175,176 (1991) [hereinafter Merkin]; see also, Philip Louis Reizenstein, Note, Chemica
and Biological Weapons – Recent Legal Developments May Prove to be a Turning Point in Arms Control, 
12 Brook J. Int’l L. 95, 99, fn.26 (1986) [hereinafter Reizenstein]. 
1786 Treaty of Peace with Germany at Versailles, supra note (589).  
 332
more comprehensive agreement was needed to deal with this matter specifically. 
Responding to this need, a new instrument was concluded on June 17, 1925: the Gene
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or oth
and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
va 
er Gases 
s in The Hague 
Conven l 
se 
of 
s 
 
nvironment is Resolution 2603A (XXIV) of 
Decem
]ny 
use 
1787 
The Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases was ratified by 132 
countries including the five major powers.1788 It covers the gap
tions of 1899 and 1907. It completely outlaws the use of chemical and biologica
weapons against other treaty signatories.1789 In addition, the Geneva Protocol for the U
of Asphyxiating Gases recognizes environmental protection, by prohibiting the use 
biological weapons, whether on humans, animals, or plants without any distinction. 
Moreover, Member States to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gase
recognize the importance of environmental protection. For example, during the 
preparatory works of the Protocol, the Polish delegate declared that “[b]acteriological 
warfare can also be waged against the vegetable world, and not only may corn, fruit and 
vegetable suffer, but also vineyards, orchards, and fields.”1790  
Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has reflected the principles
adopted in the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases in a number of its 
resolutions. The most relevant to the e
ber 16, 1969, which provides that “chemical and biological methods of warfare 
[…] are inherently reprehensible because their effects are often uncontrollable and 
unpredictable and may be injurious without distinction to combatants and non-
combatants […]” That resolution also “[d]eclares contrary to international law: (a) [a
chemical agents of warfare – chemical substances […] which might be employed beca
                                                          
1787 The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases 
and Bacteriological Methods of warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol
Use of Asphyxiating Gases]. 
 for the 
1788 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, available at <http://www.icrc.org> (last visit Aug. 17, 2001). 
1789 “[T]he use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or 
e civilized world; and [w]hereas the 
tion shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, 
ra. 5. 
, supra note (705) at 71. 
devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of th
prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are 
Parties; and [t]o the end that this prohibi
binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; [d]eclare: [t]hat the High Contracting Parties […] 
agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as 
between themselves[…].”Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, supra note (1787) pa
1790 CBW and the Law of War
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of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; (b) [a]ny biological agents of 
warfare – living organisms, […] which are intended to cause disease or death in man, 
animals
ol. 
on 
r. 
 hurt the environment 
by relea r. 
rt 
e this 
s 
s, the 
United 
                                                          
 or plants, and which depend for their effects to multiply in the person, animal or 
plant attacked.”1791 
Non-signatory States are not covered by the protection offered by the Protoc
Moreover, the Protocol “did not, however, prohibit all use of chemical weapons or 
preclude the development of new technologies or stockpiling of such weapons.”1792 A 
number of States ratified the Protocol with reservation of reciprocity, or the right to 
retaliate, under which the violation of the Protocol by a member State will free other 
members from their obligations set forth in the Protocol.1793 In case of either aggressi
or retaliation, humans might be directly or indirectly affected, but the environment is 
always the direct victim of such attacks since it cannot run, escape, or find shelte
Needless to say, the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases will
sing toxic substances, killing animals and plants, and poisoning bodies of wate
Although some signatories reserved the “right to retaliate,” the International Cou
of Justice (ICJ) implicitly has rejected the act of reprisal on one occasion.1794 Whil
occasion did not involve the use of chemical or bacteriological agents, the Court’
rejection of reprisal can be applied to those circumstances. The occasion was when an 
Albanian battery fired at two British warships that passed through the Corfu Channel on 
May 15, 1946. The Albanian Government declared that foreign warships had no right to 
pass through Albanian territorial waters without previous notification. Nevertheles
Kingdom Government replied that if fire was opened on any British warship 
passing through the Corfu Channel in the future, the fire would be returned.1795 The ICJ 
1791 G.A. Res. 2603A (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). 
1792 Fitzgerald, supra note (501) at 430. 
edia 
1793 R. R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 853, 869-71 (1970) [Baxter & Buergenthal]; Michael Bothe, Chemical Warfare, in 3 Encyclop
of Public International Law, 83, 85 (Rudolf Dolzer et al. eds., 1982). See also, 
Fitzgerald, supra note (501) at 431. 
1794 See Corfu Channel Case, UK v. Alb., April 9, 1949, General List No. 1, 1949 I.C.J. 4, <http://www.icj-
isit June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Corfu Channel Casecij.org> (last v ]; Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), May 24, 1980, General List No. 64, 1980 I.C.J. 3 
iplomatic Staff in Tehran[hereinafter Case Concerning U.S. D ].  
1795 Corfu Channel Case, supra note (1794) at 27. 
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declared that “the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian 
sovereignty” in order to ensure respect for international law.1796  
The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating 
Gases are limited to international armed conflicts, and do not apply to internal c
or peacetime m
onflicts 
ilitary operations.1797 Moreover, the Protocol does not ban testing, 
produc
 
 
 
, 
es 
es”1803 
                                                          
tion, or stockpiling of biological or chemical weapons, and it permits any 
retaliatory use of chemical weapons.1798 For instance, when the United States ratified the
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, it reserved its right to use chemical 
weapons if an enemy used such weapons first.1799 Finally, the Protocol does not contain
any mechanism to investigate or verify any suspected violation to its provisions.  
In fact, restricting gas warfare would provide environmental protection, because 
manufacture and storage in peacetime could result in accidents, or to theft by terrorists. A 
considerable debate surrounds the scope of application of the Geneva Protocol for the 
Use of Asphyxiating Gases, as to whether it limits attacks against civilian populations
only, or against animals and plants too.1800 International law provides a number of 
standards and guidelines against targeting any environmental object; therefore, member 
States to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases should consider these 
standards and guidelines before when using poisonous gases or bacteriological 
weapons.1801 
Additionally, the attitude of the United States during its ratification to the 
Protocol recalls the principle of good faith examined earlier under this title. The official 
English text version of the Protocol expressly prohibits the use “asphyxiating, poisonous
or other gases.”1802 The phrase “other gases” was so open-ended that the United Stat
objected to the English version of the text, and strongly supported the French text that 
prohibits asphyxiating, poisonous, or similar gases. The French text “similar gas
arf, supra note (1692) at 481. 
ng gases, supra note (1787). 
iants, toxiques ou 
é à juste titre condamné par 
1796 Id., at 35. 
1797 Sch
1798 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 61. 
1799 Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, supra note (1787) at 571. 
1800 Yuzon, supra note (695) at 830. 
1801 Id. 
1802 Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiati
1803 The French text read as follows: “Concsiderant que l'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyx
similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matières ou procédés analogues, a ét
l'opinion générale du monde civilisé.” 
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was expressly interpreted not to preclude irritants or herbicides, used by the United State
in Vietnam, because their effects are not similar to more lethal chemical agents like ner
or mustard gas.
s 
ve 
 
he 
 
an, animals, or plants.”1805  
 1935, Italy became the first signatory to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of 
ly, 
 the prohibition against such weapons, 
 and the Additional Protocol d II.1807 
However, these efforts were not successful
y 
tion of 
1804 In an attempt to clarify the ambiguity arising from the difference 
between the French and the English texts, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of December 16, 1969, that interpreted the prohibitions in t
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases to include “any chemical agents of 
warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid-which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on m
In
Asphyxiating Gases to use chemical weapons, when it invaded Ethiopia.1806 Eventual
the international community sought to strengthen
by adopting the four Geneva Conventions s I an
, and chemical and biological attacks have 
proliferated significantly during international and internal armed conflicts. The 
international community has not imposed sanctions for documented violations, such as 
the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, bacteriological and chemical agents by the United 
States in Vietnam, Russia in Afghanistan,1808 during the Gulf War I,1809by the Iraqi Arm
against the Kurds in Northern Iraq,1810 by Iraq against Iran, and in the terrorist ac
the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday religious cult in Japan.1811 All these incidents show that 
this instrument does not offer effective environmental protection, and the conclusion of a 
new treaty to deal more efficiently with the environmental effects of chemical weapons 
has become a matter of great urgency. 
 
                                                          
1804 Reizenstein, supra note (1785) at 102-03. 
1805 G.A. Res. 2603A, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). 
1806 Spiers, supra note (1781) at 91; Merkin, supra note (1785) at 181. 
1807 Refer to the rules examined in Part II of this thesis. 
1808 “During the 1980s, the Reagan administration made a series of allegations about Soviet violations to 
orted violations were that an illegal biological the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 BWC. Major purp
1979, and that weapons facility exploded in Sverdlovsk in the Soviets or their surrogates used yellow rain 
d & Connell, 
1811 34. 
toxins as weapons in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos the late 1970s and early 1980s.” Goul
supra note (1709) at 106. 
1809 Connaughton  & Goldman, supra note (1705) at 536-37; William E. Burrows & Robert 
Windrem, Critical Mass 47 (Simon and Schuster, 1994)[hereinafter Burrows & Windrem]. 
note (1809) at 47. 1810 Burrows & Windrem, supra 
 Fitzgerald, supra note (501) at 433-
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j. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques 
 
In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 31/72,1812 which contains 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environm
Modification Techniques (ENMOD).
ental 
ed specifically to protect human 
welfare by prohibiting any 1815 ities, 
ach State party to this Convention 
undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
1813 The ENMOD Convention is not customary 
international law.1814 It is the sole Convention design
environmental disruption.  It combines military activ
human welfare, and environmental protection. The Convention responded to the 
environmental modification techniques used by the United States Armed Forces during 
the Vietnam War.1816 The U.S. “employed several modern techniques to clear the 
rainforests and slow the movement of the Viet Cong, [such as] herbicides and defoliants 
to clear the jungle and reduce food supplies, large bladed tractors known as ‘Rome 
ploughs’ in deforestation efforts, and ‘cloud-seeding’ techniques to increase rainfall in 
certain areas to slow guerrilla actions and to impede the supply maneuvers of the North 
Vietnamese Army.”1817 It can also be argued that during the Gulf War II, Iraq created the 
“worst man-made environmental disaster in history,”1818 by setting fire to the Kuwaiti oil 
wells, and releasing crude oil into the Gulf. However, whether a State is a party to the 
Convention as is the United States, or a non-party such as Iraq, it is subject to 
international responsibility if it violates ENMOD requirements, as we will discuss in the 
final Part of this thesis. 
Article 1 of ENMOD provides that “[e]
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” According to ENMOD, effects 
                                                          
1812 G.A. Res. 31/72, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 37, U.N.Doc. A/31/39 (1976). 
1813 ENMOD, supra note (957).  
1814 Department of Defence, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - -Appendix on the 
848) at 976. See also, Katherine M. Kelly, Note, Declaring War on the Environment: 
ental Treaties During the Persian Gulf War, 7 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & 
) at A10. See also, Kelly, supra note (1817) at 921-927. 
Law of War, April 10, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 612, 616-17 (1992). 
1815 Popovic, supra note (619) at 80. 
1816 Richards & Schmitt, supra note (725) at 1063. See also, Schwabach, supra note (477) at 126 & 128. 
1817 Juda, supra note (
The Failure of International Environm
Pol’y 921, 921-923 (1992) [hereinafter Kelly.] 
1818 Ross, Experts Blame, supra note (9
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are “wi
nd the 
 single element requirement is 
unlike that of Articles 35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conven  three elements “widespread, long-
term, a
ny 
jurisdic  to 
t 
ce and 
 
ssure 
despread” if they have consequences in areas of several hundred square 
kilometers. The term “long-lasting” means damage extending beyond a season, a
term “severe” means serious damage to human life, natural or economic resources or 
other assets.1819 Some international and political experts viewed that the modification 
prohibited by ENMOD “must be large scale[, including] earthquakes; an upset in the 
ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns [.]”1820 Any use or 
manipulation of the environment that is either widespread, long-lasting, or severe, 
violates ENMOD’s single element requirement.1821 This
tions,1822 which requires the presence of the
nd severe damage” together.1823 
Article IV of ENMOD provides that “[parties agree] to prohibit and prevent a
activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under [their] 
tion or control.”1824 However, if the individual efforts of a member State fail
assure compliance with ENMOD provisions, Article V of ENMOD provides enforcemen
procedures that should be followed whenever a violation of ENMOD has taken pla
environmental harm has occurred. Those enforcement procedures, include bilateral 
consultation and cooperation, an inquiry commission, complaint to the U.N. Security
Council, or other member States’ assistance as follows: 
 
1) Bilateral Consultations and Cooperation 
In general, consultations and negotiations to resolve any mutual concern are 
considered the best way to settle the matter. Accordingly, the primary way to a
compliance with ENMOD is mutual negotiations and consultations among nations. 
                                                          
1819 The meaning of “widespread”, “long-lasting”, and “severe” does not appear in ENMOD text, h
“the Conference Committee on Disarmament conveyed this understanding to the United Nations General 
Assembly along with the actual text of the convention.” Baker, supra note (725) at 368. 
1820 Yuzon, supra note (695) at 806. See also, Glen Plant, Introduction, in Environmental 
Protection and the Law of War: A ‘Fifth Geneva’ Convention on the Protection 
of the Environment in Time of Ar
Plant, Introduction]. 
owever,  
med Conflict 23 (Glen Plant ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
1821 Whitaker, supra note (725) at 37. 
9) arts. 35, 55. 
) art. IV. 
1822 Additional Protocol (I), supra note (7
1823 Whitaker, supra note (725) at 37. 
1824 ENMOD, supra note (957
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Article V (1) of ENMOD states that “[t]he States Parties to this Convention 
undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may 
arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention.” States are often willing to cooperate and consult regarding environmenta
damage cause
l 
d by warfare, but often do not have adequate experience and qualified 
experts to settle the problem. This is particularly true of developing States. Nevertheless, 
the U.N. offers the concerned member States its assistance through its competence 
organs, ealth 
co-
rough appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance 
with its Cha  of appropriate 
internationa as 
provided fo xperts shall 
make accur y dispute raised 
by a membe
Des ng member 
States, it co ha hen consultation takes place between a superpower and 
one of will 
mental protection may be 
underm ed. 
 
2) In
In so
hampered b dy that 
problem by
t 
                                                          
 such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the World H
Organization (WHO). In addition, Article V (1) also provides that “[c]onsultation and 
operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken th
rter. These international procedures may include the services
l organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts 
r in paragraph 2 of this article.” The Consultative Committee of E
ate findings of facts and provide expert opinions relevant to an
r State of ENMOD.1825 
pite the advantage of the direct consultation and cooperation amo
ld be argued t t wu
the developing countries, it may not attain its purpose because the superpower 
use its pressure upon the developing country. If so, environ
in
quiry Commission 
me cases, consultation and cooperation among member States may be 
y inadequate information. The ENMOD Convention seeks to reme
 offering an expert commission of inquiry.1826  
 
[T]he Depository shall, within one month of the receipt of a 
request from any State Party to this Convention, convene a 
Consultative Committee of Experts. Any State Party may appoin
1825 Id., Annex to the Convention para. 1. More discussion of the Consultative Committee of Experts to be 
t section. followed in the nex
1826 Id., art. V (2). 
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an expert to the Committee whose functions and rules of 
procedure are set out in the annex which constitutes an integra
part of this Convention. The Committee shall transmit to the 
Depository a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all 
views and information presented to the Commit
l 
tee during its 
roceedings. The Depository shall distribute the summary to all 
o 
rk of the Consultative Committee of 
Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to 
perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The 
stions relative to the 
airman, to 
quest from States, and from international organizations, such 
Eac ver, some 
States prefe han 
environmen l protection as a high priority. 
 
                            
p
States Parties.1827 
 
The formulation and the procedures of the committee are laid out in annex t
ENMOD, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, which provide that 
 
1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to 
make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views 
relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 
V of this Convention by the State Party requesting the convening 
of the Committee. 2. The wo
Committee shall decide procedural que
organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but 
otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall 
be no voting on matters of substance. 3. The Depository or his 
representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee. 4. 
Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers. 
5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Ch
re
information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for 
the accomplishment of the Committee's work.  
 
h member State may appoint an expert to this committee.1828 Howe
r appointing political experts to defend their foreign policy rather t
al experts who will consider environmentat
As to decision-making issues, the Annex to ENMOD distinguishes between 
procedures and matters of substance. With regard to procedural questions, the 
Committee’s decisions should be adopted by consensus as possible, or they should be 
adopted by the majority of present and voting members. However, all matters of 
substance are not subject to voting.1829  
                              
1827 Id., art. V (2). 
Id., art. V (2). 1828 
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3) Complaint to the U.N. Security Council 
The U.N. Security Council is charged with examining any matter regarding 
“intern
 A 
 
 
en 
 
  
 any violation is qualified as a threat to international peace and security, member 
States of ENMOD, and particularly concerned States, are obliged to cooperate with an 
investig
 
  
rity Council may decide to initiate an 
ENMOD and Resolution 31/72 require all member States to 
                             
ational peace and security,”1830 and therefore has competence to receive 
complaints regarding aggression and other acts that may threaten international security.
similar procedure was adopted by ENMOD in Article V (3): 
 
Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe 
that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations 
deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a 
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such
a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all
possible evidence supporting its validity.  
 
It is notable that ENMOD’s text is general, and does not require any link betwe
a violation of the treaty and a threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless, 
according to Article 24 (1) of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is not 
competent to examine any matter that does not amount to a threat to international peace 
and security, even if it is considered a violation of ENMOD. To identify whether a
certain situation is considered a threat to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the Security Council may investigate such situation.1831
If
ation that may be initiated by the U.N. Security Council. However, initiating an 
investigation is left to the decision of the Security Council. According to Chapter VI of
the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has a number of choices.1832 For 
instance, it may invite member States to recur to negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, recur to regional agencies or 
arrangements, and finally, recur to other peaceful means of their own choice.1833
In order to resolve the question, the Secu
investigation. In such case, 
                                                                                                                                                
1829 Id., Annex to the Convention para. (2). 
1830 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 24 (1). 
1831 Id., art. 34. 
1832 Id., Chapter VI, arts. 33-38. 
1833 Id., art. 33. 
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cooperate with the Security Council.1834 On the other hand, according to Article 25 of th
United Nations Charter, “[t]he members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in a
e 
ccordance with the present Charter.”1835 
Conseq  al 
 
f or the 
rty to this 
e U.N. 
Charter rding 
 Charter 
of 
he 
uently, the results of the investigation conducted by the Security Council bind
U.N. members, whether or not they are ENMOD signatories. 
 
4) Other Member States’ Assistance 
According to the foregoing enforcement procedure, the U.N. Security Council can 
initiate an investigation to determine if a party has harmed or is likely to harm another
member State in violation of ENMOD.1836 However, to assure the rehabilitation o
compensation for environmental damages, the harmed State may recur to the assistance 
of other member States. Article 5 (V) of ENMOD provides that “[e]ach State Pa
Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if 
the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as 
a result of violation of the Convention.”1837  
This requirement is consistent with and re-emphasizes Article 49 of th
, which provides that “[t]he Members of the United Nations shall join in affo
mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided by the Security Council.”1838 
Furthermore, according to the U.N. Charter, several kinds of assistance and 
support can be provided to the harmed State. For instance, Article 41 of the U.N.
provides for coercive actions, which may include “complete or partial interruption 
economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”1839 The armed forces of t
U.N. member States may also be helpful in assisting the harmed State through 
                                                          
1834 Article V (4) of ENMOD provides that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes 
to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the 
complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of 
vestigation. ENMOD, supra note (957) art. V (4). 
pra note (957) art. V (5). 
). 
ter, supra note (71) art. 49. 
the results of the in
1835 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 25. 
1836 ENMOD, su
1837 Id., art. V (5
1838 U.N. Char
1839 Id., art. 41. 
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“demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces.”1840 Last a
most unde
nd 
sirable, according to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, collective self-defense can 
be provid r, 
a
li
d  
E ead, 
a
maneuv
the 
nd 
th 
 “ocean current modification 
(milit  such as 
activities have no wide-spread, long lasting, or severe environmental impacts. 
ENMOD was ratified by sixty-six States including Russia, United Kingdom, and 
ronmental modification techniques which change 
                                              
ed to the harmed State.1841 However, it should be stressed that the U.N. Charte
nd international law in general, is not considered a suicide pact and does not provide a 
cense to kill.1842 In other words, there are limits to the right of self-defense. 
The environmental protection of ENMOD applies only to military activities 
uring armed conflicts. Military activities and operations in peacetime are not covered by
NMOD environmental protection and yet they may also cause long lasting, widespr
nd severe damage to human health and the environment. For instance, military 
ers and weapons production and testing in peacetime can contaminate the 
surrounding environment severely for decades, as mentioned in the first Part of this 
thesis. Such activities should be covered by ENMOD, since they can manipulate the 
environment with extremely advanced technology and ENMOD can be violated as a 
result of these activities. For example, the use since 1941 of Vieques, Puerto Rico, by 
U.S. Navy as a maneuver area during peacetime resulted in wide-spread, long lasting, a
severe environmental destruction.1843 Thus ENMOD should be applicable to Vieques 
situation. 
Finally, Article II of ENMOD bans the manipulation of the environment wi
advanced technology which changes the “natural processes, dynamics, composition or 
structure of the earth.”1844 Such manipulation may be affected through the alteration of 
atmospheric conditions to bring about rainfall or through
ary use of tidal waves).”1845 It does not cover low technological activities
tearing down trees to construct an airfield or a dam,1846 since such low-technology 
the United States.1847 It prohibits envi
            
supra note (259) at 1. 
sit Aug. 17, 2001).  
1840 Id., art. 42. 
1841 Id., art. 51. 
1842 Scharf, supra note (1692) at 496. 
1843 Ramirez De León, 
1844 ENMOD, supra note (957) art. II. 
1845 Whitaker, supra note (725) at 37. 
1846 Id. 
1847 Multilateral Treaties, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/> (last vi
 343
the environment through the manipulation of natural processes. Article II of ENMOD 
states that “the term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for
changing- - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics, 
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and 
atmosphere, or of outer space.” For example, the techniques which cause “[e]arthquake
tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadoes); changes in climate 
patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and ch
in the state of the ionosphere.”
 
s; 
 
anges 
 list 
 
nce 
ronment 
t used a weapon in the Gulf War II. For instance, Adam Roberts states that 
“[i]t mi
                                                          
1848 In addition, herbicides were added to the forecited
at the Second Review Conference in September 1992.1849 
There is an argument among writers, with respect to Iraq’s international 
responsibility for the Kuwait oil fires and oil spills during the Gulf War II. The consensus
is that Iraq would not have violated ENMOD,1850 particularly since Iraq is not party to 
the Convention.1851 However, some other authorities suggest that Iraq would have 
violated the Convention.1852 The former group suggests that there is no violation, si
ENMOD prohibits only the use of the environment as a weapon,1853 and the envi
as such was no
ght well be asserted that this was, rather, a case of deliberate abuse of man-made 
installations and artificial processes: of damage to the environment, but not necessarily 
ew 
sl. 
cond Review Conference]. 
 
l 
s Multilateral 
 U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, 
l C. Szasz, The Gulf War: Environment As a Weapon, The American Society of 
 and Comments on 
s Control and The 
1848 Draft Understanding to Article II U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976), reprinted in Paul Fauteux, The Gulf War, 
The ENMOD Convention and the Review Conference, 18 U.N. Inst. For Disarmament Res. 
Newsl. 6, 7 (1992). 
1849 The Second Review Conference in September 1992. Final Declaration of the Second Revi
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (Geneva, Sept. 14-18, 1992), reprinted in 21 U.N.I.D.I.R. New
60 (1993), art. II [hereinafter ENMOD Se
1850 For example, see, Glen Plant, Environmental Damage and the Law of War, supra note (673) at 168; J.
Reiskind, The Ottawa Conference of Experts on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventiona
Warfare: A Synopsis, in Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the 
Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment 159-60 ( H.B. Schiefer ed., 1992). 
1851 Iraq signed the Convention on August 15, 1977, but has not yet ratified it. United Nation
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as Dec. 31, 1992,
U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.11 (1993) at 809. 
1852 Pau
International Law Proceedings 214, 216 (1991); E.F. Roots, International Agreements to Prohibit or 
Control Modification of the Environment for Military Purposes: An Historical Overview
Current Issues, in Verifying Obligations Respecting Arm
Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment 23-24 (H.B. Schiefer ed., 1992). 
1853 Bothe, The Protection of the Environment, supra note (675) at 57. 
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damage by the forces of the environment.”1854 On the other hand, the latter group 
suggests that Iraq violated ENMOD since the environmental damage caused by Iraq 
during the Gulf War II, specifically the oil fires and the oil spills, have widespread, 
severe, and long-lasting effects on human life and the environment. It is clear that 
ENMOD requires a lower level of damage in comparing with the level of damage that is 
required by the Additional Protocol I.1855 This view is consistent with the views of the
ENMOD’s member States at the Second Review Conference of 1992, which added 
herbicides to the list of the environmenta
 
l modification techniques.1856 It is hard to 
distinguish between herbicides and oil fires since both damage the environment 
 my view, Iraq would have violated the ENMOD Convention, for the following 
three re
 
f 
 when it invaded Kuwait in August 2, 
1990. Thus, Iraq violated the ENMOD Convention’s provisions by spilling oil into the 
 is the 
se 
severely.1857  
In
asons: First, the Final Declaration of ENMOD’s Second Review Conference of 
1992 confirmed that herbicides are an environmental modification technique, even 
though it did not address the oil spills and fires explicitly, and thus made it easier to 
include other examples of environmental modification techniques, that disequilibrate the
natural environment. Second, the damage caused by Iraq exceeded the “widespread, long-
lasting, or severe” threshold. Finally, a showing of “hostile intent” indicates a violation o
ENMOD.1858 It is clear that Iraq had such intent
Gulf and burning the Kuwaiti oil wells. 
 
k. The United Nations System of Disarmament 
 
According to the United Nations Charter, maintaining peace and security
organization’s primary purpose.1859 This purpose may be achieved by prohibiting the u
                                                          
1854 Adams Roberts, Environmental Destruction in the Gulf War, 291 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 538, 544 
(1992). 
1855 Y. Sandoz et al. eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June, 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, at 415 (1987). 
supra note (1849) art. II. 
on for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to 
r Gulf War, 35 VA. J. Int’l L. 405, 432 (1995) [hereinafter Low & Hodgkinson]. 
II. 
1856 ENMOD Second Review Conference, 
1857 Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensati
International Law Afte
1858 ENMOD, supra note (957) arts. I, 
1859 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 1 (1). 
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of force
. 
es. 
 
1) Security 
Und
the armame l peace and 
security,1861 ouncil.1862 
Thus, w en ay pose a real threat to 
interna ed in the effort to 
eliminate su h risk, by preventing the concerned State from obtaining any further arms, 
or disarmin
Acc  to sanction 
any State th r United 
Nations me ecurity 
Council to p ry cooperation with States that threaten international peace 
and security  Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides that 
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
                         
, and instead promoting the peaceful settlement of international disputes.1860 
Peace and security are threatened as long as nations are involved in the armament race
Therefore, the United Nations efforts cannot be separated from disarmament procedur
Significantly, the Security Council and the General Assembly are the U.N. organs most 
directly concerned to disarmament procedures. 
Council Disarmament Mechanisms 
er the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is directly concerned with 
nt system. Since armaments are considered a threat to internationa
 they are subject to the supervision and control of the Security C
ever an armament system in a given State mh
tional peace and security, the Security Council will be involv
c
g its arsenal to the minimum. 
ording to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has the authority
at exceeds the limit of use of its military power, or threatens othe
mbers. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the S
rohibit any milita
1863.
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
 
And Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides that 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for 
                                 
t. 24 (1). 
1863 Id., arts. 41, 42. 
1860 Id., art. 2 (3) (4). 
1861 Graham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1862 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) ar
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inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore intern
security. Such action may include demon at
ational peace and 
str ions, blockade, and 
 
oc bodies, when it may threaten the 
interna  
5 
ept the 
ponents and all research 
develop
n 
he 
ty 
nd the 
environment in Iraq and in the neighboring States from any Iraqi military threat in the 
future, since harmful arms will be dismantled.  
ements, the Security 
full compliance with its resolutions concerning the elimination of all 
 prior 
                                 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations. 
 
 
Under this authority, the Security Council prohibited the import of arms by
Iraq,1864 Liberia,1865 former Yugoslavia,1866 and Libya.1867 Moreover, international 
developments following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave the Security Council the 
power to disarm any State arsenal, through ad h
tional peace and security. Iraq was the first U.N. member State that was subjected
to the Security Council disarmament system. In its decision 687/1991, based on the 192
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, and the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), the Security Council required that Iraq “unconditionally acc
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, […a]ll chemical and biological weapons and 
all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and com
1868ment, support, and manufacturing facilities.”   
By the end of the Gulf War II, in 1991, to better assist the Security Council i
disarming the military capacity of Iraq, an ad hoc body was created under the name of t
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM was charged with the du
of inspection and investigation of all known and suspected weapon sites.1869 The 
complete execution of 687/1991 Resolution would secure both human health a
To assure Iraqi compliance with the Security Council requir
Council required 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
to the cessation of sanctions against Iraq.1870 Nevertheless, what constitutes full 
                         
. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559). 
(1993). 
1864 S. C
1865 S/RES/1343 (2001), 4287th mtng., March 7, 2001, at 5 (a). 
1866 S/RES/1021 (1995) Nov. 22, 1995. 
1867 S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 3312th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 
1868 S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559).  
1869 Id., at 9 (B) (1). 
1870  Id., para. 22. 
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compliance with the Security Council resolutions is a matter of major controversy amo
the permanent members of the Security Council.
ng 
873 rather than allow U.N. inspections of 
secret w ity 
 
ve 
r 
1871  
UNSCOM was able to greatly curtail the Iraqi armament program, despite the 
absence of the Iraqi government’s cooperation.1872 Repeatedly, the Iraqi authorities 
suspended their cooperation with UNSCOM,1
eapons sites. The Iraqi attitude threatened the credibility of the U.N. Secur
Council.1874 In response, U.S. and the United Kingdom launched air strikes against 
targets in Iraq.1875 Sometimes, the air attacks activated Iraqi cooperation with 
UNSCOM,1876 but only temporarily.1877 Despite the positive results of such strikes in 
promoting cooperation between Iraq and UNSCOM, negative results against civilians and
natural environment may result from such strikes. It would be environmentally safer if 
the United States and the United Kingdom reinforced the sanctions imposed against Iraq 
by the U.N., instead of using military tactics. 
Moreover, a considerable number of member States of the United Nations 
condemned the strikes against Iraq, including, Russia, China, and France. Desert Fox air 
strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom put limit to the function of 
UNSCOM.1878 Air strikes hurt the UNSCOM inspection, because inspectors should lea
Iraq for their safety, and Iraq use these strikes as a pretext to object the inspection. Afte
                                                          
1871 J.R. Perlak, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global 
Security, 167 Mil. L. Rev. 248, 250 (2001) [hereinafter Perlak]. 
1872 Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 724, 724 (1998) [hereinafter Wedgwood, The 
Enforcement]. 
1873 Id. 
 of 
f The United Nations’ Security Council in 
o use “all necessary means” to uphold and implement “all 
nce, and 
. 
l signed a Memorandum of 
dum 
nd the United 
ttack on Iraq: U.S. Launches Strikes as 
1874 Michael A. Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained Its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis
the Disarmament of Iraq and The Legal Enforcement Options o
1997-1998, 5 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 101, 104 (2000). 
1875 United States and the United Kingdom legally based their strikes against Iraq on the text of 678/1991 
Resolution which allows U.N. member States t
relevant resolutions.” However, some other members of the Security Council including China, Fra
Russia denied that Resolution 678/1991 can be taken as a legal basis to continue air strikes against Iraq
See, Wedgwood, The Enforcement, supra note (1872) at 727. 
1876 The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and the United Nations Secretary Genera
Understanding to accord UNSCOM “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.” See Memoran
of Understanding (Iraq, U.N.) Feb. 23, 1998), 
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9802/23/un.iraq.agreement/index.html> (last visit May 1, 2001). 
1877 Each time Iraq does not comply with the inspection provisions, the United States a
Kingdom responded by air strikes. Gerald Seib & Thomas Ricks, A
Baghdad Refuses to Comply with U.N., Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1998, at A1. 
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the diss
t 
hich is the United Nations 
Monito
, 
 
had approved his appointment of Hans Blix of Sweden as Executive 
Chairm tion 
vant to 
s released toxic and 
poisono
            
olution of the UNSCOM, and after ten years of inspection, Iraq is still presenting 
a threat to international peace and security. It not only developed chemical weapons, bu
also had weaponized VX, the most toxic of nerve agents.1879 Responding to this failure, 
the Security Council voted to create a successor body, w
ring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).1880 UNMOVIC will 
retain UNSCOM’s mandate, rights, privileges, facilities, and immunities.1881 The 
establishment of UNMOVIC does not completely overcome the failure of UNSCOM
since the abstention of three major powers of the Security Council, France, China, and
Russia, denied the political credibility of UNMOVIC.1882 This abstention left the U.S. 
and U.K alone as the only permanent members who support the Resolution.  
On January 27, 2000, Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, announced that the 
Security Council 
an of UNMOVIC.1883 However, Iraqi officials continue to refuse any resump
of international weapons inspection by UNMOVIC.1884 
Two aspects of the experiment with Iraqi disarmament are particularly rele
environmentalists. First, environmental protection was a high priority, since the Iraqi 
weapons presented a particular threat to the environment. Second, the disarmament 
process itself presented an environmental threat. It had been documented through the 
media that UNSCOM agents had to take precautions, while destroying some biological 
and chemical weapons in Iraq, because the explosion of such weapon
us gases, which would necessarily affect the surrounded environment in the short 
and long terms.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
78 Some jurists attributed the dissolution of UNSCOM to Richard Butler, the Executive Chairman of 
UNSCOM. Perlak, supra note (1871) at 248. 
rman of UN Monitoring, Verification 
18
1879 Richard A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack  148 (M I T Press, 1998). 
1880 S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54the Sess., S/RES/1284 (1999). 
1881 Petter W. Mason, Arms Control and Disarmament, 34 Int’l Law. 609, 622 (2000) [hereinafter 
Mason]. 
1882 Perlak, supra note (1871) fn. 12. 
1883 Secretary General Appoints Hans Blix of Sweden Executive Chai
and Inspection Commission, U.N. Press Release SG/A/721 (Jan. 27, 2000), available at 
<http://www.un.org/russian/question/sga721.htm> (last visit Aug. 28, 2001). 
1884 Steven Lee Myers, Signs of Iraqi Arms Buildup Bedevil U.S. Administration, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 
2000, at A1. 
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The Iraqi campaign sought to protect the environment from destruction. For 
instanc
ve 
 
q's 
be 
ent, and some weapons can be transformed to protect the 
environ
ical, biological or other types of weapons of mass 
destruction.1890
                                                          
e, UNSCOM destroyed a significant number of weapons of mass destruction 
handed over by Iraq or found by its inspectors.1885 Moreover, some of the sites of 
weapons of mass destruction were recognized by the United States during the Gulf War 
II, but were not attacked because of the risk that their accidental destruction could ha
caused.1886 The bombing of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons could have created the
risk of releasing poisonous agents into the atmosphere and potentially impacting Ira
environment and civilian populations and those of its neighbors.1887 
The best methods of disarmament are those that do not harm the environment, or 
are done in an environmentally friendly manner. In some cases, disarmament can 
directed to serve the environm
ment, for example, transforming tanks into agricultural watering machines.  
 
2) General Assembly Disarmament Mechanisms 
After the catastrophic damages caused by the explosion of nuclear bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the General Assembly was fearful that other countries could 
obtain such technology. Thus, the General Assembly called for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons,1888 by adopting the Resolution on the Prohibition of the Development and 
Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such 
Weapons,1889 which urged States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass 
destruction whether conventional, chem
 However, legally, the Resolution is not binding as it was adopted by the 
General Assembly rather than the Security Council, and it does not establish any 
mechanism of enforcement. 
 & Malone]. 
1). 
. Condron, Justification For Unilateral Action In Response To The Iraqi Threat: A 
 Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 248 (1999) [hereinafter Condron]. 
inafter Goldblat, Arms Control]. 
. Res. 32/84B on the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Type of Weapons of 
1885 Richard B. Bilder & David Malone, Book Review, Iraq: No Easy Response to “the Greatest Threat”, 
95 Am. J. Int’l L. 235, 236 (2001) [hereinafter Bilder
1886 Michael L. Cornell, Comment, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of United Nations 
Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16 Conn J Int’l . 325, 355 (200
1887 Captain Sean M
Critical
1888 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements: A Handbook 12 (Praeger Publishers, 
1983) [here
1889 G.A
Mass Destruction and New System of Such Weapons 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 45 at 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/32/45/ (1977).  
1890 Id. 
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However, the General Assembly, by Resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952, created
the United Natio
 
ns Disarmament Commission under the Security Council with a general 
mandat 1891 In 
e 
 a 
 General 
date 
been 
 of environmental modification 
techniques.  
Ano sarmament is the 
Department 82, upon the 
recommend ament ( 
SSOD II ), by the 
General As  General 
on disarmam ts and trends 
in the field xisting 
disarmamen rmament negotiation 
and delibera d the 
creation of atters, 
                                                          
e on disarmament questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959.
1978, the first special commission of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 
established a successor Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a subsidiary organ of th
Assembly, composed of all member States of the United Nations. It was created as
deliberative body, with the function of considering and making recommendations on 
various problems in the field of disarmament and following up on the relevant decisions 
and recommendations of the special session. It reports its findings annually to the
Assembly.1892 
The UNDC takes the environmental protection into consideration. This man
was included in the text of principles, guidelines, and recommendations that have 
unanimously adopted by the UNDC since its inception in 1978.1893 The UNDC requires 
“further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use
”1894
ther body within the General Assembly related to di
 for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) which was established in 19
ation of the General Assembly's second special session on disarm
and continued until 1992. It was re-established in January 1998 
sembly Resolution 52/12.1895 The Department advises the Secretary
ent-related security matters; monitors and analyzes developmen
of disarmament; supports the review and implementation of e
t agreements; assists member States in multilateral disa
tion activities towards the development of disarmament norms an
agreements; promotes openness and transparency in military m
1891 Disarmament Commission, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/undiscom.htm>, (last visit Aug. 
Nations Secretary General, Note, A Compilation of all Texts of 
s, Guidelines, or Recommendations on Subject Items that have been Unanimously Adopted by the 
da.htm>, (last visit 
20, 2001). 
1892 Id. 
1893 Boutros Boutros Ghali, The United 
Principle
Disarmament Commission, Jul. 1, 1996, G.A. 51st  Sess., G.A. Doc. A/51/182. 
1894 Id., at 9, 18, 31. 
1895 Department of Disarmament Affairs, available at < http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/d
Aug. 21, 2001) [hereinafter UNDDA]. 
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verification armament.1896 
It is compos
isarmament of 
eapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological 
eapons). It supports and participates in multilateral efforts to 
TO;1897 
s Branch (CAB), which focuses its 
nventional arms disarmament; 
(4) A Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB), which provides 
Ano ment 
Research (U mber 1984 
and became
The UNIDIR is charged to  
, confidence-building measures, and regional approaches to dis
ed of five branches that function as follows: 
 
 
(1) A Secretariat and Conference Support Branch; 
(2) A Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (WMD) which 
provides substantive support in the area of the d
w
w
strengthen the non-proliferation of WMD and in this connection 
cooperates with the relevant intergovernmental organizations and 
specialized agencies of the United Nations system, in particular 
the IAEA, the OPCW and the CTB
(3) A Conventional Arm
efforts in the field of co
substantive support to member States, regional and sub-regional 
organizations on disarmament measures and related security 
matters. It oversees and coordinates the activities of the three 
regional centers: in Africa, in Asia and the Pacific, and in the 
Latin America and the Caribbean; 
(5) A Monitoring, Database and Information Branch (MDI), 
which organizes a wide variety of special events and programs in 
the field of disarmament, produces DDA publications (such as 
the Disarmament Yearbook) and occasional papers, and 
maintains the database for specialized areas like Register of 
Conventional Arms, and Status of Treaties.1898 
 
 
ther related U.N. body is the United Nations Institute for Disarma
NIDIR). UNIDIR was approved by the General Assembly in Dece
 effective on January 1, 1985.1899 
 
                                                          
1896 Id., 
1897 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) 
is an international organization, located in Vienna, and was established on Nov. 19, 1996 by a Resolution 
adopted by the Meeting of States Signatories at the United Nations in New York. See, 
Aug. 29, 2001). 
, Background, available at <http://www.unog.ch/UNIDIR/EBACKG.HTM>, (last visit Aug. 
<http://www.ctbto.org> (last visit 
1898 UNDDA, supra note (1895). 
1899 UNIDIR
21, 2001). 
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(a) Provid[e] the international community with more diversified 
and complete data on problems relating to international security, 
the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in 
the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, 
towards greater security for all States and towards the economic 
and social development of all peoples; 
(b) Promot[e] informed participation by all States in disarmament 
efforts; 
(c) Assist[…] ongoing negotiations on disarmament and 
continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a 
progr
arma
essively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear 
ments, by means of objective and factual studies and 
analyses; 
rm 
 the 
ents of the EHRs are not providing for 
ental protection. Their goals are diffuse since they aim at 
disarmament he other 
and. H
2. Regional Instruments of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules 
 
a 
f the concerned region is restricted from 
n 
(d) Carry[…] out more in-depth, forward-looking and long-te
research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight to
problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new 
negotiations.1900 
 
 
The UNIDIR considers as the United Nations center that enhances and 
encourages member States to fulfill their international obligations in the field of 
disarmament, and to focus on nuclear disarmament.   
Except for ENMOD, the universal instrum
a real and complete environm
 and arms control on one hand, and environmental protection in t
h owever, such weakness does not affect their important rule in minimizing 
environmental harm during and after armed conflicts. Even though some of the 
environmental law instruments do not specifically provide substantial environmental 
protection, they still represent an important source of legal authority for future actions 
and enactment.  
 
Regional instruments are those international agreements among States located in 
certain region. In general, any State located out o
being party to such instruments. This section will examine the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the Africa
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Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In 
addition, this section will discuss the urgent need for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zo
 
 
Fangata
d 
Assemb
sal 
d, 
the 
is 
o 
   
ne. 
 
a. General Background of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones 
 
As a result of the environmental consequences of nuclear tests, and to keep their
territories clean and safe from tests’ effects, nuclear power States often prefer to test their
weapons abroad.1901 For example, French nuclear tests took place in Mururoa and 
ufa Atolls, 6,000 kilometers east of Australia,1902 and the United States tests of 
the hydrogen bomb took place in a number of islands under the trusteeship of the Unite
States in the South Pacific area.1903 Nuclear weapons free zones were created to avoid 
nuclear States’ abuse of other regions of the world as well as to prevent an arms race to 
acquire nuclear weapons by any State in a region. 
The idea of establishing a free zone was first presented to the U.N. General 
ly by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, in 1957, as an “atom free 
zone” for central Europe,1904 which was not adopted. Then, in the late 1950s a propo
to establish the Nordic nuclear weapons free zone, which encompasses Norway, Finlan
Sweden, and Denmark was adopted.1905 The Balkan area was also proposed as a nuclear 
weapons free zone.1906 However, none of these proposals has ever seen the light.  
The nuclear weapons free zones were established in response to Article VII of 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, which provides that  “[n]othing in th
Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order t
                                                                                                                                                                          
nal Lwyers, and the Challenge of the Millennium, 24 
Yale J. Int’l L. 485, 499 (1999) [hereinafter Nagan].. 
1902 Id. 
1903 Under the pretext of self-defense, the United States tested its hydrogen bomb in the South Pacific. U.S. 
ere 
 Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. 
el Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75th Proceeding of the 
ety of International Law 101 (1981); Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The 
8, 654, 682-90 (1955). 
1900 UNIDIR, Mandate, <http://www.unog.ch/UNIDIR/EMAND.HTM> (last visit Aug. 21, 2001). 
1901 Winston P. Nagan, Nucvlear Arsenals, Internatio
scientists grossly underestimated the test explosion of March 1945. American and Japanese sailors w
injured while the latter vessel Fukuryu Maru was sailing clear of the safety zone. Such tests were 
interpreted as a violation of the Article 73 of the United Nations
See, W. Micha
American Soci
Hydrogen Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L. J. 64
1904 Paul E. Zinner, Nuclear Free Zones 26 (1988). 
1905 Id., at 30. 
1906 Id., at 31. 
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assure t ver, 
n 
lly, which cannot be established universally, such 
as the p
 
ica, South Pacific and Africa. These parts of the 
world c
ng armed conflicts and is 
badly in need of a similar agreement. 
Most of the at the nuclear 
powers are eligible to sign. These Protocols provide negative security assurance,1912 
accordi ten to 
e 
Treaty the five major powers (U.S., France, U.K., Russia, and China) agree not to use or 
                                                          
he total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”1907 Moreo
the objectives cited in the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament1908 confirms the need for nuclear weapons free zones. 
Nuclear weapons free zones have a number of advantages. For example, they ca
restrict activities more than the international treaties, since they concluded among a 
smaller group of States, which often have common goals and concerns. Consequently, 
free zones can establish norms regiona
rohibition of testing or stationing of nuclear weapons inside a certain region.1909 
Moreover, the free zones can be used to establish an inspection safeguard system that
covers a greater number of activities than the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) system found in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.1910 For 
instance, a regional weapons-free zone would be able to cover nuclear activities of 
regional States that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 
as we will examine in the next few pages.  
Significantly, three nuclear weapons free zones were initially established in 
different parts of the world, Latin Amer
ompose altogether some ninety nations.1911 Later on, a Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone was created among ASEAN members. Despite the role that these 
nuclear weapons free zones play in minimizing the risk of a future nuclear warfare, a 
much more important zone, the Middle East, witnesses ongoi
 regional instruments contain one or more protocols th
ng to which nuclear powers confirm their obligations to never use or threa
use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties in the nuclear weapons free zone 
treaty. For example, according to Protocol II of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zon
ons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. VII. 
Objectives, supra note (1656). 
m, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1907 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap
1908 The Statement of Principles and 
1909 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 33. 
1910 Id. 
1911 Graha
1912 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 34. 
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threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty. France, China, 
the U.K., and Russia ratified Protocol II; however, the United States signed it on March 
25, 199
n 
the 
as 
the integrity of the human species and ultimately even render 
the who
onal 
r 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.1918 After signing the Tlateloco Treaty in 1967, 
Brazil did not ratify it until 1994. However, according to Article 18 (a) of the Vienna 
on the Law of Treaties, Brazil was obliged to “refrain from acts which would 
6, but has not yet ratified it.1913 
Additionally, the binding character of the nuclear weapons free zone treaties, i
general, was reaffirmed in the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ. The ICJ implied that 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty related assurance commitments are 
binding as the nuclear weapons free zones undertakings.1914  
 
b. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Latin America 
 
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1915 
(Tlateloco Treaty) creates a Latin American nuclear-free zone. It provides that “nuclear 
weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered indiscriminately and inexorably […] 
constitute […] an attack on 
le earth uninhabitable.”1916  
This regional agreement was easier to achieve, in part, because the diversity 
among member States, in terms of their quantity and quality1917is much less than the 
diversity among member States involved in drafting universal instruments. Regi
instruments can establish much stronger obligations and duties than international 
conventions normally do. For instance, the Treaty of Tlateloco established safeguards fo
Brazil’s nuclear programs during the period of time Brazil remained outside the Non-
Convention 
                                                          
1913 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1612).  
1914 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note (83) Dissenting Opinion of Justice ODA 
n agreement among States from 
 
to different cultures, traditions, religions, habits, and 
ra note (1021) at 33. 
para. 41. 
1915 Tlateloco Treaty, supra note (278).  
1916 Id., pmbl. 
1917 The level of quantity means that an agreement among twenty or thirty States is much easier to achieve 
than an agreement among 188 States. The level of the quality means that a
the same region, which have the same culture, tradition, religion, habits, and language would be much
easier than an agreement among nations belong 
languages.  
1918 Rosen, sup
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defeat the object and purpose of [the Treaty].”1919 This obligation was confirmed in 1991,
when Brazil signed an agreement with the IAEA to abandon its nuclear weapons 
development programs.
 
e 
ing the Additional Protocol I in 1977.1923 The U.S. military bases at 
uantanamo Bay, Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico are located in the Latin America zone 
and, therefore, are sub
Protoco
t 
 
6. 
1920 
The Additional Protocol II to the Tlateloco Treaty of 19681921 provides a negativ
security assurance, which prohibits the use or threat to use nuclear weapons against a 
contracting party. The United States signed the Additional Protocol II in 1968,1922 even 
before sign
G
ject to the jurisdiction of the Tlateloco Treaty and its Additional 
ls.1924 Except for Belize, Cuba, St. Lucia and St. Christopher/Nevis,1925 all the 
other Latin American countries have now ratified the Treaty, although in some cases no
until years after signing it. For instance, although Brazil and Argentina signed the
Tlateloco Treaty in 1967, Brazil ratified it only in 1994, and Argentina ratified it in 
1996.1926 Similarly, Chile had ratified the treaty in 1974, but its posture was dependent 
primarily on that of Argentina. Consequently, Chile became party of Tlateloco six 
months after Argentina’s ratification.1927 This delay necessarily affected the efficiency of 
the treaty. 
 
c. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Pacific 
 
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was negotiated and signed in the mid 
1980s under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum.1928 It entered into force in 198
                                                          
1919 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art 18 (a). 
1920 Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, supra note (1021) at 38. 
1921 Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Apr. 1, 
1968, 22 U.S.T. 754 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II to the Tlateloco]. 
 
t 
? 12 Strategic 
5 (1998), available at <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr8-3.html> (last visit Dec. 30, 
1928 r Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1612) art. pmbl. 
1922 United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Arms Control And
Disarmament Agreements 130 (1990). 
1923 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 37. 
1924 Id., at 38. 
1925 These States signed the Tlateloco Treaty but not yet ratified it. See, The Transnational Institute, 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones Project, available at <http://www.tni.org/nwfz/pages/exinwfz.htm>, (last visi
Dec. 30, 2001) [hereinafter The Transnational Institute]. 
1926 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 338 fn 51. 
e, Regional Denuclearization-I Tlateloco Treaty: How Successful1927 See, Savita Pand
Analysis 35, 35-4
2001). 
 South Pacific Nuclea
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The Treaty has three protocols, prohibiting activities related to the manufacture, 
stationing, and testing of nuclear explosive devices on the territories of the contracting
parties.
 
r 
clear 
col 
nd the United Kingdom are required to apply the basic 
provisi
nd 
 
h others 
e 
greements, gave a 
great co
“[d]etermined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes 
1929 Protocol II contains the prohibition of any actual or threatened use of nuclea
weapons, i.e., the negative security insurance.1930 Protocol III prohibits testing of nu
weapons.1931 The treaty provisions affect the world’s nuclear powers.1932 Under Proto
I, the United States, France, a
ons of the Treaty to their territories in the zone established by the Treaty. 
Therefore, the Treaty will apply to the U.S. possession in the South Pacific, Jarvis Isla
and American Samoa although they do not contain any military facilities. Under Protocol 
II, the U.S., France, the U.K., the Russian Federation and China agree not to use or
threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or to eac
territories within the zone. Under Protocol III, the U.S., France, the U.K., the Russian 
Federation, and China agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone 
established by the Treaty.1933 However, the French nuclear tests that took place in 
October 20, 1995, in the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls,1934 apparently to violate the 
treaty, provoking public opinion against the nuclear States, and resulting in the French 
adherence to the Additional Protocol III.1935 Consequently, France scaled back the 
number of tests conducted from eight to six to adhere to the South Pacific Free Zon
Treaty and its protocols.1936 
The South Pacific Free Zone Treaty, unlike other regional a
nsideration to zone’s environmental protection. For instance, member States 
“[d]etermined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of 
the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their 
descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace.”1937 Member States also 
                                                          
1929 Id., Protocol I. 
1930 Id., Protocol II. 
otocol I art 3, Protocol II art. 4, and Protocol III art. 3. 
ost, France’s Nuclear Dilemma, Jan-Feb Foreign Aff. 108, 108-109 (1996). 
ra note (1021) at 46. 
fic Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1612) pmbl. 
1931 Id., Protocol III. 
1932 Id., Pr
1933 Id. 
1934 David S. Y
1935 Rosen, sup
1936 Id. 
1937 South Paci
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and other radioactive matters.”1938 In order to achieve such environmental protection,
Treaty requires member States “to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the 
propos
 the 
ed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment 
of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South 
Pacific region by dump ea of radioactive 
wastes 
ber States to refrain 
from po
s on the 
ing, with the aim of precluding dumping at s
and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.”1939 These 
provisions show the signatories concern not only for the prevention of the nuclear 
weapons proliferation, but for protecting the environment as well. 
Moreover, the South Pacific Free Zone Treaty requires mem
ssessing nuclear weapons.1940 It also regulates peaceful use of nuclear materials 
and equipment.1941 It prevents member States from stationing on their territories nuclear 
devices,1942 or even testing them.1943 Moreover, it prohibits dumping of radioactive 
wastes and other material in the sea of the zone.1944 However, the South Pacific Free 
Zone Treaty did not address the dumping of radioactive wastes and other material
land.  
 
d. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Africa 
 
The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty was signed in Cairo on April 11, 
1996.1945 According to Annex I, the Treaty’s jurisdiction consist of the entire continent 
mainland Africa and certain number of islands.1946 This zone covers the U.S. Naval 
Facility leased from the British on the island of Diego Garcia.1947  
                                                          
1938 Id. 
1939 Id., art. 7 (1) (d). 
pon-Free Zone in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty) pmbl., Sept. 13, 1995, 
pon 
r Mauritius Mayotte Prince 
on Islands Principe Reunion Rodrigues Island Sao Tome Seychelles Tromelin Island. See, 
 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1945) Annex I. 
1940 Id., art. 3. 
1941 Id., art. 4. 
1942 Id., art. 5. 
1943 Id., art. 6. 
1944 Id., art. 7. 
1945 Treaty on an African Nuclear-Wea
U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 426, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc A/50/426 [hereinafter African Nuclear Wea
Free Zone Treaty]. 
1946 Agalega Island Bassas da India Canary Islands Cape Verde Cardagos Carajos Shoals Chagos 
Archipelago - Diego Garcia* Comoros Europa Juan de Nova Madagasca
Edward & Mari
African
1947 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 47. 
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According to some scholars, the African continent “represents the smaller States 
of the world that do not wish to have their security compromised by the threat and/or use 
of nuclear weapons.”1948 However, it is also the case that the widespread poverty a
short-sighted governmental policies have led many African countries to accept sh
of wastes, including radioactive wastes.
nd 
ipments 
compan
oved.1952 
The ris
 
f safe disposal of radioactive materials, developed 
countri
ternational 
relation
al 
, but not to the treaty itself,1953 because it is not open to them yet. 
 
an 
                                                          
1949 For example, an American-European 
y signed a contract with the government of Guinea-Bissau to dump 3.5 million 
tons of wastes in its territory in exchange for 140 million dollars granted to the 
government of Guinea-Bissau.1950 In addition, some American companies signed 
contracts with the Congo and Senegal governments to store wastes in their territories for 
a payment of $100 per barrel.1951 As a result, these companies got clean waste disposal, 
officialdom was paid, and the general population suffered consequences, or m
k of receiving such nuclear wastes is that most of the African countries are 
developing States; they lack the advanced technology and equipment to treat such wastes 
which if dumped into water bodies or released into the air or even leaked into the ground
will cause severe damage to human health and the environment. Thus, rather than 
actually solving the problem o
es have often simply moved the problem to poorer, less developed states.  
The nuclear States have shown little support for the African Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone, because it does not advance their interests. Unfortunately, in in
s, States’ interests are a higher priority than the protection of human life, and the 
natural environment. The United States and the United Kingdom led the efforts of parti
support when adhered to the three Additional Protocols to the African Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone
The existence of rogue States in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone has had
an effect on the attitude of the nuclear powers. For instance, the fear of a possible Liby
1948 Nagan, supra note (1901) at 506. 
1949 See, Khaled Zaglool, Amaleiat Dafn Inifayat Fy Afrigia [The Operations of Dumping Hazardous 
Al-Dawleiah [International Policy] 200-01 (1989) (in Arabic); Ian 
ar Clean-Up Popular in Kuwait, Share Skills with “National Salvage”, April Def. & 
 (1992) [hereinafter Curtis]. 
Wastes in Africa], 98 Al-Seyassa 
G. S. Curtis, W
Foreign Aff. Strategic Pol’y  6, 7
1950 Id., at 202. 
1951 Id. 
1952 Curtis, supra note (1949) at 7. 
1953 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 48. 
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nuclear attack against NATO Forces or land targets in Southern Europe,1954 has led the 
United States and the United Kingdom to show little enthusiasm for the African Nuclear 
Weapo
 for a 
 the 
 the free zone.1956 However, only member States are 
bound by this obligation, unless general principles of international law or international 
f 
d, according to Article 6 (b) and (c), “[t]o dismantle and destroy any 
nuclear device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty; 
                                        
ns Free Zone Treaty.  
Long ago, the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) recognized the need
nuclear weapons free zone. All African countries have endorsed that policy, even
Republic of South Africa, which halted its nuclear weapons program.1955 
The sole environmental consideration in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
Treaty is found in the Preamble. It provides that member States have “[d]etermined to 
keep Africa free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive 
matter.” 
Furthermore, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty considers the fact 
that developed countries dump their nuclear wastes in Africa, and therefore prohibits 
dumping of radioactive wastes in
customary law extend it to other countries.  
Article 3 of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty requires member States to 
renounce nuclear weapons devices,1957whether developed by their own capacity or 
assisted by other States.1958 Member States are also prevented from developing, 
manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, or possessing any nuclear explosive devices.1959 
Similarly, member States are prevented from testing, assisting or encouraging the tests o
nuclear explosive devices in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.1960 Moreover, 
even if member States obtained nuclear devices prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, 
they are require
                  
1954 Id., at 51. 
1955 Nagan, supra note (1901) at 506, 509. 
1956 Article 7 of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty provides that “[e]ach Party undertakes: (a) 
To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained in the Bamako Convention on the 
 
can 
 African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1945) art. 7. 
). 
). 
Ban of the Import into Africa and Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes within Africa in so far as it is relevant to radioactive waste; (b) Not to take any action to assist or
encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the Afri
nu n-free zone.”
1957 Id., art. 3. 
clear-weapo
1958 Id., art. 3 (a) (b
1959 Id., art. 3 (c
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[and] (c) [t]o destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where 
possible, to convert them to peaceful uses.” 
As most States in Africa are developing countries, and are wary of threats to the
sovereignty, Article 4 of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty combine
Treaty’s objectiv
ir 
s the 
es and the member States’ sovereignty by providing that “[e]ach Party 
undertakes ive device. 
Without pre  exercise 
of its sovere y foreign 
ships and ai craft, and 
navigation b nner not 
covered by ansit passage 
of straits.”1
To a uclear Weapons 
ree Zone Treaty established a verification process that includes the creation of the 
frican 1962  
, as 
(a) [c]ollating the reports and the exchange of information as 
provide ided 
for in annex IV, as well as conve  on 
ints 
 
                                                                                                                                 
to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explos
judice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the
ign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits b
rcraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign air
y foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a ma
the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or tr
961 
ssure compliance with the Treaty’s provisions, the African N
F
A  Commission on Nuclear Energy.  Article 6 (d) of the Treaty requires States to
verify “the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices
well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.” Moreover, 
according to Article 12 of the Treaty, the Commission on Nuclear Energy is also 
responsible for  
d for in article 13; (b) arranging consultations as prov
ing conferences of Partiesn
the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties on any matter 
arising from the implementation of the Treaty; (c) reviewing the 
application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by IAEA 
as elaborated in annex II; (d) bringing into effect the compla
procedure elaborated in annex IV; (e) encouraging regional and 
sub-regional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear science and technology; (f) promoting international 
cooperation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses of 
nuclear science and technology.  
                                            
1960 Id., art. 5. 
1961 Id., art. 4. 
1962 Id., art. 12, Annex III. 
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Finally, despite the role that the Treaty should play to exclude any nuclear arms 
from the African zone, Africa still suffers from radioactive materials that have been 
dumped or stored in the free zone. Moreover, while the Treaty deals with future nuclear 
danger, it says nothing about the risk of materials that have already been dumped and 
does not provide for cleanup and rehabilitation procedures.  
, 
kistan has ratified the broader Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclea
ast 
l the ten Southeast Asian States signed the Treaty.1966 
nder the Treaty, member States pledge themselves to environmental protection, 
having “[ ctive 
wastes and other radioactive matter.”1967 It also requires member States to undertake “to 
support
s 
e 
                                                          
 
e. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Southeast Asia  
 
The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Bangkok
was signed by the ASEAN States in Bangkok, Thailand, on December 15, 19951963 to 
minimize nuclear weapons proliferation in the Southeast Asian region. 
Significantly, India and Pakistan are the most dangerous nuclear States in the 
region. However, neither India nor Pa
r Weapons Treaty.1964 Long ago, the States in the region attempted to eliminate 
the nuclear risk posed by India and Pakistan. For example, they attempted to establish an 
ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality to serve as a buffer between Southe
Asia and Pakistan on one side, and India on the other side.1965 In the mid-1980s, 
Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zone. And in 1995, al
U
d]etermined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioa
 the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the 
protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and it
Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with th
sia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 639 [hereinafter Southeast 
 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
 Create Nuclear-Weapon-
ms Control Today, Dec. 1995- Jan. 1996, at 23; The Transnational Institute, supra 
1963 Southeast A
Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty]. 
1964 Rosen, supra note (1021) at 37. 
1965 Id., at 36. 
1966 They are:
Myanmar, and Laos. See, Evan S. Medeiros, Southeast Asian Countries Agree to
Free-Zone, Ar
note (1925). 
1967 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1963) pmbl. 
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aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by
anyone anywhere in the region.”
 
the 
the 
eeds 
an 
ble geographic position, led to its refusal to adhere to 
the Non 1970 , and 
terrorists’ access to nuclear weapon sites and ability to use such weapons in their attacks. 
Given all of these dangers and tensions, the establishment of a nuclear weapons 
free zone is an urgent matter. This fact was expressed, universally, by the Revision 
Conference of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1995, which 
pment of [Nuclear Weapons Free Zones] and zones free of 
1968 
The United States has expressed some support for the Treaty, but only of a limited 
nature. In 1993, the former U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, told ASEAN that 
United States was willing to see a draft of the Treaty. However, in early 1995, then 
President Clinton informed the Indonesian President that the text of the Treaty and its 
Protocol did not meet all fundamental U.S. concerns, and that the U.S. would not sign 
document until it did.1969  
 
f. The Urgent Need for A Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
 
Like the other regions discussed in this section, the Middle East region also n
the conclusion of a nuclear weapons free zone treaty. In fact, the Middle East has 
urgent need for this kind of agreement, because the region contains a number of rogue 
States that aim at building a nuclear arsenal to face the United States intervention in the 
region. The creation of the State of Israel, and the development of its nuclear weapons 
program, in the middle of this region has created a heightened state of tension. The 
nuclear powers have interests in the area, which facilitate the advancement of nuclear 
weapons program in the region. Moreover, the Israeli success at developing a nuclear 
weapons program, and its vulnera
-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.  On the other hand, Libya, Iran
Iraq, with the support of Russia, have taken steps to develop similar nuclear weapons 
programs capable of countering the Israeli program that is supported by the United States. 
Moreover, acts of terrorism that have occurred in the region raise concerns about 
announced that the “the develo
                                                          
1968 Id., 7 (1). 
1969 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty of Bangkok, available at 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/seanwfz/index.html>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001).  
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all weapons of mass destruction, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle E
was encouraged as a matter of priority.”
ast, 
 level, the Cairo Declaration, 
adopted
f 
The rules of the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty should be 
e nuclear war in 
the reg gypt 
the 
gional nuclear weapons free zone.  
The establishment of the free zone requires cooperation among regional States,  
excluding the United States and Russia, or an 
interna l 
 
e the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Strategic Arms 
Reduct
a. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: 
   
1971 On the regional
 on the occasion of the signing the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, 
provides that “the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions o
tension, such as the Middle East, on the basis of arrangement […] enhance global and 
regional peace and security.”1972 
formulated by Israel, Iran, and the Arab States, in order to prevent a futur
ion, especially since they all have the same concerns. For example, in 1974, E
and Iran raised the necessity of establishing a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, 
before the United Nations General Assembly.1973 And in 1980, Israel also urged 
establishment of a re 1974
and the participation of a neutral State, 
tional organization that can supervise the application of such a Treaty. This neutra
body would be charged also with verifying compliance, with the treaty’s provisions.  
 
3. Bilateral Conventions of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules 
 
Bilateral conventions are those which involve two States only, without any 
reference to the region in which they are located. The most relevant bilateral convention
that I will examine ar
ion Treaties. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
n, supra note (1021) at 42. 
ration, Apr. 11, 1996, available at <http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/cairo.htm>, 
28, 2001). 
1970 Rose
1971 Andemicael, supra note (1644). 
1972 Cairo Decla
(last visit June 
1973 See, G.A. Res. 3263, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974). 
1974 U.N. Intst. For Disarmament Research, A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in The Middle East at 59, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/96/24, U.N. Sale No. GV.E.96.0.19 
(1996). 
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The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)1975 was concluded between the Unit
States and the former Soviet Union on May 26, 1972.
ed 
n 
er 
ited 
 the 
on 
he 
great su
1976 The ABM Treaty was based o
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, which requires memb
States to pursue, in a good faith, measures related to eventual disarmament. Four years 
after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the Un
States and Russia concluded the ABM Treaty as a means of promoting disarmament in 
those two countries. 
The contracting parties agreed that each would have only two ABM deployment 
areas.1977 Later on, both countries signed a Protocol to the treaty in order to reduce
number of ABM deployment areas to one.1978 Accordingly, the former Soviet Uni
chose to deploy an ABM system around Moscow, but the U.S., as an indication of t
ccess of the treaty’s efforts, decided not to deploy an ABM system at all.1979 
Moreover, the ABM Treaty requires that “[e]ach Party may have no more than a total of 
fifteen ABM launchers at test range.”1980 Any excessive number of restricted or 
prohibited devices should be “destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within 
the shortest possible agreed period of time.”1981 The Treaty represented the minimum 
agreement reached by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, and therefore it requires the 
parties to continue “active negotiations [to achieve a real] limitations on strategic 
                                                          
1975 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, (U.S., Russia) May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter 
ABM Treaty]. 
d 
 
t area 
e hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may 
tor 
e of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system 
ntial of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM 
 the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
itation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Jul. 3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1647, 
 Treaty]. 
reaty, <http://sun00781.dn.net/nuke/control/abmt/> (last visit May 1, 
1976 Id., pmbl. 
1977 Article III of the ABM provides that “[e]ach Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their 
components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred an
fifty kilometers and centered on the Parties national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one 
hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and     
(2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular 
and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deploymen
having a radius of on
deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM intercep
missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding 
ABM radars operational or under construction on the dat
deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a 
potential less than the pote
radars.” Id., art. III. 
1978 Protocol to the Treaty Between
Republics on the Lim
1648 [hereinafter 1974 Protocol to the ABM
1979 John Pike, Anti-Ballistic Missile T
2001) [hereinafter Pike]. 
1980 ABM Treaty, supra note (1975) art. IV. 
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offensi
ited States 
e defense 
egally 
ere 
y excessive numbers of devices. According to Article XII (1), each 
country cle 
 
he 
cluded, in addition to the policies of the two superpowers’ cooperation, 
Vietnam
                                                                                                                                                                            
ve arms.”1982 Consequently, the treaty “has subsequently been extensively 
modified by amendment, and various common understandings and protocols.”1983  
According to Article IX of the ABM Treaty, the two nations are prohibited from 
transmitting anti-ballistic missiles technology to other States. Therefore, the Un
violated its obligations under the treaty by providing Israel an advanced missil
system and its components, to face threats from the neighboring States1984 that ill
obtained from other nuclear powers, i.e., China and Russia, such technology.1985 In 
addition, a number of violations have been committed by the Russians. The most blatant 
of these was the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar facility, which was deployed in 
violation of the ABM Treaty.1986  
In order to comply with the ABM Treaty provisions, the two countries w
required to destro
 was entitled to verify that the other had in fact complied. However, that Arti
also required the signatories to consider the generally recognized principles of 
international law,1987 such as the precautionary principle, intergeneration and
intergenerational equity, and avoiding harm to the environment of other nations. 
Therefore, enforcing the provisions of the ABM Treaty would entail consideration of the 
recognized principles of international law, including environmental protection. 
Environmental protection was included in the agenda of the 1972 Summit at which t
Treaty was con
 War, negotiations for a strategic arms limitations, trade, science, and 
technology.1988  
Furthermore, in May 23, 1972, the two nations concluded an Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection,1989 which restricted any 
 
1981 Id., art. VIII. 
 
9) [hereinafter Spring, Why The ABM Treaty is Already Dead].  
 (1906) at 410. 
ronmental 
on with the Soviet Republics]. 
1982 Id., art. XI. 
1983 Pike, Anti-Ballistic, supra note (1979). 
1984 Graham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
1985 Baker Spring, Why the ABM Treaty is Already Dead and What it Should Mean for United States
Secretary, 4- SPG NEXJOP 31, 38 (199
1986 Id. 
1987 Id., art. XII (1). 
1988 Robinson & Waxmonsky, supra note
1989 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, May 23, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 845 [hereinafter Agreement on Envi
Protecti
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environmental disturbance resulting from the ABM Treaty application. This 
environmental agreement was the effort of a series of informal discussions, involving 
specialists such as Dean Douglas Costle1990 and Professor Nicholas A. Robinson,1991
sponsored by the United Nations Association of the U.S. (UNA-USA) and the U
Nations Association of the U.S.S.R. (UNA-USSR),
 and 
nited 
 advance 
sian 
 
f the Russian General Staff General Mikhail Kolesnikov to open their 
nuclear ors 
l 
 of 
                                                          
1992 as proxies for both nations’ 
governments. 
The ABM Treaty does not completely eliminate the risk of attacks by anti-
ballistic missiles. Inadequate technology can still lead to errors. For example, “[o]n 
January 25, 1995, a scientific rocket was launched from Norway into space. The rocket’s 
payload contained instruments for studying the Aurora Borealis. The Norwegian 
government had notified the Russian Foreign Ministry of the launch plan well in
of the launch date. But the Foreign Ministry failed to pass this information to the Rus
Ministry of Defense. The result was that the Russian military authorities initially
misinterpreted the launch as a missile attack heading for Russian territory. This 
precipitated a nuclear alert that caused the former Russian President Mr. Boris Yeltsin 
and the chief o
 control briefcases and consult each other via a hotline.”1993 Some commentat
expected that, in response to that kind of mistake, Russia would necessarily target the 
United States.1994 Fearful of such mistakes, the U.S. Congress concluded that the nationa
security of the United States requires the funding of Russian programs to eliminate 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and thus promote “defense by other 
means.”1995 Approximately 1.6 billion has been appropriated through Department
Defense to fund the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.1996 Besides 
1990 Dean Douglas Costle was Connecticut’s air pollution commissioner and co-chair the Joint Committee 
, Robinson & 
l of Law and the Legal Advisor of 
e ABM is Already Dead, supra note (1985) at 37. 
gime of Bilateral Assistance Programs: International Agreements 
 also, Guruswamy & Aamodt, supra 
as U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator under President Carter. See
Waxmonsky, supra note (1906) at 409. 
1991 Nicholas A.Robinson is a Professor of Law at Pace University, Schoo
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). 
1992 Id. 
1993 Bruce Blair, Who’s Got the Button? Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1996, at C- 1. 
1994 Spring, Why th
1995 See, Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1994). 
1996 See, Jack M. Bread, A New Legal Re
Governing the “Nunn-Lugar” Demilitarization Program in the Former Soviet Union, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 
895, 895 fn. 3 (1995) [hereinafter Bread, A New Legal Regime]. See
note (298) at 299. 
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increas
er 
ty 
m 
ing the national security of the United States from a Russian nuclear threat, this 
Program also secures the environment from future harm or threats that may result from 
such arsenal.  
Moreover, the 1994 Agreement between the United States and Russia on the 
Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic1997 requires 
bilateral consultation on technical solutions for the elimination of radioactive and oth
types of pollution. Norway, as a neighboring country, fears nuclear pollution and has 
therefore agreed to protect its shared environment with Russia1998 by rendering free 
technical assistance for the dismantling of Russian nuclear powered submarines, 
delivering equipment, transferring technology, and providing financial assistance. 
When the ABM Treaty was concluded during the cold war, it was described by 
U.S. President Kennedy as, “a step back from the shadows of war.”1999 The importance 
of the agreement was reflected in the provision that “this treaty shall be of unlimited 
duration.”2000 However, in 1998, many U.S. Congressmen asserted that the ABM Trea
was a relic of the Cold War, and argued that U.S. national security requires the 
deployment of a limited missile defense system against missile attacks from “rogue 
States” regardless of the ABM Treaty.2001 They described the ABM Treaty as the second 
mistake committed during the cold war, along with the mistake of managing the Vietna
War.2002 Therefore, the former U.S. President Clinton was prepared to pull out of the 
ABM Treaty,2003 if an amended agreement was not reached with Russia.2004 Later, 
President Clinton’s successor, President George Walker Bush, declared that the “thirty 
years old ABM treaty with Russia should be scrapped.”2005 He added that “no treaty that 
prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising 
                                                          
1997 Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic, Dec. 16, 1994, U.S., 
Russian Federation, 1994 WL 761204. 
1998 Morten Bremer Maerli, Proliferation and Pollution Risks from Naval Nuclear Activities in Northwest-
s & Soc’y  (2001), available at 
> (last visit Nov. 7, 2001). 
ham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
ead, supra note (1985) at 35. 
ident Bush Speech on Missile Defense, May 1, 2001, available at 
1/bush.missile.trans/>, (last visit May 2, 2001). 
Russia, 30 Forum on Physic
<http://www.aps.org/units/fps/jul01/701art3.html
1999 Dunkley, supra note (314). 
2000 ABM Treaty, supra note (1975) art. XV (1). 
2001 Gra
2002 Spring, Why the ABM is Already D
2003 Id. 
2004 Graham, supra note (1638) at 49. 
2005 Pres
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/0
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technology to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies, is in our interests or in the 
interests of the world peace.”2006 This statement may be interpreted as an intention to
abrogate the ABM Treaty. However, according to Article XV (2) of the treaty, a m
State has the right to withdraw from the treaty only if it decides that extraordinary events 
demand
 
ember 
ed it. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the withdrawal, each signatory “shall 
give no
e 
aty, 
Kazakhstan, and 
kraine, is no longer binding to Russia itself, and that Russia is not a part to the 
eorge W. Bush believed that ABM Treaty 
present
 
internationally, in order to protect human health and the environment. 
 
s Reduction (START) program is a four steps program, each 
 of a START treaty.  Each treaty seeks to reduce 
tice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the 
Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying 
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”2007 However, as a result to th
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, some legal fellows believe that the ABM Tre
which was concluded with the former Soviet Union: Russia, Byelarus, 
U
Treaty.2008 Recently, the American President G
ed a different era and was formulated to face the threat of different enemies, 
therefore he submitted a withdrawal request to Russia.2009 Since ABM Treaty is a 
bilateral treaty, the withdrawal of the United States would eliminate the jurisdiction of the
treaty. 
The ABM Treaty of 1972 was concerned only the United States and the former 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, now, “more than [twenty] Third World countries, including 
rogue States, possess ballistic missiles,”2010 and the ABM Treaty does not cover them. 
This situation effectively requires an international instrument to regulate the matter 
b. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties 
The Strategic Arm
step of which requires the conclusion 2011
                                                          
2006 Id. 
2007 ABM Treaty, supra note (1975) art. XV (2). 
2008 Spring, Why the ABM is Already Dead, supra note (1985) at 35. 
2009 Bradley Graham & Mike Allen, Bush to Tell Russia U.S. Will Withdraw From '72 ABM Pact, Wash. 
urner Publishing, 1997). 
ca 
s, 
start/starttex.htm> (last visit Mar. 20, 2001) [hereinafter 
Post, Dec. 12, 2001, at A3.  
2010 See, Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Nuclear Countdown After the Soviet 
Fall 243-310 (T
2011 See, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Treaty Between the United States of Ameri
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arm
July 31, 1991, <http://www.acda.gov/treaties/
 370
the nuclear arms of the contracting parties beyond the level reached by the previous o
The program started in a bilateral treaty, concluded on July 31, 1991, between the U
States and the former Soviet Union.
ne. 
nited 
uch as 
convention concluded among five States: The United States, Byelarus, 
Kazakh  
d 
ave 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2012 The dissolution of the former Soviet Union, five 
months later, produced number of States, some of which inherited nuclear arms, s
Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.2013 Consequently, to control these weapons 
and to respond to the needs of the new international circumstances, START I has been 
modified in the Lisbon Protocol2014 of 1992. Under that Protocol START I became a 
multilateral 
stan, Russia, and Ukraine.2015 According to the Lisbon Protocol and its associated
documents, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine committed to accede to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear States “in the shortest possible time,”2016 an
to fulfill all the duties and obligations under that Treaty.2017 Consequently, member 
States required to get rid of all nuclear weapons and other strategic offensive arms from 
their territories.  
For Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to be included in the program to 
eliminate their nuclear arms that were inherited from the former Soviet Union, they h
to ratify START I. In addition, they are required to ratify the NPT. Since these States 
have different governmental systems, the process of ratification also varies. For example,
the legislatures in Ukraine delayed the ratification of both the START I and the NPT, by
voting against the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, and in favor of remaining 
 
START I]; Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-
Rus. Fed., S. Treaty Doc. 1, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter START II].  
e United States Relating To International Law: Arms 
. 
92) [hereinafter Nash]. 
92, 
, 2d Sess. (1992), available at 
[hereinafter START II]. 
2012 Federation of American Scientists: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I), <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/index.html> (last visit Aug. 20, 2001) [ hereinafter 
FAS, START I]. 
2013 Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of Th
Control And Disarmament (U.S. Digest, Ch. 14, §7) U.S.—CIS Protocols to START Treaty, 86 Am. J
Int’l L. 799,800 (19
2014 Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 23, 19
U.S.-Russia, Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan, S. Treaty Doc. No. 32, 102d Cong.
<http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/lisbon.htm>, (last visit Aug. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Lisbon Protocol]. 
2015 Nash, supra note (2013) at 800. 
2016 Lisbon Protocol, supra note (2014) art. V. 
2017 These duties and obligations were examined under Section  “The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons.”  
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as a nuclear power for an unspecified transitional period.2018 The Kazakhstan legislatur
took similar action.
e 
 
ause they think that getting rid of these nuclear arms would weaken 
and thr
by offering 175 million dollars in Nunn-Lugar funds to aid Ukraine in 
disman
 
T I and its associated documents. However, a delay of three and a half years, 
from th e post-
 
c 
f 
                                                          
2019 Although these new States were sensitive to the international
interest in reducing nuclear arms, they did not seriously want to fulfill their obligations 
under the treaty, bec
eaten their national security. Therefore, some nuclear States, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, offered to provide these new member States with 
security assurance,2020 in order to encourage them to ratify START I. The United States 
went even further 
tling their nuclear weapons when it ratified START I and NPT.2021 The United 
States also informed Russia that it would not purchase uranium from its dismantled 
weapons until Russia reaches an agreement with the other States on an equitable sharing 
of the proceeds.2022 
After all these efforts, all the Lisbon Protocol signatories fulfilled their obligations
under STAR
e original date of the START I’s entry into force resulted from involving th
Soviet States.2023 
The objective of START I is to increase stability at significantly lower levels of
nuclear weapons.2024 It addresses the “daunting challenge of reducing the balance of 
terror created by nuclear weapons through dramatic cuts in submarine-launched ballisti
missiles.”2025 On the other hand it raises concerns regarding the need to safely dispose o
2018 Lee S. Wolosky et al., START, START II, and Ownership of Nuclear Weapons: The Case for a 
“Primary” Successor State, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 581, 584 fn. 19 (1993). 
2019 Federation of American Scientists: START I: Lisbon Protocol and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
.org/nuke/control/start1/news/npt-95.htm> (last visit Aug. 20, 2001). 
ations in National Security 
d, 
mp. L. Rev. 333, 342-43 (1997); Sohn, supra note (2020) at 555. 
12). 
nafter FAS, 
<http://www.fas
2020 Louis B. Sohn, START II Treaty, Section Recommendation and Report: American Bar Association 
Section of International Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, 28 Int’l Law. 552, 555 
(1994) [hereinafter Sohn]; Id. 
2021 Id., at 555. 
2022 Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post Cold War Transform
and Separation of Powers—Beating Nuclear Swords into Plowshares in an Imperfectly Competitive Worl
20 Hastings Int’l & Co
2023 FAS, START I, supra note (20
2024 Federation of American Scientists: START I Entry Into Force, available at 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/news/starteif.htm>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001) [ herei
START I Entry Into Force]. 
2025 START I, supra note (2011). 
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huge qu e 
2027 
nd 
 covered by the Treaty; (b) exchange of 
telemet a;    
f 
ber of inspections have been conducted in Russian and 
Americ
Pavloh
T II was the next 
step tow
antities of weapons, launchers, and nuclear and fissile materials mandated by th
Treaty.2026  
The strength of START I lies in its verification system, which responds to 
question of trust between the enemies of yesterday and friends of today. The well-
established verification system was the result of a nine-year period of negotiations.
The verification regime established by START I provides for: (a) data exchanges a
notifications on strategic systems and facilities
ry data from missile flight tests; (c) a ban on the encryption of telemetry dat
(d) twelve types of on-site inspections and exhibitions; and (e) continuous monitoring o
mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).2028  
To better assure compliance with START I and its verification system, a Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) was formed under to Article XV of the 
START I. Consequently, a num
an facilities to detect nuclear weapons.2029 Moreover, the United States began 
continuous portal monitoring activities at missile assembly plants in Votkinsk and 
rad.2030 Similarly, Russian inspectors began portal monitoring at a Thiokol 
Corporation facility in Promontory, Utah.2031 
The development of disarmament systems shows that the arms controllers, 
themselves, are becoming aware of the environmental problems they have created.2032 
Thus, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) sought to dismantle nuclear 
warheads and missiles. In START I, they are dealing with dismantling the reactors of 
nuclear submarines from which these missiles are launched.2033 STAR
ards demilitarization. 
                                                          
2026 See, The White House, U.S. Nunn-Lugar Safety, Security, Dismantlement Program, 
2194.htm> (last visit May 14, 2001). 
n, supra note (2020) at 553. 
supra note (2024). 
<http://www.acda.gov./factshee/wmd/nuclear/ctr/ssd3
2027 Soh
2028 FAS, START I Entry Into Force, supra note (2024). 
2029 FAS, START I, supra note (2012). 
2030 FAS, START I Entry Into Force, 
2031 Id. 
2032 Guruswamy & Aamodt, supra note (298) at 306. 
2033 Id. 
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START II was signed on January 3, 1993. The U.S. ratification was completed on
January 26, 1996, and the Russian Duma completed its ratification on April 14, 200
Unlike START I, START II is a purely bilateral treaty, between the U.S. and 
Russia. While START I reduced the strategic arms possessed by both sides, START II 
went beyond this limit to require
 
0.2034  
 reduction of the strategic forces on each side to no more 
than 3,5
 
BMs 
o confirm the conversion of 
heavy I
 
 
ing 
of 2,00
00 warheads. START II bans all Russian heavy ICBMs and their launchers by the 
year 2003,2035 including Multiple Independent Targeted Reentry Vehicles, which will 
necessarily reduce the risk of nuclear war.2036 According to START II, Russia agreed to
eliminate all SS-18 n-missiles, both deployed and non-deployed.2037  
START II does not stand-alone, but relies upon START I, and cannot enter into 
force without the prior entry into force of START I.2038 START II contains the same 
provision as START I, except as explicitly modified by its provisions.2039 Consequently, 
START II adopted the same verification system provided in START I, except that 
START II provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy IC
and their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections t
CBM silo launchers.2040 
Despite the substantial reduction in strategic arms, the nuclear risk still persists. A
minimum number of warheads are still permitted under START II. Therefore, on March
22, 1997,2041 the former American President Clinton and the former Russian President 
Yeltsin affirmed their intention to establish a framework for START III.2042 
START III will be established by December 31, 2007, and will impose a ceil
0-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each party.2043 START III will be based on 
                                                          
2034 Federation of American Scientists: Srategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), available at 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start2/index.html>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001). 
2035 Sohn, supra note (2020) at 554. 
merica and the Russian Federation on Future Reduction and 
isit Aug. 20, 2001).  
s Service, 
, supra note (1021) at 30. 
2036 Id., at 553, 554. 
2037 Nash, supra note (2013) at 261; Sohn, supra note (2020) at 554. 
2038 Id., at 553-55. 
2039 Treaty Between the United States of A
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, modified as of May 21, 1996, 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start2/docs/start-95.htm> (last v
2040 START II, supra note (2011) art. V. 
2041 See, Press Conference by President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Federal New
Mar. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws Files. 
2042 Rosen
2043 Federation of American Scientists: Srategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STARTIII), available at 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start3/index.html>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001). 
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the rules and regulations provided in START I and START II, and will include measures 
relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destructio
of strategic nuclear warheads.
n 
 
 and 
 
2045 START 
IV will
s. 
ironmental dimension. This issue can be examined, 
accordi
 
to 
arge of such substances. Furthermore, the U.S. offered 175 million 
dollars s,2047 
ribute and assist to assure safe 
environ
ction of 
er, 
2044 Similar to START II, START III will consist of a
bilateral convention between Russia and the United States.  
Once a degree of stability is secured between the U.S. and Russia by the 
compliance with STARTs I, II, and III, other nuclear powers, such as China, France
the United Kingdom, would become more directly involved. Thus, a future START IV
is intended as a multilateral convention, involving all the nuclear powers.
 derive the experiences of STARTs I, II, and III. However, it may cause new 
difficulties and conflicts of interests, because it will involve more than two nation
Despite the fact that the START treaties do not explicitly address environmental 
protection, they do have an env
ng to the nature and goals of these treaties, from two positive and negative 
visions: The positive vision is that the elimination and reduction of strategic arms would
necessarily reduce the environmental risk of any future armed conflict. The negative 
vision is that the disarmament of nuclear weapons presents its own environmental 
hazards in terms of safe long-term disposal. To avoid the negative risk, the U.S. agreed 
purchase Russia’s uranium from dismantled weapons,2046 which would eliminate the 
hazardous disch
 in Nunn-Lugar funds to aid Ukraine in dismantling their nuclear weapon
since they lack sophisticated disposal technology. 
In sum any arms dismantling would assure the environmental protection from 
possible future threat. However, poor disarmament technology would cause side 
environmental effect, unless developed States would cont
mental disarmament.  
Except for ENMOD, none of the EHR instruments were specifically intended as 
means of environmental protection. These agreements are focused on the prote
civilian populations; environmental concerns are only accidental to that goal. Moreov
                                                          
2044 Id. 
2045 Federation of American Scientists: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START IV), available at  <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start4/index.html>, (last visit Aug. 20, 2001). 
2046 Sohn, supra note (2020) at 555. 
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most of the EHRs were codified and adopted by military authorities since they are 
relevant to disarmament and arms control. And each nation seeks to protect and sec
its national defense and security without any consideration to arms race environmental 
consequences. 
In addition, EHRs do not address the newly invented weapons of mass 
destruction such as Depleted Uranium (DU), which is similar to chemical weapons 
since it has indiscriminate effec
ure 
ts, is uncontrollable, and has long-lasting environmental 
impacts. Therefore, a new Enviro-Humanitarian Convention should be adopted to 
include the prohibition of such newly invented weapons. 
evertheless, the enviro-humanitarian rules can play a great role in promoting the 
environmental protection, both in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. However, 
this role cannot be maintained unless military personnel learn to consider the 
environment as much as national security. This goal can be achieved by introducing 
environmental education in military schools. A stronger relationship can be established 
between military establishments and national environmental organizations. Moreover, 
environmentalists can be included in the planing of military operations in order to 
indicate the protective areas where military operations should be avoided, provide the 
best way to rehabilitate any militarized areas, inspect any military accidents, report 
environmental damages and recommend means of rehabilitation, and participate in 
codifying national and international military rules to better serve both the national 
security and the environment. 
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2047 Id., at 555. 
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Part V:  
Responsibility for  
Environmental Damage Caused by Warfare 
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As examined in Part I of this thesis, responsibility for environmental destruction 
can be described in two categories: international responsibility and national 
responsibility. If the environmental damage triggers one of the International 
Human
nal 
them. Since the examined rules are relevant to armed conflicts, 
the bell ict 
. 
will be 
lity will be examined in Section II. 
 
However, another definition of international responsibility was adopted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC), providing that “[e]very internationally wrongful 
itarian Law Rules (IHL), International Environmental Law Rules (IEL), or the 
Enviro-Humanitarian Rules (EHR), the responsibility that might be raised is 
“international” responsibility. However, if the environmental harm triggers the natio
environmental law rules, then it becomes a “national” responsibility.  
Like all other rules of the law, environmental law rules need an enforcement 
authority to implement 
igerents are considered the enforcing authority. However, once the armed confl
is over, they might neglect such enforcement.2048 Therefore, it would be useful if an 
international entity, such as the United Nations,2049 plays the role of the enforcing power
According to the forecited classification, the international responsibility 
examined in Section I, and national responsibi
 
A- International Responsibility 
 
The evolution of the system of international relation has generated substantive
changes in international responsibility for environmental damage. Historically, the State 
was considered to be the only international actor in international law. Accordingly, 
international responsibility was originally conceived of as a set of international rules 
governing States’ international obligations in their relations with other States.2050 
act of a State entails the international responsibility of the State.”2051 International 
                                                          
2048 Harry Almond, Weapons, War and the Environment, 3 Geo. Int’l Envt’l L. Rev. 117, 129-30 
(1990) [hereinafter Almond, Weapons].  
2049 According to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has an enforcing powe
but its ability to act is restricted by the member States’ approval, especially the five permanent members. 
2050 Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law, 18 
Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp
r, 
 
. L.J. 821, 823 (1996) [hereinafter Sucharitkul]. 
. 
2051 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on State Responsibility, July 12, 1996, U.N.Doc. 
A/51/10, Part I, art. 1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]
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responsibility is also defined as “accountability for a violation of international law, as the 
legal relationship originating automatically between the State that violates its 
interna
GOs, 
 
m is governed by International 
Human
f 
 and 
rought 
gations 
age 
5  
                                                          
tional obligations and the State whose rights are injured.”2052 
More recently, actors other than State- e.g., international organizations, N
and private parties- have been recognized as actors subject to international responsibility. 
“[States] can no longer claim to be the sole holders of the right to participate in the 
international legal order and its processes, having been joined by a new range of 
actors.”2053 Thus, the scope of law of international responsibility has expanded to include
these non-State actors. 
Moreover, the international responsibility syste
itarian Law, International Environmental Law Rules, and Enviro-Humanitarian 
Rules. Therefore, there exist two types of international responsibility: the responsibility 
of international persons, and international criminal responsibility. Each type o
responsibility has its own subjects and rules.  
 
1. The Responsibility of International Persons 
In international law, “international persons” are defined to include States
international organizations. When a State or an international organization violate an 
obligation undertaken or imposed on them by international law, claims may be b
before the ICJ or other international tribunals. In environmental cases, responsibility 
arises either because of the breach of one or more international customary obli
recognized among nations, or because of the violation of a treaty.2054 A breach of 
international environmental law rules results when activities within a State cause dam
to other States’ environment or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.205
Practically, the State and the international organization cannot cause 
environmental damage during peacetime or during times of armed conflicts by 
national Actors 
0 (2000) 
fter McLaughlin]. 
uences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International 
 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/428 (Mar. 15, 1990).  
2052 Bernhard Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship between Responsibility and 
Damages, 185 Recueil des Cours 9, 20 (1984). 
2053 Philippe J. Sand, Introduction, in Greening International Law XXV(Philippe J. Sand 
ed., 1993) cited in Robert McLaughlin, Improving Compliance: Making Non-State Inter
Responsible for Environmental Crimes, 11 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 377, 385 fn. 5
[hereina
2054 International Liability for Injurious Conseq
Law, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess.
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themselves. However, certain actors that represent a State or an international organization
could commit such acts, and accordingly, those acts may be considered acts of the State 
or the international organization and can raise question of the State’s or the internatio
organization’s responsibility for the environmental damages that may resu
 
nal 
lt from them. 
For exa
r that 
ilians, 
, 
il 
ilitary 
, 
rged 
with th
 
us, 
      
mple, the armed forces of a State are clearly a governmental body, where their 
wrongful activities are attributable to their States.2056 
Far too often, States become involved in armed conflict, and when they do, their 
acts are often responsible for damage to the environment. It has also become familiar to 
find international organizations involved in armed conflicts. Since States and 
international organizations could be involved in armed conflict, their agents may cause 
warfare environmental damage, and may result in international responsibility fo
damage. For instance, the 1999 Nis airfield attack by NATO in Kosovo affected civ
civilian objects, a market, and a clinic, when a CBU-87 cluster bomb container 
mistakenly missed its target and hit unintended civilian areas.2057 Therefore, on May 8
1999, the former Secretary General of the NATO, Javier Solana, confirmed the 
responsibility of NATO for the attack.2058 Similarly, the United Nations Security Counc
has the right to form subsidiary organs to enforce its decisions relevant to the 
international peace and security.2059 Some of those organs may be involved in m
activities, such as the armed forces organized under the umbrella of the U.N,2060 the 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),2061 which have been cha
e disarmament of the Iraqi armament program. The work of those organs may 
cause severe environmental consequences. Once “[t]he United Nations forces engage as
combatants in an armed conflict, they are subject to the laws of armed conflict.”2062 Th
                                                                                                                                                                       
 by 
Military Operations, in Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflicts at 409 
(R. Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Greenwood, State Responsibility].  
ampaign, supra note (143). 
te (2056) at 410. 
2055 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822) Principle 21; Rio Declaration, supra note (683) Principle 2. 
2056 Christopher Greenwood, State Responsibility and Civil Liability for Environmental Damage Caused
2057 Human Rights Watch Report, Civilian Death in the NATO Air C
2058 Id. 
2059 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 29. 
2060 Id., arts. 43 (1), 45. 
2061 S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54the Sess., S/RES/1284 (1999). 
2062 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra no
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severe environmental consequences may raise the international responsibility of the 
United Nations if such activities violated mandatory international rules.  
 a 
e if, 
ox 
ca. In that 
ecurity Council would have the right to allow the World Health 
rganization (WHO) to eliminate smallpox, and to require all States to cooperate. 
onsibility rests on all States 
and on 
 
 It could thus create an army of medics who 
ould go around the world and carry out this task, and indeed would have the 
threaten . In 
 
, the 
“with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general conventions applicable to the 
conduct of military personnel,”2063 including the environmental protection provisions. 
 
On the other hand, responsibility is involved under the U.N. Charter only when
U.N. organ determines that there is a threat to peace and security, so no such 
responsibility arise from a small environmental harm. Thus, responsibility would aris
for instance, when the Soviet Union broke up, some terrorists were able to get smallp
virus from former Soviet facilities, hide it in Western Europe, Canada and the United 
States, and then threatened to spread the smallpox in Europe and North Ameri
situation, the S
O
Because of the threat to international peace, international resp
the U.N. itself. The U.N. can constitute the U.N. Sanitary Inspection as a new 
U.N. subsidiary organ to visit every country, and assist in the elimination of smallpox by
giving every one vaccination to prevent it.
w
responsibility to do so. Another example would arise if any group or individual 
ed to blow up a nuclear facility and cause radiation to spread around the world
these examples, the U.N. would have the responsibility to act, and any action by the 
Security Council would be justified under the environmental security concept.   
In addition to these hypothetical examples, the U.N. has in fact recognized its
responsibility under international law to safeguard the environment. Thus, in 1993
United Nations, in its military operations in Rwanda, undertook to conduct operations 
Similar provisions were introduced in the United Nations Status of Force agreements 
signed after 1993, such as in Haiti,2064 Angola,2065 Croatia,2066 Lebanon,2067 and in West
2068Sahara in 1999.    
                                                          
2063 Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5, 1993, UN-
y of 
al Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 
hraga]. 
, 
Rwanda, art. 7, 1748 U.N.T.S., cited in Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicabilit
Internation
406, 407 fn. 5 ( 2000) [hereinafter S
2064 Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Haiti, Mar. 15, 1995, UN-Haiti
art. 7, 1861 U.N.T.S. 249. 
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In recent years, the responsibility of “international persons” for environmental 
damage has become an important concept. Previously, environment damage was regarded 
as merely incidental to armed conflict, but now it has become a fundamental part of 
military strategies in armed conflicts.2069 Accordingly, international responsibility is 
triggered when there is an act imputable to an international person, whether a lega
an act in violation of an international obligation, which causes damage to the 
environment. 
l act, or 
 
 act 
 an international obligation. The plaintiff State also has to prove the link 
betwee
0   
on 
is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation of the State.”2071 Under that definition, fault is a 
                                                              
a. An act imputable to an international person  
Acts can constitute a legal basis for international responsibility, whether they are 
legal or illegal, based on the fact that any nation is responsible for acts, whether legal or 
illegal, committed within its jurisdiction. 
 
1) Fault Responsibility for Environmental Harm in Times of Armed Conflicts 
Under the traditional view, the international responsibility that results from an 
illegal act imputable to an international person is “fault responsibility.” To establish such 
responsibility the plaintiff State has to show that the defendant State has committed an
in breach of
n the alleged conduct and the damage that was suffered (causation). Fault 
responsibility is based on a State failure to use due diligence to avoid causing damage.207
Fault responsibility was confirmed by the ILC when it provided that “[t]here is an 
internationally wrongful act of a State when: (a) conduct consisting of an act or omissi
                                                                                                               
ons Peacekeeping Operation in Angola, May 3, 1995, UN-
407 fn. 5. 
onsibility of an Occupying Power for Environmental Harm: The 
 art. 3.  
2065 Agreement on the Status of the United Nati
Angola, 1864 U.N.T.S., cited in Shraga, supra note (2063) at 
2066 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia, May 15, 1995, 
UN-Croatia, 1864 U.N.T.S., Id., at 407 fn. 5. 
2067 Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Dec. 15, 1993, UN-Leb., 
1901 U.N.T.S., Shraga, supra note (2063) at 407 fn. 5. 
2068 Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara, Feb. 11, 1999, UN-
Morocco. 
2069 Lacayo, supra note (63) at 28. 
2070 Lisa M. Kaplan, International Resp
Case of Estonia, 12 Transnat’l L. 153, 183 (1999) [hereinafter Kaplan]. 
2071 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note (2051)
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violation of any international rule. Many of those rules relevant to environmental 
protection in times of armed conflicts have been examined in Parts Two, Three, and Four 
of this thesis.  
The violation of an international obligation, whether derived from customary or 
conventional source,2072 is a wrongful act and can result in the imposition of 
responsibility on an international person for damage caused by such act. This obligatio
could be very general, such as good neighborliness, or very spec
n 
ific, such as reduction of 
hazardo 3  
 
978, in 
olation of 
viet 
 
ed to cause widespread, long lasting, and severe damage 
to the n d 
ed 
us substances in certain areas, or the monitoring or reporting of ozone levels.207
For example, France was held responsible for the action of its special forces in destroying
the vessel Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand in July 1985.2074 Another example is the 
case of Cosmos 954, when a Soviet nuclear powered satellite fell on January 24, 1
Canadian territory, depositing radioactive substances. It was interpreted as a vi
Canadian sovereignty, and raised the international responsibility of the former So
Union.2075 
The Secretary General of the United Nations, as a “Commander in Chief” of the 
United Nations armed forces, issued a binding2076 Bulletin that prohibits his forces from
“using methods of warfare intend
atural environment.”2077 This provision clearly held the United Nations arme
forces, or any U.N. operations conducted under U.N. command or control,2078 responsible 
for any environmental damage that qualified as “widespread, long-lasting, and severe 
damage.” Here, it would be useful to mention that only the U.N. operations during arm
conflicts are subject to that prohibition.2079 The exclusion of peacetime operations from 
this provision is another threat to the environment. Moreover, the Bulletin would offer 
                                                          
2072 Cervi, supra note (347) at 383. 
2073 Guruswamy et al. Eds., supra note (1097) at 338. 
2074 “On July 10, 1985, a civ
at its moorings in Auck
ilian vessel, the ‘Rainbow Warrior’, not flying the New Zealand flag, was sunk 
land Harbor, New Zealand, as a result of extensive damage caused by two high 
explosive devices.” Ruling Pertaining to the Difference Between France and New Zealand Arising from the 
Rainbow Warrior Affair, 26 I.L.M. 1349, 1349 (1987) [hereinafter Rainbow Warrior Affair]. 
cardo-Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibilityfor 
arm, in International Responsibility for Environmental Harm 31 
2075 Cervi, supra note (347) at 393; Ric
Environmental H
(Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) [hereinafter Mazzeschi]. 
2076 Shraga,, supra note (2063) at 409. 
2077 Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Force of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999) § 6.3 [hereinafter S.G. Bulletin]. 
2078 Shraga, supra note (2063) at 408. 
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more e
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le. 
nited Nations or his State raise the international 
respons
ations 
nsible for his death, and paid 
compen
l 
 a 
host country, the claims filed by the host nation against the United Nations for causing 
                                                                                                               
ffective environmental protection if it responded to damage that is widespread, 
long-lasting or severe, rather than requiring all three elements. 
Since the United Nations armed forces are provided, according to Article 43 o
the U.N. Charter, by State members,2080 one may question whether the responsibility for 
environmental damage should be attributed to the international organization or the State
that provides the soldiers. The answer to this question depends on the nature and 
inducement of the act. If it has been committed according to the international 
organization’s orders, objectives, and rules then the responsibility will be on the 
international organization. However, if the act was committed in accordance with or in
violation of national orders, objectives, and rules then the State will be held responsib
The individual State would thus be responsible for ensuring the lawful behavior of the 
soldiers it provides to the U.N.  
In contrast, if uniformed personnel of the United Nations is victimized by a 
certain State’s armed forces, would the U
ibility of this State. Since the attack is against United Nations personnel, then 
both the United Nations, which has been affected by the violated of its immunity and 
reputation, and the State the victim’s own State, which has been substantively harmed by 
losing its citizen, could do so. Accordingly, in 1948, both Sweden and the United N
made claims against Israel concerning the killing of Count Bernadotte, the United 
Nations missionary to Israel, which was held respo
sation.2081 
Practically, it is difficult for the United Nations to make claims for environmenta
damage, because most of its employees and services belong to member States, and most 
of its buildings are located in host States such as the United States and Switzerland. 
However, when environmental damage occurs in a United Nations building located in
environmental damage can present a legal standard for the United Nations to file similar 
                                                              
2079 Id., at 409.  
2080 Article 43 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[a]ll Members of the United Nations, in order to 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the 
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.” U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 43 (1). 
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claims against the perpetrator State. For example, in 1994, when Hizbollah Guerrillas in
South Lebanon targeted Israeli cities, and hid in the civilian population, Israeli armed 
forces threatened to target the perpetrators, even if t
 
hey were hidden among civilians. 
Under t
n, 
  
ividual 
s-
 
 
he fragile island ecosystem.2086 The Prime Minister of the Islands 
asserted re 
                                                                                                                                                                            
hat threat, many civilians sought shelter in United Nations building, in South 
Lebanon. However, the Israeli Air Force targeted the building, causing the death of about 
100 civilians, and polluting the surrounding environment.2082 A fact finding commissio
formed by the former Secretary General of the U.N. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, held 
Israel responsible for the massacre.2083
A State or other international actor can be held responsible, even if the ind
who committed the violation does not represent it. However, here the responsibility will 
stand on a different legal basis, i.e., the violation of “a duty to exercise due diligence vi
à-vis private actors.”2084 That duty imposes on States the duty to examine in each
circumstance whether the environment is in danger from the acts of the private actors, 
and therefore, requires protection from the State.  
The State will then be subject to the control of the international community, to 
verify whether the protection procedures that have been taken are suitable to the actual 
threat. For instance, the Solomon Islands claimed the United States was responsible for 
environmental damage, resulting from oil leakage of the sunken warships, based on the
failure to fulfill its duty of due diligence,2085 when it failed to prevent the foreseeable 
discharge of oil into t
 that the Solomon Islands were never a party to World War II, and were therefo
not responsible for cleaning up wartime debris.2087 
 
2081 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 182. 
2082 Letter addressed to the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dated 
. 
 
eability to a contemplated procedure and to take appropriate measures in timely fashion to 
r. 1 (1996), available at 
C 
t To Clean Up WWII Debris, Agence France 
421887, cited in Id., at 357 fn. 32. 
May 7, 1996, U.N. Doc. S/1996/337
2083 Id. 
2084 Suarez, supra note (121) at 103. 
2085 The due diligence is the reasonable efforts of a State to “inform itself of factual and legal components
that relate forese
address them.” U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess, Supp. No. 10, at 17, U. N. Doc. A/51/10/Cor
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/chap05.htm> (last visit Nov. 12, 2001) [hereinafter The 1996 IL
Report on International Liability]. 
2086 Cervi, supra note (347) at 376. 
2087 George Atkins, Solomon Islands Pressures Japan, Wes
Press, Oct. 27, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13
 385
Armed conflict often causes transboundary pollution in neutral States, which wil
hold the source States responsible whether the armed conflict took place according to th
rules of law or not. For example, when Iraqi military operations caused pollution th
contaminated Iran, Pakistan, and India, those countries held Iraq responsible, even if it 
raised the legal issue of self-defense.  
The State obligation to protect other States from transboundary pollution
including those resulting from armed conflicts, was first elaborated in the 
l 
e 
at 
, 
Trail Smelter 
Case.2088 The Trail Smelter rule, as “a framework for the analysis of interstate dispute 
with environmental dimensions,”2089 has been widely accepted as a statement of 
customary international law generally applicable to cases of pollution, including medi
other than air.
a 
by 
s a 
 
the atm
2090 The Court stated that under the principles of international law “no State 
has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein.”2091 Thus, a
result of the emission of sulphur dioxide by the smelters of the Consolidated Mining and
Smelting Company activities, Canada was held liable for the damages produced in the 
State of Washington by pollution, engendered by the discharge of sulphur dioxide into 
osphere.2092  
The ICJ reaffirmed the same obligation in the Corfu Channel Case, which was
concerned with the right of passage of British warships through the Corfu Channel.2093
1946, Albany tried to prevent the British warships from passing through the Channel
military forces, including laying anti-vessels mines, to prevent their passage.2094 In this 
case, the Court concluded that it is “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”2095 In 1972, the 
Stockholm Declaration incorporated the 
 
 In 
 by 
Corfu Channel standard in Principle 21, which 
                                                          
2088 Trail Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11, 1941) [hereinafter 
Trail Smelter]. 
2089 Mickelson, Rereading Trail Smelter, 31 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 219, 232 (1993). 
2090 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of Law of the United 
States § 601 reps. Note 1 (1987). 
2091 Trail Smelter, supra note (2088) at 1965. 
2092 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 421. 
2093 Corfu Channel Case, supra note (1794). 
2094 D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime 
Naval/Military operations, 29 Cal. W. Int’l L. J, 283, 293-94 (1999). 
2095 Corfu Channel Case, supra note (1794) at 22. 
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prohibi of 
sions 
 since terrorist groups are based in 
certain 
 
  
rred when the U.S. unwittingly allowed Al-
Qaeda nder 
l 
est 
s and opens its territory to other nations 
for the 
t is 
tries 
provide money to certain charitable organizations in their territory, knowing that some of 
the charity m onsible for 
its passivity  its 
                      
ted States from allowing their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights 
other nations.2096 Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, relevant to transboundary 
environmental damage, is almost identical to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration: 
“States have […] the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States.” These legal provi
hold any source State responsible for environmental damage crossing its borders and 
harming any neighboring State.2097 They are also reflected in the principle newly set forth 
by the American President George W. Bush that,
States’ territories and harm other nations’ environment, not only terrorists are 
responsible for their crimes, but also those “who harbor them,”2098 since States have to 
use their territories so as not to harm others. There are four situations in which a State
may be held responsible when acts committed in its territory causes harm to other States:
First, if a private actor uses the territory to harm others without the State’s 
permission or against its will. For example, if pirates in Indonesia seize a ship in the 
Strait of Malacca, Indonesia will considers these people to be acting in violation of 
international law. Another example occu
to act inside its territory. In this situation, the State cannot be responsible, u
international law unless it defeats the international efforts to combat such internationa
crimes, whether piracy or terror, and does not cooperate on an international scale to arr
the perpetrators and punish them. For instance, in the Indonesian example the State will 
not be internationally responsible if it cooperate
purpose of arresting the pirates.  
Second, if the State knows that there are terrorists groups in its territory, bu
passive, and looks the other way. For example, Kuwait and some other Islamic coun
oney is going to help terrorists. Here, the State can be held resp
, since it turns the other way in order to avoid internal problems on
                                    
 Declaration, supra note (822) Principle 21. 
 Orrego Vicuna, Final Report Prepared for the Eight Committee of the In
Law by the Rapporteur on the Subject of Environmental Responsibility and Liab
2096 Stockholm
2097 Francisco stitute of 
International ility, 10 
Geo. Int’l Envt’l L. Rev. 279, 279 (1998). 
2098 This concept was frequently used by the American President and his Cabinet during the period of time 
that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. 
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territory. Th . However, 
the State co  other States to 
arrest the pe
Thir terrorists on 
its land and ke the threat 
seriously. F ainst 
terrorists op  not regard the threat seriously enough 
to act. As with the previous scenario, the State can be held responsible for its negligence, 
since it
g 
 
, 
 
ignificantly, some national systems, besides establishing different kinds of 
ional responsibility system. For example, the 
Restatem
nment of another State or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. (2) A State is responsible to all 
other States (a) for any violation of its obligations under 
Subsection (1)(a), and (b) for any significant injury, resulting 
from such violation, to the environment of areas beyond the 
) A State is responsible for any 
 a violation of its obligations 
of another State or to its 
e State provides, indirectly, a good soil for the terrorists to operate
uld avoid being internationally responsible by cooperating with
rpetrators and bring them to justice. 
d, the case of negligence, when the country knows that there are 
 it could arrest them, but it does not do so because it does not ta
or instance, prior to September 11th attacks, the U.S. failed to act ag
erations in its territory, because it did
 could have arrested the terrorists but it did not before the terrorists committed 
their crimes. Here also the State could avoid international responsibility by cooperatin
with other countries to fight terrorism.  
And finally, when the State is harboring terrorists, and is actively helping 
terrorists and hiding them. An obvious example of this situation involves the Taliban
Government, in Afghanistan. In this situation, the State is internationally responsible
since without Afghanistan’s help, the Al-Qaeda terrorist group would have had no place
to train their personnel or to plan their crimes. 
S
responsibility, reinforce the internat
ent Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that  
 
(1) A State is obligated to take […] measures as may be 
necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to 
ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control (a) conform 
to generally accepted international rules and standards for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of 
another State or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction; (b) are conducted so as not to cause significant 
injury to the enviro
limits of national jurisdiction. (3
significant injury, resulting from
under Subsection (1), to the environment 
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property, or to persons or property within that State’s territory or 
under its jurisdiction or control.2099 
 
 
Often, States try to escape international responsibility by raising the argume
an environmental violation was committed under the law of war, which under certain 
circumstances allows violations under the umbrella of military necessity.
nt that 
 
nd 
ncerned actor responsible before the international community. 
 
ut 
 a 
.] Charter. [If] in the course of the fighting […] 
the invader[’s armed forces…] destroy a [military] installation, [despite its legality in a 
2100 
Nevertheless, under more desirable environmental rules, and the restrictions imposed on
the military necessity principle, there would be no difference if the violation is of a 
peacetime international rules or a wartime international one,2101 since both kinds of 
violation will be interpreted as wrongful acts committed against international rules a
will hold the co
 
2) Responsibility Without Fault 
An international person can be held responsible in international law not only for 
violations of international obligations, but also for acts which conform to international 
law rules but harm another nation’s environment. Thus, this responsibility is considered 
absolute because it directly attaches to the defendant international person without regard
to fault.2102 This sort of responsibility has been adopted by the ILC in the “International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by 
International Law” topic.2103  
Absolute responsibility has proved to be a controversial issue,2104 since the 
environmental harm is caused by a lawful activity of the international person, witho
any failure of due diligence.  
Absolute responsibility may be imposed if “a State invades its neighbor in 
circumstances which could not possibly justify a plea of self-defense, so that there is
clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the [U.N
                                                          
2099 Restatement Third, supra note (1101) § 601 (1). 
2100 Low & Hodgkinson, supra note (1857) at 449. 
2101 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 399. 
2102 UNEP, Responsibility Pour Les Dommages Dus A La Pollution ou Autre Dommage Ecologiques Et 
Leur Indemnisation, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG. 8/2 (1977).  
2103 The 1996 ILC Report on International Liability, supra note (2085) at 125-51 
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regular
invader 
 
er 
 
 is 
ovides that “a State which launches a space 
object is liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the 
surface r to aircraft in flight.” Accordingly, compensation was sought by 
Canad
exampl
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or 
des 
    
 combat, the environmental effects of such lawful act, even if it does not respond 
to the needs of] Article 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I, [will] hold the [
State] responsible for the damage because it was a direct consequence of the illegal 
invasion.”2105 
Another example of absolute responsibility involves UNSCOM and 
UNMOVIC, which work according to the rules of international law. However, their 
work caused environmental damage in Iraq, without violation of any international rules. 
Nevertheless, the U.N. was held to be internationally responsible for all environmental 
damage resulting from destruction of the Iraqi armament program. Iraq does not have to 
prove anything except a causal link between UNSCOM or UNMOVIC activity and the
environmental harm suffered.2106 Therefore, responsibility without fault is used to det
activities by any international person that might result in environmental damage, even
without evidence of negligence or fault. A clear example of absolute responsibility
found in Article 11 of the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects,2107 which pr
 of the Earth o
a for damage resulting from the Soviet nuclear power satellite, Cosmos 954, 
when it fell onto Canadian territory.2108 
Absolute liability has been adopted in a number of international instruments. For 
e, Article III (1) of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage2109 provides that “the owner of a ship at the time of an incident or, 
where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the first such 
been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.” However, this Article exclu
                                                                                                                                                                         
oto, Note & Comment, General Principles of International Environmental Law, 3 
aused by Space Objects (Sept. 1, 1972), available at 
47) at 393. 
 Protocol to the International Convention on the Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Jan. 15, 1993, 
reprinted in Benedict on Admiralty 6-86.2 (1993) [hereinafter Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage Protocol]. 
2104 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 399. 
2105 Id., at 403. 
2106 Max Valverde S
ILSA J. Int;l & Comp. L. 194, 203 (1996). 
2107 Convention on International Liability for Damage C
<http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts/BH595.txt> (last visit Nov. 16, 2001). 
2108 Cervi, supra note (3
2109
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the owner from liability if he can prove that such pollution “resulted from an act of war, 
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable 
and irre  Civil 
 any incident at the facility causes 
damages or loss of life or property.2111 
 
b. C
Cau onal person 
and the env e cause must not be too 
remote or speculative,2112 and must be established by clear and convincing evidence.2113  
hall be liable for nuclear damage upon proof that such 
damage
of nnex I paragraph 9, that 
German
es 
sistible character.” Another example is found in the Vienna Convention on
Liability for Nuclear Damage, adopted absolute responsibility to hold an operator of a 
nuclear installation, including a military installation, “liable for nuclear damage upon 
proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear incident […].”2110 Similarly, the 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy imposes strict 
liability on an operator of a nuclear installation when
ausation 
sation is a link between the wrongful act attributed to an internati
ironmental damage that results from such act. Th
Some international instruments that address international responsibility explicitly 
require a link between the State’s acts and the damage. For example, Article II (1) (3.4) 
of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage provides that “[t]he 
operator of a nuclear installation s
 has been caused by a nuclear incident in his nuclear installation.”2114  
A much older instrument that required proof of causation is the Treaty of 
Versailles of 1919, which required, in Part VII Section 1 A
y compensate “damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations 
of war.”2115 A State may be found to have caused damage when any of its representativ
                                                          
2110 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, art. II, IV, 1063 U.N.T.S. 
265 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Civil Liability]. See also, Kathy J.S. Fritz, Civil and State Liability 
For Nuclear Accidents: A Proposal for Eastern Europe 6 Fall Int’l Legal Persp. 37 (1994) 
[hereinafter Fritz]. 
L. Comm’n 226, U.N. Doc. 
nal Principles for 
 
 L. J. 311, 337 (1989) [hereinafter Gaines]. 
pra note (2110) art. II (1)(3.4). 
589) Part VII, Sec. 1, Annex I, para. 9. 
2111 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, art. 3, 956 U.N.T.S. 
251 [hereinafter Convention on Third Party Liability]. 
2112 Summary Records of the 2179th Mtg., (1990) 1 Y.B Int’l 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1990. 
2113 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A., at 1965. See also, Sanford E. Gaines, Internatio
transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasses?, 30
Harvard Int’l
2114 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, su
2115 Treaty of Versailles, supra note (
 391
cause it, even if the representative act without authority. For example, the United State
Mexican Mixed Claims Commission provides that: 
 
Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or comm
environmental] destruction or looting a ay
s-
itting wanton [or 
lw s act in disobedience 
 
pons, 
man health and the environment, the State’s failure to prevent that behavior 
can result in
On t tal damage 
caused by p d by 
persons ope
A S d damage in 
another State when the other State’s actions itself triggered the damaging conduct. For 
instanc
e 
 
usal link between 
the invasion and the loss is not sufficiently direct.”  
roof of causation is often particularly difficult in environmental cases,2120 since 
the environmental effects of military activities may be difficult to trace, particularly when 
more than one international actor is involved. For example, the oil discharge from sunken 
ot 
 
to some rules laid down by superior authority. There could be no 
liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken that 
any acts committed by soldiers in contravention of instructions 
must always be considered as personal acts.2116 
  
States can be held responsible, in such cases, for failing to prevent such harm.2117
If military personnel use available arms, such as nuclear, biological or chemical wea
to harm hu
 the State’s liability.  
he other hand, a State will not be held responsible for environmen
ersons who do not represent the State, e.g., when damage is cause
rating without authority in a State’s territory.2118  
tate or an international organization will not be held to have cause
e, in the Gulf War II, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) 
declared that “[t]he two essential elements of admissible losses are (a) that such losses 
must be the result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait and (b) that th
causal link must be direct. Since the U.N. trade embargo was imposed in response to
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, losses suffered solely as a result of that 
embargo are not considered eligible for compensation because the ca
2119
P
warships from World War II in the marine environment of the Solomon Islands cann
                                                         
ds 
) at 106. 
No. 15 of the Governing Council of the UNCC, UNCC Dec. 18, 1992, No. 15, para. 3. 
2116 The United States-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission, available at 4 Reps. Int’l Arb. Awar
110, 116 (1926). 
2117 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 401. 
2118 Suarez, supra note (121
2119 Decision  
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yet be linked to ships of any particular country.2121 Modern technology and science can 
be very 
 
 
reover, 
many en
 of 
g 
e 
r 
ed 
ers 
                                                                                                                                                                            
useful in identifying the multiple sources of the environmental effects. For 
example,  
in the case of the pollution of the Rhine by chloride the District 
Court of Rotterdam has clearly stated that the author of 37,5 per 
cent of the pollution, the French Potassium Mines sited in the
proximity of Mulhouse, was liable for the damage caused in the 
Netherlands, but asked for expertise as far as the amount of the 
damage was concerned. At the end the two parties agreed on the 
payment of a lump sum.2122 
 
 
Another difficulty in the proof of causation results from the fact that activities
occurring in one place may have harmful effects in another far away place.2123 Mo
vironmental effects do not appear immediately after the alleged act, and may 
take years or decades to appear. For instance, over fifty years after the cease-fire of 
World War II, environmental problems started to appear in the marine environment
Solomon Islands, as a result of the sunken warships’ oil leakage.2124 
 
 
 
c. Damage 
International persons can be held responsible for damages caused to another 
belligerent or a neutral State resulting from its wrongful acts. Damage may result durin
peacetime military operations or during armed conflict. One example of peacetim
damage is the destruction caused by the United States Navy in Vieques.2125 Anothe
example was on October 4, 2001, when a Ukrainian missile was mistakenly launch
during military exercises and killed all the seventy-eight passengers and crew-memb
on board civilian airliner. The airplane crashed into the Black Sea en route from Tel 
 
2120 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 398 & 408. 
2121 Cervi, supra note (347) at 359. 
l De L’Environment 77-80 (1989), cited in Alexander Kiss, 
e, in International 
 Francioni & Tullio 
2122 Kiss, Droit Internationa
Present Limits to the Enforcement of State Responsibility for Environmental Damag
2 (FreancescoResponsibility for Environmental Harm 6 fn. 
Scovazzi eds., 1991). 
2123 Id., at 5. 
vi, supra note (347) at 352. 2124 Cer
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Aviv, Israel, to Siberia.2126 Another example of peacetime damage was the death of five 
U.S. citizens and one New Zealander who were observing an U.S.-Kuwaiti military 
maneuv
rces of 
s can 
apply to harming other belligerent States. For 
example, during the Gulf War II, it appears that Iraq caused extraterritorial 
environme 2129 
An y responsible 
for damage d on the fact 
that the env re 
generation d as a 
violation o en acts 
committed ld be held 
responsible  exploitation of 
Iraqi natura s during the 
attack agai
n nvolves the damage caused to the environment of areas that 
do not nity, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
er on March 12, 2001, and were accidentally targeted by an U.S. jet.2127  
Most military-related environmental damage results from armed conflicts. For 
instance, during the Gulf War II, Iraq was responsible for exploiting the resou
Kuwait and the Gulf States and inflicted serious, if not irreversible environmental 
damage.2128 Since environmental effects can cross borders, military activitie
damage the environment of a neutral State, and can trigger the same rules of 
international responsibility as would 
ntal damage, and harmed the environment of neutral nations.
 important question is whether a State can be held internationall
 caused by its own armed forces to its own environment. Base
ironment is not only owned by the present generation, but also futu
s as well, a State should be held responsible for all acts interprete
f international law rules and which damage the environment, ev
 against its own environment. Thus, the Iraqi government shou
 for acts committed against its own environment, such as the
l resources, and harming the environment with chemical weapon
nst the Kurds of Northern Iraq.  
other question iA
belong to any State, and which may qualify as the common heritage of huma
“res communis,”2130 such as damage caused to the high seas, outer space, or 
Antarctica.2131 Here, no State can represent all those who may be affected by such acts. 
However, that does not mean that acts committed in these areas will escape 
international responsibility. In such cases, Article 145 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea provides that  
 
2125 See d to Vieques. 
rop Bomb supra 
  Part One of this thesis for environmental damage cause
2126 Missile Crash Airline Seek Damage, supra note (276). 
2127 U.S. Jet D , note (277). 
2128 Ross, Environmental Warfare, supra note (1072) art. 528. 
2129 Id. 
2130 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 419. 
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 l 
trol 
cal 
arine environment, particular attention being 
paid to the need for protection from harmful effects of such 
h 
e 
e general rules of 
interna
d 
a State or by an international organization; either can be held responsible.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
[n]ecessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area2132 to ensure 
effective protection for the marine environment from harmfu
effects which may arise from such activities. To this end the 
Authority shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations and 
procedures for inter alia: (a) the prevention, reduction and con
of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, 
including the coastline, and of interference with the ecologi
balance of the m
activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, 
construction and operation or maintenance of installations, 
pipelines and other devices related to such activities; (b) the 
protection and conservation of the natural resources of the Area 
and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine 
environment.  
 
Article 145 created a legal basis to impose responsibility on all States wit
regard to these areas. Any environmental damage caused to these areas as a result of th
violation of the contractual obligations will constitute, according to th
tional law, a legal basis for all other contracted States to raise the responsibility 
of the concerned State.2133 This right to action is confirmed in Article 139 of the Unite
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that 
 
States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities 
in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or State 
enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the 
nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them 
or their nationals, shall be carried out in conformity with this 
Part. The same responsibility applies to international 
organizations for activities in the Area carried out by such 
organizations. 
 
It is notable that Article 139 does not distinguish between damage committed by 
 
 the Sea, Area means “sea-bed and ocean floor 
eof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra 
2131 Id., 
2132 According to Article 1 of the Convention of the Law of
and subsoil ther
note (1019) art. 1(1)(1). 
2133 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 419. 
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Based on the right of any contracting party to defend the marine environment, 
both Australia and New Zealand filed a suit against France for nuclear tests committed 
under the sea in the Pacific.2134 They claimed that France’s tests violated, not only their 
rights, mmunity, by causing 
radioac y to be 
 the claimant States defended the interests of all nations, they 
could not claim damage for themselves unless they had suffered damage themselves. 
Nevertheless, they did draw intern  committed against 
common interests, and to protest against France’s non-compliance with international 
law rules.2 ion, some 
internation  represent 
the interna tal harm.  
In 1 es seeking to 
limit the am at can be imposed on the United Nations, in order to 
avoid any future unlimited financial claims of damage.2138 Nevertheless, this limitation 
does n of 
1) Stopping the Violation 
 but the rights of all members of the international co
tive fall-out and thus violating the rights of the international communit
protected against radioactive contamination of the environment.2135   
In this case, where
ational attention to the harm
136 Nevertheless, in order to provide a greater environmental protect
al persons, such as the U.N. Security Council, may have the right to
tional community2137 even without requiring a direct environmen
998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of rul
ount of liability th
ot give the United Nations’ armed forces unlimited freedom to cause any kind 
damage. Therefore, gross negligence and misconduct are excluded from such limits, and 
the United Nations will bear liability for compensation in full in these cases.2139  
 
d. International Responsibility’s Consequences 
If a State’s international responsibility is proven, one or more of four 
consequences can be resulted: (1) stopping the violation, (2) satisfaction, (3) restitution 
or (4) compensation.2140  
 
                                                          
2134 Nuclear Tests Case, Preliminary Objection, (Aust. & N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99, 102, 135, 139. 
2135 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 422. 
ter, supra note (71) art. 24 (1). 
6/96repfra.htm>, 
085) arts. 41-46. 
2136 Id., at 419. 
2137 U.N. Char
2138 Third Party Liability: Temporal and Financial Limitations, G.A. Res. 52/247 (June 22, 1998). 
2139 Shraga, supra note (2063) at 410. 
2140 U.N. Doc. A/51/10/Corr. 1 (1996), available at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/199
(last visit Nov. 12, 2001), supra note (2
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 A State whose conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act 
having a continuing character is under the obligation to cease that 
conduct, without prejudice to the responsibility it has already 
incurred.2141 The injured State is entitled, where appropriate, to 
obtain from the State which has committed an internationally 
wrongful act assurances or guarantees of non-repetition of the 
wrongful act.2142  
 
One response to a violation o vironmental rules is to stop the 
violatio f the enemy, 
is approach is useless in most environmental disasters that 
result from armed conflicts, because when harmful techniques are used on the 
environmen ple, the 
atomic bom ons against 
the Norther uch acts is useless 
since they w peated, and have already produced their environmental effects. 
However, it is still a positive sign when a nation agrees to stop causing unlawful damage 
to the envir pan, in 
1945, the U  nation in 
the future. O ertake not to use 
any more ch d thereby help to 
protect the e
 
2) Satisfaction 
 
f international en
n. For example, if belligerents are spilling oil into the water bodies o
such as the Iraqi military did in 1991 in the Gulf, they can be required to stop such act 
immediately. However, th
t, they are typically used only once rather than repeated. For exam
bs were used against Japan once,2143 and Iraq used chemical weap
2144n Iraqi Kurds once.  Thus, requiring the cessation of s
ill not be re
onment. For example, after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Ja
nited States undertook not to use these weapons against any other
ther nations could act similarly; for instance, Iraq could und
emical weapons, against the Kurds or any other nation, an
nvironment. 
Satisfaction for all international environmental violation entails an 
acknowledgment of the violation and some action to offset the damage. As provided in 
the ILC Report of 1996, 
                                                          
2141 Id., art. 41. 
2142 Id., art. 43. 
2143 See, Itsuzo Shigematsu & Suminori Akiba, Sampling of Atomic Bomb Survivors And Method of Cancer 
Detection in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in Cancer in Atomic Bomb Survivors 1 (Itsuzo 
Shigematsu & Abraham Kagen eds., 1986); Woodcock, supra note (161) at 69. 
2144 Uekert, supra note (656) at 71. 
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 1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act satisfaction for the 
damage, in particular moral damage, caused by that act, if and to 
the extent necessary to provide full reparation.  
2. Satisfaction may take the form of one or more of the 
following:  
a. an apology;  
b. nominal damages;  
c. in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State, 
damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement;  
d. in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the 
serious misconduct of officials or from criminal conduct of 
officials or private parties, disciplinary action against, or 
punishment of, those responsible.  
3. The right of the injured State to obtain satisfaction does not 
 
y taken the form of an apology, 
the rep
tion or 
panese government apologized 
for dam
mer 
Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, apologized for the same reason, to the former 
justify demands which would impair the dignity of the State 
which has committed the internationally wrongful act.2145  
 
 
Satisfaction is an act undertaken by a State that violated the international rules, to
satisfy another State that was affected by such violation. The nature of the satisfaction 
varies with the nature of the violation. Satisfaction ma
lacement of diplomatic or consular personnel, or an increase in the level of 
diplomatic relations. 
Any of these actions may amount to satisfaction of an environmental viola
other violation of international law. For example, the Ja
age caused during World War II, during diplomatic dealings with specific 
countries, and during the U.N. human rights sessions in Geneva.2146 The for
Japanese Prime Minister, Morihiro Hoskawa, presented his country’s apology, during 
talks with Korean President Kim Young-Sam.2147 Similarly, another former Japanese 
President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, in 1993.2148 A more recent example occurred 
in 2001, when an American air plane violated the air space of China, Beijing refused to 
                                                          
2145 The 1996 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note (2085) art. 45. 
2146 Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan’s World War-Rape Victims, 17 Hastings
Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 497, 535 (1994) [hereinafter Parker & Chew]. 
2147
 
e in  See, S. Koreans Say Japanese Apology Falls Short, Reuter Library Report, Nov. 7, 1993, availabl
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lbyrpt File. 
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hand over the crew or the air plane unless the United States apologized for its viola
of China’s air space.
tion 
te the 
ations will 
be affe
should 
an 
 
r the 
ride of the nation.  
A blatant example of such harm occurred in November 1993, when the Bosnian 
Croats destroyed the four-century-old e in Mostar, in former 
Yugosla  on the UNESCO list of protected 
sites, it linked Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was a symbolic because both the Muslims 
and the Orth by 
destroying i n. With 
that kind of
compensati d the nation’s pride and dignity. 
As m at are not 
prohibited i o 
apologize b ple, in 
2001, when  allowing an 
espionage p  because 
it believed t r, the U.S. 
                         
2149  
Nevertheless, in environmental matters, satisfaction does not rehabilita
environmental effects caused by wrongful military actions. Since future gener
cted by environmental damage, the present generation has no right to accept 
apology for the sake of future generations. That view does not mean that nations 
retaliate for environmental violations, but it does mean that environmental damage c
be ameliorated only by restitution and compensation. 
On the other hand, some environmental harms involve both dignitary or symbolic
harm and ecological harm. One example could be the destruction of historic sites, o
destruction of a holy shrine or a national monument. Here, the damage is not just 
ecological, but also damage to the p
 Neretva Bridg
via.2150 Although the bridge did not appear
odox population used it and cooperate in maintaining it.2151 Thus, 
t, the Serbs also symbolically attacked that tradition of cooperatio
 environmental harm, an apology in addition to restoration and/or 
on is preferable in order to rebuil
entioned earlier, liability may be imposed as a result of acts th
n international law. In such cases, the defendant State may refuse t
ecause it behaved in accordance with international law. For exam
 China claimed that the United States violated its sovereignty, by
lane to fly over its air space, the United States refused to apologize
hat its airplane was flying in international airspace. Howeve
                                                                                                                                                    
2148 Parke
2149
<
10, 2001) [hereinafter Jiang Demand U.S. Apology]. 
2150 Peter Maass, Cultural Property and Historical Monuments, in Crimes of War “What the 
9) [hereinafter Bassiouni & Nafziger]. 
r & Chew, supra note (2146) at 535. 
 Cnn.com, Jiang Demands U.S. Apology for Plane Collision, April 4, 2001, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/04/china.aircollision.08/index.html>, (last visit Sept. 
Public Should Know,” 111 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999) [hereinafter Maass].  
2151 M. Cherif Bassiouni & James A.R. Nafziger, Protection of Cultural Property, in International 
Criminal Law 961 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, 199
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administration presented its apology to China when it appeared that the U.S. airplane 
violated the Chinese airspace.2152  
 
3) Restitution 
Article 43 of the ILC Report provides that 
 
The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act restitution in kind, that 
is, the re-establishment of the situation which existed before the 
wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that 
restitution in kind:  
a. is not materially impossible;  
b. would not involve a breach of an obligation arising from a 
peremptory norm of general international law;  
c. would not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit 
which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in 
kind instead of compensation; or  
d. would not seriously jeopardize the political independence or 
economic stability of the State which has committed the 
internationally wrongful act, whereas the injured State would not 
be similarly affected if it did not obtain restitution in kind.  
 
Restitution is not always an available choice. When restitution is possible it 
could be very expensive. For example, a survey of the looting and destruction in Kuwai
City estimated the repair costs at over US $ 100 billion.
t 
e 
In a non-environmental case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) highlighted 
s as to the availability of restitution in international law.2154 
2153 Restitution is considered th
best way to rehabilitate the environment, so that the environmental status can be 
returned to its condition before the harmful activities. However, in some cases of 
environmental damage, such as the extinction of fauna or flora species, or the 
destruction of a historical site or a cultural monument, where damage is irreparable, 
restitution is not feasible solution.  
the fundamental uncertaintie
In Paraguay v. USA, Paraguay argued that the U.S. violated its obligations under the 
na Convention on Consular Relations, in not informing Breard, a Paraguayan 1963 Vien
                                                          
2152 Jiang Demands U.S. Apology, supra note (2149). 
2153 Curtis, supra note (1949) at 7. 
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nationa ss 
ay 
n 
ourt could consider the merits of the 
case, P 57 
 
egal 
 
.2160 
e availability of restitution as a remedy should be 
given p
; and the fact that, unlike 
Breard ed 
l convicted of murder in the U.S. and due to be executed, of his rights of acce
to the Paraguayan Consul and in not notifying the consulate of his detention. Paragu
sought restitution for being prevented from exercising its consular rights and ensuring 
the protection of its interests and those of its nationals.2155 Paraguay also submitted a
urgent request for immediate measures to prevent the execution, in order to protect the 
life of Breard and the ability of the ICJ to order restitution to Paraguay.2156 Paraguay 
argued that if the U.S. executed Breard before the C
araguay would be deprived of the opportunity to restore the status quo ante.21
The U.S. admitted the breach of Vienna Convention, but argued that an apology was a
sufficient response.2158 The U.S. also claimed that the invalidation of the proceedings 
and a return to the status quo ante as penalties for the failure to notify was without l
support and was unworkable.2159 The U.S. argued that restitution could not be ordered 
by the Court. The ICJ left open the question of the availability of restitution, and found
that the dispute as to whether restitution was available under the Vienna Convention 
could be determined only as part of a ruling on the merits of Paraguay’s claim
In environmental cases, th
articular attention for several reasons: the environment is not owned by the 
present generation only, but by future generations also; the risk that environmental harm 
might traverse State borders and harm neighboring nations
, the environment cannot defend itself. This point of view was implicitly adopt
by the U.S. in Paraguay v. U.S., when it accepted that “whether restitution is necessa
or appropriate may depend on the rule broken.”
ry 
nces 
             
2161 
Restitution in an environmental disaster requires clean up and rehabilitation 
efforts. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in the Chorzow Factory 
case, provided that “[r]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conseque
                                                                                                                                                                
2154 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), Apr. 9, 1
Provisional Measures, at 1-16, 37 I.L.M. 810 (1998) [hereinafter 
989, 
Paraguay v. U.S.]. 
2155 Id., at 4. 
2156 Id., at 8. 
iginal status before the occurrence of the violation. 2157 The status ante quo means the or
2158 Paraguay v. U.S., supra note (2154) at Declaration of President Schwebel . 
. 
2159 Id., at 18. 
2160 See, Christine Gray, The Choice between Restitution and Compensation, 10 European J. Int’l L
413, 413-414 (1998) [hereinafter Gray]; Id., at 31. 
2161 Gray, supra note (2160) at 417. 
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of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.”2162 Wiping out all the consequences of
illegal act against the environ
 an 
ment requires cleanup and rehabilitation. Rehabilitation 
withou
s 
CC, which 
provide a) 
t 
n 
occurs,
ulf States 
y to 
der 
nd 
                                                          
t cleanup may threaten the environment more than help it, since rehabilitation by 
normal construction work on an affected area can actually create additional 
unacceptable health hazards.2163 
The cleanup process requires both funds and expertise. Funds can be provided a
a result of the compensation process; in addition, wealthy States may be able to provide 
funds to clean up environmental disasters in poor States.  
Cleanup costs were considered by the Criteria of Claims of the UN
d that environmental damage includes losses or expenses resulting from “(
[a]batement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly 
relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil and coastal and international 
waters; and (b) [r]easonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environmen
or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and 
restore the environment […].”2164 Obtaining the necessary funds may be a lengthy 
process, especially when the liable State tries to avoid, escape, or minimize due 
compensation, such as Iraq has done with regard to Kuwait. When that kind of situatio
 other nations can perform a valuable service by providing funds quickly to 
promote the cleanup process. 
In the case of the Gulf War II, one of the major problems was that the G
ignored the priority of environmental cleanup, and concentrated instead on the 
economy.2165 The Gulf States, most of which are wealthy, did not provide the mone
fund the expensive environmental cleanup,2166 hoping instead that Iraq would shoul
that responsibility. Moreover, the United States, which led the coalition against Iraq a
2162 Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 29, 47. 
2163 Curtis, supra note (1949) at 7. 
2164 Decision of the Gove rdrning Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, 3  Sees., 18 
riteria for Additional Categories of Claims, 
ereinafter Criteria for Claims].  
supra note (1072) art. 583. 
mtg., Nov. 28, 1991, Revised at the 24th mtg., Mar. 16, 1992: C
U.N. Doc. S/23765 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1045, 1046 [h
2165 Ross, Environmental Warfare, 
2166 Parrish, Gulf’s Postwar Cleanup Never Took Off, L. A. Times, Jan. 12, 1992, at D10, col. 4 
[hereinafter Parrish]. 
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participated in destroying the environment of the region, did not contribute any kind
assistance to the cleanup process, whether monetary or by equipment.
 of 
States and the United 
Kingdo
, and 
eanup needed.  
nd to 
e Gulf 
War II 
 
military hostilities were anticipated, the environmental disaster was not; thus, the 
                                
2167 
Another major obstacle to environmental restoration is the availability of 
expertise, since cleanup requires a sophisticated level of environmental talent that is 
available only in some developed countries, such as the United 
m, and some specialized international organizations, such as UNEP and IUCN. 
For instance, after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait in 1991, UNEP created a task 
force, which included experts from UNEP, the World Health Organization (WHO)
various regional governments, to conduct a detailed 90-day study of the environmental 
destruction,2168 in order to determine the level of the environmental cl
The shortage of both money and highly trained specialists would necessarily 
affect the cleanup process.2169  To avoid such shortages, an international fund could be 
created to promote, along with the cooperation of the specialized international 
organizations, a source of money and expertise. States could participate in the fu
preserve the environment. One model for such a plan is the European Community 
Commission’s formation of a $20 million plan to combat oil well fires and protect 
wildlife on April 10, 1991.2170 $12 million of the money was directed to support fire-
fighting operations.2171 This plan includes the creation of a model sanctuary, which 
involves cleaning a heavily polluted zone, then creating a buffer zone around it.2172  
Another fund to support the environmental cleanup in the aftermath of th
was created by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and received 
pledges totaling $5 million from three undisclosed nations.2173 
Other problems can arise in the cleanup of damaged sites. For example, Kuwait 
faced difficulties in cleaning up the unexpected burning of its oil wells by Iraq. Although
                          
nmental Warfare, supra note (1072) art. 583. 
n Plan to Help Fight Pollution in Persian Gulf, 14 Int’l 
 Rep. 222 (1991). 
at 223. 
2167 Ross, Enviro
2168 The Spoils of War, 28 U.N. Chron. 17 (June, 1991). 
2169 Curtis, supra note (1949) at 6. 
2170 See, Commission Announce $20 Millio
Envt’l
2171 Id., 
2172 Id., at 223. 
2173 International Maritime Organization Launches Gulf Oil Pollution Disaster Fund, 14 Int’l Envt’l 
Rep. 127 (1991) [hereinafter IMO Gulf Oil Disaster Fund]. 
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2174 Moreover, the lack of transportation and facilities in Kuw
was another serious problem that delayed the cleanup operations.
ait 
rmed 
ntentionally or unintentionally, in the cleanup process. 
Intentio  
176 For 
, 
efforts 
ple, 
ot be 
 
ed 
by the U
o normal, the damaged environment should be 
d include the restoration of human health 
by medically treating affected perso iseases that result from 
 requirement, the Criteria for Claims of 
the UNCC provides that environmental damage includes losses or expenses resulting 
from “(b) R  or future 
measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to […] restore the 
2175  
As military forces are the major pollutants of the environment during a
conflicts, they also participate, i
nally, they assist civil authorities in fulfilling their tasks to protect the
environment. Unintentionally, armed forces may clear certain areas of harmful 
substances, such as landmines, because they have to pass through these areas.2
example, during the Gulf War II, coalition troops cleared landmines on their way into 
Kuwait. Later on, in order to rebuild Kuwait without any fear of unexploded landmines
the country was classified into eight geographical areas. Each area was assigned to a 
foreign military team, in addition to a Kuwaiti team, to clear landmines.2177 The 
of clearing these areas can only be interpreted as an environmental cleanup.2178 
However, cleaning military debris may present practical problems. For exam
the sunken ships that threaten the marine environment in the Solomon Islands cann
cleaned up for two reasons: (1) liability is divided between the United States and Japan;
and (2) the United States claims ownership of the sunken warships, which are protect
.S. historic preservation laws.2179 The United States’ attitude in this case is 
environmentally unfriendly, because it has delayed any action to restore the site.  
Cleanup is not the only means of restitution. The rehabilitation of the 
environment is also required.   
In order to get back t
rehabilitated. The rehabilitation process shoul
ns, and fight the d
environmental disasters. In compliance with this
easonable measures already taken to […] restore the environment
                                                          
2174 Curtis, supra note (1949) at 7. 
2175 Id. 
2176 Id. 
2177 KCSR, Landmines, supra note (540) at 25-26. 
2178 This effort alition by giving  was helped by the way the Kuwaitis rewarded their supporters in the Co
them clearance contracts in proportion of their efforts. See, Curtis, supra note (1949) at 7. 
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environme l damage 
for the pur nment 
[...].”2180 S aterial 
Production ed millions 
of dollars, placed in a trust fund to cover the costs of related medical problems.2181  
rsist 
 
s to 
, lost wages, 
nt; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmenta
pose of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the enviro
imilarly, in the U.S., residents of areas surrounding the Feeds M
 Center (FMPC) in Fernald, Ohio, have been collectively award
Nevertheless, despite the cleanup process, environmental damage often pe
for a long time. For example, the effects of the Kuwaiti oil fire during the Iraqi invasion
could take centuries to rehabilitate.2182 It has also been predicted that in Saudi Arabia 
the pollution will last for years.2183 And the marine life in the Gulf will take decade
recover from pollution.2184  
 
4) Compensation 
Article 44 of the 1996 ILC Report provides that 
 
1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act compensation for the 
damage caused by that act, if and to the extent that the damage is 
not made good by restitution in kind.  
2. For the purposes of the present article, compensation covers 
any economically assessable damage sustained by the injured 
State, and may include interest and, where appropriate, loss of 
profits.  
 
In general, “[s]ecuring compensation for an injured party is an undisputed 
objective of liability principles. Indeed, compensation defines the essence of the classic 
tort case, in which the injured party sues the allegedly responsible party for monetary 
damage to recover direct expenses or losses such as medical expenses
                                                                                                                                                                             
& Gerrard]. 
2184 Parmelee, Environmentalists Survey the Blackened Wasteland That was Kuwait, The Wash. Post, 
2179 Cervi, supra note (347) at 358. 
2180 Criteria for Claims, supra note (2164). 
2181 Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 111. 
2182 McIlroy, Oil is Everywhere in Kuwait, The Montreal Gazette, Dec. 7, 1991, at K6. 
2183 Stephan L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The Gulf War, July N.Y. L. J. 1, 13 (1991) [hereinafter Kass 
Dec. 20, 1991, at A4, col. 1. 
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diminished property values, or non-monetary reparation such as oil spill cleanup or a 
revegetation areas.”2185 
Whenever there is environmental damage, because nature is a living thing, 
restoration should always come before compensation. Payment of compensation does not 
elimina
, 
i environmental requests 
present
 activities. Another example of peacetime military activities that is 
subject or over six 
over Canada’s territory.2186  
Some scholars distinguish between the violation of international obligations that 
ose that afford indirect protection to the environment in 
2187
 
         
te the harm to the environment, just as paying compensation for the death of a 
human being does not restore that person to life. However, compensatory payment can
for example, fund the planting of trees in a damaged forest; and international law does 
provide for compensation as a remedy. If a State is held responsible according to the 
international rules, it is obliged to pay compensation for environmental damage caused 
by its agents or representatives. But compensation is always secondary to restoration.  
Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV provides that “[a] belligerent party which 
violates the provisions of the said regulations shall […] be liable to pay compensation.” 
Similarly, Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides 
that “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.”  
Compensation can be required regardless of whether the environmental effect 
occurred in times of armed conflict or in peacetime. The Kuwait
ed to the UNCC against Iraq as a sort of compensation for environmental damage 
occurred during times of armed conflict. However, the compensation requested by the 
Sibir Airlines for damages resulting from the October 4, 2001, accidental missile attack 
during an Ukrainian military exercise is an example of compensation for damage during 
peacetime military
 to compensation is the Canadian request of the former Soviet Union f
million dollars for damage from the Cosmos 954 Soviet nuclear power satellite that fell 
afford direct protection and th
tim y the direct ones are compensable.  This 
argument, however, would eliminate the possibility of compensation for much of the
                                                 
es of armed conflicts, and argue that onl
t 449. 
2185 Gaines, supra note (2113) at 324 fn. 65. 
2186 Cervi, supra note (347) at 393. 
2187 Low & Hodgkinson, supra note (1857) a
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environmental destruction that accompanies war. There is no way to separate the dir
and indirect environmental effects of armed conflict. According to Arbitrator Parker, the 
distinction between direct and indirect damages is “frequently illusory and fanciful an
should have no place in international law.”
ect 
d 
there 
ly 
y 
is 
n.2191 This practice can be accepted in non-
environ on. 
ion 
e 
e 
ents such as endangered species and unique 
monum t be 
e 
                                                          
2188 Moreover, in environmental matters 
should be always someone responsible for the environmental damages, whether direct
or indirectly, and even when multiple parties are involved. For example, some scholars 
believe Iraq should not be held liable for the environmental destruction committed by the 
Iraqi troops during the Gulf War II,2189 under the pretext that the Persian Gulf is alread
subjected to substantial pollution from peacetime activities.2190  
The U.S. has asserted that compensation is more practical than restitution, and 
therefore preferable as a means of reparatio
mental cases; however, the best and most just environmental relief is restituti
But if such restitution is impossible, then, in environmental damage cases, compensat
can be accepted.  
Some scholars have argued that, whenever damage is irreparable, no 
compensation should be required, “since nothing can reasonably be done to reinstate th
affected area.”2192 This point of view is illogical and completely incompatible with 
established rules and principles of law. Waiving compensation only because the damag
caused is irreparable is a kind of reward for the perpetrators. It would also encourage 
military forces to avoid paying compensation, to cause only irreparable damage by 
targeting irreparable environmental elem
ents. According to the rules of law, acts causing irreparable damage should no
forgiven. Instead, they should be subject to extraordinary compensation, equivalent to th
extraordinary value of the damaged elements. Such compensation would be useful to 
fund projects seeking the replacement of the irreparable elements, commercially or 
 War 1990-91 in International and English Law 276 
gkinson, supra note (1857) at 451. 
2188 War Risk Insurance Premium Claims, (Nov. 1, 1923), 7 UNRIAA 44, 62, quoted in Lady Hazel M. 
Fox, QC, Reparations and State Responsibility: Claims Against Iraq Arising out of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Kuwait, in The Gulf
(Peter Rowe ed., 1993).  
2189 Low & Hod
2190 William M. Arkin et Al., supra note (465) at 18. 
2191 Paraguay v. U.S., 37 I.L.M. (1998) 468. 
2192 David Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused by Marine 
Oil Sills: The Effect of Two New International Protocols, 5 J. Envt’l L. 71, 88 (1993) [hereinafter 
Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries]. 
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scientifically, and to fund efforts to protect similar environmental elements, to assure 
their safety in other portions of the world.  
Compensation has been required under international law in many situations 
involving irreparable harm. For example, Germany paid billions of dollars in direct 
compensation to its World War II victims.2193 As a direct result of the Luxembourg 
Treaty, signed in 1952 between West Germany and Israel, the latter still receives 
compensation for the victimizing of Jewish people by the Third Reich.2194 Similarly, 
Iran rec
 
onsible for 
damage that occurs in another nation’s environment. A legal basis for this liability can 
be found in e State is 
adversely a y damage 
caused ther ps to ensure that 
                                        
eived compensation from the United States for the damage caused, when the 
U.S.S. Vincente shot down a civil airliner in 1988.2195 The United States also paid $2
million to Japan in ex gratia compensation for disruption of its fishing industry, and 
$950,000 to the Marshall Islands, for damages resulting from nuclear tests of 1954 on 
Eniwetok Atoll and Bikini Island.2196  
Belligerent States have often compensated neutral States as well for damage 
caused by their armed forces. The United States received compensation from Israel for 
damage caused to the USS Liberty in 1967, and from Iraq for the damage caused to 
USS Stark in 1987.2197 Non-belligerent States may also be affected by environmental 
pollution from armed conflict. Here, the source State should be held resp
 Trail Smelter case, which affirms that if the environment of on
ffected by activities of another, the former will be liable for an
eby and will be required to pay compensation and to take ste
                  
2193 Parker & Chew, supra note (2146) at 528. 
2194 Id., at 529. 
 […] 
 
e 
mine whether was a legitimate military target. 
 
or the loss of life, personal injuries and material damage.” U.S. Note to Iraq on 
; 
sponsibility, supra note (2056) at 403. 
2195 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 403. 
2196 Cervi, supra note (347) at 389-90. 
2197 According to the U.S. Note to Iraq on Liability “The U.S.S. Stark was attacked by an Iraqi aircraft
while [it] was engaged in peaceful activities in international waters. At the time of the attack, the U.S.S. 
Stark was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white numeral on its
hull. The U.S.S. Stark twice notified the Iraqi aircraft that it was approaching U.S. warship. Th
Government of Iraq [wa]s aware that U.S. vessels navigate in the area. In the circumstances, Iraqi 
personnel knew or should have known that the U.S.S. Stark was an American vessel. Moreover, they 
should have taken the steps necessary to identify it and deter
The attack by the Iraqi aircraft resulted in a tragic and needless loss of life, personnel injury, and property
damage.” The Iraqi Government admitted its international responsibility and its result to offer 
“[c]ompensation […] f
Liability and Iraqi Note to U.S. on Compensation, May 20, 1987, XXVI I.L.M. 1427, 1427, 1428 (1987)
Greenwood, State Re
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the cause o er damage 
in the f r
osed 
t the 
age 
d] that 
r 
utions, apparently, include compensation for environmental damage. In 1990, 
the Se
ations, for restitution or 
nancial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements 
...] 
  
Som rity 
Council’s ri nvasion of 
Kuwait, on udicial 
functio  Th ity ouncil exceeded its 
mandat t[ing] of independent judges competent to 
rule on compensation for those entitled to it in any conflict.”2200 Similarly, Cuba 
ight 
f such damage is dealt with so as to remove the possibility of furth
e.2198 utu
The United Nations Security Council, using different terms, has also imp
liability in the form of compensation. For instance, the Security Council Resolution 
387/1976 of March 31, 1976, “call[ed] upon the government of South Africa to mee
just claims of the People’s Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the dam
and destruction inflicted on its State.”2199 Much stronger language was used by the 
Security Council Resolution 290/1970 of December 8, 1970, which “[d]emand[e
full compensation by the Government of Portugal be paid to the Republic of Guinea fo
the extensive damage to life and property caused by the armed attack and invasion.” 
Both resol
curity Council Resolution 674/1990 used similar language when  
 
[reminded] Iraq that under international law it is liable for any 
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third 
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the 
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq; [invited] 
States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and 
those of their nationals and corpor
fi
as may be established in accordance with international law[
e member States, such as Iraq and Cuba, argued against the Secu
ght to impose on Iraq responsibility for damage caused during its i
the grounds that it is a political body and imposing liability is a j
e Iraqi representative argued that “the [Secur ] Cn.
e […] it is not a judicial body consis
contested the Security Council’s right to make decisions as to liability as a court m
                                                          
2198 Trail Smeleter Case, supra note (2088) at 1940; Jullian Barron, Note, After Chernobyl: Liability for 
Transnat’l L. 674, 661 (1987) Nuclear Accidents Under International Law, 25 Colum. J. 
[hereinafter Barron]. 
2199 Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946-1989) 173, at 4 (Karel C. 
Wellens ed., 1990). 
2200 U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. Speech given by Mr. Al-Anbari (Iraq) prior to the vote on 
Resolution 674, at 32, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2951 [hereinafter S.C. Res. 674/1990]. 
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do,2201 and argued that the ICJ is the judicial body competent to impose responsibility on 
States.2202 
The ed the 
question of The Security 
Council dem f the 1988 
bombing of o erbie,2204 typically a judicial matter. The 
former P
 
with legal procedures such as questions of extradition and 
proceedings in connection with prosecution of offenders and 
Wh ually raise to 
question co et 
troublesom tion. 
Therefore, o o der 
              
 examination by the Security Council of the Lockerbie disaster rais
separation of powers between the Security Council and the ICJ. 
anded that Libya hand over two of its nationals2203 accused o
an American Flight 103 over L ck P
resident of the ICJ, Justice Bedjaoui examined the interaction between the 
Security Council and the ICJ and stated that  
 
the difficulty […is that] the Security Council not only has 
decided to take a number of political measures against Libya, but 
has also demanded from it the extradition of two nationals. It is 
this specific demand of the Council that creates an overlap with 
respect to the substance of the legal dispute with which the Court 
must deal, in a legal manner, on the basis of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention and international law in general.2205  
 
Judge Ni voiced a similar concern:  
 
The Security Council, as a political organ, is more concerned 
with the elimination of international terrorism and the 
maintenance of international peace and security, while the [ICJ], 
as the principal judicial organ of the [U.N.], is more concerned
assessment of compensation [.]2206 
 
en member States accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, they us
ncerning the separation of powers. However, the issue can be qui
e when a dispute involves States that do not accept ICJ jurisdic
he Security Council should act to clarify the legal authority t rt
                                            
peech given by Mr. Alarcon de Quesada (Cuba) in relation to Resolution 674, at 58. 
2202 Id., Speech given by Mr. Alarcon de Quesada (Cuba) in relation to Resolution 674, at 58. 
2203 Johnston, Anti-Terror Weapon, supra note (931) at A12. 
2204 Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism, supra note (636) at 574. 
2205 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretatio
2201 Id., S
n 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. 
issenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, at 680, available at 31 I.L.M. 
tion of Montreal Convention
U.S.), 1992  I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 41, 1992) D
662 (1992) [hereinafter Questions Arising from the Applica ]. 
2206 Id., Declaration of Judge Ni at 675. 
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compensation, request extradition, or take other judicial actios. One basis for such 
action, particularly in environmental cases might be the 1972 Stockholm Declaratio
Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that “States s
n. 
hall co-operate to 
develo
e 
 
 
This unprecedented Resolution imposed responsibility for environmental damages 
on Iraq for warfare damage caused in Kuwait, including environmental damage. It was 
hat environmental damage caused by 
y 
2212
cess 
p further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within th
jurisdiction and control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”2207 
In at least one instance, the Security Council used very strong language in 
imposing responsibility for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources, 
and held Iraq responsible for such damages. There, the Security Council: 
 
[r]eaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and 
obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be 
addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under 
international law for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or 
injury to foreign governments, national and corporations, as a 
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.2208 
the first time that international law recognized t
armed conflict is compensable.2209 The Security Council “reaffirm[ed] that Iraq must pa
for environmental damage and the loss of natural resources caused by its role in the 
Persian Gulf War,”2210 whether in Kuwait or other countries.2211  
The United Nations Security Council, under Article 29 of the Charter,  created 
the United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC). The UNCC functions as a 
subsidiary organ of the United Nations’ European headquarters in Geneva,2213 to pro
                                                          
2207 Stockholm Declaration, supra note (822) Principle 22. 
2208 S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559) para. 16. 
2209 Low & Hodgkinson, supra note (1857) at 406, 408. 
2210 S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559) para. 7. 
e Iraqi’s responsibility for the losses caused from its conducts in 
 
s.” U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 
2211 The Security Council established th
1990-1991 in its resolution 687/1991. 
2212 Article 29 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[t]he Security Council may establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its function
29. 
2213 S.C. Res. 692 (1991), supra note (562) para. 3. 
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claims,  
 pay 
minister the fund.2215  
To evaluate damages caused by the Iraqi invasion, the UNCC classified claims 
into three ca ims of 
corporation ents and 
other intern nmental 
claims.2217  because it 
consists of 0 billion.2220  
Com f direct 
ecological d  to the 
natural reso
ld nclude] losses or expenses 
 including the environmental claims, and pay compensation for losses resulting
from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.2214 The Security Council decided to create fund to
compensation for claims and to establish a Commission to ad
tegories: (1) claims of individuals, categories A through D, (2) cla
s and other private entities, category E, and (3) claims of governm
ational organizations, category F2216 which includes the enviro
The last category is expected to include the largest claims,2218
forty-two claims from twelve countries,2219 aggregating nearly $4
pensation for environmental damage should include the amount o
amage, cleanup costs, and the value of the depletion and damage
urces. According to the UNCC, in the Iraqi case, 
 
The] environmental damage [shou  i[
resulting from: (a) Abatement and prevention of environmental 
damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires 
and stemming the flow of oil and coastal and international 
waters;  (b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and 
restore the environment or future measures which can be 
documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the 
environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the 
environmental damage for the purpose of evaluating and abating 
the harm and restoring the environment; (d) Reasonable 
monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings 
for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health 
                                                          
2214 In paragraph 3 of the Security Council decision No.692/1991, the council “Decides to establish the 
Fund and Commission referred to in paragraph18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with Part I of the 
Secretary-General's report, and that the Governing Council will be located at the Offices of the United 
Nations at Geneva and that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the activities of the 
Commission should be carried out elsewhere”. 
2215 S.C. Res. 692 (1991), supra note (562). 
2216 Category “F” has four levels, the environmental claims are classified under “F4”. Available at 
<http://www.unog.ch
2217 The Governing C
/uncc/commiss.htm>, (last visit Oct. 10, 2000). 
ouncil has identifies six categories of claims, Category “A” claims, “B”, “C”, “D”, 
“E” and “F”. Id. 
2218 Briscoe, supra note (466) at 114.  
2219 The nations most affected by the Iraqi environmental devastation were Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and 
mant 
iscoe, supra note (466) at 130 fn. 27. 
Syria. These States have pending substantial claims for environmental damage and natural resources 
depletion before the UNCC. Briscoe, supra note (466) at 116. 
2220 Presentation of Dr. Mojtaba Kazazi of the UNCC Secretariat during regional meeting of clai
states, Kuwait City, May 18, 1998. Cited in Br
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risks as a result of the environmental damage; and (e) Depletion 
of or damage to natural resources.2221 
 
It makes sense that compensation for loss of properties be paid to the affected 
governments. However, payment for losses of the natural environment and depletion of 
natural resources should not be made to individual governments, without any 
international supervision as to whether compensation will be directed to the 
environmental rehabilitation process or not. Thus international control or even 
particip
rganization such as UNEP to have the authority to monitor such funds. 
As of S
 economy 
” 
ired with the 
UNCC extended the deadline for presenting such claims.2223  
24 the Secretary General 
ation in the environmental rehabilitation is very important, because the 
environment is not owned by the present generation only, but also future generations. In 
addition, the rehabilitation process necessarily affects neighboring States through the 
transboundary pollution. Therefore, it would be important for an international 
environmental o
eptember 2001, little had been done in the way of environmental rehabilitation 
and cleanup in Kuwait. Instead, the government is concentrating on building its
and restarting the exportation of oil rather than rehabilitating and cleaning up the 
environment.2222 
However, deadlines were established for the filing of the various categories of 
claims. The deadline of January 1st, 1995 was set for category “A”, “B”, “C” and “D
claims, and January 1st, 1996, for category “E” and “F” claims; and February 1, 1997, for 
the environmental claims, in category “F.” All of the deadlines have now exp
exception of claims of missing persons and claims for damage and losses resulting from 
landmine or ordnance explosions since they cannot be easily found or detected. The 
According to Security Council Resolution 687/1991,22
created a fund to pay the compensation to victims approved by the UNCC.2225 This fund 
                                                          
2221 Decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, 3rd Sees., 18 
General Report concerning the “Creation of the United Nations Compensation Fund and 
pensation Commission” according to the provisions of S.C. Res. 687/1991, U.N. 
991) May 2, 1991.  
mtg., Nov. 28, 1991, Revised at the 24th mtg., Mar. 16, 1992: Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, 
U.N. Doc. S/23765 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1045, 1046 [hereinafter Criteria for Claims]. 
2222 Parrish, supra note (2166) at D10, col. 4. 
2223 <http://www.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm> (last visit Oct. 10, 2000). 
2224 S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note (559) paras. 18 & 19. 
2225 U.N. Secretary 
the United Nations Com
Doc. S/22559 (1
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is financed by no more than thirty percent of Iraqi oil sale revenues.2226 To assure these 
revenues, the oil buyers must deal with the United Nations, not with Iraqi oil 
companies.2227 
The “amounts recommended by the panels of Commissioners2228 will be subje
to the approval by the Governing Council,”
ct 
he 
s are set forth in “Security 
Counci
 
, EHRs, and 
f the 
ental damage assessment2232 should assist in applying international law 
rules an
laims should be 
assessed
2229 whose membership reflects the 
composition of the Security Council at any given time. The Governing Council’s 
decisions are final and not subject to any appeal or review.2230 The guidelines that t
Commissioners must consider in their examination of claim
l Resolution 687/1991 and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, the 
criteria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any 
pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary, 
Commissioners shall apply other relevant rules of international law.”2231 The invocation
of “international law” as a general expression allows the application of IHL
IEL that were examined earlier. Therefore, Commissioners’ expertise in the fields o
law or environm
d requirements. 
Despite the fact that the Security Council Resolution 687/1991 considers the 
environmental damage resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “[R]esolution 687 did 
not define environmental damage or the depletion of natural resources, and did not 
provide any guidance to the UNCC as to how the environmental c
 for purposes of reparation or compensation.”2233  
                                                          
2226 S.C. Res. 705/1991, Aug. 15, 1991. 
2227 Id., para. 1 (b). 
2228 The Commissioners have the primary responsibility for determining the outcome of the claims pending 
before the Commission. Each panel of Commissioners must “report in writing […] to the Governing 
Council on the claims received and the amount recommended to be awarded for each claimant.” 
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 6th Sess., 27th 
 
 
ntal damages…”, available at <http://www.unog.ch/uncc/commiss.htm>, 
vities, Oct. 15, 1996, 
mtg., art. 38 (c), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/INF.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1053 (1992). 
2229 Id., art. 40 (1). 
2230 Id., art. 40 (4). 
2231 Id., art. 31. 
2232 “Commissioners are chosen for their integrity, experience and expertise in such areas as
law…assessments of environme
(last visit Oct. 20, 2000). 
2233 United Nations Environmental Programme, Report of the Working Group of Experts on Liability and 
Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from Military Acti
UNEP/ENV.Law/3/Inf.1, at 1. 
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In general, compensation should cover the value of the harmed objects, and 
should be sufficient to establish the situation as it was before the harmful act. With regar
to environmental damage, compensation should seek to cover the costs of conta
incurred by any nation, the clean-up costs by any nation, the costs of restoration
natural resources, a
d 
inment 
 of the 
nd any other costs associated with these environmental 
catastro r 
ly 
ility may be very reluctant 
to allow an assessment team to enter the area to be assessed.2236  
Eve damage 
may be dif y be difficult to 
determine, ddition, 
the damage ter occurs, 
with longer exposures creating more severe damage.2237 Furthermore, some experts 
conside ce 
t. 
d by World 
 
                                                          
phes.2234 It is estimated that Iraq may face as much as $100 million in wa
reparation.2235  
Two kinds of problems may arise in calculating the amount of compensation: 
those related to assessment, and those related to evaluation. Assessment can be a problem 
because modern technology still lacks the methods and techniques necessary to precise
assess environmental damage. Moreover, a nation facing liab
n if the environmental damage can be assessed, evaluation of the 
ficult. First, evaluation of wartime environmental damage ma
 because war often imposes severe and simultaneous damages. In a
 amount is affected by the length of time over which the disas
r that reliance on future income, e.g. future oil revenues is an unreliable sour
for meeting necessary expenses, even when they are evaluated. Finally, if the 
responsible country is poor, it may be simply unable to pay regardless of their 
intentions.2238 
After an armed conflict the victorious States may pressure the defeated 
belligerents to abandon any request for compensation resulting from the armed conflic
For example, despite the substantial human and environmental effects cause
War II, including the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when Japan signed the peace
 Ecology, N.Y. 
er War]. 
note (1642) at  418. 
 
le at 
2234 137 CONG.REC. H.715 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Rep. Lagomarsino). 
2235 Youssef M. Ibrahim, Another War Begins As Kuwait Oil Well Fires Threaten Region’s
Times, March 16, 1991, at D2 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Anoth
2236 Green, State Responsibility, supra 
2237 “Background paper”, “First International Conference on Addressing Environmental Consequences of
War”, prepared by the Environmental Law Institute, June 10-12, 1998, at 14, availab
<http://www.eli.org/ecw.htm>, (last visit Oct. 20, 2000). 
2238 Kelly, supra note (1817) at 950. 
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treaty,2239 it abandoned the right to claim compensation against the United States.2240 
Article 19 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that  
ding 
art 
claims,
ning a 
substantial right already established by the rules of international law, erga omnes and 
any State.2241 Specifically as to 
enviro
e to 
new kind of international responsibility,2243 and may result in further charges. For 
example, despite the fact that the domestic investigation of the 1986 Chernobyl accident 
f 
 
[Japan] waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the 
Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of 
actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and 
waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions 
of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese 
territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty. 
 
 
The political circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty, inclu
pressure from the U.S., and Japan’s fear of continuing the combat, explain the large p
why Japan agreed to it. Nevertheless, despite the Japanese apparent waiver of any 
 Japan still has the right to request compensation from the United States, because 
the waiver is incompatible with the general rules of international law. Abando
jus cogens rules, is beyond the authority of 
nmental claims, the waiver is ineffective because the harmed environment is not 
owned by only one Japanese generation, but by future generations also, whose right 
cannot be waived. Despite the waiver, the Japanese government was still responsibl
its population and to the environment.2242  
Once compensation is due, the responsible nation must pay it to the injured 
international person. Refusing to pay due compensation may form a legal basis for a 
concluded that “the prime cause of the accident was an extremely improbable 
combination of violation of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff o
                                                          
2239 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Allied Treaty with Japan]. 
2240 Takeshi Itoh, State Compensation for Atomic Bomb Victims, Dec. 12, 1994, 
<http://www.warewulf.com/nuke/News/News/State> (last visit Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Itoh]. 
2241 Parker & Chew, supra note (2146) at 538. 
2242 A Medical Assistance Legislation was implemented in Japan in 1957. Itoh, supra note (2240). 
2243 Cervi, supra note (347) at 382. 
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the unit,”2244 the former Soviet Union did not compensate any of the affected 
nations.2245 This refusal should result in additional charges against the former Sovie
Union, nevertheless, the international community did nothing regarding this situation. 
Finally, even if a State is found to be liable, individuals may still be responsible 
for serious international law violations
t 
o 
an 
ms 
ns 
y 
tional system.2250 Therefore, according to this opinion there is no legal 
basis fo rtheless, 
 
are a 
ve 
              
2246 under international criminal law.  
 
2. International Criminal Responsibility 
A State cannot be hanged, whipped or imprisoned, and thus cannot be subject t
those forms of criminal responsibility.2247 However, some jurists argue that a State c
still be subjected to criminal responsibility.2248 This argument based on the analogy 
between the State and the corporation, since both, the State and the corporation, have 
moral personality and are represented through individuals. Many domestic legal syste
do recognize the criminal responsibility of the corporation, and therefore they recognize 
the criminal responsibility of the State.2249 They also consider the international sanctio
that may be imposed on the State as analogous to the criminal punishment that ma
imposed in the na
r excluding the State from the international criminal responsibility. Neve
punishing a State presents a number of unique difficulties. In domestic criminal law, an 
individual can be subjected to the power of the State directly, and society is bound to
respect the execution of the punishment. However, in international law, sanctions 
method of exerting international pressure to assure respect for international law rules. 
Moreover, the State, unlike criminal individuals, can in many circumstances wai
                                            
2244 Philippe Sands ed., Chernobyl Law and Communication: Transboundary 
Nuclear Air Pollution-The Legal Materials 4 (Cambridge Univ. , 1988) [hereinafter 
Sands, Chernobyl]. 
2245 Justin Mellor, The Negative Effects of Chernobyl: On International Environmental Law: The Creation 
of the Polluter Gets Paid Principle, 17 Wis. Int’l L.J. 65, 70 (1999) [hereinafter Mellor, The Negative 
Effects of Chernobyl]. 
2246 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 432. 
arek, Criminalising State Responsibility, 14 Revue Belge De Droit International 460, 
1978-9), cited in John Dugard, Criminal Responsibility of States, in International Criminal 
lina, 
ontrolling State Crime 
2247 K. M
464-79 (
Responsibility 247(M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1999) [hereinafter Dugard]; see also, Luis F. Mo
Can States Commit Crimes? The Limits of Formal International Law, in C
349-70 (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed., 2000) [hereinafter Molina]. 
2248 Dugard, supra note (2247) at 247. 
2249 Id., 
2250 Id., 
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sanctions under international law. Furthermore, in international law, criminal sanctions 
are effective only when other States agree to impose that punishment. If a particular State
refuses to participate, there is no legal basis for compelling it to do so. For example, 
despite the sanctions imposed on Iraq by U.N. Security Cou
 
ncil resolutions, some nations 
have m
international criminal law was held in the city of Nuremberg. The main trial was on 
 and other 
membe
  
rvation 
with the orders of a superior official. If a combatant “acted pursuant to an 
order o , 
via 
stem. 
                                                          
aintained diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq. To that extent criminal 
sanctions under international law are much less effective than domestic criminal 
punishment.2251 
International criminal responsibility is not a new principle of law. It has 
developed and evolved over time. Following World War II, one of the first trials under 
November 20, 1945 against former Reichsmarschall Hermann Göering
rs of German military command.2252 The Nuremberg trials sentenced thirty-six 
persons to death and twenty-three to life imprisonment in the thirteen trials.2253
The ILC defines international criminal conduct as “a serious breach of an 
international law obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and prese
of the human environment.”2254 A combatant may be held criminally responsible for the 
serious violation of the law of war in times of armed conflicts, and other international law 
rules in peacetime. Criminal responsibility may be assigned even if a combatant’s act is 
in compliance 
f his Government or of a superior, the order shall not free him from responsibility
but may be considered mitigation of punishment […].”2255 
Specific courts have been established to examine international crimes. Currently, 
there are two ad hoc criminal courts, one for crimes committed in the former Yugosla
and the other for crimes committed in Rwanda. Moreover, there is a permanent 
International Criminal Court scheduled to convene in the near future. In view of these 
historical developments, the next section will address the obstacles that face the sy
2251 Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Proceeding (Vol.1), 
Nuremberg, 1947, at 34, cited in Molina, supra note (2247) at 352 fn. 15. 
ajor War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 
harter]. 
2252 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Nuremberg Trials, in 4 Encyclopedia of Pub. Int’l L. , 50, 50 
(Rudolf Dolzer et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Jescheck]. 
2253 Id., at 51. 
2254 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note (2051) art. 19. 
2255 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the M
8, Aug. 8, and Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London C
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 a. A Historical View of the International Criminal Responsibility 
s 
t 
 
the 
s 
se demands, be liable to pay 
compen f its 
nal 
Philippines during the insurrection of 1899-1902 […] led to the court-martial of a number 
of American soldiers.”2258 However, the national jurisdiction does not always respond 
d accused German war criminals were tried 
The roots of international criminal responsibility are deep in the history of the 
law. The first international criminal tribunal was held in 1474 when Peter von 
Hagenbach, governor of a German territory that included the Upper Rhine, was tried and 
convicted by a court composed of Swiss, German, and Alsatian judges for crimes 
committed against God and man, and atrocities against the citizens of Breisach during it
occupation.2256 Although it is 500 years old, this reasoning could be applied today, so tha
“crimes against God” could include crimes against God’s creatures, such as the natural 
environment. 
In more modern times, international criminal responsibility has been inspired by 
other international law rules. For instance, the second sentence of Article 3 of The Hague 
Convention IV suggests a form of international criminal responsibility,2257 by providing
that “[a] belligerent party […] shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons 
forming part of its armed forces.” Similarly, Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I of 
Geneva Conventions provides that “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provision
of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the ca
sation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part o
armed forces.” 
Historically, individuals accused of war crimes have been prosecuted in natio
courts. For example, the “atrocities committed by the United States troops in the 
and completely satisfy the needs of international community. For example after World 
War II, “a few of the more than eight hundre
by the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig. Although several of these Germans were 
convicted, they received particularly light sentences […] and some even escaped from 
                                                          
2256 Giulio M. Gallarotti & Arik Y. Preis, Politics, International Justice, And the United States: Towards A 
 Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 U. Cal. J. Int’l L. & For. Aff. 1, 3 (1999) [hereinafter
Gallarotti & Preis]; Trooboff, supra note (2258) at 19-20. 
2257 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 401. 
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prison.”2259 The dissatisfaction of Germany’s handling of nationals turned over to it for 
prosecution following World War I,2260 led to the abandonment of that method of dea
with criminal responsibility.
ling 
the 
 
eutral 
judicial
 
n 
l at 
eld 
s 
nd 
r and 
 
 
2261 However, the ICRC has proposed a model law for 
punishment of war crimes that would serve as an example for national legislation.2262
This model would eliminate differences among national legal systems, assure n
 procedures, and reduce the number of cases examined before the international 
criminal tribunals regarding environmental crimes. 
Between October 1943 and January 1944, efforts of the United States and the
United Kingdom resulted in the creation of the United Nations War Crimes Commissio
(UNWCC).2263 Since then, other judicial agencies have been created, including the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,2264 and International Military Tribuna
Tokyo.2265 Proceeding before these tribunals were the first in which individuals were h
internationally responsible for the violation of international law. The major powers, 
France, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union and the United States, were 
represented in the Nuremberg military tribunal.2266 The Tokyo military tribunal wa
composed of judges from eleven nations, including the four major powers.2267 
Article 6 of the London Charter, which established the rules of Nuremberg a
Tokyo trials, defines “War Crimes” as violations of the laws of customs of wa
specifically the “plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.” The Nuremberg 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
of cases. For example, Kaiser Wilhelm II himself escaped prosecution by taking refuge in the Netherlands. 
Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 4. 
2261 Committee on Environmental and Public Pollution Task Force, supra note (541) at 52. 
2262 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, War Crimes, in 4 Encyclopedia Pub. Int’l L., 294, 296 (Rudolf 
s Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes Under International Law: Jurisprudential 
al. W. Int’l L. J. 127, 127 (1991) [hereinafter Beres, 
, 
2258 William Greider, The Point Where War Becomes Murder, Wash. Post. Oct. 11, 1970, at D-1, cited
in  Petter D. Trooboff, Introduction, in Law and Responsibility in Warfare 243 fn. 40 (Petter
D. Trooboff ed., 1975) [hereinafter Trooboff]. 
2259 Friedman ed., The Law of War: A Documentary History 776-77 (Greenwood 
Publishing Goup, 1972) [hereinafter Friedman], cited in Id., at 243 fn. 41.  
2260 The dissatisfaction of the Germans dealing with the criminals of war of World War I based on number 
Dolzer et al. eds., 1982). 
2263 Louis René Beres, Toward
Foundations and Jurisdictional Choices, 22 C
Towards Prosecution]. 
2264 London Charter, supra note (2255). 
2265 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, Jan 19, 1946, T.I.A.S No. 1589
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. 
2266 London Charter, supra note (2255) art. 2. 
2267 Trooboff, supra note (2258) at 20-1. 
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trials included the first recognition of a “purely environmental war crime”2268 when it 
charged nine Germans with “ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry [including] the 
wholes
ages 
ility.”2270 Despite the absence of explicit environmental protection in the 
London t 
ing 
ity. 
ents 
ale cutting of Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to 
preserve the timber resources of the country.”2269 Most warfare environmental dam
falls under the jurisdiction of Article 6. Additionally, Article 6 introduced a remarkable 
development in the field of international responsibility of individuals, in that “the 
requirement of diversity of citizenship was eliminated, extending the reach of 
international criminal law to violations irrespective of the dictates of national law. 
National sovereignty no longer served as a shield against individual criminal 
responsib
 and Tokyo Charters, this development will substantially served the environmen
by subjecting individuals to international criminal justice for crimes committed at home, 
especially when committed during armed conflicts. Moreover, the Japanese, after be
defeated in World War II, accepted the principle of international criminal responsibil
Article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that “Japan accepts the judgm
of the International Military Tribunals for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes 
Courts […].”2271 
Practically, environmental crimes were not recognized as explicitly as they are 
now, and the international military tribunals were not specifically focused on such 
crimes. For example, in U.S.A. v. Wilhelm List, et al., “the destruction of communication 
and transport facilities and houses in Norway (province of Finnmark) was not considered 
a war crime.”2272 However, nine German civilian officials were charged, in occupied 
Poland, with “ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry [including the] wholesale cutting of 
                                                          
2268 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 125. 
2269 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948); discussed in Caggiano, supra 
06; Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 201-02. 
: 
in Protection of the Environment 
r Tanja].  
note (7) at 486-87; Leibler, supra note (1220) at 1
2270 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity”: The Need for A Specialized Convention, 31 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 457, 464-65 (1994) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity]. 
2271 Allied Treaty with Japan, supra note (2239) art. 11. 
2272 Gerard J. Tanja, Individual Accountability for Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict
International and National Penal Enforcement Possibilities, 
During Armed Conflicts at 489 fn. 22 (R. Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafte
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Polish and’s 
 no 
behind national sovereignty,2275 Saddam Hussein and others who are alleged 
to have caused “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague 
ronmental Laws, can be tried for war crimes and 
crimes r 
 
 
ent. 
 
nment 
 
timber.”2273 That action violated Germany’s duty as occupier to protect Pol
land.2274 
Under the Nuremberg Principles, which provides that political leaders could
longer hide 
Convention, and International Envi
against humanity.2276 In Strasbourg, the Council of Europe’s 183-membe
Parliamentary Assembly condemned the Iraqi attack on the environment, describing it as
a “disgraceful attack,” and called for a war crime tribunal analogous to those of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo.2277 A similar attitude was taken by some United States senators,
who urged that the Iraqi President be put on trial for crimes against the environm
Senator Lieberman said, “there was substantial sentiment in Congress to create some kind
of treaty or convention that would make clear that vindictive assaults on the enviro
[…] would be punished- and punished severely.”2278  
The trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo resulted in 3,686 convictions and 924 
acquittals. By the end of 1958, the Western Allies had convicted 5,025 Germans of war 
crimes, 806 being sentenced to death, and the Soviet Union had convicted around 
10,000.2279 
 
b. The Ad Hoc Criminal Courts 
After the trials of Tokyo and Nuremberg, it seems that the international 
community turned away from the concept of individual criminal responsibility. During
the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge caused the death of an estimated 2 million people in 
                                                          
2273 Caggiano, supra note (7) at 486-87. 
2274 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 125. 
2275 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 4. 
, 21/2/6 
eres, After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of 
led Environmental Terrorist, Chi. Trib., Mar. 7, 1991, at C8. 
4 (1986). 
2276 Nicholas A. Robinson, International Law and the Destruction of Nature in the Gulf War
Envt’l Pol’y & L. 216, 220 (1991) [hereinafter Robinson, International Law and the Destruction of 
Nature]; See in general: Louis R. B
Law, 24 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 487 (1991); Luis Kutner & Ved P. Nanda, Draft Indictment of 
Saddam Hussein, 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. Pol’y 91 (1991). 
2277 Robert Rice, Gulf Oil Spill Another Crime Against Humanity, Fin. Rev., Jan. 31, 1991, at 3. 
2278 Hussein Cal
2279 G. von Glahn, Laws Among Nations 78
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Cambodia, yet the international community did nothing about it.2280 However, in 1993, 
this concept was reestablished when the U.N. Security Council established the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola
of International Hum
tions 
anitarian Law in Yugoslavia (ICTY).2281 Two years after its 
establis
ions, and private entities.2283 
 
ry 25, 
er 
y Chief of Staff, and Vlajko Stojilkovic, former Serbian Minister of 
Interna
issinger, 
hment, the ICTY’s “judges […] were elected, Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
were promulgated, a Headquarters Agreement was entered into, […] Prosecutor and 
Register were appointed, courtrooms, offices, and a jail were constructed at the Hague, a 
staff of over 500 persons were hired, seventy persons were indicted, and trials were 
commenced.2282 The expenses of the ICTY are covered by contribution from United 
Nations member States, and voluntary contributions from some States, international 
organizat
The ICTY is charged with prosecuting crimes committed on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991. The 1993 Statute of the ICTY includes provisions for 
punishing wanton destruction,2284 including destruction of the environment. On May 24,
1999, the ICTY indicted the former Yugoslavian President Milosevic with four other 
former government officials,2285 Milan Milutunovic, President of Serbia until Janua
2001, Nikol Sainovic, former Deputy Prime Minister, Dragoljub Odjanic, form
Yugoslav Arm
l Affairs.2286 
This development was not universally appreciated. Some commentators feared 
that similar indictments could be issued against representatives of nations that intervened 
to stop the civil war there. For example, the former Secretary of State, Henry K
                                                          
2280 Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court, 18 Va. 
Envt’l L. J. 217, 222 (1999) [hereinafter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability]. 
l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1995), cited in Scharf, 
ote (1692) at 501 fn. 118. 
 
 of the Former 
19. 
te, supra note (190) arts. 2 (d), 3 (b).  
Yugoslavia: Milosevic Must Be Transferred to The Hague, Mar. 2, 
r. 39, available at <http://www.amnesty.org> (last visit 
2281 ICTY Statutes, supra note (190). 
2282 See, Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the 
Internationa
supra n
2283 Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
Yugoslavia since 1991, at 43-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665 (1996), cited in Scharf, supra note (1692) 
at 501 fn. 1
2284 ICTY Statu
2285 Amnesty International Organization, 
2001, AI Index EUR 70/005/2001- News Service N
Mar. 14, 2001). 
2286 Id. 
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expressed his worry that such a broad mandate could provide a basis for indicting U.S. 
officials involved in the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.2287 However, this fear sho
not be allowed to hinder prosecutions of any person who is justifiably charged wi
crimes.  
One year later, the Security Council created a similar body,
uld 
th war 
 of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Rwanda (ICTR). It is authorized to prosecute violations of IHL rules,2289 especially the 
f the Tutsi Tribe in Rwanda.2290  The only 
environ
ar 
e Yugoslavian and the Rwandan conflicts, the 
interna onflict, 
 
n the two courts is that the ICTR statute does not 
limit “c  
                                              
2288 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violation
genocide murder of 800,000 members o
mental jurisdiction of the ICTR is for crimes that can be interpreted as 
“pillage”.2291 
Unlike the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, which tried individuals for w
crimes committed in international armed conflict, the ICTY and ICTR have the authority 
to try individuals for war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts.2292 Despite the 
similar internal characters of th
tional community deemed the Yugoslavian conflict, unlike the Rwandan c
to be international, because it involved different ethnic groups fighting for the right of
self-determination. Under the applicable law of the ad hoc courts, that factor made 
Yugoslavia the scene of an “international” conflict. The ICTY applies the law of 
international armed conflicts, while the ICTR applies the law of internal armed 
conflicts.2293 Another difference betwee
rimes against humanity” to those occurring during armed conflict, while the ICTY
statute does.2294  
 
            
letter for Canegie 
, 49  Sess., 3453  mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR 
ar: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal 
CTR Statute, supra note (2288) art. 3. 
2287 Mary-Lea Cox, Milosovic in The Hague: Trial or Error?, A Companion News
Council on Ethics & Int’l Aff., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 1[hereinafter Mary-Lea Cox]. 
2288 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR th rd
Statute]. 
2289 Id., art. 1. 
2290 Scharf, supra note (1692) at 501. 
2291 ICTR Statute, supra note (2288) art. 4 (f). 
2292 Carl E. Bruch, All’s not Fair in Civil W
Armed Conflict, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 695, 717 (2001). 
2293 Id. 
2294 ICTY Statute, supra note (190) art. 5; I
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c. The International Criminal Court 
The ad hoc and temporary international criminal tribunals of ICTY and ICTR
not cover all kinds of crimes, and not all countries are subject to their jurisdiction. Th
continuing violations of international law rules, including those relevant to the 
environmental protection, encouraged States to create a permanent International Crimin
Court of Justice (ICC). The ICC follows, in many senses, from the world’s experie
with the ICTY and ICTR.
, do 
e 
al 
nce 
 the 
s Boutros-Ghali, as result of a 
“renais
C 
al 
 
 knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life 
or injur
2295 
The statute of the ICC was adopted as a Final Act of the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court held in Rome in 1998.2296 It will come into force after ratification by
sixtieth State,2297 which has not yet occurred.2298 The creation of the ICC was described 
by the former Secretary General of the U.N., Boutro
sance of international law.”2299  
The Rome Statute is not a pure environmental document. However, it focuses on 
assuring the protection of the IHL rules.2300 Article 5 of the Statute provides that the IC
shall have jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to the internation
community as a whole.” This Article grants jurisdiction to the ICC to hear cases 
involving charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression. The ICC also has jurisdiction over crimes of environmental destruction 
committed during armed conflicts. However, only crimes committed after the date of 
entry into force of the Rome Statute may be adjudicated by the ICC, even if they were
committed during armed conflicts.2301 The Rome Statute defines any “intentional 
launching of an attack in the
y to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe 
                                                          
2295 David Stoelting, Introduction, International Criminal Law, 35 Int’l Law. 613, 613 (Summer 2001) 
[hereinafter Stoelting]. 
e, supra note (191). 
s passed by a vote of 120 in favor, seven against, and twenty-one abstentions. It 
arleton 
2296 Rome Statut
2297 Id., art. 126 (1). 
 Rome Statute wa2298 The
was reported that the China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, United States, and Yemen voted against the Statute. 
Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 2. 
2299 The former Secretary General of the United Nation, Boutros Boutros-Ghali address at C
University, in 1995. Cited in Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 1. 
2300 Rome Statute, supra note (191) art. 8. 
2301 Id., art. 11. 
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damage to the natural environment […]” as a war crime.2302 This text can be desc
less stringent than the ENMOD’s text, because it requires the presence of the three 
elements together, whereas ENMOD requires the presence o
ribed as 
f only one element out of the 
three, w
 fall 
] 
ge to civilian 
n executive order giving domestic 
military
ndle. 
l system 
is either unable or unwilling to respond, and to avoid proceedings which may be 
 unsatisfactory.”2307 The ICC cannot be involved in 
uld be adequate.2308  
 organs: (1) the Presidency; (2) the Chambers: 
hether long-lasting, severe, or widespread. 
It appears that the attacks on the United States, on September 11th, 2001, can
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, since such attacks can be interpreted as “intentional[…
attack[s which] cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or dama
objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment 
[…].”2303 Thus, the ICC could provide a forum for the prosecution of those crimes. 
However, the United States has not only refused to ratify the Rome Statute, but has 
asserted its exclusive right to judge such criminals. Significantly, on November 13, 2001, 
the American President, George W. Bush, signed, a
 commissions the right to try suspected terrorists.2304 This controversial order 
could be said to undercut international support for the ICC as a forum for crimes of 
international terrorism.2305 
The ICC is not a substitute for national legal systems,2306 but instead is intended 
to provide a means of prosecuting crimes that national systems are ill-equipped to ha
The ICC would function, only in exceptional situations, where the national lega
“politically expedient, but manifestly
cases where a national legal system wo
The ICC is comprised of four
Appeals, Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions; (3) the Office of the Prosecutor; and (4) the 
Registry.2309 Eighteen judges are required to compose the different Chambers.2310 The 
                                                          
2302 Id., art. 8 (2)(b)(iv). 
2303 Id. 
2304 Cnn.com, Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizen in the War Against 
Terrorism, Nov. 13, 2001, § 4 (a), available at 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/11/14/inv.military.court.doc> (last visit Nov. 18, 2001). 
al Legal Responses to Terrorism, materials recorded from the Annual meeting of the 
he American Law Schools, tapes 209-10, Jan. 3-6, 2002, New Orleans, Luisiana. 
ra note (2053) at 391. 
is, supra note (2256) at 6. 
 note (191) art. 34. 
). 
2305 See, Internation
Association of t
2306 McLaughlin, sup
2307 Id. 
2308 Gallarotti & Pre
2309 Rome Statute, supra
2310 Id., art. 36 (1
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Assemb
 
divide  other 
s 
ing 
d by the accused, 
by a State that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the case, or by a State whose 
acceptance of jurisdiction is required according to Article 12 of the Statute.2319 
United 
1  
ly of States Parties elects the eighteen judges, according to their 
qualifications,2311 by a secret ballot.2312 Once the judges are elected, they elect, by
absolute majority, the President and, his first and second Vice Presidents.2313 The judges 
themselves into an Appeals Division, composed of the President and four
judges, a Trial Division, composed of no less than six judges,2314 and a Pre-Trial Division 
which can function with three or fewer judges.2315 
Three authorities have the power to transmit cases before the ICC: member State
can refer the matter to the Prosecutor,2316 the U.N. Security Council can do so accord
to the power of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,2317 and the Prosecutor can initiate an 
investigation on his own.2318 The jurisdiction of the ICC can be conteste
Based on the fact that the ICC has jurisdiction over environmental crimes,2320 
Nations Environmental Program “[UNEP] could act as the environmental 
equivalent of the [United Nations Security Council] with respect to the Rome Statute.”232
Some international law jurists have contended that genocide against the 
environment (ecocide) should be regarded as a serious breach of international 
environmental law rules, and treated as a crime of war.2322 Ecocide means the “denial of 
life to areas of plants and vegetation, or total destruction of other features of the natural 
                                                          
2311 “(a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and inte
who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices. (b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall: (i) Have established competence in criminal law
and procedure, and the necessary rel
similar capacity, in criminal pr
grity 
 
evant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other 
oceedings; or (ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of 
internati
experience in
working languages of the Court.” Id., art. 36 (3). 
2312 Id., art. 36 (6). 
arts. 13 (a), 14. 
onal law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive 
 a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court; (c) Every 
candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the 
2313 Id., art. 38 (1). 
2314 Id., art. 39. 
2315 Id., arts. 39, 64. 
2316 Id., 
2317 Id., art. 13 (b). 
2318 Id., arts. 13 (c), 15. 
2319 Id., art. 19. 
2320 Id., art. 8 (2)(b)(iv). 
2321 McLaughlin, supra note (2053) at 406. 
2322 Trooboff, supra note (2258) at 23. 
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environment.”2323 Including this crime as a war crime could serve deter nations and 
individuals from committing this kind of wholesale destruction, although it must 
that defining genocide as a crime has not prevented it from happening. 
 
 
d. Difficulties with the Current System of International Criminal Responsibility  
There exist some legal obstacles that prevent international criminal responsibility 
from being as effective as it might be. The major obstacle is sovereign immunity, which 
exempts each State and its high officials from the judicial juris
be said 
diction of another State, or 
even fr  the jurisdiction of international tribunals.2324 According to this principle no 
obligations erefore, most 
of the exam sdiction of 
either the ad ts, ICTY, and 
ICTR have lavia or 
Rwanda.2325 unless they 
express thei
owever, international law recognizes a “duty to prosecute or extradite” in certain 
circum
ct 
ents. “The extradite-or-prosecute 
require
om
can be enforced on a State unless it agrees to be bound by it. Th
ined instruments do not bind non-member States to accept the juri
 hoc or the permanent criminal courts. The ad hoc criminal cour
no jurisdiction over crimes committed beyond the former Yugos
 Similarly, the ICC has no jurisdiction over non-member States, 
r acceptance.2326  
H
stances.2327 This duty is set forth in number of international instruments including 
the four Geneva Conventions2328 and the Additional Protocol I.2329 Where that duty 
applies, prosecution presents no threat to States’ sovereignty and eliminates any 
international tension that may result therefrom. Practically, not all the States are subje
to this duty unless they are signatories to these instrum
ment is intended to ensure that States make some effort to bring [criminals] to 
                                                          
2323 Id. 
2324 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 2. 
2325 For the ICTR see, James Bucyana, The International Penal Tribunal for Rwanda and National 
Reconciliation, 8 Int’l J. Refugee L. 622, 624 (1996) [hereinafter Bucyana].  
 most of the international conventions, such as the International Convention 
(56) art. 50; 
supra note (56) art. 146. 
otocol (I), supra note (79) arts. 85, 88.  
2326 Rome Statute, supra note (191) art. 12. 
2327 This duty is codified in
Against the Taking of Hostage , Dec. 17, 1997, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. 
2328 Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art. 49; Geneva Convention (II), supra note 
Geneva Convention (III), supra note (56) art. 129; and Geneva Convention (IV), 
2329 Additional Pr
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justice, either through prosecution or extradition.”2330 Under that requirement, a State has
the right to choose between the two procedures, but if prosecution does not respond to t
needs of justice, then affected States may intervene. For example, in the case of 
 
he 
.A. v. U.S
Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq, et al., Mr. Rezaq  
 
hijacked an Air Egypt flight shortly after takeoff from Athens, 
and order[ed] it to fly to Malta. On arrival, [he] shot a number of 
passengers, killing two of them, before he was apprehended. 
Rezaq pleaded guilty to murder charges in Malta, served seven 
years in prison, and was rel
afterwards, he was take n
eased in February 1993. Shortly 
n i to custody in Nigeria by the United 
n 
g 
 
s 
 
y 
ion 
 
                                                          
States authorities and brought to the United States for trial. [He 
was convicted on one count of aircraft piracy under 49 U.S.C. 
app. § 1472 (n) (1994)].2331 
 
Arguably, the sentence there did not adequately serve justice since seven years i
prison does not respond to the harm caused by hijacking, shooting, killing and terrifyin
innocent civilians. Therefore, despite the prosecution and punishment that took place in
Malta, the United States believed that justice had not been achieved, and U.S. agent
captured the hijacker and prosecuted him in the U.S. 
If, for any reason, the State cannot properly prosecute a criminal suspect, it should
extradite him. Extradition is based on a State’s international duty to cooperate. This dut
was set forth in the 1973 General Assembly Resolution of the Principles of International 
Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of 
War Crimes Against Humanity.2332 Specific importance was attributed in that resolut
to crimes of war and crimes against humanity based on the fact that “such offenses are 
international crimes over which there exists universal jurisdiction.”2333 It would be 
internationally and environmentally useful to include environmental crimes under this 
duty, especially where environmental crimes have extraterritorial effects, over which the
2330 U.S.A. v. Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq et al., 134 F. 3d 1121at 1129, available at 
<http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/airpir.htm>, (last visit Oct. 25, 2001). 
2331 Id., at 1125. 
2332 Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of 
XVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th  Sess., Supp. 
3) [hereinafter Principles of International Co-operation in the 
 (2270) at 481. 
Persons Guilty of War Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.Res. 3074 (X
No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc, A/9030 (197
Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment]. 
2333 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note
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international community should have jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the “extradition of 
criminals in general has already been the exception rather than the rule […and
possibility of extraditing war criminals for the destruction of the environment seems, 
therefore, hardly a serious option.”2334 
The violation of the principle of co-operation in the field of detention, arrest, 
extradition and punishment in war crimes and crimes against hum
war 
] the 
anity is considered 
“contra
 
 
ven 
tate 
, 
ed 
rrorist 
ecute criminals on their own territory, 
but in a he 
ng to 
the Afghani legal system was also unacceptable, because there was considerable evidence 
influence of Bin Laden. 
 immunity excludes some persons from being subject 
ry to the United Nations Charter and to generally recognized norms of 
international law.”2335 The same view should apply to those environmental crimes that 
may qualify as crimes of war, especially when they cause “widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment […].”2336 Unfortunately, crimes committed 
against the environment but which do not cause long-term, widespread, and severe
damage to the natural environment are not subject to international criminal jurisdiction. 
Sometimes the choice between prosecution and extradition is not available, e
if the State is a signatory of an international instrument that imposes that duty. A S
may be reluctant to prosecute or extradite for a political, ideological, religious, or ethnic 
reason. For example, Libya, as a result of its political differences with the United States
refused to adhere to the “duty to prosecute or to extradite” provided in the Montreal 
Convention on Safety of Civil Aviation. Similarly, the Taliban, because of their alleg
religious differences with the United States, refused to extradite the suspected te
Osama Bin Laden. Some States may offer to pros
 situation where this offer would be internationally unacceptable, because of t
State’s role in the crime and, therefore, the international violation. For example, the 
Libyan offer to prosecute the two national Libyans in the Lockerbie case was 
unacceptable, because it was believed that the accident was planned by the Libyan 
Government and executed by its agents. Similarly, prosecuting Bin Laden accordi
that Taliban Government was under the 
On the other hand, sovereign
to international criminal responsibility, especially when crimes are committed by heads 
                                                          
2334 Tanja, supra note (2272) at 487. 
th2335 G.A.Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR 26   Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 79, U.N. Doc, A/8429 (1971). 
e Statute, supra note (191) art. 8 (2)(b)(iv). 2336 Rom
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of State or other influential persons.2337 For example, the immunity of Saddam Hu
and his official army commanders exempt them from prosecution before the Internation
Criminal Tribunal. Similarly, the immunity of the former Yugoslavian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic, during his presidential mandate, prevented his prosecution before 
the ICTY for his responsibility in the killing and expulsions of thousands of ethnic 
Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.
ssein 
al 
ere the ICTY is located, 
to be th
 
y to 
rael for war crimes and 
genocid
 
ure 
2338 Once this mandate expired, the 
Yugoslavian authority handed over Milosevic to The Hague, wh
e first former head of State to be prosecuted in that forum.2339 Saddam Hussein 
and his army leaders will not be prosecuted for the war crimes that they committed as 
long as they remain in power, unless another State can obtain physical custody over 
them,2340 such as when the United States successfully arrested General Manuel 
Noreiga2341 in Panama to try him in the U.S.2342  
The U.S., in similar circumstances, could prosecute the persons suspected of 
hijacking the cruise ship, Achille Lauro, and killing an American,2343 only by gaining
physical custody over the suspects. The U.S. got physical custody by using a military 
aircraft to force an Egyptian airplane, which was transporting the suspects from Ital
Egypt, to land.2344 Similarly, Israel abducted suspected Nazi war criminal, Adolf 
Eichmann, from Argentina, in order to prosecute him in Is
e.2345 Israel, faced with repeated refusals to extradite Eichmann, claimed that it 
had no alternative but to kidnap him and, thus, proceeded to try, convict, and execute
him.2346 Such tasks are not always easy. For instance, the United States failed to capt
the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid,2347 who was responsible for the murder of 
                                                          
2337 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 19. 
2338 Milosevic Jailed, supra note (2338). 
2339 Mary
2340
ew World Order: The 
Uuclear Role  International Law in United States Courts and Foreign Policy, 17 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev. 438, 449 (1994) [hereinafter Hagan]. 
2342 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 46 (1999); Id., at 343. 
man, Towards an International Criminal Court, 3 San Diego Just. J. 1, 89-90 
27, 1993, at 
izes U.N.]. 
-Lea Cox, supra note (2287) at 1. 
 Gupta, supra note (62) at 267. 
2341 Patrick M. Hagan, Government Sponsored Extraterritorial Abductions in the N
of
2343 Id., at 48. 
2344 Id. 
2345 Matthew Lipp
(1995). 
2346 Id., at 89-90. 
2347 Michael Ross, Nunn Criticizes U.N. Hunt for Somali Warlord Aidid, L.A. Times, Sept. 
A12 [hereinafter Ross, Nunn Critic
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24 U.N. Pea ibuted to 
local loyalty
It ca ama’s national 
sovereignty mian authorities 
and not by t ry of the 
U.S. forces ade pursuant to such 
a request. S ckers could 
be seen as a istry, as 
well as a vi  was flying. 
Likewise, th rgentina 
sovereignty  the right of asylum. Therefore, his 
abduction by Israel inside Argentina’s territory without their permission could be 
conside
nts: a 
 itself. The 
moral e
s were 
teral 
(b) The requested State shall, if it is under an existing 
cekeeping troops in 1993.2348 The difficulty in this case was attr
 and the knowledge by Aidid of his homeland.2349  
n be argued that the U.S. action in Panama was a breach of Pan
, because General Noreiga was subject to arrest by the Pana
he United States, unless Panama asked the U.S. for help. The ent
into Panama to arrest Noreiga would be lawful only if m
imilarly, the U.S. action to arrest the suspected Achille Laura hija
 violation of the sovereignty of both the State of the airplane’s reg
olation of the airspace of the country over which the airplane
e Israeli action of kidnapping Eichmann was also a violation of A
, since Argentina granted Eichmann
red a breach of Argentina’s national sovereignty. 
The legality of such unilateral actions must be viewed in light of two eleme
physical element and a moral element. The physical element is the action
lement involves the question of whether the action should be internationally 
accepted. In the forecited examples, the moral element was absent since the action
not internationally accepted and violated other States’ sovereignty. Thus, these unila
actions tended to undermine the effectiveness of international criminal law. 
The Rome Statute of the ICC creates a State duty to cooperate and hand over 
criminals. Article 90 (7)(a), (b) of the Rome Statute provides that  
 
7. Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court 
for the surrender of a person also receives a request from any 
State for the extradition of the same person for conduct other than 
that which constitutes the crime for which the Court seeks the 
person's surrender:  
(a) The requested State shall, if it is not under an existing 
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting 
State, give priority to the request from the Court;  
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting 
State, determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or 
                                                          
2348 S.C. Res. 837, U..N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). 
2349 Gupta, supra note (62) at 267. 
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to extradite the person to the requesting State. In making its 
decision, the requested State shall consider all the relevant 
factors, including but not limited to those set out in paragraph 6, 
but shall give special consideration to the relative nature and 
gravity of the conduct in question. 
 
  
Under this statute, States must adhere to the international law rules and 
obligations, and do not act unilaterally to arrest or abduct terrorists and criminals
Otherwise, these disputes will be settled simply by power, not by law.   
Significantly, some States do not grant any protection to criminal perpetrators 
even under the coverage of immunity, at least for particularly serious crimes. For 
example, when an international warrant was issued by a Spanish judge, the United 
Kingdom rejected the immunity claimed by Augusto Pinochet, and he was arrested 
during his hospitalization in London for crimes against humanity committed while he w
the Chilean head of State.
. 
as 
ternational amnesty. 
The am
f 
ent 
 Treaty of 
y to the 
Turks who had committed the crime irrespective of whether they acted as State actors or 
2350 The United Kingdom thus created a precedent for other 
States to dismiss immunity claims for such serious crimes. 
Another kind of shield that can protect criminal suspects is in
nesty accorded to alleged World War I Turkish criminals of war is a unique 
example of the international protection of war criminals.2351 “In 1923, after the failure o
ratification of the 1919 Treaty of Sèvres,2352 which required that the Turkish governm
turn over to the allies those responsible for [killing of Americans, however,] the
Lausanne2353 excluded such provision and a protocol was attached, giving amnest
non-State actors.”2354 This amnesty can itself be viewed as an international crime 
committed by those who signed and negotiated it.  
                                                          
2350 Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuse
Internal Conflicts: A Positive View, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 302, 314-15 (1999)[hereinafter Si
d in 
mma & Paulus]. 
mbiguities, in International Criminal Responsibility 247(M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
 
her Instruments, Lausanne, Jul. 24, 1923, available at 18 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 
mework of International Humanitarian Law, supra note (2351) at 620-1. 
2351 M. Chreif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlap, Gaps 
and A
1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law].  
2352 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turky, Aug. 10, 1920, available at 15 Am. J. Int’l L.
179 (Supp. 1921). 
2353 Treaty with Turky and Ot
(Supp. 1925). 
2354 James F. Willis, Prologue To Nuremberg: the Politics and Diplomacy of 
Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (1982), cited in Bassiouni, The 
Normative Fra
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A different kind of problem is illustrated by the ad hoc tribunals, Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, ICTY, and ICTR, all of which were criticized for establishing “justice af
fact. Since [they] have been created in response to transgression, critiques have 
questioned whether justice was carried out according to the generally accepted princi
of nulun crimen and peona sine lege [no crime or punishment without prior law].”
ter the 
ples 
 
ng 
d 
codified before any trial took place, and even before any violation 
occurre
he 
orts 
tate responsibility, but makes “individual 
respons
2355
Some scholars noted that, during the actual trials, ICTY and ICTR Judges were creati
laws and procedures.2356 The ICC is excluded from such critique because it was create
and its laws were 
d. However, even as to the ad hoc tribunals, its laws were not created after the 
violation occurred, but before, and indeed even before the creation of these tribunals. T
instruments that established the ad hoc tribunals did not create criminal law, but only 
reaffirmed the laws of IHL, IEL, and EHRs that previously existed. 
Despite these difficulties in assigning international criminal responsibility, eff
must be made in order to vindicate the rights of victims. The Criminal responsibility of 
individuals does not, in any way, exclude S
ibility […] additional to, and not exclusive of, the responsibility of the 
government concerned.”2357 Both the State and individual are subject to criminal 
sanctions. In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, while recognizing the criminal responsibility o
accused, the ICTY considered that “[t]he continued indirect involvement of the 
Government of the [former] Yugoslavia in the armed conflict in the Republic of 
and Herzegovina […] gives rise to issues of State responsibility […].”
f the 
Bosnia 
age 
2358 The same 
position was taken by the United States Congress when it declared, after the dam
caused by Iraq to the Kuwaiti environment in 1991, that “Saddam Hussein and Iraq” 
                                                          
2355 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 21; Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note (2270) at 
468. 
2356 Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal That Overcomes Past 
Objections, 23 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 417, 437-38 (1995) [hereinafter Jamison]; A. Rohan Perera, 
, 300 
 1-10 (1989), Chapter 6, n. 19; Germany Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual, para. 
Toward the Establishment of An International Criminal Court, 20 Commonwealth L. Bull. 298
(1994) [hereinafter Perera].  
2357 United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, Part III, 173 (1958); U.S. Department of the Navy, 
Annotated Supplement to the Commanders’ Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. 
A)/FMFM
12M (1992). 
2358 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of May 7, 1997, Trial Chamber II, IT-94-IT, para. 606. 
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should be held legally, morally, and financially accountable for its crimes against th
environment.
e 
 
errorist 
el or its interests, where terrorists have been described by some anti-
Israeli 
e 
 
g 
 
t Nixon and [his 
Secreta n 
ated. Another example involves the Khmer Rouge, who were 
responsible for what are probably the worst mass killings since World War II. However, 
they “were dignifie[d] in October 1991 as party to an agreement to end the civil war, [and 
2359 
The politicization of the international crimes, including those committed against
the environment, is another difficulty facing the achievement of international criminal 
responsibility. For example, according to the national, regional or ethnic beliefs, certain 
acts can be interpreted as heroic acts, even while they can also be interpreted as crimes of 
war in other parts of the world. This issue has been raised repeatedly during t
attacks against Isra
movements as heroes and martyrs. 
Political considerations can influence a State’s decision as to whether to prosecut
crimes of war. Some crimes may be prosecuted vigorously, while others may be ignored 
despite their severity. Since the aftermath of World War II, “many crime have been 
committed but very few have been prosecuted.”2360 Many of these crimes have been 
committed during wars waged by national leaders. Should these leaders be held 
“responsible [for] simply adopt[ing] or knowingly permitt[ing] the adoption of policies
and objectives the realization of which was likely to lead to the commission of 
[environmental] crimes[?]”2361 Under international practice, the response to this question 
is not clear. Some national leaders have been held responsible for their policies in wagin
wars, while some others have not. For instance, “it is well-known that Truman, the 
[former] President of the United States, personally made the decision to use the [atomic
bombs in Japan in World War II],”2362 and “[the former] Presiden
ry of State] Dr. Kissinger [designed the policy of American military interventio
in Vietnam].”2363 Their potential criminal responsibility for the violation of the laws of 
war has never been litig
                                                          
2359 H.R.REP. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.REC. 1824 (1991). 
2360 See, Andries, Report to the Committee on Military Criminology, International Society for Military 
 
Criminal Law and the Law of War, 29 Rev. De Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 422 
(1990).  
2361 Richard A. Wasserstrom, Individual Responsibility in Warfare, in Law and Responsibility in
ter Wasserstrom]. Warfare, 209 (Peter D. Trooboff, 1975) [hereinaf
2362 Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 424. 
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were] g
s at home, but withdrew without any attempt to arrest the Iraqi criminals 
of war,
, Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi criminals of war are still ruling the country 
rather than being prosecuted in international criminal tribunals.  
osevic, after negotiating and signing the peace treaty 
with Bo
iticizing the rules of international law. They leave the 
impress
s 
s 
     
rant[ed] legitimacy and freedom from punishment as part of the new 
government.”2364  
A different example involves the United States and the Allies troops, who after 
liberating Kuwait in February 1991, entered South Iraq to assure the complete defeat of 
the Iraqi invader
 including Saddam Hussein. The U.S. made the political decision that the arrest 
and prosecution of Saddam Hussein was undesirable, since the Iraqi President is Sunni 
and the United States does not want the region to be governed by extremists Shiia, 
particularly since Iran, on the other side of the Gulf, is governed by Shiia. So political 
considerations resulted in no prosecution. In fact, after the cease-fire nothing was heard 
from the U.S. or its allies about any war crimes or the criminal responsibility of Saddam 
Hussein. This attitude was also transmitted to the Security Council since its resolutions 
were silent on this issue.2365 The result is that, almost eleven years after the signature of 
cease-fire
In contrast, Slobodan Mil
snia-Herzegovina, was captured in April 2001,2366 and is being tried by the ICTY 
for his crimes of war.  
The forecited examples reflect the double standards of the international 
community as a direct result of pol
ion that international criminal justice is imposed by victorious States, or the great 
powers,2367 as they wish. As a result, the credibility of international criminal institution
is undermined.  
To maintain the effectiveness and credibility of international criminal justice, it 
would be necessary to be substantive and objective in dealing with international crime
                                                                                                                                                                        
ggest
War, in Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 256 (Richard J. 
Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Robert, Environmental Issues]. 
6/28/milosevic.court/index.html>, (last visit Oct. 30, 
siouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note (2270) at 466-67. 
2363 Townsend Hoopes, The Nuremberg Su ion, in Crimes of War 233-37 (Falk et al. eds., 
1971). 
2364 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note (2270) at 493. 
2365 Adam Robert, Environmental Issues in International armed Conflict: The Experience of the 1991 Gulf 
2366 CNN.Com, Milosevic Jailed in The Hague, available at 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/0
2001)[hereinafter Milosevic Jailed]. 
2367 Bas
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and criminals. This is particularly so when such crimes result in sacrificing international 
law principles, such as State sovereignty. The ICC should have extensive jurisdiction 
over cr
ion, 
 a 
legislative, judicial and executive powers. Persons suspected of international 
crimes 
m, 
 
m o 
in 
 War I.2369 However, in that case, the national legal system 
did not
f 
 
rding to which judges are subordinated, such as France, 
                                                          
imes committed within the national jurisdiction of non-member States. The ICC 
should also have jurisdiction over crimes committed before its formation. In conclus
the international responsibility system is by no means perfect, and too often, States hide 
behind their sovereignty and allow some individuals to be protected from the system of 
justice.  
 
B- National Responsibility 
 
National responsibility arises from the laws of individual States, consistent with
State’s 
might be prosecuted under national laws, by national judges, and punished by 
national enforcement authorities.  
The national system has traditionally had a priority over the international syste
where questions arise of violation of either national rules or international ones.2368 For 
instance, when a national legal system is effective in prosecuting criminals and serving
justice, the international legal syste  will be excluded from intervention. According t
this rule, Germany was given the right to prosecute its citizens who were involved 
crimes of war during World
 serve the ends of justice, since most of the criminals escaped punishment.2370 
After World War II, military tribunals were established under the national legal system o
each Allied State to prosecute criminals of war,2371 along with the international military
tribunals of Tokyo and Nuremberg. 
National legal systems differ from each other, sometimes in significant ways. For 
example, some countries function under the common law system, based on judicial 
precedents, such as the United States. Other countries have adopted the civil law system, 
based on codified laws acco
2368 Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 6. 
, Matthew Lippman, Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals 
osecutions of Nazi]. 
2369 Friedman, supra note (2259) at  776-77. 
2370 Id. 
2371 Trooboff, supra note (2258) at 20. See also
Before Post-World War II Domestic Tribunals, 8 U.Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1999-2000) 
[hereinafter Lippman, Pr
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Egypt, 
e 
er 
 
 Western legal principles, since 
teachin  
oo. 
iminate and reduce their negative effects at least on the environment, 
as a glo y 
It is in 
 law. 
 
er 
 responsibility. 
t punish 
                                                          
and Kuwait. Moreover, even this simple classification is very complicated, since 
the sources of law vary dramatically from one country to another. For example, som
countries give priority to the codified rules of law, some others grant this priority to the 
customary laws of the nation, others consider religious rules dominant over any other 
laws.  
These difference can have a substantial effect on the relations between nations, 
since an act of an individual may be considered legal in one nation, and illegal in anoth
nation. For example, the occidental nationals who attempted to spread Christianity in
Afghanistan, in August 2001, acted legally according to
g any religion is considered a matter of liberty, that is assured by the European
Convention for the Human Rights2372 and is a constitutional right in many European 
countries. However, spreading Christianity or any other religion in Afghanistan is 
considered a severe crime. 
Therefore, as long as international relations exist, such differences will exist t
Nevertheless, to el
bal common, a standard environmental law should be formulated, examined b
the representatives of all nations, and its final draft should be transmitted to the 
legislators in each country for comments prior to being adopted as a national law. 
the ultimate interest of all States to adopt and encourage such a model environmental
This idea may take a long time to be realized, but it will greatly serve our generation and
future generations as well. 
Until this idea turns into a fact, we should deal with the current situation and try 
to illustrate the mechanisms available on the national level to assure environmental 
protection. Most national systems extend traditional concepts of responsibility to cov
environmental matters. However, each national system has its own rules of
For example, most national legal systems, directly or indirectly, enacted laws tha
environmental crimes. Nevertheless, the same environmental crime can be considered as 
misdemeanor in one nation and as a felony in another nation. The punishment may be 
ental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, art. 9, 213 
955).  
2372 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundam
U.N.T.S. 221 (1
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monetary only in one country, and imprisonment in another, based on many facto
including the environmental awareness in each nation.  
Warfare environmental damages, theoretically, can be sought in the nation
courts of the victim nation. However, even when the involved nations have similar legal 
systems, the perpetrators “would normally be entitled to sovereign immunity” from 
prosecution in a State other than their own.
rs, 
al 
, 
e 
his 
immun  of 
es 
 
w 
sponsibility, such as the United Nations’ humanitarian intervention, 
must be
cted 
 have 
                                                          
2373 Even if the perpetrators are not immune
“the act of State doctrine would bar consideration of the merits of the claim in som
jurisdictions.”2374 
It would be useful here to mention that in some States, particularly the Third 
World States, armed forces have a certain immunity for reasons of military secrecy. T
ity prevents any other national authority from imposing control or rules
enforcement over military activities and installations. Nonetheless, within the State, 
military activities should not be excluded from any control. Special military authoriti
could be created to fulfill the goal of civil authorities. For instance, military courts could 
be established to examine cases involving military activities, and military police could be 
created to replace the traditional police forces in order to enforce military laws. These
military authorities are usually governed by the military, and are trained by military 
personnel, which would increase their credibility and their effectiveness.  
On the other hand, in circumstances such as civil wars, piracy, and narco-traffic 
situations, where States are incapable of establishing order and responsibility, then a ne
legal concept of re
 applied. To control these situations, there should be some international force that 
can step into nations to capture war criminals, to stop genocide or avoid terrible 
environmental catastrophes. Here, the new legal concept of responsibility, which may be 
called “internal responsibility,”2375could be applied. One example of that kind of 
responsibility is the case of Panamanian President, Manuel Noreiga, who was prote
by sovereign immunity although he was a drug dealer. An international force could
f war criminals, their 
 that they are giving war criminals back to the international tribunal. 
2373 Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 411. 
2374 Id., at 412. 
2375 Internal responsibility means that type of responsibility, which is partly national and partly 
international. For example, when the prosecutors in The Hague ask for the arrest o
arrest may be national or international, by NATO, government officials, or police forces of any State. The 
result will be
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effected his arrest without an invasion by another country. Another example is piracy,
which has been considered as “hostis humani generis,”2376 i.e., a
 
 crime against all 
countri
o 
e 
international rules work. These rules have to be defended wherever and whenever they 
former 
Yugosl ry 
 
 it 
sponsibility amounts to a missing link 
in the i
nations, the principal means of imposing responsibility for warfare environmental 
damage is u tringent 
environmen
Res uations:  
(A) Past act B) Past 
actions not la , but unlawful under international law and; 
not crimes or civil wrongs when committed, but are so under 
es. Pirates continue to commit crimes in the Malacca Strait and in the waters of 
southeast Asia. International forces could serve an important function, because the tw
involved States, Indonesia and Malaysia, do not have the power to stop such crime.  
In other situations, such as slavery, genocide, long-lasting irreversible 
environmental damage, drugs, or civil wars, there should be rules delineating when the 
international community can intervene to help, stabilize the condition and make th
are weakened. For instance, if genocide takes place in a certain place, such as the 
avia, a failure to prosecute will weaken the protection against genocide eve
place else. The international community should recognize that when these horrible events
happen, they are not just the internal affairs of a certain State, but concern all nations. 
Thus, there should be some kind of responsibility to cover the forecited situations, and
is not the same kind of State responsibility that may arise out of formally declared war 
between nations. 
The absence of rules creating this kind of re
nternational order. Until that link is created, there will be no reliable system for 
punishing war crimes that arise in these kinds of shadowy situations. The intervention of 
international forces to stabilize these situations is necessary, and may become more 
necessary in the coming years. Nevertheless, until these ideas are accepted among 
nder national law. And indeed, national laws may impose more s
tal constraints than international law in some cases. 
ponsibility under a nation’s law may be found in three possible sit
ions which were already crimes or acts entailing civil liability; (
yet crimes under the national w
(C) Past actions which were 
                                                          
2376 Zou Keyuan, Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea, 31 Maritime L & Comm. 107, 
107 (2000). 
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revisions of national law. This section will examine each of the forecited situations in two 
differen
re, under 
ve
ha d 
ch site 
 re oval 
s.”
a
hazardous waste […] or 3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false 
l, manifest […] or 4) knowingly generates, 
orts, or […] handles any hazardous 
t legal systems, the United States system and the State of Kuwait system. 
 
1. Past Actions which were Already Crimes or Acts Entailing Civil Liability 
In the case of the United States, since the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)2377 had already gone into effect, 
the prosecution was for acts that had already been defined as crimes. Therefo
CERCLA, e n the “federal government has been held accountable for cleanup costs 
associated with government-owned zardous substances.”2378 CERCLA also create
liability for private parties either to implement government cleanup programs at ea
or to reimburse government cleanup expenses.2379 
Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint and several, and retroactive upon past and 
present owners, transporters, and generators of hazardous waste, for “all costs of m
or remedial action 2380 In another words, liability is imposed under CERCLA for the 
costs of removing the w ste and restoring the site to acceptable environmental quality. 
 
Strict liability holds parties accountable for waste disposal 
practices regardless of intent, negligence, or causal connection. 
Joint and several liability ensures that all liable parties at a site 
are responsible for the entire cleanup. Retroactive liability holds 
responsible parties liable for waste disposal practices that took 
place before CERCLA was enacted, and which may have been 
legal at the time of disposal.2381 
 
Under another U.S. environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), any person who: “1) knowingly transports or causes to be 
transported any hazardous waste or […] 2) knowingly treats, stores, or dispose of any 
material statement […] in any application, labe
store, treats, transports, disposes of, exp
                                                          
2377 CERCLA, supra note (1361). 
2378 Hoover, supra note (534) at 134; See, FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d 
113) at 342. 
Ci  liable for cleanup costs as an operator within the meaning of 
CERCLA). 
2379 Gaines, supra note (2
r. 1994) (holding the United States
2380 CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). 
 441
waste[…],”2382 shall be subject to fines of up to $50,000 for each day of violation, or up 
to two years imprisonment, or both.2383 Under RCRA the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) can initiate and conduct investigations, and refer the matter to the 
Attorney General for prosecution if necessary.
 
Unlike 
ne, 
t natural 
 
 
A, 
 the authority to impose administrative 
penaltie
 of EPA’s imposition 
of such
 
         
2384 
Another U.S. statute, the Clean Water Act (CWA),2385 was enacted to “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.”2386 
CERCLA,2387 it applies only to releases or threats of releases of certain 
substances into navigable waters.2388 Section 311 (b)(1) of the CWA prohibits the 
discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, the adjoining shoreli
contiguous zones, or certain other designated areas, or discharge which may affec
resources belonging to or managed by the United States. Discharge of oil from a “public
vessel”2389 is excluded from the CWA’s civil, administrative and criminal penalties.2390
According to Section 309 (b), persons who violate the requirements of the CW
including discharging without a permit or in violation of a permit, are subject to civil 
penalties by EPA, including a permanent or temporary injunction. More significant, 
however, is the fact that the Congress gave EPA
s without going to court.2391 After seeking review EPA of the decision to impose 
administrative penalties, alleged violators may seek judicial review
 penalties.2392 The administrative penalties will not bar a citizen suit if was 
brought before the commencement of the administrative penalties.2393 Additionally, the 
CWA authorizes criminal prosecution for certain negligent or knowing violations of the
                                                                                                                                                                    
2381 Brian J. Pinkowski, Simplifying CERCLA Defenses to Liability, 28 Urb. L. 197, 201 (1996). 
2382 RCRA, § 3008 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d). 
2383 Id. 
 within the U.S., it excludes petrolum from its definition 
ned or […] operated by the United States. See, CWA, § 311 (a)(4), 
A, § 309 (g)(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(8). 
(B). 
2384 RCRA, § 2002 (c), 42 U.S.C. § 6912 (c). 
2385 CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1252-1387, (1972). 
2386 CWA, § 101 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a). 
2387 Although CERCLA applies to water pollution
of “hazardous substance.” See, CERCLA, § 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14). 
2388 CWA, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321. 
2389 “Public vessel” means a vessel ow
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (a)(4). 
2390 CWA, § 311 (b)(5)-(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(5)-(7); Cervi, supra note (347) at 374. 
2391 CWA, § 309 (g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g). 
2392 CW
2393 CWA, § 309 (g)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(6)
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Act,2394 and for knowing endangerment, where a person knowingly violates the CWA 
and thereby places another person is imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
injury.2395  
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)2396 imposes liability on parties respo
for vessels 
nsible 
or facilities that discharge oil or pose the substantial threat of a discharge of 
oil into
o 
has gone 
into eff
 
the protection of the marine environment in Kuwait, and Law No. 19/1973 Concerning 
and its Executive Rules,2403 include 
 the navigable waters, shorelines or exclusive economic zone of the United 
States.2397 The OPA provides damages for, inter alia, injury to natural resources, 
economic losses, and removal costs.2398Significantly, the OPA provides certain foreign 
governments and individuals a right to claim removal costs or damages resulting from 
discharges or substantial threats of discharges of oil from “Outer Continental Shelf” 
facilities or deep water ports, a vessel in navigable waters, a vessel carrying oil as carg
within the United States, or an Alaskan pipeline tanker.2399 Public vessels,2400 however, 
excluded from the statutory reach of OPA.2401  
Thus, if a person is prosecuted under one of the forecited statutes after it 
ect, then his acts have previously been defined as crimes. 
On the other hand, in the case of Kuwait, the production and exportation of the 
crude oil is the main source of living. This kind of activity threatens the environment if 
not restricted by the rules of law, especially since the technology and the experience in 
that field are not very advanced. Some laws regulating the production and exportation of 
oil do reflect concern with environmental protection. For instance, Law No. 12/1964 
Concerning the Prohibition of Navigable Water Pollution by Oil,2402 designed to assure
the Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources 
                                                          
2394 CWA, § 309 (c)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(1)-(2). 
2395 CWA, § 309 (c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(3). 
2396 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
2397 OPA, § 1002 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (a). 
2398 OPA, § 1002, 33 U.S.C. § 2702. 
2399 OPA, § 1007, 33 U.S.C. § 2707. 
2400 or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of “Vessel” means every description of water craft  being 
 used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel. OPA, § 1001 (37), 33 U.S.C. § 2701
(37). 
2401 OPA, § 1002 (c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(2). 
2402 Kuwaiti Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Act, supra note (1524).  
2403 Petroleum Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515). 
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some provisions to assure the environmentally friendly exploitation of petroleum 
resources. 
Article 4 (1) of Law No. 12/1964 provides that “any pollution [that occurs in 
marine
 
s 
the 
2407 Fines are not always an effective 
deterrent, since oil companies make fortunes out of their activities and paying some 
thousands o ns.  
A hi n 1990, 
during the I luted by 
Iraqi armed e sources in 
Mina’a Al-A 2408 The 
persons wh ey are captured 
and jud ed vertheless, no 
fine wi onment. 
on, such as 
e 
. 
 areas by discharging, leakage of oil or any other liquid containing oil from any 
ship or land-base source, as] described in Articles 12404 and 22405 of this law is punishable
by a fine of up to 40,000 Kuwaiti Dinard (“KD”).2406 It is notable that a violation of thi
law is punishable only by a fine, not by imprisonment. However, under this provision, 
High Court of Kuwait has, in a number of cases, fined the owner or the captain of the 
ship for polluting the marine environment with oil.
f KDs will not stop them from continuing their harmful operatio
storical example of marine environment pollution by oil occurred i
raqi invasion of Kuwait, when marine areas were considerably pol
 forces who discharged crude oil into these areas from land-bas
hmady, and from oil tankers already moored in Kuwaiti seaports.
o committed such crimes escaped international justice, but if th
according to the Kuwaiti laws, they will be maximally fined. Neg
ll be adequate to address the harm that they caused to the marine envir
Article 4 (1) is applicable to cases of oil pollution only. Other causes of polluti
munitions that may explode during military maneuvers, or under-sea mine explosions, ar
not subject to this Article, even if they cause severe marine environment pollution
                                                          
2404 Artic
aking oil, 
d to store 
2405 Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Law provides that “Any cargo 
registered at Kuwait and designed to load ‘150’ tons and more, and any other ship registered in Kuwait and 
designed to load ‘500’ tons and more, are prohibited from discharging oil or any other liquid containing no 
less than hundred units in each million, in any area that considered prohibitive to it, according with annex 
ter Pollution Prohibition Law, supra note (1524) art 2 (1). 
t 
).  
le 1 of the Law articulated that “[p]olluting naval areas, [Kuwait internal waters and territorial sea] 
that defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, is completely prohibited, whether by discharging, or le
or any other liquid containing oil, from any ship, any place on the land, or any equipment prepare
the oil, or to transport it from one place to another, on board the ship or on the land[…].” Kuwaiti 
Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Act, supra note (1524) art. 1.  
No.1 of this law.” Kuwaiti Navigable Wa
2406 Id., art 4. One KD= 3.3 U.S. Dollars as of 2002. 
2407 See, The Legal Aspects of Maritime Pollution With Particular Reference to 
the Arabian Gulf, Chap. 9, at 220-224, cited in Badryah Al-Awady, Commentarie, The Judgmen
Concerning Polluting the Seas with Oil: the Necessity to Discard the Negligence as a Bases for 
Responsibility in Pollution Cases (in Arabic), 1 L. & Sharia J. 193, 195-96 (1979
2408 Schmitt, supra note (971) at 14, 18.  
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The Kuwaiti government gave implicit criminal immunity for foreign petroleum 
companies, to encourage them to exploit the Kuwaiti petroleum resources. For example, 
Law No. 19/1973 related to Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources did not 
include any criminal responsibility for its violation, even in Article 3 which addresses 
environmental damage.2409 It does, however, include civil and administrative liabilities. 
Article
nalty of the amount not less than KD 
ing KD 50.000 will be imposed for each 
iolation to this law or its executive rules. If the same violation’s 
tion 
 
e 
ts. 
 
KD 
environmen  
compensati  Article 10 
is applicabl age 
occurred as be subject to this Article. 
Kuwait Municipality issued Announcement No. 130/98,2410 relevant to the public 
use of t
provided in the law of the public cleanliness.2412 Kuwait military forces use training 
 10 of that statute provides that  
 
[a]n administrative pe
10.000 and not exceed
v
committed within three years from the date of the precedent 
violation, the mentioned punishment will double. If the viola
harms the petroleum patrimony, an appropriate compensation
will be imposed beside the mentioned penalty. This 
administrative punishment or the imposed compensation will not 
interfere with any other punishment or penalty defined in th
laws, regulations, and contractual or international agreemen
10.000 is the minimum administrative penalty for the prohibited 
tal harm. In addition, the responsible party has to pay appropriate
on to cover the costs of cleanup and rehabilitation. Unfortunately,
e to petroleum operations only, which means that if the same dam
 result of military operations, it will not  a
he desert’s environment. The Announcement examines and regulates the 
environmental effects of the spring camps. It requires campers not to kill animals or 
destroy plants.2411 Any violation of the Announcement will be subject to the punishment 
camp in the desert of Kuwait, and therefore should be subject to the same rules addressed 
                                                          
2409 Article 3 of the law relevant to the Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources provides that 
“[E]ach delegated in the work, should take all necessary precautionary measures and actions to prevent any
damage or risk produced from petroleum operations, on human life, public health, property, natural 
resources patrimony, cemeteries, religious, antiquarian, or tourism sites. He should also take all necessary 
precautionary measures to prevent air, surface and underground waters pollution.” 
2410 Kuwait Municipality Announcement, supra note (1543). 
2411 Id., at 8. 
 
e violation of  [the Public 
s.” Law Decree of the Cleanliness, supra note (1517) art. 3. 
2412 “[A] fine not less than KD 5 and not more than KD 200 will be imposed for th
Cleanliness Law] provision
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by the announcement, especially since some military campers discard ammunitions’ 
debris and toxic materials on their sites. However, they are not. 
The Environmental Public Authority (EPA) Law goes further, and imposes 
criminal punishment in addition to liability for cleanup procedures. Article 13 of the 
Kuwaiti EPA Law provides that  
 
[w]ithout prejudice to any other severe penalty stipulated by 
another law, anyone who violates the norms and conditions 
provided for in Article 8,2413 or violates the suspension order 
stipulated in Article 10 of this law,2414 shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or a fine not 
exceeding KD 10.000 or with both penalties if repeated. In 
addition, the Court may confiscate the materials that cause 
pollution of the environment or have harmful effects. The Court 
may oblige the authority causing the pollution or the harm to bear 
all costs required for remedying harm that may affect the 
environment and which is a direct result of the violation, and to 
remove the pollutants at their expense or close the places where 
work is the source of pollution for a period not exceeding three 
months and in case of repetition of the violation, the Court may 
rule, the cancellation of the licenses[…].2415  
 
 
Despite the applicability of this Article to civilian activities, there is no legal 
obstacle that may prevent its applicability to military activities, unless explicitly excluded
by another law. It is remarkable that the EPA Law emphasizes environmental protectio
by giving the Court the ability to confiscate any materials determined to be a s
pollution. This law also grants the Court the power to require a defendant to pay expens
for the cleanup of all damage that directly results from the violation. The Court has also 
the right to temporarily order the closure of the source of pollution. However, Article 13 
also has its weaknesses as a vehicle for protecting the environment. First, although the 
                                                          
 
n 
ource of 
es 
2413 Article 8 of the Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law provides that “[t]he Board of Directors 
shall prepare the systems d criteria that might be found upon determination of the location or establish o
use or remove of any establishment or production of materials or carry out operations or any other activ
that may lead to environmental pollution. The Authority shall carry out and execute environmental impact 
 an r 
ity 
studies of the development projects. The Authority, in case of violating these systems and conditions, may 
suspend the execution of the project and withdraw the license of the violator of the works or the 
ronmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967) art. 8. 
ti Environmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967) art. 10.  
ara. 1. 
establishments or the activities. The authorities and the parties concerned are obliged to respond to this 
request.” The Kuwaiti Envi
2414 The Kuwai
2415 Id., art. 13 p
 446
Court was given the right to confiscate any materials that have actually caused pollution
it does not have power to seize materials that are likely to do so in the future. That is, 
although the law imposes punishment, it does nothing to prevent pollution before it 
occurs. Second, Article 13 states that “the Court may oblige the authority [...] to bear all 
costs required for the remedy,” but gives no guidance as to amounts. General criteria 
should be set forth in the statute to provide predictability and fairness. Finally, this 
Article does not deal with any future environmental damage that may be connected to th
violation, even though environmental damage often has long-lasting effects.  
Another Kuwaiti environmental statute is Law No. 56/1996 Concerning the 
Issuance of the Kuwait Industry Law, which requires
, 
e 
 the Public Authority of Industry to 
“assure rnational 
ction 
plete, 
partial 
ese 
 
n 
ties 
ities 
s. The 
Public Authority of Industry can notify, warn, revoke privileges, or suspend or cancel an 
 the total application of [any] industrial project to all national and inte
rules related to environmental protection, and [to assure] that all the rules of produ
are subject to these rules.”2416 Article 1 of the Industry law is applicable to every 
industrial establishment and craft. An industrial establishment is “any establishment that 
mainly seeks the transformation of the primary elements and materials into com
or intermediary industrialized products, or even transforming partially 
industrialized and intermediary materials into complete industrialized products. Th
activities would includes mixture, disjunction, formalization, reformalization, assemblage
and packing only if the work in the establishment is based on mechanical power.”2417 A
industrial craft is defined by the law as “every production or maintenance activity based 
on the handiwork in cooperation with light use of machines and which produces 
untypical products.”2418 Thus, those would apply to, among other areas, to the activi
of the military. Kuwaiti military forces may practice some simple industrial activ
such as assembling, and thus fall within Article 2. Consequently, the military would be 
bound to respect environmental protection according to Article 29 (17). Violations of the 
Kuwait Industry Law would be subject to either administrative or criminal sanction
                                                          
2416 Ghanoon Bisha’an Isdar Ghanoon asyna’ah 56/1996 [Law Relevant to the Adoption of the Industry 
Law No. 56/1996] art. 29. 
2417 Id., art. 2. 
2418 Id., art. 3. 
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industry’s permit as an administrative penalty.2419 In more severe violations, a crim
penalty can also be
inal 
 imposed. Article 43 of the law provides that “anyone establishes an 
industr ithout 
repare an 
al 
esult in the denial of the permit request. 
dditionally, Kuwaiti Monument Law No. 11/19602421 provides that “every one 
 
nd the 
ated 
in the 
Monument Law.  
                                                          
ial project, or modifies an existing industrial establishment or craft, […] w
permit, is subject to imprisonment of period not exceeding three years and fine not 
exceeding KD 3,000 or one of the punishment. The Public Authority of Industry can also 
order the closing of the unpermitted establishment.” 
According to Decision No. 9/1990 Regulating the Procedures of the 
Environmental Impact Studies for Structural and Industrial Projects, all industrial 
establishments, including military industrial establishments, are required to p
Environmental Impact Study prior to starting any activity.2420 Any serious environment
effect of the industrial project would r
A
who deliberately damages a registered movable monument, even if it is under his 
possession, demolishes a historical building or site, or trespasses on a historical building 
or a monumental site shall be imprisoned for no less than a year and no more than five 
years and be subject to a fine of no less than [Indian Rupees] IR 1000 and no more than
IR 10,000.”2422 Military activities may present a serious threat to the monuments a
cultural heritage of every nation, and therefore should be subject to this statute. For 
example, in 1990, the Iraqi military forces caused severe damage to the Kuwaiti 
monuments, whether the monuments were located in Kuwait National Museum or loc
in Kuwait Scientific Museum. Iraqi troops also damaged the historical sites located 
Failaka Island. Moreover, military maneuvers may cause damage to the historical 
monuments and sites as well.2423 Definitely, Iraq was not punished under Kuwaiti 
aiti Monuments Law, supra note (1520). 
 in 
 
 
nflict – Is it Working? A Case Study the Persian Gulf War Experience, 23 Colum. VLA J. L. 
2419 Id., art. 39. 
2420 The Environmental Impact Assessment Ministerial Decision, supra note (1551) art. 1. 
2421 The Kuw
2422 Id., art. 42. It would be noted that this law uses the Indian Rupees which was used as method of trade
Kuwait before the issuance of the Kuwaiti Dinar, and the Kuwaiti Dinar equals more than thirteen Indian
Rupees. Abdullah K Al-Ayoub, The Legal System of Kuwait, in Modern Legal System 
Cyclopedia, 5.180.31 (Professor Kenneth Rober Redden ed., 1990) [hereinafter The 
Legal System of Kuwait]. 
2423 Harvey E. Oyer III, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Co
49 (1999). 
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Finally, Law No. 131/1977 Regulating Ionizing Radiation Usage and the 
Protection Against its Hazards should be extended to apply to military activities, since 
their ac
 
2. Past Actions Not Yet Crimes Under the National Law, But Unlawful Under 
Internation
Res commits an 
action not a nternational law 
rules. For e he Kurds in 
Northern Ir n is neither 
prohibited n rnational 
law prohibi apons since 
they have significant humanitarian and environmental impacts. Various international 
instruments of the 
Development, Production Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruc  
g to 
sevic, and his military 
comma cide 
              
tivities occasionally involve the use of ionizing radiation. Article 17 of the Kuwait 
Ionizing Radiation Law provides that “any violation of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 82424 of this 
law is punishable with imprisonment for a period of time not exceeding three years and
fine not less than KD 100 and not more than KD 225 or one of these punishments.” 
Regrettably, the environment in Kuwait is underestimated, and many severe 
environmental crimes are considered misdemeanors, leaving the country volnerable to 
many serious environmental threats.  
 
al Law 
ponsibility may arise under a nation’s laws, even when a person 
unts to a violation under i crime in his country, if the act amo
xample, Iraqi armed forces used chemical weapons to combat t
aq. Under Iraqi law, the use of weapons of mass destructio
or allowed; their national law is silent on the subject. However, inte
ts the use of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical we
 reaffirm this concept, such as the Convention on the Prohibition 
tion (CWC).2425 Thus, Iraq as a member of the United Nations must adhere to this
international norms, and can properly be sanctioned under international law foe failin
do so.  
Similarly, the former Yugoslavian President, Slobodan Milo
nders committed genocide against their Muslim populations. Although geno
against Muslims is not considered a crime under Serbian law, it is an international war 
                                            
2424 Articles 2 and 3 require the possession of permit, from the Ministry of Health, before the importing, 
exporting, manufacturing, possession, rotating, transport, or discard of ionizing radiation equipments or 
materials.  Article 4 requires the permitted entity to limited with the conditions of the permit, and to t
the necessary measures to assure the safety of the citizens, the workers, and the environment. Article 8 
ake 
obliges the permitted entity to inform the concerned authority in case of loosing ionizing radiation materials 
or equipment, or in case of serious accident. Kuwaiti Ionizing Radiation Law, supra note (1510) arts. 2, 3, 
4, and 8. 
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crime, and many international instruments prohibit it. Article 5 of the Rome Statute, fo
example, provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction 
in accordance with this Statute with respect to […t]h
r 
e crime of genocide.” Article 6 of 
the Rom
easures intended to prevent births within the 
 
mmitting 
 
he 
atomic bombs by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki [without examining…] 
any adverse effects on the environment. The Court considered that the bombs were 
e to the use of poison and poisonous gases […].”  In this case, the Court 
e Statute states that  
 
[f]or the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part;  
(d) Imposing m
group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
 
Thus, even though their acts were not criminal under Serbian law, these officials
could properly be prosecuted under international law. Likewise, the Iraqi President, 
Saddam Hussein, may in the future be prosecuted under international law for co
war crimes, even if his acts were not criminal under the Iraqi law. 
The dropping of atomic bomb on Japan by the United States, although not 
unlawful act under U.S. law, may also be considered a crime under international law. 
“[In 1963] the Tokyo District Court […assessed] the legality of dropping t
comparabl 2426
ergareferred to the  omnes, by noting that “[Atomic bombs dropping over Hiroshima and 
ich 
                                                      
Nagasaki] may be regarded as contrary to the fundamental principle of law of war wh
hibits the causing of unnecessary suffering.”2427 pro
                                                                                                                       
2425 CWC, supra note (1671). 
2426 Ryuichi Shimoda v. The State, 32 I.L.R. 626. Cited in Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 
424, fn. 32. 
2427 Id., at 634. 
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Yet another example involves the potential liability of the present Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, for his role in the 1982 massacres which took place at two 
Palestin  
 
on 
st 
nother example is found in the Kuwait Municipality and the Ministry of Public 
2432
 
intensif  
In sum, even if the national law does not regulate or prohibit actions that have 
severe impa tional law may do 
so. When ea international 
community e strong nation will prevail every 
                      
ian refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatila.2428 An Israeli commission of
inquiry concluded under the international pressure on Israel, after the massacres, to held
Sharon responsible.2429 Therefore, the commission found Sharon guilty of “indirect 
responsibility” for the killings of civilian Palestinians and forced him to leave his positi
as a former Army high official.2430 Nevertheless, Sharon came later in a higher position, 
as the Israeli Prime Minister, and he is continuing his stringent and tough policy again
the Palestinian people.2431  
A
Works, which disposes of domestic sewage directly into the Persian Gulf, causing 
significant harm to the fragile marine environment in the Gulf.  There is no national 
law in Kuwait that criminalizes such acts.2433 However, according to the international 
principle of the prohibition of transboundary pollution, Kuwait should be held 
responsible for the environmental damage effects that affected or may affected in the
future the neighboring States of the Persian Gulf. Under that principle of international 
law, Kuwait authorities should prohibit releasing domestic sewage into the Gulf, and 
y scientific research to treat and recycle such sewage. Moreover, cleanup
procedures should include both the affected areas on the Kuwaiti shores and the deep 
waters of the Gulf. 
cts on human health, welfare or the environment, interna
ch nation acts independently and without any respect for the 
, then there will be no world order, and th
                                    
2428 Zev Chafe 01, at 
31[hereinafter
2429 See, Kaha hristopher 
Walker, Begin
2430 Chafets, s
2431 Although mmitted in 1982 could 
affect his poli
2432 The marin rely affected by the Red Tide, which appeared during 1999 and 
2001. See, EP > (last visit Dec. 
20, 2001).  
2433 Id. 
ts, Dagger Aimed at Sharon Really Meant for Israel, Daily News, June 27, 20
 Chafets]. 
n Report at 3, available at 31 I.L.M. 373, 373, [hereinafter Kahan Report]; C
. 29, 1982 at 1.  Agrees to Hold Massacre Inquiry, TIMES (London), Sept
upra note (2428) at 31. 
Sharon came to his present position by democracy, the crime that he co
tical future and prevent him from holding critical positions. 
e life in Kuwait was seve
A, Fish Killing Reports, 1999 & 2001, available at <http://www.epa.org.kw
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time whether it acts legally or illegally. However, since no country can act independently 
or with
3. Past
Under 
ch 
p costs. 
ury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
It is clear that Section 107 (a) of CERCLA applies to any present or past owner 
and operator of a facility of which any hazardous substance may be disposed, which 
out interaction with other countries, then respecting the international rules is a 
duty, not merely a choice, for every single nation.   
 
 Actions which were not Crimes or Civil Wrongs when Committed, but are so 
Revisions of National Law 
As a rule, most criminal laws may not be applied retroactively. However, some 
national laws criminalize past actions even though they were committed at a time when 
such prohibition did not exist and were therefore considered to be legal acts. This 
retroactive application may be particularly appropriate for acts that have significant 
impact on human health and the environment, and that continue to cause damage. In su
situations, the actors may be held responsible for paying compensation and cleanu
A significant example of this category can be found in the United States 
environmental statutes. Under CERCLA, liability can be retroactive. Section 107 (a) of 
CERCLA states that 
 
[…] (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who […] arranged for disposal or treatment […] 
of hazardous substances […], and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances 
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration 
vessels or sites selected by such person […] shall be liable for 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action […]; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response […]; 
(C) damage for inj
resources […]; and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study 
[…]. 
 
 
shows that CERCLA could be applied retroactively.  
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In 1980, the United States faced a hazardous waste “crisis”, as a result of decades 
of casual industrial waste management.2434 The Congress enacted CERCLA to generate 
revenue to clean up the waste. CERCLA gives the government the power to held parties 
responsible for cleanup costs, even if their acts were legal when taken.2435 CERCLA 
cleanup process can be activated by any “release of a hazardous substance”2436 into the 
environment. It applies to federal hazardous waste sites as well as non-federal sites a
provided in Section 120 (a)(1) which states that “[e]ach department, agency, an
instrumentality of the United States shall be subject
s 
d 
 to, and comply with, this chapter in 
the sam -
g 
iver 
s).2439 
e deposited over a 30-year period by 
two General Electric factories located along the river.2441 Even though this act was not 
e manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any non
governmental entity.” 
Furthermore CERCLA provides for remediation. The statute authorizes the 
government to pursue Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP) and to demand payment to 
remediate. Under Section 120 of the Act, a PRP may be not only a present owner of a 
facility, but a past owner as well. Thus, liability may be imposed even if the previous 
owner violated no laws that were in existence at the time of his acts. The same can be 
true even for a governmental actor. In a significant case, “the federal government was 
held liable for cleanup costs at an [National Priority List (NPL)] site contaminated durin
World War II by a company that manufactured rayon for the war efforts under close 
government supervision.”2437 
A striking example of this kind of retroactive liability involves the Hudson R
in New York State. In 1984, a 200-mile stretch of the Hudson was declared a 
“Superfund” site2438 because of contamination by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB
The PCBs can “bio-accumulate” in fish and cause significant health problems, including 
cancer, to people who eat fish.2440 The PCBs wer
                                                          
2434 Gaines, supra note (2113) at 332. 
CLA § 103 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (a). 
2435 Id. 
2436 CER
2437 FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d 1994 WL 
314814 (3rd. Cir.) cited in Dycus, supra note (4) at 88. 
CLA was enacted in 1980. 
t visit Dec. 17, 2001). 
2438 CER
2439 EPA Newsroom, Factsheet: Hudson River Record of Decision, Dec. 4, 2001, available at 
<http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline4_120401.htm> (las
2440 Id. 
2441 Id. 
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illegal 
 before 
CERCL  
, an American company, established a small factory, 
Union C
ted 
ical 
, 
4,000 
 that 
ety measures or emergency 
procedu aw, the 
Although the Bhopal disaster resulted from civilian activities, the same reasoning 
could be ap
                      
at the time of disposal, because the danger of PCBs was not yet recognized, 
CERCLA holds responsible parties liable for waste disposal that happened
A was enacted. Thus, under that statute, the EPA ordered General Electric to
“dredg[e] an estimat 2.65 million cubic yards from 40-miles section of the river to 
remove approximately 150 thousand pounds of PCBs.”2442 
Another civilian example is the Bhopal disaster. The city of Bhopal was the site 
of part of “India’s Green Revolution” that aimed at increasing the productivity of 
crops.2443 In 1962, Union Carbide
arbide India Ltd. (UCIL) in Bhopal, the capital of Madhya Pradesh, to produce 
pesticides.2444 India owned 51% of the factory, and the American company owned the 
rest, 49%, but the American company was operating the facility. In 1979, the plant star
to manufacture the pesticide Methyl Isocyanate (MIC).2445 In 1984, a hazardous chem
reaction took place when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage tank, and then
“about 40 tons of [MIC] poured out of the tank […] and escaped into the air, spreading 
eight kilometers downwind, over the city of nearly 900,000.”2446 As a result, about 
people were killed, about 4,000, and approximately 400,000 injured.2447 The actions
led to this tragedy were not specifically prohibited by Indian law. Nevertheless, the 
Indian government successfully argued that the American parent company was 
responsible, due to its failure to employ adequate saf
res. Although these failures were not specifically prohibited under Indian l
company was in effect held retroactively liable. 
plied to activities on a military base or at a munitions factory.  
                                    
2442 Id. 
2443 TED Case Studies, Bhopal Disaster, available at <http://www.american.edu/TED/BHOPAL.htm>, (last 
visit Dec. 14, 2001). 
tle lighter that water but twice as heavy as air.” See, Id. 
2444 Id. 
2445 “MIC is one of the many ‘intermediates’ used in pesticide production and is a dangerous chemical. It is 
a lit
2446 Id. 
2447 Id. 
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In K n of 
19612448 pr ubject to any law that was codified after the 
pollution occurred. Practically, it is difficult to modify this constitutional provision, as the 
Kuwait l 
rfere 
e 
it 
should  a stable source for cleanup 
costs. For e , and has no 
jurisdiction etroleum 
industry cau er, the 
Kuwaiti Par ir or who did 
so in the pa ons to 
remedy haz
Arti PA) Law 
provides a legal basis for actors against polluters. That Article provides that 
 
ironment, the 
e extended 
uwait, the principle of non-retroactivity included in the Constitutio
ents persons from being sev
i Government does not favor or encourage any efforts to modify any constitutiona
rule, since it may create a precedent to amend other constitutional rules that may inte
with the Government’s interests. 
However, in some cases, the retroactivity principle should be applied to correct 
serious gaps in the law. Kuwait could follow the experience of other nations, such as th
United States, which imposed retroactive environmental liability under CERCLA and 
other statutes to generate funds for expensive cleanup procedures. Similarly, Kuwa
impose retroactive environmental liability to provide
xample, the Kuwaiti legal system lacks air pollution legislation
 over cases of air pollution. In the absence of regulation, the p
ses severe air pollution for the 10th district in Kuwait.2449 Howev
liament could enact a law to punish any person is polluting the a
st. Such a statute would be likely to encourage polluters to take acti
ards, in order to avoid future sanctions.  
cle 10 of the Kuwaiti Environmental Protection Authority (E
[t]he Higher Council shall upon the proposal of the Board of 
Directors and after notifying the official authority, decide to stop 
work in any establishment or any activity or preventing use of 
any instrument or material wholly or partially if the progress of 
the work or the action results in pollution of the env
cessation shall be for one week duration and might b
to another week. The administrative authorities and concerned 
parties are obliged to execute the order of the suspension and the 
Authority may request certain measures to be fulfilled during the 
period of suspension […]. 
 
 
                                                          
2448Article 32 of the constitution provides that “[…n]o penalty may be imposed except for offenses 
committed after the relevant law has come into force.” Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 32 (para. 
1). 
2449 Meshal Al-Mashan, Oil Companies Play Role: The High Pollution in Fahaheel, Kuwait Times, May 
ahaheel.] 10, 1999, 1999 WL 5554794 [hereinafter The High Pollution in F
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The application of this Article is limited to acts taken after the law was enacted. 
Again, however, Article 10 could be amended to have retroactive liability over acts 
committed before its enactment, in order to provide for greater environmental protection.  
Similarly, the Kuwaiti law regulating the use of the Ionizing Radiation im
liability for human casualties or environmental damage caused by activities involving 
ionizing radiation equipments or substances, but only when those activities occur after 
1977. For earlier acts, there is no liability, even if they caused lingering damage.  
Finally, Kuwaiti Civil Law No. 67/1980 states that  
 
every action which shall cause damage to others is subject to 
compensation, whether this damage is direct or indirect, and 
whether the wrongdoer is aware of his action or not. The 
compensation is for the actual loss and for lost profit, and shall 
cover the damage even if it is only moral. The claim of liability 
shall be vo
poses 
id three years after the harmed party has knowledge of 
the damage and the party who caused it, or after fifteen years of 
the occurrence of the illegal action, whichever is shorter, unless 
the claim of liability is a result of a crime. Any agreements 
releasing parties from liability prior to their occurrence are 
considered illegal.2450 
his provision is general, and may cover any harmful activity to the environment, 
whether committed by national or foreign, military or civil person. However, it imposes 
only ci bility, which is considered the most important remedy for the environmental 
rehabilitation, without any reference to criminal responsibility. 
n the other hand, it could be argued that the Gulf region was also victimized by 
the Iraqi acts. The wetland and marches are important for the ecology of the Gulf and the 
Gulf natural resources. Therefore, when Saddam Hussein made the canals and drained all 
the water out of these marshes, he destroyed the wetlands and damaged their nature. 
Nevertheless, these wetlands can be restored and their ecological balance can be brought 
back, but it takes a lot of work and money to be restored. Now if someone needs to bring 
responsibility against Saddam Hussein for the destruction of the ecological balance of the 
marshes, who might be this one, and under what mechanisms? Here, possibly the 
fisherm n who use the fish from the Gulf and can see that their home have been 
                                                          
 
T
vil lia
O
e
2450 The Legal System of Kuwait, supra note (2422) at 5.180.36. 
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destroyed because their nurseries, the w stroyed, therefore, these 
fishermen lost their livelihood der the Iraqi law against Iraq 
as a State that sponsored the destruction of the marshes. However, the Iraqi law has to 
authorize such kind of lawsuit. Or it could be argued that someday under a new Iraqi 
Parliam
etlands, were de
, and could bring a law suit un
ent there might be a law that says the marshes have to be restored because the 
ecology of the nation needs to be brought back. Thus, everyone who does not follow this 
law may be responsible and have to clean it up whether he is the owner, the State, or a 
certain company or ministry. Moreover, any Gulf State that could be affected by what 
Saddam did to the marshes of the Gulf can bring responsibility against him when he is no 
longer in his position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part VI 
The Recommendations 
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That the legal system regarding environmental protection both in peacetime and 
in times of armed conflicts needs to be re-evaluated and reinforced. It is necessary to 
propose new ideas to address the inadequacies of the existing national and international 
gal systems. This thesis proposes some new ideas, presented in the form of 
 
military operations in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. Some of the 
recomm
 
 in 
herefore, 
 
to mod  
 
rnational 
community should act, as soon as possible, to translate these recommendations into 
he international community will be responsible before 
le
recommendations to reduce or eliminate negative environmental impacts that result from
endations may seem unrealistic, but the international community is faced with the 
choice of accepting new ideas or watching the continued degradation of our environment.
A number of key issues must be addressed by the international community
order to protect the environment more effectively during armed conflicts. Moreover, each 
nation has an obligation to take certain number of steps to protect its own environment 
and other nations’ environment as well. Finally, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) have a major role in reinforcing environmental protection worldwide. T
the recommendations will be classified as: recommendations addressed to the 
international community, recommendations addressed to national societies, and 
recommendations addressed to the NGOs. 
 
A- Recommendations Addressed to the International Community 
 
The international community is the strongest and the most powerful source of 
environmental protection. Collectivelly, the nations of the world have the necessary tools
ify the international legal system, and can persuade, and even force, individual
States to take action. The international community’s tools can be mandatory, such as 
international conventions and Security Council resolutions, or they can be permissive, 
such as international declarations and the General Assembly’s resolutions.  
The next few pages propose number of recommendations that are necessary to
protect the environment from harmful activity during armed conflicts. The inte
positive instruments. Otherwise t
future generations for failing to prevent further environmental degradation. 
 
 458
 
1. Improving Intern
 
ational Environmental Dispute Resolution for Armed Conflict 
environmental field, 
since th
 
al 
cial 
the ICJ Statute, the 
Court m
at least 
 the 
e ICJ. 
 
onal 
he 
iction over environmental matters  that have 
widespread, long-lasting or severe impacts, even if the concerned party does not accept 
                              
Despite the experience that most international jurists have in the field of resolving 
international conflicts, they still lack the necessary awareness in the 
is field has its own characteristics and is a relatively new area of the law. 
Therefore, a specialized judiciary committee to examine environmental conflicts is highly
recommended. Environmental cases require experience in both national and internation
environmental laws, in addition to basic scientific knowledge. Most international judi
bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), possess no expertise in 
environmental issues.2451 However, according to Article 26 (1) of 
ay form a permanent chamber, composed of three or more judges, to deal only 
with environmental cases.2452 At present, ICJ has competence over conflicts when 
one party is a State. NGO’s, or groups of individuals, have no right to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. International organizations have only the right to recur to
interpretative competence of the Court, but have no right to complain directly to th
Even when States are parties to a conflict, the ICJ has no compulsory jurisdiction. Thus,
the ICJ has jurisdiction only when a State expressly agrees to submit a dispute to it.2453  
This system can, and should be changed. The jurisdiction of the ICJ can, and 
should, be expanded in environmental matters. Allowing member States, internati
organizations, NGO’s and group of individuals to bring complaints for environmental 
violations that cause widespread, long-lasting or severe environmental damage before t
ICJ, will better advance the cause of environmental protection. Furthermore, the ICJ 
should have compulsory jurisd 2454
the ICJ jurisdiction. 
                            
s 
he ICJ, supra 
). 
onds, supra note (969) at 216. 
2451 Simonds, supra note (969) at 218. 
2452 “The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges a
the Court may determine, for dealing with [environmental] cases [...].” Statute of t
note (769) art. 26 (1).  
2453 Id., art 36 (2
2454 Sim
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The legal regime regarding environmental war crimes can also be strengthened 
and improved. As discussed earlier, there have been few trials for war crimes of any kind, 
and few of them involved crimes of environmental destruction.2455  
A court was established by the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982; however, it 
has jurisdiction only over the marine environment2456 and it excludes military op
from its jurisdiction.
erations 
 
s the 
presenc
 to 
 
 
committee developed rules for arbitrating disputes relevant to the environment and/or 
natural resources. The rules were adopted by consensus by the PCA Administrative 
tate to examine all the environmental matters 
2457 The Statute of Rome, which has jurisdiction over war crimes,
does cover crimes that have widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.2458 However, the Statute of Rome threshold is too high, since it require
e of all three elements before jurisdiction can be asserted. 
Thus, it appears that it is necessary to establish an international judicial body
specialize in examining international environmental cases. This body could be an 
international environmental court of justice (IECJ) similar to the ICJ. Alternatively, an 
environmental chamber of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) could be 
established to settle environmental disputes resulting from armed conflict through 
conciliation, mediation, good offices, commission of inquiry, and arbitration, based on 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules or Conciliation Rules.2459 The PCA Working Group on Environmental Dispute
Resolution established a drafting committee of experts in environmental law and 
arbitration, under the chairmanship of Professor Philippe Sands.2460 The drafting 
Council on June 19, 2001.2461 
The IECJ can be established in any S
and disputes. The idea of creating an international court that specializes in environmental 
                                                          
2455 Rymn James Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, “Greenkeeping,” Enforcement 
tion During Armed Conflict, 10 Geo. Int’l Envt’l L. 
y Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by 
t 
of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protec
Rev. 441, 486 (1998) [hereinafter Parsons]. 
2456 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note (1019) art. 1 (1)(1) 
2457 Id., art. 236. 
2458 Rome Statute, supra note (191) art. 8 (2)(b)(iv). 
2459 Pegg
Non-State Entities, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 191, 212 (2001). 
2460 Permanent Court Arbitration PCA, Cour Permanente d’Arbitrage, <http://pca-cpa.org/EDR/> (last visi
Feb. 11, 2002). 
2461 Id. 
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cases g e 
 
interna
re 
er NGOs or 
intergo the 
 
creation of a new international environmental dispute resolution mechanism.2469  
oes back to 1988.2462 A private initiative by a committee in Rome examined th
subject, and organized a conference in Rome from 21-24 April 1989, attended by experts
from thirty countries.2463 The conference called for the creation of a permanent 
tional court at the U.N. level to be competent in all environmental matters.2464 
Moreover, in 1994, the Venice Declaration provided that “national governments should 
[...] officially support the project of an International Court of the Environment.”2465 
Unlike the ICJ, the proposed court should have the right to decide environmental 
disputes even if the concerned parties, according to their sovereignty rights, do not 
express their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IECJ.2466 Moreover, international 
persons other than the State should have the right to invoke IECJ jurisdiction over seve
environmental violations. For example, environmental organizations, wheth
vernmental organizations, should be able to present their complaints to 
IECJ.2467 It would be also environmentally useful if groups of individuals could be given
the right to recur to the IECJ.2468 Nevertheless, States may oppose such a proposal, as 
they already rejected a resolution proposed by the planning committee of the United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) calling for the 
                                                          
2462 Amedeo Postiglione, The Global Demand for An International Court of
Environment 18 (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1999) [hereinafter Post
2463 Id. 
 the 
iglione]. 
2464 Id., a
2465 ,” 
 
2468 Individuals have no legal stand to bring environmental violations to the attention of the ICJ and 
Abuse, 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 355, 358-59 
nt for a resolution on settlement of 
rning the environment submitted by Pentagonal countries (Austria, Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republics, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia and Poland), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.1, Mar. 27, 1991.  
t 19. 
 Venice Declaration resulted from the Conference “Towards the World Governing of the Environment
prepared by the International Court of the Environment Foundation, June 2-5, 1994, cited in 
Postiglione, supra note (2462) at 20. 
2466 Stephen J. Ovara, Note, Waging the Next War: The Carryover of Arms Control Verification Procedures
to International Environmental Law, 5 Geo. Int’l Envt’l. L. Rev. 151, 175 (1992). 
2467 Postiglione, supra note (2462) at 19. 
international tribunals. See, James T. McClymonds, Note, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An 
International Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 583, 633 (1992); Michelle L. Schwartz, 
International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental 
(1992). 
2469 U.N.G.A. Preparatory Committee for the UNCED, Eleme
International dispute conce
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States prefer to settle their differences through arbitral bodies rather than the 
international court of justice,2470 since they can chose the arbitrators, and the arbitration 
procedu
ight 
IECJ could function not as a court, but as a chamber to receive applications of arbitrators 
competent t tal dispute 
took place, bitrators in 
the chambe ld apply. 
Alternativel
Fina  the IHL 
instruments vent crime 
against the in acts of 
environmen ecessary to 
combat thes ould do so.2473 
 
2. Creation of a U.N. Trusteeship System for States that Cause Unnecessary Severe 
Enviro
 
2474
territories were placed under the supervision of some United Nations’ members to assist 
res usually take a short time. The IECJ could take those concerns into account. 
The IECJ could function as follows: member States submit their questions to a 
judiciary committee that is formed according to pre-established rules. States have no r
to interfere in the formulation of the judiciary committee or the law of ruling.2471 The 
o settle environmental conflicts. Then, whenever an environmen
parties to the conflict could choose their judges from the list of ar
r, and could specify which environmental laws those judges shou
y, the arbitrators could apply existing environmental law rules. 
lly, a new crime of “ecocide”2472 should be recognized in
, to prosecute any individual who commits, assists, or fails to pre
environment. Even though the Statute of Rome criminalizes certa
tal damage, it does not establish the kind of broad prohibition n
e serious crimes. Instruments that specifically target ecocide w
nmental Damage  
 
Even though the implementation of a trusteeship system is very unlikely, a
proposal for such a system could set to stage for other proposals to protect civilian 
population, the global ecosystem, and plant and animal species. 
In international law, areas incapable of internal or external self-determination  
can be placed under the administration of another State. As a result of World War II, 
them to develop and govern themselves. After World War I, the Mandate System of the 
                                                          
2470 Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in 1 The Future of the ICJ 8 (L. Gross ed.
cited in Joanne K. Lelewer, Note, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving Treaty 
Disputes, 21 N.Y. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 379, 381 (1989). 
2471 Id., at 382. 
2472 Falk, Environmental Disruption, supra note (632) at 34. 
2473 See, I (E) 
, 1976) 
of this Part. 
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League of Nations appeared to control these cases, and it continued after World War II as 
the Trusteeship of the United Nations.2475 
According to Article 77 (1) of the United Nations Charter, trusteeship is a system 
created
ards self-government or independence as may 
ld be a healthy 
environ
 
 to administer territories detached from the enemies in World War II, territories 
voluntarily placed under the system by the administration States, and territories held 
under the League of Nations’ mandate system.2476 The goals of the trusteeship system are 
 
a. to further international peace and security; b. to promote the 
political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive 
development tow
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory 
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people 
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each 
trusteeship agreement; c. to encourage respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of 
the independence of the peoples of the world; and d. to ensure 
treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all 
Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also 
equal treatment for the latter in the administration of 
justice[...].2477  
 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, there shou
ment where people can live safely and securely since they are connected to their 
environment. Therefore, the administration authority should, among other things, 
maintain a healthy environment in the trust territories. If the inhabitants of the trust 
territories are not capable of developing minimal environmental safeguards, the 
trusteeship should operate to achieve that goal. And indeed, a trusteeship could be created 
for that purpose in the first place, if conditions exist that may cause environmental harm 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
ot only territories of 
defeated States can be subject to it. But also territories already place under the mandates system, or 
administering State. Hyun S. Lee, Note, Post Trusteeship 
James N. Murray, JR., 
ited Nations Trusteeship System (The University of Illinois Press, 1957) [hereinafter 
Murray]. 
2476 League of Nations Covenant, arts. 22, 23. 
2474 Stephanie A. Paulk, Determination of Self in a Decolonized Territory: The Dutch, The Indonesians, and
The East Timorese, 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 267, 282 (2001).  
2475 Unlike the mandates system, the trusteeship system had broader scope, where it is n
voluntarily placed under the trusteeship by the 
Environmental Accountability: Case of PCB Contamination on the Marshall Islands, 26 Denv. J. Int’l 
L. & Pol’y 399, 403-04, 417 (1998) [hereinafter Lee, Post Trusteeship]; 
The Un
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to othe
teeship Council, to supervise the 
best application of the trusteeship system. By 1994, all the trust territories obtained their 
complete ri nce after 
being admin tions’ General 
Assembly d ires its 
reactivation rusteeship 
Counci
ns 
nited Nations from 
being s
nvironmental standards and requirements. There should be substantial cooperation 
etween the Trusteeship Council and the environmental expertise organizations, such as 
nited Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), to examine any environmental violation 
nd decide whether it is serious enough to raise the possibility of a trusteeship. However, 
 assure the neutrality of such procedures, the ICJ should have the last word on whether 
r nations’ environment through transboundary pollution. The administration 
authority should be an environmentally friendly State, and should enhance the 
environmental condition and awareness of that nation.  
The United Nations has an active body, the Trus
ght of self-governing, with Palau the last to be granted independe
istered by the United States.2478 Accordingly, the United Na
ecided to freeze the Trusteeship Council, until a new need requ
.2479 However, there is no legal obstacle for reactivating the T
l whenever needed. 
Not all the environmental violations would be serious enough to invoke the 
application of the United Nations trusteeship system. However, where environmental 
violations may cause widespread, long lasting or severe environmental damage, a 
trusteeship could be an appropriate solution. A modification in the United Natio
Charter would be required to allow a concerned State to bring the matter to the 
Trusteeship Council in order to examine the situation and decide whether the 
environmental violation is severe enough to place a country under trusteeship. Moreover, 
Article 78 of the U.N. Charter, which prevents any member of the U
2480ubject to the trusteeship, would have to be abolished.   
The U.N. trusteeship system can provide help in preventing future environmental 
destruction, and it could be used as a tool to threaten any nation that violates international 
e
b
U
a
to
the situation requires placing such country under the trusteeship system. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2477 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 76. 
2478 United Nations Website, Trusteeship Council, available at <http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm> (last 
visit Jan. 27, 2002). 
2479 Id. 
 464
Moreover, to assure sound environmental development, the trusteeship syste
hould ado
m 
pt the international accountability principle through sophisticated examination 
of inhabitants’ petitions and regular visits to their territories.2481   
d 
ld submit petitions to the Trusteeship Council requesting the 
suspens 2483
, or how hard the 
admini  
                
s
Subsequently, the Trusteeship Council should  
 
a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;      
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the 
administering authority; c. provide for periodic visits to the 
respective trust territories at time agreed upon with the 
administering authority; and d. take these and other actions in 
conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.2482 
 
When the environmental remediation reaches a certain level, local authorities an
groups of individuals cou
ion of the trusteeship over their territories.  These petitions could be examined 
by the Trusteeship Council, which could then submit recommendations to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, to decide whether to continue the trusteeship. 
Practically, it does not matter how the United Nations’ Trusteeship System works, how 
many petitions are heard, how many visiting missions are sent
stering authority defends its policies in the Trustee Council. What does and should
matter is whether the trusteeship system has achieved its goals.2484 
This recommendation is unlikely to be adopted, but even its proposal could 
persuade local authorities to internally enforce the international environmental standards 
to avoid being subject to the administration of another State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2480
Charter, supra note (71) art. 78. 
2481 Roger S. Clark, Book Review, Christopher Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental 
Damage Under International Trusteeship, 28 Int’l Law. 186, 190 (1994); Murray, supra 
note (2475) at 128-97. 
rray, supra note (2475) at 211. 
 “The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United 
Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality. ” U.N. 
2482 U.N. Charter, supra note (71) art. 87. 
2483 Id., art. 87 (b). 
2484 Mu
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3. Creation of An International Fund to Rehabilitate Warfare Environmental 
Damage 
 
As a result of the environmental destruction in times of armed conflict, 
responsible parties would be charged to pay the expenses of cleanup and rehabilitation
the environment. However, States do not easily admit their responsibility for warfar
environmental damage. Usually, it takes long time, through the international legal 
system, to attribute responsibility for warfare environmental damage to a cert
 of 
e 
ain State.  
s place 
tion to the recept of compensation from the 
enemy could work against environmental cleanup by causing delay. Unfortunately, the 
 
fter ten years following the cessation of hostilities in Gulf War II did 
uwait
ld be 
tes, 
s benefit 
s 
se; 
in order to calculate the arms tax, international cooperation is essential in order 
to calcu  tax 
 the United 
Nations member States that have experienced the environmental effects of armed conflict 
Assessing such responsibility might be more easily accomplished if it take
during or directly after the armed conflict. For example, protected areas could be 
rehabilitated immediately after the armed conflict, when plants and animals have only 
recently been disturbed.  
Linking environmental rehabilita
environmental compensation is often the last thing to be considered by belligerent States.
For instance, only a
K  receive a portion of its environmental compensation. 
To assure effective environmental rehabilitation, an international fund shou
established to fill this gap. Professor Jeffrey Miller has proposed financing an 
international fund by taxing States that export arms technology, such as the United Sta
Russia, North Korea, South Africa, and Israel.2485 He believes that as these State
from selling arms and weapons, they should support the negative environmental effect
that may be caused by their technologies.2486 This proposal makes a great deal of sen
however, 
late the total amount of weapons sold by a certain State or an individual. The
should be assessed against the arms dealer and delivered to the international fund. 
Until such a proposal is adopted, the fund should be financed through
                                                          
2485 Jeffrey G. Miller, Environmental Protection and the Law of War, public audience at Pace University
School of Law, Nov. 2, 2000. 
2486 Id. 
, 
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and are financially capable, such as Japan, United Kingdom, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, a
United States.  
The incentive for contributing to such a fund can be found in the ill effects of not 
doing so. For example, in Afghanistan, one result of the long war against the Soviets
of the civil wars that followed was the environmental destruction of that country. The 
inability of Afghanistan to recover from that environmental (and other) destruction 
helped to create a great environment to host terrorist activities. An international effort to 
rehabilitate the environmen
nd the 
 and 
t could have helped to prevent that situation.2487  
d.  
 
From 
Political Disputes 
 
ne 
. 
litical, 
 
given 
Finally, cleanup, rehabilitation and rebuilding the environment should be 
regulated and organized by the United Nations. A set of rules should regulate the 
percentage of contribution of each State to these efforts. These efforts should create a 
program to study each case, determine the appropriate funding priorities, and supervise 
these efforts until the job is complete
4. The Need For International Environmental Assistance To Be Independent 
In some cases and in certain times, some financial or technical support from o
country may avoid or prevent a substantial environmental harm in another nation
However, some States refuse to provide such support because they object to the po
economic, or military system in the recipient State. A number of developed countries 
refrain from environmentally assisting countries they consider “outlaw States.” 
Nonetheless, international organizations, as neutral bodies, do not link environmental
assistance to secure nature and natural resources to the political situation of a 
country.  
For example, after NATO’s attacks against the former Yugoslavia, NATO’s 
member States, including the U.S., announced that as long as Milosevic the former 
Yugoslavian President was in power they would provide only humanitarian 
                                                          
2487 Efforts of dismantling civilian populations, cleaning up, rebuilding Afghanistan are all led by the 
United States. “[M]ore than 60 nations and the world's leading development organizations said they had 
in foreign assistance to help rebuild the war-torn nation, with 
ed for the next two years when experts say it will be needed most.” Clay 
r Afghan Renewal, Wash. Post,  Jan. 22, 2002, at A8. 
secured pledges of more than $4.5 billion 
most of that funding promis
Chandler, $4.5 Billion Pledged fo
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assistance.2488 This statement did not in all cases preclude emergency cleanup or 
environmental restoration when needed.2489 Another example is Iraq, where the U
refuse to provide material needed to improve the environmental situation in Iraq, suc
agricultural materials and equipment, that could be used for military purposes or to 
produce herbicides. However, refusal to provide environmental assistance should not be 
linked to the presence of Saddam Hussein, since he may disappear at anytime, but the 
environment will last, and providing a healthy environment is not relevant to one person 
but to the common globe. 
.S. 
h as 
e 
, 
such 
ersons, i.e., States and 
international organizations. It “has no credible means to address individual [...] 
.”2491 However, modern 
international law, especially in the environmental field, concerns individuals as well as 
interna  
The absence of such rules was behind the escape of Iraqi criminals of war from 
punishment nvasion of 
Kuwait in 1 aqi liable [for 
                      
The tension between States should not present an obstacle to securing th
environment. To assure that the environment is the only beneficiary from the assistance
environmental organizations such as UNEP and IUCN may play a mediator role in 
cases. For instance, the assistance may be delivered, distributed and executed under the 
supervision of these organizations.  
 
5. Strengthen and Increase Individual Punishments in International Law2490 
 
Traditional international law addresses international p
accountability for even the most flagrant violations of law
tional persons. Individuals can directly harm the environment and can also be held
responsible for such acts. Accordingly, international law should adopt the necessary 
means to capture, prosecute and punish individuals suspected of committing 
environmental crimes.  
 for the horrible environmental crimes committed during the Iraqi i
990. Unfortunately,  “little has been done to hold Iraq or any Ir
                                    
2488 Jovan Gec, Pollution “Hot Spots” ID’d in Serbia, Associated Press Online, July 27, 1999, available in 
t, 
, July 21, 1999, at 9. 
1999 WL 22027435 [hereinafter Gec]; Christopher Walker, Another Victim of Milosevic-the Environmen
Christian Science Monitor
2489 Schwabach, supra note (477) at 140. 
2490 See, II (F) of this Part. 
2491 Sharp, supra note (509) at 3. 
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committing ld adopt 
means of pu of any 
internationa  induce 
individuals  National 
jurisdiction should not stand as an obstacle to prevent the international community from 
imposin ho 
rm to the State sovereignty. The U.S. intervention in Panama to 
arrest G 2495  and 
ples of 
 
l 
of international 
law. Fo
]he role of military establishments in environmental protection 
and re-generation, [...t]he interaction between armed conflict and 
the environment [and i]dentifying means of strengthening the 
 environmental] crimes.”2492 The international community shou
nishing any individual who violates or provokes the violation 
l environmental norm, since the threat of punishment is likely to
to comply with international and national environmental rules.2493
g its rules. Local authorities should punish members of its own armed force w
fail to comply with environmental rules, just as they would seek the punishment of those 
who belong to other nation’s armed forces.2494  
State sovereignty should not prevent the international community from 
prosecuting criminals. Any encroachment on State sovereignty in order to capture and 
prosecute environmental criminals is slight compared to the harm caused by those 
criminals to the environment. Adopting such measures in a new international instrument 
would relieve any ha
eneral Manuel Noreiga,  and in Afghanistan to capture AlQaeda members,
the NATO arrests of the former Yugoslavian President, Milosevic, provide exam
an international force that arrested war criminals who violated international law rules,
without undermining the sovereignty of the States involved. 
 
6. Extend IUCN’s Mission to Cover Armed Conflict  
 
Since the International Union for the World Conservation of Nature and Natura
Resources (IUCN) is one of the most active environmental organizations, it serves as a 
useful case study as to how such organizations might advance the cause 
r example, the IUCN supports studies on  
 
[t
current international legal system concerning environmental 
protection during times of armed conflict. [...] IUCN should urge 
                                                          
2492 Leibler, supra note (1220) at 117; Caggiano, supra note (7) at 504; Greenwood, State Responsibility, 
supra note (2056) at 408-10. 
2493 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 493. 
2494 Dycus, supra note (4) at 145. 
2495 Hagan, supra note (2341) at 449. 
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governments that are not already parties to relevant [to armed 
conflict] international legal instruments to ratify these 
instruments[,] IUCN should [prepare for regional and global] 
diplomatic conferences [...] to reinforce [...] supplement [...t
actual] legal regimes for environmental protection in time
2496
he 
s of 
rmed conflicts [...].  
 
vation 
measur
rform any act in accordance with its objectives.”  It seeks to 
“influe
le and 
ecologically sustainable.” This statement makes clear the link between military activities, 
ten threatful to the environment, and the goal of the IUCN. 
g a 
             
a
 
 
Accordingly, the World Conservation Congress at its 2nd Session in Amman, 
Jordan, 4-11 October 2000, considered “the effects of armed conflicts in natural areas of 
national, regional and global importance, and on the indigenous peoples and local 
communities that inhabit them” the Congress adopted Resolution No.CGR2.CNV016, 
concerning Armed Conflicts in Natural Areas (Panama and Columbia), and requested that
the Director General seek to ensure that IUCN promotes cooperation and conser
es between Columbia and Panama in these and other natural areas endangered by 
armed conflict.”2497 
The 1948 Statute of the IUCN was revised in Montreal on October 22, 1996. 
According to this revision Part I Article 1 provides as follows: “The [IUCN] is 
constituted in accordance with Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code as an international 
association of governmental and non-governmental members. Therefore, it has legal 
personality and may pe 2498
nce, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity 
and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitab
which are of
In addition to the goals of the IUCN, its composition is very helpful in providin
connection with national authorities, especially the military, since  
 
                                             
Neely 
n Natural Areas (Panama and Columbia) Resolution No. CGR2.CNV016, Adopted 
 (last 
and Columbia)]. 
. 
a note (746) at 1.  
2496 Will Verwey, Protected Areas, War and Civil Strife, in Parks for Life: Report of the 4th 
World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas 97-8 (Jeffrey A. Mc
Ed., Feb. 10-12, 1992) [hereinafter Verwey]. 
2497 Armed Conflicts i
by the 2nd World Conservation Congress, Amman, Jordan 4-11 Oct. 2000, see  <http://www.iucn.org>
visit Jan. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Armed Conflicts in Natural Areas (Panama 
2498 IUCN Statutes of Oct. 5, 1948, revised Oct. 22, 1996 (ISBN 2-8317-0410-3) (published for IUCN by 
Imprimerie SADAG, Belgrade, France, 1997) at 2, [hereinafter IUCN Statutes], cited in Prof. Nicholas A
Robinson, Note on the Legal Status of IUCN, supr
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IUCN is unique among international organizations in that it was 
created with and has consistently possessed a membership of 
sovereign States,2499governmental agencies of States,2500and both 
international and national non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”), as well as non-voting Affiliate Members.2501  
 
 
ces in 
2502
 
nst 
 
 has States as members. Thus, the IUCN may be 
able to generate more direct institutional support for its activities, in a way the ICRC 
As a first step, the IUCN should establish cooperation with the military authorities 
in every member State. The IUCN may offer honorary membership to military 
This unique membership system will allow IUCN to be connected to 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, within the limit of a State or among States. 
The IUCN should benefit from this position and maintain relations with military for
member States, to provide the organization with the ability to intervene in military 
operations, especially in times of armed conflict. In this regard it is important that Article 
70 of the Additional Protocol I allows relief actions that are humanitarian in nature  to 
be taken in accordance with the acceptance of States parties to the conflict.2503  
Some may object to this idea because the ICRC seems to hold such a position in
the present time. However, the ICRC has not succeeded in preventing any attacks agai
the environment, since its primary role is in protecting people and saving their lives. Its
focus is not environmental. The IUCN does focus directly on environmental issues. 
Moreover, unlike the ICRC, the IUCN
would not be able to.  
                                                          
2499 “States” meaning those States which are “members of the United Nations or any of its specialized 
agencies, or of the [IAEA], or parties to the Statutes of the [ICJ].” Id., art. 5(a); Robinson, Note on the 
Legal Status of IUCN, supra note (746) at 2 fn.5. 
2500 The IUCN Statutes defines “government agencies,” many of which are park departments or 
environmental ministries, - as “organizations, institutions and, when applicable, government d
which form part of the machinery of government in a State including those agencies of the com
federal States having a analogous structure.” Id., art. 5(b); Robinson, Note on the Legal Status of IUCN, 
supra note (746) at 2 fn. 6. 
2501 International non-governmental organizations “shall be institutions and associations organ
more States,” Id., art. 5(e), and national non-governmental organizations “shall be institution
associations incorporated within a State,” Id., art. 5(d); Robinson, Note on the Legal Status of IUCN, supra 
epartments 
ponents of 
ized in two or 
s and 
note (746) at 2 fn. 7. 
2502 As a fact, the human environment cannot be given a real protection without protecting the natural 
n a healthy and safe environment. 
rse 
ent of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.” 
 art. 70. 
environment, since humans need to live i
2503 “[R]relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adve
distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreem
Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79)
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commanders and invite them to participate in the IUCN congress meetings every three 
years to increase their environmental awareness. Moreover, IUCN may play an important 
educational role, by providing military authorities with materials regarding enviro
protection during armed conflicts, and by giving environmental lectures to military 
personnel. 
Additionally, the IUCN may establish environmental symbols to distinguish 
environmental sites to be protected in case of military attacks during armed conflicts. Fo
example, a symbol of a leaf may designate a protected area or a forest, a UNESCO 
symbol may indicate a historical site or a cultural monument, and a wave sig
nmental 
r 
n may 
denote 
ay 
of 
sible 
ted 
a dam, river or shore. These environmental signs could be approved by an 
international conference and distributed to military authorities. Furthermore, IUCN m
cite the possible causes of irreparable environmental harm, such as the destruction 
endangered species habitats or the destruction of a historical site, and require military 
authorities to increase the precautionary measures in these areas and to deter pos
actions.2504 Finally, IUCN should also promote the creation of an international fund to 
restore natural resources damaged by armed conflicts and to finance intervention in 
environmental emergency cases.2505  
 
7. Improve Existing International Agreements 
 
Most of the international instruments that were examined in Parts II, III, and IV of 
this thesis were concluded in response to specific circumstances or dangers, and reflec
the concerns of those particular circumstances. However, following Gulf War II, there 
was increased interest in addressing more universal or ongoing environmental threats. 
Nations, organizations, and individuals showed a new interest in dealing with 
environmental dangers that could result from any armed conflict.2506 Commentators on 
the issue were divided into two groups. The first group believes that existing 
environmental law rules are sufficient to assure environmental protection during armed 
                                                          
2504 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 488. 
2505 th ld Congress on National Parks and Prot IUCN, Parks For Life, Report of the 4  Wor
12, 1992)
ected Areas  98 
. 
 
(Jeffrey A. McNeely Ed., Feb. 10-
2506 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 443.
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conflict, and that the problem consist in guaranteeing adherence to the existing rul
not in the rules themselves.
es and 
ent 
s a 
 of “military 
necessi
ver, Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conven
 like the ENMOD,2511 responsibility 
were based on the occurrence of a single element.2512 Damage that could be described in 
terms of any ent, and 
should be tr ould be 
modified to ext of 
Article 56 p ms, dikes, and 
                      
2507 Another group of commentators2508 believes in the 
necessity to enact new law to deal with environmental destruction during armed 
conflicts.2509 My view lies somewhere in between, i.e., that the existing system is not 
completely capable of assuring the environmental protection during times of armed 
conflicts. However, it is not necessary to enact new law; it would be sufficient if existing 
international law instruments were modified or supplemented to respond to the pres
environmental threats. Existing law provides a basic level of protection, and serves a
starting point. We must start there, and seek to build upon that foundation.  
Most of the IHL instruments would be improved if the principle
ty” is eliminated. Even if the principle of military necessity is not completely 
eliminated, any attack based on that principle should not harm human lives or the 
environment. Moreo
tions should be modified to attenuate the condition of responsibility for 
environmental damage. Instead of requiring all the three elements,2510 i.e., widespread, 
long-term and severe damage, it would be useful if,
 one of those elements could present a real danger to the environm
eated as such. Moreover, Article 56 of the Additional Protocol I c
 improve the environmental protection during armed conflict. The t
rovides protection only to a certain number of installations, “da
                                    
 Government falls into this [team].” See e.g., St2507 “The U.S. atement of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy 
Legal Ad isor, U.S. Department of State, before the Meeting on International Law Principles of the Senate 
Environm
Environm
. 
o 
 The European Community Environment Commissioner, Greenpeace, the Government of Jordan and to 
e extents UNEP fall in this team. See e.g., Memorandum from Colonel J.P. Terry, Deputy Legal 
 on Environmental Destruction as a Weapon of War 2 
ce Calls for a Geneva Convention for the Environment 
ronment as a Weapon in Times of Armed Conflict, U.N. GAOR, 46th 
 Doc. A/46/141 (1991), cited in Simonds, supra note (969) at 210. 
181. 
pra note (957) art. I. 
v
ent and Public Works Committee’s Gulf Pollution Task Force, Jul. 11, 1991; Exploitation of the 
ent as a Weapon, Statement of Robert B. Rosenstock, the U.S. Representative to the Sixth 
Committee of the 46th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, cited in Simonds, supra note (969) at 210
2508 “Lawyers and those concerned with the law often respond to what is seen a new problem by wanting t
invent or create new laws. This is not, however, always the best possible course to take.” Adam Roberts, An 
International Expert’s Overview, in Environmental Protection and the Law of War 151 
(Glen Plant ed., 1992). 
2509
som
unsel to the Chairman of the Joint CCo hiefs of Staff,
ne 11, 1991); Greenpeace International, Greenpea(Ju
ne 1991); Exploitation of the Envi(Ju
ss., Annex, U.N.Se
2510 Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 
2511 ENMOD, su
 473
nuclear electrical generating stations.”2513 In view of the Iraqi degradation of the 
environment in Kuwait in 1991, when the Iraqi military burned oil wells and spilled 
crude oil into the Gulf waters, it becomes essential to include oil facilities in the for
list.
ecited 
 56 would have two environmental advantages; 
first, it 
ust 
t 
in 
long 
nsibility to intervene 
whenever there is a threat of widespread long-lasting or severe environmental damage. 
The General Assembly should also participate in criminalising any environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2514 Including oil facilities in Article
would protect natural resources during times of armed conflict, and second, it 
would avoid the requirements of Article 35 (3) and 55 that the environmental harm m
be widespread, long-term and severe.2515 The Additional Protocol I environmental 
standards should be extended to cover internal armed conflicts too, since there is no 
reason to distinguish between the environmental destruction caused by international 
armed conflict and that caused by non-international armed conflict.2516 
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention should also be modified, by 
including provisions similar to Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I, if no
more stringent.2517  
The IUCN Amman Clause should be included in all instruments regulating 
international and internal armed conflicts. The IUCN Amman Clause can fill any gap 
current environmental protection law. It states that 
 
[u]ntil a more complete international code of environmental 
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by international 
agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all its constituent 
elements and processes remain under the protection and authority 
of the principles of international law derived from established 
customs, from dictates of the public conscience, and from the 
principles and fundamental values of humanity acting as steward 
for present and future generations.2518 
 
The Charter of the U.N. should be modified to charge the Security Council, a
with maintaining international peace and security, with the respo
 
2512 supra 
pra note (969) at 213-
 Simonds, note (969) at 211. 
2513 Additional Protocol (I) , supra note (79) art. 56. 
2514 Kelly, supra note (1817) at 946. 
2515 Id., at 946-47. 
2516 Simonds, su 14. 
2517 Id., at 213. 
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humiliation.2519 This step on the part of the General Assembly would have a great 
environmental effect, because, even if it was not adopted by unanimous vote, it could 
establis d 
n to 
, 
e a 
vities, it 
ent 
d and not the mindset of the State.  
Additio
rful 
systems in cases of flagrant violations against the environment. 
h a general principle of law acceptable among civilized nations, and woul
require the minority to comply with it. 
The importance of ENMOD requires a periodical update of the conventio
meet the needs of the environment and new threats to it. A State which experienced 
catastrophic environmental destruction by other nation’s military forces, such as Kuwait
should undertake to convince the majority of member States to ENMOD to approv
periodical review conference perhaps every ten years, to improve the environmental 
protection of ENMOD.2520 Since ENMOD addresses offensive military acti
should be modified to extend its jurisdiction to cover defensive military activities as well. 
ENMOD could also be strengthened by a provision that would allow for enforcem
even if the State causing damage did not admit a hostile intent behind its action, because 
the effect on the environment should be considere 2521
nally, Article 1 of ENMOD, which currently provides protection against only 
widespread, long lasting or severe damage, could be modified to include under its 
jurisdiction any environmental harm.  
Finally, ENMOD deals with military activities only in times of armed conflicts, 
not in peacetime. Since such activities may have serious environmental impacts, 
ENMOD should be modified to include military operations in peacetime, especially 
activities that occurred on military bases abroad. The treaty should provide that any act, 
direct or indirect, that causes damage to the environment even in times of peace, would 
be considered as a crime against international law.2522 The treaty should adopt a powe
enforcement system to assure that military forces are not protected by their national 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Fubara, supra note (331) at 219. 
l in The Persian War, Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 
2518 IUCN Amman Clause, supra note (745) para. 9. 
2519 Okordudu-
2520 Kelly, supra note (1817) at 949. 
2521 Id., at 948. 
2522 Margaret T. Okordudu-Fubara, Oi
23 St. Mary’s J. 123, 219 (1991). 
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8. Conclude New Treaties 
 
Following the Gulf War II, there was some pressure on the international 
community to conclude a treaty encompassing warfare environmental damage. A
academic conference reported in The Independent (London) on June 4, 1991
n 
ul  
go  rules already exist, some others need to be 
modifie
 rules. For example, a new convention that 
crimina  
 
e a
 the 
 
2523 
reaffirmed that trend. The question of whether a new set of rules sho d be codified, or
whether the existing rules should be modified, was subject to a great discussion.2524 As 
stated earlier in this thesis, many od
d or supplemented, while some new laws need to be put in place. Customary law 
and State practice supply some of the “missing” rules.2525 However, a new 
comprehensive treaty should concentrate on environmental protection and cover the gaps 
in existing international environmental
lizes damage to the environment during military operations whether in peacetime
or in times of armed conflict should be adopted.  
Professor Richard Falk proposed the Ecocide Convention.2526 He was inspired by
the adoption of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, and compared the importance of the environmental protection to the 
importance of the humans.2527 According to Article I of the Draft Articles on the Crime 
of Ecocide “ecocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime 
under international law.”2528 Article I requires member States to prevent and punish 
crime of ecocide.2529 Article I also criminalizes environmental degradation during 
peacetim nd times of war. However, it could be argued that using the term of “time of 
war” instead of times of armed conflict might exclude internal armed conflicts from
convention. Article II of the Draft defines as criminal acts done with an “intent to disrupt
                                                          
2523 McCoubrey, supra note (588) at 236-7. 
. 
ed in 1973 by Richard A. Falk, and 
ironmental Disruption, supra note (2526) at 45-9 [hereinafter 
upra note (2526) at 45-9. 
2524 Id., at 237. 
2525 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 484. 
2526 Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and International Law, in 
Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal, 34 (Arthur H
Westing ed., 1984) [hereinafter Falk, Environmental Disruption]. 
2527 Id., at 43. 
2528 A Proposed Convention on the Crime of Ecocide, was propos
revised in 1984, available at Falk, Env
Proposed Convention on Ecocide]. 
2529 Falk, Environmental Disruption, s
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or destroy” the environment. This requirement may exclude serious acts of environmental 
destruction that may be committed as a result of mere negligence or disregard. 
The Draft not only criminalizes completed crimes against the environment, but 
also conspiracy and attempt to commit such crimes.2530 This Draft goes beyond
criminalizing environmental destruction in peacetime and times of war, and requires the 
U.N. to form a Commission for the investigation of ecocide crimes.
 
rimes should 
criminals 
dition and prosecution. 
 ICRC, 
 Conventions.2535 The application of the fifth Geneva 
Conven
2536 The 
t 
tent 
2531 Jurisdiction is 
given either to an international environmental court or the judicial authority of the State 
where the crime was committed.2532  
To facilitate the prosecution procedures, member States are required to cooperate 
in extraditing criminals to the concerned authority, and such environmental c
not be, under any circumstances, described as political crimes which may allow 
to escape extra
As an alternative approach, several groups, including the United Nations,
Greenpeace International and a number of jurists,2533 proposed a fifth Geneva 
Convention.2534 The fifth Geneva Convention includes Marten’s Clause to cover all the 
subjects not examined in the earlier
tion is wider than the Ecocide Convention, since it covers all the environmental 
destruction resulting from armed conflict, including internal armed conflicts under its 
jurisdiction. However, it does not apply to peacetime environmental destruction.
proposed fifth Geneva Convention requires member States to be cautious in military 
activities that may harm neutral States, and should inform them about any harmful 
conduct.2537 It limits the applicability of the principle of military necessity, and states tha
it shall “not automatically prevail over the principle of environmental protection.”2538 
Like the Ecocide Convention, the fifth Geneva Convention requires a showing of in
                                                          
2530 Proposed Convention on Ecocide, supra note (2529) art. III (b) (d). 
2531 Id., art. V. 
2532 Id., art. VII. 
2533 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 472. 
2534 London Round Table Conference on A Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
in Times of Armed Conflict, June 3, 1991, organized by the London School of Economics, Greenpeace 
se Studies, cited in Id., at 473 fn. 249. 
n and the Law of War: A ‘Fifth Geneva’ 
 43 (Part 1, Element 1 (A)). 
International, and the Center for Defen
2535 Plant, Environmental Protectio
Convention, supra note (652) at
2536 Id., at 43 (Part 1, Element 1 (B)). 
2537 Id., at 44 (Part 1, Element 1 (E)). 
2538 Id., at 45 (Part 1, Element 1 (F)). 
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to harm the environment, but also considers the nature of the weapons or techniques u
If the nature of those weapons is likely to cause environmental damage then the 
Convention will be applied.
sed. 
all 
 It further prohibits the use of certain 
specific
uals 
 the draft.2544 Finally, the Convention assigns to the 
nvironmental NGOs the task of applying the convention and safeguarding the 
oth the Ecocide Convention and the fifth Geneva Convention are quite 
advanc on, 
ion 
rism should be 
adopted
new 
e 
nd 
in the 
cts of 
                  
2539 Moreover, the proposed fifth Geneva Convention 
requires member States to prohibit weapons and techniques that can be expected in 
circumstances to cause environmental damage.2540
 weapons and tactics already recognized to be harmful to the environment.2541 
The Convention also seeks to exclude zones and areas containing ecosystems, species or 
genetic materials of vital international importance from being subject to any attack, and 
provides that they should be demilitarized.2542 Beside State responsibility,2543 individ
can be prosecuted under
e
environment.  
B
ed. Since States are usually cautious regarding any new international conventi
these proposals are unlikely to be adopted without considerable discussion and educat
to lay a foundation for agreement. 
Furthermore, a new comprehensive convention dealing with terro
. This convention should provide a new definition of terrorism in view of the 
developed techniques that terrorist groups are using nowadays. However, since 
governments are not permanent, any conference that will call for the conclusion of a 
treaty on terrorism must assemble different nations, religions, and ethnic groups to ensur
a truly international effort. The representatives must have the opportunity to discuss a
negociate, in order to distinguish terrorism from legal acts of violence undertaken 
name of self-determination. The Islamic nations already took this step and defined 
terrorism when Muslim scholars discussed the matter during a conference in Makkah, 
Saudi Arabia in 2002. According to the Islamic conference, terrorism means “all a
aggression unjustly committed by individuals, groups or States against human beings 
                                        
2539 Id., at 46 (Part 2, Element 2 (A)). 
2540 Id., at 48 (Part 2, Element 2 (b)). 
2541 Id., at 52-4 (Part 1, Element 3). 
at 5 (Part 4, Element 4 (B)). 
2542 Id., at 51 (Part 1, Element 1 (H)). 
2543 Id., at 44 (Part 1, Element 1 (D)). 
2544 Id., 
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includi g the 
lly 
s 
tion 
ates to extradite suspected terrorists, the neutral authority to 
whom t uch 
ent 
.N. resolution gives peacekeeping forces the right to access and monitor 
situatio l 
keeping forces 
could not only monitor the violation of cease fires by use of traditional weapons, but 
reas under their 
surveillance. For example, peacekeeping forces c n prevent a State’s armed forces from 
dumping or releasing hazardous substances into the territories of other States. They can 
also rep  
lance 
ng attacks on their religion, life, intellect, property or honor ...[d]amagin
environment and public or private facilities and endangering natural resources” is equa
an act of terrorism.2545 Since the Islamic nation did its part, other nations should do their
to approach different definitions and then reach a common one. The new treaty on 
terrorism should include the common definition.  
The new treaty on terrorism should focus on establishing effective coopera
among nations in fighting terrorism. There should be a set of codified rules examining in 
detail the duty of member St
hey should be delivered in case of disagreement, and the procedures of s
extradition or delivery. 
 
9. Charge U.N. Peacekeeping Operations to Monitor Environmental Situations 
 
The United Nations has the power to form and use small, multinational, and 
lightly armed forces as a peacekeeping operation,2546 to monitor cease-fires between 
combatants. This same model may be used to assure the protection of the environm
and natural resources and to report any flagrant violation against them.  
The U
ns within cease-fire areas. They might also be able to monitor environmenta
destruction committed within areas under their surveillance,2547 especially since the 
environment has been used as a military target in recent wars. The peace
could also report any use of the environment as a weapon in the a
a
ort to the U.N. Security Council any substantial environmental violation.
However, the U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot practice such environmental surveil
without legal basis. 
                                                          
2545 Muslim Scholars Define Terrorism, The Voice of Muslims, Jan. 18, 2002, at 1. 
ons, supra note (2455) at 496. 2546 Pars
2547 Id. 
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Therefore, the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of 
peacekeeping operations should also charge them to fulfill certain missions including 
monito
 
 
. Security Council decides to deploy armed forces 
within e 
 
cue 
uting such a mission to armed forces under the authority of the U.N. 
Securit
B) Recommendations Addressed to National Societies 
 
e intermediate body between the international 
e 
ring the environmental situations within certain areas. Such operations could be 
called “Greenkeeping.”2548 The nature of the mission might affect the formation of the 
peacekeeping forces. For example, a certain number of environmentalists could be 
included in the peacekeeping forces to fulfill environmental missions; or military 
personnel of the peacekeeping forces could be required to have a certain level of 
environmental experience.  
The United Nations forces should go beyond supervising and reporting 
environmental degradation, which may do little for human well-being after violations are
committed. The United Nations may establish an “environmental task force” the goal of 
which is to quickly respond to environmental emergency situations that may result from
armed conflict.2549 When the U.N
certain country, it can deploy the environmental task force at the same time. Th
“Greenkeeping” would then be in a position to assure the environmental protection, to
prevent any military action that might cause severe environmental harm, to secure 
protected sites within the State, and to take immediate emergency environmental res
operations.  
Attrib
y Council gives the environmental mission of these forces the necessary respect, 
violators may be faced with stringent measures of the Security Council. 
 
The State is considered th
community and the people of a nation. The State may take part in the international 
instruments and apply them within its jurisdiction. Moreover, a State may convey th
nation’s point of views to the international community during the consideration of any 
international instrument. 
                                                          
2548 Id. 
2549 Verwey, supra note (2496) at 98. 
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1. Revise Military Manuals, Based upon the Experiences of Germany, USA, and 
Other Countries 
 
Including environmentally friendly rules of law in the national military manuals 
would contribute to the protection of the environment within the State’s jurisdiction and 
would be reflected in the behavior of its armed forces abroad. For instance, when the 
military manual prohibits any environmental destruction during peacetime and in times 
armed conflict, armed forces would comply ith this requirement whether their 
of 
 w
operati  
. Any 
 
e 
itary 
                                                          
ons took place on their homeland or abroad. Moreover, environmentally friendly
practices may present a model which other nations military manuals may adopt
armed forces should “deter, prevent, and punish unjustified environmental damage,”2550
and to assure the best environmental protection, military manuals should incorporate th
environmental rules of International Humanitarian Law,2551 Environmental Law Rules 
and Enviro-humanitarian Law.  
Governments may revise their existing military manuals by incorporating the 
existing rules.2552 Further, any military manual should at least include both Marten’s 
Clause and the IUCN Amman Clause. For example, military manuals of the United 
States, United Kingdom and Germany already include the Marten’s Clause,2553 and 
should be improved to include the IUCN Amman Clause regarding environmental 
protection.  
Improving military manuals can take place only by revising the existing mil
manuals according to the procedures set forth in the legal system of each country. 
Improving military manuals can be an easy task in a legal system such as Kuwait, where 
2550 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 484. 
2551 Bake supra note (725) at 382. 
2552 The Munich consultation on “Law Concerning the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed 
Conflict” eld in Dec. 1991, sponsored by the International Council of Environmental Law and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and its Resources, pt. I, para. 5.  
2553 See, Dep’t of the Army, the Law of Land Warfare, para. 6 (Field Manual No. 27-10, 
nd Air Operations 1-7 (b) (AFP No. 110-31, 1976). See also, United Kingdom 
 2, 5 (1958). See, Federal Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian Lan in 
ra. 129 (ZDv 15/2, 1992), cited in Kelly, supra note (1817) at 78 
r, 
 h
1956); U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, International Law - - The Conduct of Armed 
Conflict a
War Office, The Law of War and Land, Being Part III of the Manual of Military 
Law, paras. 2,
Armed Conflicts – Manual, pa
fn. 7. 
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the Minister of Defense possesses extraordinary powers.2554 However, in some other 
legal system
ilitary manual” is internationally adopted and 
imposed over national m
environm
il activities. For exam
arfare,” uses language 
identical to the Addition
of the m
 
s, only the legislators can revise military manuals. But there exist other 
mechanisms for including environmental law rules in military practices other than revised 
military manuals. For example, in the United States, “in a February 1996 memo to senior 
State Department, the former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, laid out the policy 
of the Clinton Administration on environmental security, placing the environment near 
the top of U.S. national security interests,”2555which gave the environment a high 
priority.  
On the other hand, if a “model m
ilitary forces of all countries, it would better advance 
ental protection. The ICRC’s efforts are focusing on encouraging States to 
integrate environmental protection into military manuals. Until this model is enacted, 
military forces should be subject to the existing manuals and the environmental laws and 
regulations that are applicable to civ ple, the U.S. armed forces are 
subject to vast array of international, foreign, federal and State laws and regulations, 
which obliged them to go “green.”2556 The U.S. armed forces are providing a great 
example that should be followed by other States’ armed forces. Furthermore, despite the 
fact that the United States has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions, the Army’s field manual, “The Law of Land W
al Protocol I in some of its provisions. For example, the language 
anual’s definitions of the “permissible objects of attack” is identical to the 
language of Article 52 (2) of the Additional Protocol I. The definition is limited to 
“objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”2557   
 
 
                                                          
2554 Ghanoon Ragom 32 Lisanat 1967 Fy Sha’an Aljaysh [Law No. 32/1967 related to the Military] Jul. 12, 
1967, art. 24. 
2555 Thomas A. Lippman, On Amazon, Christopher Stands up for Environment, Wash. Post., Mar. 5, 
1996, at A9. 
2556 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 490. 
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 2. Modernize Military Technology to Avoid Environmental Destruction 
 
In the present time, most armed forces focus on militarizing their personnel with
the most destructive and harmful weapons and techniques. Such techniques do not always 
achieve victory in battlefield. For instance, despite the Iraqi military capacity, it did not
achieve any victory against the allies in the Gulf War II. Moreover, such techn
also be particularly rm
 
 
iques can 
ha ful to the environment. My strong view is that militaries should 
focus o
 
s 
or xample, in the United States, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a Municipal Technology Assessment 
facilitie 2559
 
d be 
 
n technologies, arms and techniques that avoid environmental destruction. 
However, until an international legal rule adopts this view, environmental protection will 
be less effective than it could be. 
In the civilian context, governments have made use of “technology assessment,”
that is, “the systematic study of the effects on society that may occur when technology i
introduced, extended, or modified with special emphasis on the impacts that are 
unintended, indirect and delayed.”2558 F  e
Program that provides alternative technology for municipal wastewater treatment 
s.  Technology assessment can also be used in the military context by 
ministries of defense all over the world, in order to provide alternative technologies for 
the weapons of mass destruction, or to mitigate the severe impacts of such weapons on 
human population and the global ecosystems. 
Some commentators criticize the idea of banning a category of weapons based on
their environmental effects because according to them, such a ban would be difficult to 
define and expensive to implement.2560 However, rehabilitating the environment coul
more difficult or even impossible, and more expensive. Moreover, although the 
preliminary phases might be difficult and expensive, once these weapons are destroyed,
                                                                                                                                                                             
2557 Dycus, supra note (4) at 141-42. 
2558 Timothy B. Atkeson, Technology Assessment: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 4 Envt’l L. Rep. 
50140, 50140 (1947). 
2559 Office of Wastewater Management, available at <http://www.epa.gov/owm/muni.htm> (last visit Feb. 
13, 2002); see also, Carol R. Goforth & Ronald R. Goforth, Technology Due Diligence – The Need for and 
onnection with Investment in High – Tech Companies, 17 
rs Computer & Tech. L. J. 165, 194 (2001).  
onds, supra note (969) at 214. 
Benefits of Technology Assessment in C
Rutge
2560 Sim
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States would avoid any future environmental harm or destruction without those additiona
costs.   
l 
l 
61 
ces, is not 
only to  
 
n offensive ones, in order to protect the 
environ
 not 
y 
ng countries, to allow the public and NGO’s to know the 
nvironmental effects of every military operation. The European Community signed the 
arhus Convention in 1998, adopting standards of public access to information which 
ecame part of the national legal system of every member State. Article 1 of Åarhus 
ates that, “In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present 
nd future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-
being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation 
The armed forces are capable of playing a major part in environmental protection. 
Existing military equipment and facilities may be used, not only to carry out military 
operations, but also to serve in securing the environment. For example, military radar, 
space bases, and intelligence gathering have great value as tools to prevent environmenta
destruction, to identify existing threats, and to identify persons responsible from them.25
Moreover, military equipment and logistical support may be used to clean up 
contaminated sites.2562 
With modern military technology, the duty of any State’s armed for
 damage the enemy’s forces, but also to protect its own citizens. For instance, the
“Patriot,” an anti-missile, was used during the Gulf War II to destroy Iraqi missiles 
directed against the American installations in the region. Armed forces could focus on
improving their defensive techniques rather tha
ment as well. Doing so would tend to “green” the armed forces and prepare them 
to deter any environmental destruction.2563 
 
3. Provide the Right of Access to Information and Environmental Justice 
 
Military operations in peacetime and times of armed conflict often have 
environmental consequences. Information about such environmental damage should
be kept from the public. A system of sharing information should be established in ever
nation, particularly developi
e
Å
b
st
a
                                                          
2561 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 495. 
2562 Id. 
2563 Id. 
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in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with th
provisions of this convention.” Other States should learn from the European experience 
e 
in this field and adopt similar systems. 
ght 
ction 
t 
 
hould 
rce the 
 
elfare, or the environment in order to 
compen d 
                                                          
In the United States, for example, the Emergency Planning and Community Ri
to Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986 is concerned with gathering information and making 
them available in a comprehensible form to the public.2564 The Environmental Prote
Agency (EPA) is charged with maintaining a publicly accessible computer database and 
putting out information to the public.2565 Moreover, State and local organizations mus
make information reported under EPCRA available to the public. The information
reported under EPCRA is intended to allow the public “to identify environmental 
concerns [and/or to outline] potential environmental justice concerns.”2566 
The definition of the “public” that has the right of access to information s
include specialized international organizations and NGOs. Specialized international 
organizations and NGOs have the environmental experience that would reinfo
public’s ability to face environmental threats. 
Environmental damage usually has a specific character that distinguishes it from
other kinds of damage. Therefore, the public should have means of access to 
environmental justice, and any person who is or was affected by the environmental 
consequences of military operations should be able to sue the armed forces for the 
damage that their operations caused to his health, w
sate him and/or clean up the contaminated site. Public access to information an
environmental justice will have a positive effect on the environment by causing the 
armed forces to think carefully before engaging in any activity that may harm human 
health or the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
2564 Citizen for a Better Environment v. The Steel Company., 90 F. 3d. 1237, 1239 (1996), available at 65 
USL W 2069, 42 ERC 2057, 26 Envt’l L. Rep. 21, 408 [hereinafter Citizen for Better Environment v. 
The Steel Company]. 
2565 Id., at 1239. 
2566 Id. 
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 es 
ay result 
ould be very useful to the environment if a civil 
authority held this task, because civil authorities are more likely to consider the 
ironmental protection. The 
proposed civil service can be composed of environmental experts to examine 
environ
 
 
he 
 
onmental 
ental brigade should be 
highly trained in the environmental field, should not be subordinated to any military 
 
4. Modify the Status of the Civil Ministries of the Environment and Create a New 
Service within these Ministries to Deal with Environmental Emergency Respons
and Cleanup 
 
Civil authorities are often unable legally to interfere with military operations, 
even if such operations may cause severe environmental harm. The military often is the 
only institution in a position to act.2567 However, traditional military forces are not 
capable of deterring, punishing and rehabilitating environmental damage that m
from their operations. Two possible avenues could be used to fill this gap. First, civil 
services could be established within the ministries of environment to address the 
environmental damage caused by military activities whether in peacetime or in times of 
armed conflicts.  Practically, it w
environment as a high priority and will provide for greater env
mental emergencies arising from armed conflict. The team should have 
extraordinary powers in times of environmental emergencies, so that its members have
unlimited access to sites and information, and have authority to direct the military to take
necessary measures to reduce and eliminate any environmental threat. To assure that t
team will be granted this kind of power, the highest authority in the country should form
this team and invest it with the forecited powers.   
Until this proposal is being effective, a second scenario should be considered, 
which is “greening” armed forces.2568 Governments could create special envir
brigades within the ministries of defense to examine environmental harm of peacetime 
and times of armed conflicts. The members of the environm
authority, and should be empowered to enforce its recommendations. This 
recommendation will assure the priority of environmental concerns over military 
concerns.  
                                                          
2567 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 492. 
2568 Id., at 492-93. 
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In the United States, at the State level, national guard forces have sometimes bee
used in emergency response to national disasters. The national guard serves as “an on
force for state governors in case of civil disorders and [natural] disasters.”2569 In the 
United States, the former President Clinton expanded the activities of the national guard 
forces in areas such as “antiterrorism, the war on drugs, environmental emergencies, rur
health initiatives, and other domestic contingencies.”2570 The national guard forces also
participate in community service projects.2571 These forces could also be used during 
armed conflicts to maintain and secure the environment, since environmental 
emergencies during arme
n 
-call 
al 
 
d conflict are often much more severe than those which arise 
during 
before committing 
serious
creasing public awareness must occur before, during, and after armed 
conflicts. Each of these phase presents its own challenges. 
                                                          
peacetime. India took a significant step in this area, by forming a green brigade 
within its armed forces vested with securing and protecting the environment in peacetime 
and in times of armed conflict. 
 
5. Increase the Environmental Awareness Among People 
 
Public awareness of environmental concerns is crucial to ensuring adequate 
environmental protection. When environmental awareness reaches a certain level, the 
military is much more likely to take such concerns into consideration 
 environmental crimes. Moreover, even if a serious environmental crime took 
place, an aware citizenry is more to exert pressure on the army to avoid such crimes in 
the future and to clean up their site. Increasing public awareness was identified as an 
important step by the Rio Declaration, which provides that “States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available.”2572 In
ich 
s Dept. of Defense: Who’s in Charge of the National Guard? 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 453, 
ity Report,” The Officer 42 (Oct. 1992) cited in Kathleen H. 
and Soldiers’ Civil Relief 
 J. 517, 517 fn. 2 (1993). 
2571 National Guard: State Emergency Missions, FV 1990, USA Today, Sept. 14-16, 1990, at A3. 
2572 Rio Declaration, supra note (683) Principle 10. 
2569 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Last American Warrior Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the 
U.S. Armed Forces, 18 Fletcher F. World’s Aff. 65, 76 (1994); see also, Jeff Bovarnick, Perp
v. United State
469 (1991).   
2570 See, Clinton, “ROA National Secur
Switzer, Benefits for reserve and National Guard Members Under the Soldiers’ 
Act of 1940, 110 The Banking L.
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First, before armed conflict, environmental awareness may be built by teaching 
environmental values in schools, and particularly in the early school years; even, for 
exampl  the 
g 
ld 
 in or 
 
ed 
llow color of food packages.2576 Moreover, armed 
forces may provide and build camps for refu  from sheltering into 
 
commanders should comply with the laws of war, particularly the IHL rules, and take 
those ru
 
02 in 
wareness and exposure” to the 
opulation.2578 
 
              
e, by encouraging kids to clean their environment by not disposing of trash on
ground, and by recycling. NGO’s should play important role in this task,2573 by providin
experts in the environmental field to teach, or to instruct teachers. Governments shou
inform their armed forces about protected areas and World Heritage sites located
near local and foreign military operations.2574 The military also should practice recycling
programs and undertake useful training exercises to avoid causing unnecessary 
environmental harm.2575 
Second, during armed conflict, armed forces should be made aware of protected 
areas, which should not be targeted during armed conflict. The public should be inform
about military sites, mine fields, and other environmental hazards. For example, in 2001, 
the American army taught the Afghan civilians how to distinguish between the yellow 
color of cluster bombs and the ye
gees and prohibit them
or escaping through protected areas. And to reduce the environmental threat, military
les seriously in planning and executing their operations.2577   
Finally, after the end of the combat a well trained task force should know the
locations of fragile environmental areas. Some of them may demine mine fields, others 
may water the plants and feed the animals. Armed forces could teach the population how 
to recognize landmines and avoid their threat, as the United States did in January 20
Afghanistan, by providing for “mines training a
p
                                            
2573 Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel, Preventing War and Its Health Consequences: Role of Pub
Professionals, in War And Public Health 388, 390 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Si
eds., 2000). 
2574 Verwey, supra note (2496) at 98. 
lic Health 
del 
2575 Parsons, supra note (2455) at 490. 
2576 U.S. Warplanes Again Hammer Taliban Positions, supra note (154). 
2577 Dycus, supra note (4) at 145. 
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6. Increase Possibility of Extradition of Criminals in Environmental Cases 
 
National law enforcement should cooperate with other States to facilitate the 
extradition of criminals indicted for committing acts of environmental destruction. Not
every environmental cr
 
iminal should be subject to extradition, but those whose acts 
violate 
ve 
al 
is 
rovides 
ions 
l responsibility excludes NGOs from any 
major role, and thus reduces the effectiveness of that system. The NGOs should be 
to the International Criminal Court. For example, the ICRC should have the right to bring 
flagran
                                                                                                                                                                            
the international standards by causing widespread, long lasting or severe 
environmental damage should be. If the State where the environmental crime can pro
that such a level of environmental harm has occurred, then any State where the crimin
is found should extradite him to be presented to justice.  
National laws should be enacted in every State to assure the applicability of th
principle.2579 If such measures were adopted, they would make the international legal 
system of extradition much more effective. The national and international systems could 
work together, and in case of conflict, priority should be given to the system that p
more environmental protection. 
 
C- Recommendations Addressed to Non-Governmental Organizat
 
The existing system of internationa
granted the right to bring violations to the attention of the ICJ, the ad hoc Courts or even 
t violations of the IHL rules to the attention of the above-mentioned bodies. 
Further recommendations to the NGOs follow. 
 
1. Introduce Environmental Protection as a Goal of the ICRC  
 
The ICRC’s primary mission has been a humanitarian one, and it has achieved 
considerable success in protecting humanitarian rights. However, protecting the 
environment is very much a secondary concern in the mission of the ICRC. The draft 
 
2578 DoD, News Briefing, General Tommy Franks, Jan. 18, 2002, available at 
http:www.centcom.mil/news/press_briefings/Franks_18jan.htm> (last visit Jan. 31, 2002). <
2579 Simonds, supra note (969) at 216. 
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protocol submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmati
Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDD
made no refer
on and 
H) 
ence to environmental protection. Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional 
Protoco
RC 
environmental 
one. Cooperation could be fostered between the ICRC and the IUCN. For example, IUCN 
could create an Emergency Response Team to work with the ICRC in emergency 
situations and cooperate with the ICRC delegates in working on the protection of human 
health and lives. The Emergency Response Team can monitor violations of 
environmental law rules, inspect and gather information about environmental 
degradation, persuade parties to the conflict to cease environmental destruction, and 
pursue cleanup and rehabilitation efforts.  
2. NGOs Should Maintain Solid Relations With Internal Authorities in Each Nation 
 during times of armed conflict, NGO’s should arrange for 
periodic visits to every nation in peacetime, contribute to increasing environmental 
awareness of the national level, and establish a national group of representatives in each 
State to defend their interests. Thus, when a country suffers from a national tragedy, 
NGO’s would be in a position to relieve humanitarian and environmental threats without 
being rejected by civilian populations. NGO’s often have material and financial resources 
to help in improving environmental conditions, but cannot act because of internal 
, authorities can enact 
l I, which are the environmental landmarks of the IHL, were introduced at the 
Conference itself.2580  
Environmental concerns could be made a higher ICRC priority. Since the IC
delegates have the right of access to battlefields, they could monitor environmental 
situations, gather information, and report them to the concerned authority. The ICRC 
could create an internal team with environmental capabilities, since environmental 
protection is directly tied to its humanitarian goals. For example, providing drinking 
water for a refugee camp involves both a humanitarian mission and an 
 
 
To assure their welcom
political or military problems. However, if their presence was not limited to emergency 
situations, they might be able to act more effectively. Similarly
                                                          
 
2580 Bouvier, Protection of the Natural Environment, supra note (81) at 574. 
 490
laws and regulations but may not ha nforce them. Therefore, 
cooperation between NGO’s and internal authorities could ameliorate environmental 
hazards
ntly, 
 
expand their role to cover relief efforts during armed conflicts. 
 
ve the materials to e
.2581   
Among NGO’s, there can be one recognized Red Cross or Red Crescent Society 
per nation, to focus on relief efforts during natural disasters in peacetime.2582 Curre
there exist 170 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world.2583 These 
societies can play a significant role in safeguarding the social and economic development 
in each nation, and thus facilitate sound environmental practices. Local governments 
should facilitate their mission and provide them with necessary materials. Moreover, to 
provide greater environmental protection, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies
should 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2581 Dian
A Propos
). 
ms of 
Armed Conflict? 9 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 287, 288 (1997). 
ne M. Kueck, Comment, Using International Political Agreements to Protect Endangered Species: 
al Model, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 345, 346 (1995). 
2582 Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster 
Relief Actions in International Law and Organization 89 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1985
2583 Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, The International Committee of the Red Cross-How Does it Protect Victi
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Conclusion 
 
International and internal armed conflicts have taken place all over the world. 
Modern history is full of examples of environmental damage caused by warfare, much of 
which has caused transboundary pollution that presents a serious threat to civilian 
populat al 
e 
t call 
nd 
f 
 
onmental 
ts to achieve sustainable development. The Rio 
Declara
 
ent 
ng with 
ions, the natural environment, and plant and animal species. Current internation
environmental dispute mechanisms are inadequate to protect the rights of civilians or th
environment. This is so despite the fact that most international law instruments tha
for peaceful settlements of disputes urge nations to settle their differences peacefully a
to maintain peace and security in their relations, such as the United Nations Charter o
1945.  
In 1992, the Rio Declaration was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the 
U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. Principle 26 of Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development provides that “States shall resolve all their envir
disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.” The peaceful settlement of disputes had been emphasized by the Rio 
Declaration because it recognized that recourse to armed conflict as a method for settling 
differences will undermine effor
tion combines the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes with other 
environmental values, by recognizing that nations should not only seek peaceful 
settlements of their differences, but should also protect nature and natural resources as
well.  
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration provides that “[p]eace, development and 
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.” This principle raises 
concerns about peace, development and environmental protection, which cannot be 
separated and all of which are threatened by armed conflict. Thus, in order to provide a 
healthy and safe environment for human populations there should be peace, developm
and environmental protection.  
The Rio Declaration also directly addresses the problem of environmental damage 
caused by armed conflict. Principle 23 limits the power of military forces in deali
the environment in an occupied territory, by providing that “[t]he environment and 
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natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be 
protected.” This principle should be strongly applied to the West Bank and Gaza Str
during the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Israeli and Palestinian armed forces 
ip 
should ral 
s armed 
refore 
respect ed 
Principle 
 
tal 
ration 
ld not be effective without practical measures. Therefore, an action plan, 
Agenda  
ess, the 
able 
f the 
l-
equipped armed forces are capable of attacking other countries and causing vast 
be subject to Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration and protect the nature and natu
resources in West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration goes beyond prohibiting any State’
forces from destroying the environment of another State, by requiring that States shall 
participate in developing the environment during armed conflicts. It provides that 
“[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall the
 international law providing protection for the environment in times of arm
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” This principle declares 
that all armed conflicts are destructive of sustainable development. In light of 
24, it is evident that States must respect international law instruments that deal with 
environmental protection in times of armed conflict, and must cooperate in the 
progressive development of further international law to protect the environment. This 
principle provides great environmental protection in times of armed conflicts, but it says
nothing about the mechanism and the rules that should be applied to avoid environmen
damage during armed conflict. 
Thus, the States assembled in Rio De Janeiro in 1992 believed that the decla
alone wou
 21, was adopted to implement sustainable development. It addresses several
objectives and outlines certain steps for governments, international organizations, and 
non-State actors to adopt in order to promote sustainable development. Neverthel
subject of environmental impacts of armed conflict was totally ignored by Agenda 21. 
Since armed conflict cannot only harm the environment, but also can prevent sustain
development from taking place, an action plan is needed. Even with the adoption o
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 in 1992, armed conflicts still occur whether between 
States, or within a State. Moreover, throughout the history of armed conflicts, the larger 
the conflict, the greater the environmental threat becomes. Nations with huge and wel
environmental damage. Therefore, nations, particularly developed countries, should be 
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urged to reduce their military capacity and budgets to the minimum level possible to 
maintain their national security and should focus on how to implement sustainable 
development in order to live in peaceful societies and to maintain the international ord
Principles 23, 24, and 25 of the Rio Declaration could be cons
er.  
idered the legal 
basis for environmental protection in times of armed conflict even though they say 
nothing about the mechanisms to do so. Agenda 21 is a major action plan for 
implem nting sustainable development, but it does not mention warfare environmental 
damage that will necessarily impact on sustainable development. Thus, there is an urgent 
need for an environmental action plan to implement Principles 23, 24 and 25  
his thesis has addressed the environmental impact of armed conflict and 
identified specific steps for the international community as well as national governments 
to take in furtherance of environmental protection and, therefore, sustainable 
development. These steps are crucial in order to promote more effective environmental 
protection. Even if armed conflict is not considered at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa,2584 marking the ten-year 
anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), at some point in time nations must consider practical means to protect the 
environment in times of armed conflict. The recommendations in this thesis should be 
adopted and more concern should be given to the environmental impacts of armed 
conflicts. 
 sum, although I have completed the writing of my thesis, work should be 
accelerated to implement and adopt some, if not all, of the recommendations, in order to 
better advance protection of the global ecosystem and to achieve the sustainable 
development for the present and future generations. My thesis addresses not only civilian 
populations, but also military personnel and decision-makers as well, since its main 
objective is to persuade military personnel around the world to secure and protect 
environmental values and to consider the environment as a high priority whether in their 
peacetime operations or in the battlefields. My thesis also speaks for the interests of the 
natural world, of which human society must learn to be a better guardian. We can no 
                                                          
e
T
In
2584 Committee Bulletin Board, Environmental Law Committee Announces World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Vol. 31 No. 1 International Law News 11, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Committee 
Bulletin Board].  
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longer sacrifice nature during tim ature can not sustain our social 
and economic development if neglected. If m  recommendation and analysis in some 
thers the adoption of new measures to safeguard the environment in times of 
 
es of armed conflict, as n
y
way fur
armed conflict, then I shall be grateful for undertaking this research. 
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